La globalización como fenómeno económico y político viene avanzando arrolladoramente en el mundo, especialmente a partir de la última década del siglo XX. Este fenómeno fue tomando cuerpo después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, cuando las transnacionales se fueron afianzando en el control de la economía de los países más pobres, cerrándoles la posibilidad de salir adelante en sus empresas por sus propios medios. Los países andinos son un ejemplo de esta realidad y por eso se reunieron en Cartagena de Indias el 26 de mayo de 1969 para crear una asociación que permitiera hacer frente a las transnacionales y protegiera a sus propias empresas, dándoles la oportunidad de extender sus mercados a los territorios de los países involucrados, en primera instancia, y luego al exterior. El nombre mismo de la asociación «Pacto Andino» muestra la intención inicial, que apareció como una apuesta en donde los incentivos eran más políticos que económicos, más públicos que privados, es decir era más de gobiernos que de las bases involucradas. Han pasado treinta y un años de la creación del Pacto Andino y los problemas fueron apareciendo a cada paso haciendo que un socio fundador (Chile) se retirara en 1976 y otro (Venezuela) se incorporara en 1973. El Perú también mantuvo una posición de retirada que duró cinco años, hasta que en 1997 se reincorporó plenamente. Al cerrar la década de los noventa, los intentos de integración se han extendido a otros aspectos de la sociedad y el mismo Pacto ha terminado siendo la «Comunidad Andina de Naciones» que en cierta medida busca imitar a la Comunidad de las Comunidades Europeas. El interés económico y comercial, basado en la sustitución de importaciones, se ha ampliado a la libre competencia de mercados; también se han incorporado aspectos de integración cultural y judicial, así como de apoyo financiero a través del Fondo Andino de Reserva para casos de emergencia económica de sus miembros. Los procesos de integración no son sencillos, aun cuando visto de lejos parecería que, dada la mayor integración lingüística, se podría trabajar en una integración cultural y económica con mucha mayor facilidad que en el caso de Europa, donde las barreras idiomáticas son más difíciles de resolver. ¿Qué es lo que impide avanzar más eficientemente en la integración de la Comunidad Andina? ¿Cómo se preparan sus miembros para el siglo XXI? ¿Qué dificulta la integración total? Éstas y otras preguntas se discutirán en este artículo, buscando llegar a conclusiones que nos permitan llegar a un entendimiento del proceso y sus proyecciones para los próximos años. Globalization as an economic and political phenomenon is rapidly extending in the World specially during the last decade of the 201h Century. This process started to be visible after the World War II, when transnational corporations became more active to control the economies of the poorest countries, blocking the way to the national economies to do their own. The Andean countries are an example of this reality and that is why they gathered at Cartagena de Indias on May 26th, 1969, to found an association powerful enough to confront the transnationals and protect their own enterprises giving them the chance to extend their market areas. The name «Andean Pact» reflects the initial objective that was formulated as a bet where the incentives were more political than economic, more public than private, that is, more at the government level than to the social bases. After 31 years of the Andean Pact, the problems have not been a few. Chile, one of the founding associates decided to step out in 1976 while Venezuela got in as a full member in 1973. Perú also was at the edge for five years until1997 when he decided to assume full responsibilities. At the closing of the 1990's the integration plans extended to other issues and the pact moved to be the Andean Community of Nations resembling in some way the European Community of Nations. The economic and commercial interest based on the import-substitution model was relaxed to accept the free market policies. Other issues incorporated were the cultural and judicial integration, and the establishment of the Andean Reserve Fund to help member States in their economic emergencies. The integration processes are not easy even though when looked from outside it would appear the contrary. What are the obstacles to step up the integration of the Andean Community? How are their member States getting ready for the next coming years? What blocks total integration? These and other questions are discussed in this paper, hoping to arrive at reasonable conclusions.
El desarrollo entendido tanto en su sentido social como económico, representa un desafío articulador para los pueblos latinoamericanos, en un contexto de globalización neoliberal hostil a sus intereses. Las ciudades Latinoamericanas que se pensaban como lugares donde se conjugaban el progreso y la modernidad están atravesando por procesos de diferenciación en su estructura espacial y social como resultado de la combinación de complejos factores relacionados con el avance del capitalismo global y con patrones culturales, históricos y sociales. Este trabajo tiene por objetivo identificar y analizar los modelos de desarrollo dominantes y su relación con los cambios territoriales que caracterizan a las ciudades intermedias en el norte Argentino. Se toma como ejemplo los aglomerados Gran San Miguel de Tucumán y Gran San Salvador de Jujuy durante el periodo 1990–2015. La estrategia metodológica combina actividades y técnicas cualicuantitativas y utiliza como fuentes de información los Censos Nacionales de Población, Hogares y Viviendas (1991, 2001, 2010), imágenes satelitales Landsat-TM para los mismos años y material bibliográfico. Los resultados se centran en los procesos de conformación y expansión urbana vinculada a los cambios en relación al concepto de desarrollo; y en las lógicas residenciales que primaron en la producción de las ciudades, como manifestación de las políticas dominantes cristalizadas en el territorio de los aglomerados estudiados. Aún en un contexto de pobreza particularmente desfavorable, los esfuerzos por sostener un modelo de ciudad competitivo se mantienen, en detrimento –o a expensas– de la vulnerabilidad creciente de la mayor parte de la población. ; O desenvolvimento entendido tanto em seu sentido social como econômico, representa um desafio articulador para os povos latino-americanos, em um contexto de globalização neoliberal hostil a seus interesses. As cidades latino-americanas que se enxergavam como lugares onde se conjugava o progresso e a modernidade estão atravessando processos de diferenciação em sua estrutura espacial e social como resultado da combinação de complexos fatores relacionados com o avanço do capitalismo global e com padrões culturais, históricos e sociais. Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar e analisar os modelos de desenvolvimento dominantes e sua relação com os câmbios territoriais que caracterizam as cidades intermediárias no norte Argentino. Se toma como exemplo os aglomerados Grande San Miguel de Tucumán e Grande San Salvador de Jujuy durante o período 1990–2015. A estratégia metodológica combina atividades e técnicas qualitativas e quantitativas e utiliza como fontes de informação os Censos Nacionales de Población, Hogares y Viviendas (1991, 2001, 2010), imagens de satélite Landsat-TM para os mesmos anos e material bibliográfico. Os resultados se centram nos processos de conformação e expansão urbana vinculada aos câmbios em relação ao conceito de desenvolvimento; e nas lógicas residenciais que dominaran na produção das cidades, como manifestação das políticas dominantes cristalizadas no território dos aglomerados estudados. Ainda em contexto de pobreza particularmente desfavorável, os esforços para sustentar um modelo de cidade competitivo se mantem, em detrimento ou as custas da vulnerabilidade crescente da maior parte da população. ; In the context of aggressive neoliberal globalization, development –in a social as well as in an economic sense – represents a challenge for Latin-American countries. Latin-American cities, which were seen as places where progress and modernization was combined went through processes of social and spatial re-organization. This is the result of a variety of factors like the advancement of globalized capitalism as well as of social, cultural and historical changes. This paper aims to identify and analyze the dominant development models and their relations to territorial changes that are characteristic to the intermediate cities in the Northwest of Argentina. As case studies, we present the examples of Gran San Miguel de Tucumán and Gran San Salvador de Jujuy from 1990 to 2015. In doing so, we combine quali-quantitative methods of analysis, like statistics of the official census data (1991, 2001 and 2010), remote sensing (Landsat-TM) and bibliographic material. The analysis shows the relation between the process of urban expansion and the dominant models of development. Besides, the paper focuses on the residential logics behind the production of these cities as a manifestation of dominant politics materialized in the agglomeration under study. In an adverse context of poverty, the competitive model of city even continues being dominant in detriment – or at the expense – of the vulnerability of the majority of the population ; Fil: Malizia, Matilde. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Tucumán. Instituto Superior de Estudios Sociales. Universidad Nacional de Tucumán. Instituto Superior de Estudios Sociales; Argentina ; Fil: Boldrini, Paula. Universidad Nacional de Tucumán; Argentina ; Fil: Ruiz Peyré, Fernando. Universidad de Innsbruck ; Austria
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Dirk Messner on the dynamics of global change and the significance of international science and technology cooperation in the post-Western world
This is the fifth in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich
In recent years, the analysis of new emerging powers and shifting global order has become central to the study of international relations. While International Relations, aiming to evolve into a truly global discipline, is only just about to start opening up towards Non-Western perspectives, global power shifts have already led to a restructuring of global governance architecture in large fields of political reality and practice. Dirk Messner illustrates how far global power shifts have to lead to new patterns of international cooperation using international science and technology cooperation as a case in point. He argues that investment in joint knowledge creation and knowledge exchange is vital for managing the earth system. Messner also points to the multitude of tasks related to socio-technical systems which the political sphere is currently facing, particularly with regard to the challenge of managing the climate system.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is the most important challenge facing global politics that should be the central debate in the discipline of International Relations?
The biggest challenge of the next decades which we have to come to terms with is governing the big global commons. When I say global commons I do have in mind the atmosphere, the climate system, and other parts of the earth system, but also international financial markets and global infrastructures, such as the Internet – stability of these and other global commons is a public good much required. We need to stabilize the global commons and then manage them in a cooperative manner.
Three dynamics of global change make it specifically challenging to manage these global commons. The first wave of global change is the globalization wave; the economic globalization, cross-border dynamics, global value chains. It becomes evident that in many areas and especially when it comes to the global commons, regulation exceeds the capacity of individual nation states. The international community is required to institutionalize multilateralism and efficient global governance mechanisms in order to properly address issues arising from global dynamics. The second big global change is the shift from a Western to a post-Western world order. Global power shifts remaking the international system impede governing global commons. The third wave of global change is related to climate change, which adds a new dimension of global dynamics; human beings now have to learn how to steer, to stabilize, and how to govern the earth system as such. We are not only a species living on this planet, depending from resources and ecosystems of the earth systems. With the acceleration of economic globalization during the 1990s and the emergence of new, non-Western economic drivers of change, like China, humankind now significantly impacts the physical structures of the earth system. This trend is new. For the first 4,6 billion years of the existence of the earth system it was driven by the laws of physics, the dynamics of biology and bio-chemical processes. Homo sapiens appeared 220.000 years ago, and the impact of our species on the earth system has been marginal until the industrial revolution started 250 years ago. During the last decades human mankind became a major driver of change at a planetary scale.
How did you arrive in your current thinking about these issues?
I have always been interested in international relations, international policy dimensions, and the global economy. I started at the Free University of Berlin at the beginning of the 80's towards the mid-80's, studying Political Science and Economics. One among those professors who have been particularly important to me is Elmar Altvater. He was the supervisor of my diploma as well as of my Ph.D., and he sent me abroad. This resulted being a pivotal experience to me. I studied the last year of my first degree in Seoul, in South Korea. It was the period, the 80's, when the four Asian Tiger states emerged following Japan's example: South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapur. I had the chance to visit these countries, study there and learn a lot about Asia. I was fascinated by the dynamics of emerging economies and what this implied for the international arena. Somewhat later, the Latin American continent became the center of my interest. I did research in Nicaragua, Uruguay, Chile and some other Latin American countries, trying to understand liberalization-movements, how weaker actors come under pressure in Western-dominated global settings, but also how some countries managed it to become dynamic parts of the global economy (like the "Asian tigers" or Chile) and why others failed. I learnt that it is crucial to understand dynamics of global change in order to being able to build solid and inclusive economic structures and legitimate political systems at national levels. There has always been a political impulse that pulled me into certain fields I decided to work in.
What is your advice for students who would like to get into the field of global change research or international cooperation?
My first advice is: visit and work in different countries and different cultural and political settings. It is one thing to learn from scholars or books, but having studied and having lived in different contexts and countries is absolutely a key experience. This is the way to understand global dynamics, to get a feeling for differences and similarities. My second advice stems from my experience and conviction that we need much more interdisciplinary research than we currently have. We talk a lot about interdisciplinarity, however, we do not have career paths that systematically build interdisciplinary teams.
Looking particularly at global environmental changes and the future of the earth system, at the end of the day, social scientists and natural scientists need to learn how to work together and to understand each other. The future of the oceans, for example, is not a question that can be understood by ocean biologists only. They are the people studying how these elements of the earth system are actually working, the dynamics and drivers - focusing on physical, chemical, and biochemical processes. But when we look at the oceans towards 2100 from the perspective of global change, the most important drivers are now us human beings, our economies, our consumption patterns, our greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts on the oceans. And this implies that to understand dynamics of global change, we need to analyze the interactions, interdependences and feedback loops between three systems: the ecological system(s); social systems (our economies and societies) driven by humans; the technical systems and infrastructures. Therefore natural scientists, social scientists, and engineers need to interact very closely. In the German Advisory Council on Global Change we call this approach: Transformation Research. Currently, we do not possess the appropriate university structures to adequately address this sort of problems. This is an immense institutional challenge. If I were a young scholar I would move into this direction, crossing disciplinary boundaries as much as possible.
What is the role of science and technologies in the dynamics of global change?
There are multiple important dimensions, but I would like to focus on some of them by moving through the aforementioned waves of global change. Technology is driving economic globalization, the first wave of global change. So we need to understand the dynamics of new technologies, especially the impact of ICTs, in order to understand the dynamics of economic globalization. The World Wide Web and social communication media are restructuring industrialization processes and global value chains. ICT infrastructure is also displaying a big potential for less developed regions. In Africa, for example, we saw many African countries jumping from the old telephone technologies to smartphones within less than a decade, because the old, maintenance and capital intensive communications infrastructure was no longer needed. Many African people now have access to smartphones, thus to communication- and information networks, and begin to reshape prize constellations and the global economy. Because of its restructuring effects, the impact of ICTs is relevant in all areas of the global economy. The global trend towards urbanization is similarly related to ICTs. Currently, we approach the global economy via data on national economies. But this might be about to change, as global mega-cities develop into global knowledge and financial hubs, building their own networks. In 2040, 80 percent of the global production, global GDP, global consumption, global exchange might be concentrated in 70 to 80 global cities or city regions.
Technology is also linked to the second wave of global change – the tectonic global power shift – in the way that investment in technology and knowledge in emerging economies are growing rapidly. We are not only facing economic and political power shifts, but also a remaking of the global science and research system itself. From my perspective, international cooperation in the field of science and technology research between "old powers" and "new powers", between Western countries and non-Western countries is extremely important for two reasons: First, we need to pool know-how in order to solve core global challenges and to develop patterns for managing the global commons. Interaction and cooperation in the field of science and technology is especially important for the creation of knowledge that is "better" in any way. For instance, in the field of adaptation policies to the impacts of climate change, most of the knowledge on how societies and local communities actually work or respond under these conditions exists in non-Western societies. The generation of knowledge is context dependent. We need to interact with colleagues from the respective countries for mutual learning and common knowledge improvement. My second argument is that, as an effect of the global power shift, traditional development cooperation is losing legitimacy. Many of these societies, from China to Peru, from Kenya to Vietnam, are no longer interested in our usual business, in our "aid-packages", our money, our experts or our concepts. What they are more interested in is true and reciprocal knowledge exchange and joint knowledge creation. Therefore, investments in respective forms and institutions of knowledge exchange and creation will be a central pillar of/for future oriented development cooperation or international cooperation and beneficial for all partners involved. Joint knowledge creation is a precondition for joint action and legitimate global governance initiatives.
The role of technologies with regard to the implications of climate change is crucial and multifaceted. In the German Advisory Council on Global Change we put forth suggestions concerning the transformation towards a low-carbon global economy. We are relatively optimistic in a technological sense. This statement is partly based on the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) research, which has been driven by Nebojsa Nakicenovic, one of our colleagues, who is working on energy modeling. The perspective there is that we know which kind of technologies we need for the transformation into a low-carbon or even zero-carbon economy. We can even calculate the investment costs and structures of different countries and regions. But we do know relatively little about the transformation processes of entire societies, economies and, eventually, the international system towards low-carbon systems. The transformation towards a low-carbon society is a "great transformation". In the entire history of mankind there might be only two examples for such a profound change: the industrial revolution 250 years ago and the Neolithic revolution 10.000 years ago, which induced the practices of agriculture. Today, we thus witness the third great transformation: the decoupling from fossil resources, from high-carbon to zero-carbon. To achieve the 2° Celsius goal, a complete decarbonization of the basic infrastructures of the global economy (the energy systems, the urban infrastructures and systems, the land use systems) is required – within a very limited period of time, until 2070. Comprehensive knowledge is key to achieve this. Let me emphasize once more the significance of international cooperation in the field of science and technology research, particularly in the IPCC context. I am sure that politicians from China, India, or Brazil only accept what the IPCC is presenting as objective knowledge, as the stand of the art knowledge, because their national scientists are deeply involved. If this were a classical western-based knowledge project it would have resulted in a lack of legitimacy. In the case of global climate policy, it is obvious that investment in joint knowledge creation is also about creating legitimacy for joint action.
What are the main obstacles of the low-carbon transformation?
The first two great transformations have been evolutionary processes. No one "planned" the industrial revolution, not to mention the Neolithic revolution. These have been evolutionary dynamics. The sustainability transformation instead needs to be a governed process right from the beginning. In our institute, we looked at different transformation dynamics, not only the really big ones, the Neolithic, industrial, and the current sustainability transformation. We also examined structural adjustment programs in Latin America and Africa, the collapse of communism at the end of the 80s, the abolition of slavery, and similar other key transformations of human societies. Based on this historical perspective, we have identified four main drivers of transformation: The first one is crisis, this is the most important one. Confronted with strong crises, society and probably also individuals react and change direction. The second important driver is very often technology and scientific (r)evolution. The third driver is vision: If you are confronted with a problem but you do not know where to go to, transformation becomes very difficult. The European Union is the product of a fresh vision among elites after World War II; the United Nations is a result of the disasters of the first half of the 20th century. Advancing a vision is an essential means to move or to transform in a goal-oriented manner. Sustainability, of course, is also a vision. The fourth and last driver of transformation is "knowledge": you know that you have a certain problem constellation, and though the crisis is still not there, you react based on your knowledge in a preventive way.
For the low-carbon transformation, the fourth driver currently is absolutely key. We are able to address problems which would otherwise become much worse in the future, although the climate crisis is latent still – in contrast to, for example, the financial crisis, which is more visible in its effects. The impacts of a global warming of 4 or 5 degrees are still not visible. This makes for a huge difference. In fact, humans are not very good at acting and transforming significantly based on knowledge only. In combination with visible, tangible crises, knowledge is a strong driver of change, but without crisis, it is merely sufficient. Transformations based on knowledge and preventive action only are rare. The ozone hole is one positive example; solving the problem was possible because it required less complex technological change, affecting few industries only. Human beings are risk-averse in a sense, we are conservative, we do not like to change rapidly; we are path-dependent. John Maynard Keynes once said: "It is easy to develop new concepts and ideas. The difficult thing is to forget the old ones". Therefore, scientific tools are needed in order to sketch out future scenarios. Based on scientific knowledge, we need to convince our societies, our political decision-makers that it is necessary and possible to transform societies and economies towards sustainability – in order to avoid disruptive change in the earth system. Pushing towards sustainability at a point where the crisis has not yet materialized implies a specific and new role for science in managing global dynamics. Organizing a deep transformation towards sustainability avoiding significant crises driven by Earth system changes would be a cultural learning process – a civilizational shift.
What are the effects of growing multipolarity for global governance processes?
To start optimistically, I would argue that in contrast to historical situations in which this kind of tectonic power shifts led to conflicts or even wars, the current situation is different. The world is highly interconnected and economic interdependencies are stronger than ever. Charles Kupchan is differentiating between "war", "cold peace" and "warm peace". I think that a big "war" is not very probable, and "cold peace" is what we are in actually. "Warm peace" would be cooperative global governance: we identify our problems, have a joint problem analysis, and subsequently start acting cooperatively on them. But this does not describe the contemporary situation. While there are no severe global conflicts, we do not solve many of the global interdependency problems.
There are many barriers to global cooperation and I would like to mention two or three of those. The first one consists of power conflicts and power struggles. Hopefully realists such as John Mearsheimer are not right in claiming that "a peaceful rise of China is not possible". But the fundamental point remains that the re-organization and shuffling of power resources is rendering cooperation extremely difficult. The second point is that all the important global actors currently have severe domestic challenges to manage. The European countries are coping with the European dept crisis. Similarly, the United States is concerned with financial turbulences and rising social inequalities. China has to keep its annual growth rate of about 8 to 12 per cent and meanwhile stabilize its rapid modernization process. In India, there is still a large group of people suffering from poverty. So, managing that and trying to be a responsible global actor at the same time is not easy at all. In brief, all actors that we would like to see taking on a more responsible role on the global level are overcommitted domestically.
There is consensus among different disciplines on what cooperation is actually about. At the Centre for Global Cooperation Research we did a study on The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation (2013) based on insights of very different disciplines – evolutionary biology, social anthropology, cognitive sciences, psychology, political sciences, behavioral economics – to find out what the basic mechanisms are which help human beings to cooperate at any scale towards global corporation in a world of nine billion people. Finally, we identified seven factors promoting cooperation: trust, communication, joint we-identities, reputation, fairness, enforcement – and reciprocity, which is the most fundamental prerequisite. These factors form an enable environment for cooperation and they are manmade. In contexts, actor constellations, systems, in which these basic mechanisms of cooperation are strong, they help to embed power dynamics, to solve social dilemma problems and to manage interdependencies. In contrast, contexts, actor constellations, and systems in which theses basic mechanisms of cooperation are weak, will be driven mainly by power dynamics and struggles. By looking at these factors one immediately understands why the G20 context is so difficult. We have been able to create and to well establish these factors in our old settings; in the European Union, the Western world, the transatlantic community. But now we are sitting together with new actors rather unknown. The G7/G8 world – the OECD driven and the western driven global economy and global politics – has moved towards G20 since it was acknowledged that one cannot manage any global turbulence without emerging economies. The G20 was created or rather called to meet in 2008, a few days after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers when many feared the collapse of the world's financial markets. Most western economies were highly indebted, whereas the emerging economies, especially China, were holding large currency reserves. From a behavioral perspective we have to invest in these basic factors of cooperation in the G 20 context in order to create the essential preconditions of joint action to solve the big global problems. This represents a long-term project, and unfortunately many of these global problems are highly challenging from the time perspective: a tension derives from the gap between time pressure in many of these areas and the time it probably needs to build up these basic mechanisms of cooperation. In fact, the major feeling is that international cooperation is even weaker now than a decade ago. I usually visualize the current situation of the G20 as a round table with 20 seats but no one is sitting there. Charles Kupchan's "No one's world" or Ian Bremmer's "The G0 world" deal with the same problem: international cooperation, global governance is currently so difficult, although all these interdependency problems rendered the problem of managing the global commons fully obvious. If you talk to our Foreign Ministers or Finance Ministers or Chancellors and Presidents, they of course all know exactly what is out there in terms of globalization impacts. But organizing the necessary global consensus and the governance and cooperation structures is tremendously difficult.
How far is the discipline of development research affected by global change?
This is a complex question, to which I do not have a definite answer. The whole field of development research is currently about to get redefined. In the past, the concept of development was clear: On the one side, there was the developed world, the OECD-world, consisting of 35-40 countries and on the other side, the "underdeveloped" part of the world, all other countries. Understanding the differences between developed and developing, along with thinking about the basic drivers of modernization and wealth creation in less developed countries was at the core of development research for a long period. How can poor countries become rich and as developed as OECD countries already are?
Today, it is highly questionable if even the broader categories of "development research" still serve to analyze the new realities. Do we currently still need "development economists", and how would they differ from classical "economists" doing research in those European countries suffering most from the debt crisis, high unemployment and weak institutions? Situations in many OECD countries nowadays look like what one would expect from a still developing or emerging economy, and the other way around. So, what distinguishes development research? This is an important question. Studying non-OECD countries, do we still need development research based governance theories or democratization theories – thus, theories that are systematically different from those we apply in our research on OECD countries? The discipline of development research is under immense pressure. This debate is linked to the second wave of global change we talked about: the post-western world order, emerging economies catching up, convergence trends in the global economy.
If you look at the role of international technology transfer, the same scenario arises: the North-South, donor-recipient categories have dissolved. Technology transfer has lost its distinct direction, and it is much more reciprocal and diffuse than it used to be. There are several studies currently pointing to the fact that investment rates in R&D and in technology creation are growing fast in several regions around the globe, whereas in many OECD-countries, investment is stagnating, or even decreasing. The whole map of knowledge, if you like to say so, is about to undergo deep changes. This implies that the common assumption that knowledge is based in OECD countries and transferred to the South via development cooperation is just not working any longer. We need new patterns of cooperation between different countries in this area. And we need research on global development dynamics which will be different from classical development research which has been based on the assumption of a systemic North-South divide for a long time.
How do institutions such as the World Bank react to the emerging and redefined agenda of development?
The current reorientation of the World Bank as a Knowledge Bank originates from the assumption that knowledge is just as important as money for global development. The second point is that more and more of their partners in non-OECD countries, classical developing and emerging economies, are more and more interested in the knowledge pools of the World Bank and less in their experts. And: dynamic developing countries and emerging economies are even more interested in investments in their own knowledge systems and joint knowledge creation with the World Bank. The old North-South knowledge transfer model is eroding. You might say that there currently are two contradictory global trends: on the one hand via social media and the Internet, knowledge is being widely distributed – broader than ever before and actually, theoretically accessible at any point in the world –, on the other hand the proliferation of knowledge is accompanied with access restriction and control, and the growing privatization of knowledge. Aiming to play a constructive role in collaborative knowledge generation, the World Bank invests a lot in building up freely accessible data bases and open research tools, including the provision of governance or development indicators of any kind. However, this is a difficult process that is developing slowly.
The World Bank is currently undergoing several basic re-orientations. The structures inside of the World Bank are about to become less hierarchical and more horizontal. Originally, the World Bank has been a much more western dominated organization as the Bretton Woods institutions were formed by the United States and its allies. If you look into the governance structures of the World Bank today, it is still largely dominated by OECD countries, but you can notice that this is changing. It is a global organization but 90 % of people working there have been studying at Anglo-Saxon universities. Actors especially from emerging economies have been criticizing that for long, claiming that the World Bank as a global organization should have to be represented by a global citizenship. Although this had slowly started to change already, all the knowledge and all the qualification procedures still remained very western dominated. So they asked the World Bank to diversify its partner structures, to reach out and cooperate with research institutions from around the world. This is what the World Bank is trying to do at the moment, which is really a break with its culture. Because even though the World Bank is a global organization, it has always been a very inward-looking organization. The World Bank was strong, with fantastic professionals and researchers inside, but without cooperating tools. Now they are trying to broaden their cooperation structures and to learn from and together with other institutions.
What are the opportunities and difficulties of big data analysis for global development?
Access to any kind of data is important for any kind of knowledge creation. It has been very limited for many developing countries over a very long time. So, thinking about how to assure access to serious data is significant. This would be my first point. My second point is that, when it comes to big data and the question of managing large amounts of indicators on, for example, cross-country or cross-sector modeling, I think the new technologies are opening up new research possibilities and opportunities. Big data provides the opportunity to identify patterns. Looking for similar dynamics in very different systems is a very interesting exercise, because you get deeper insights into the basic dynamics of systems. This is what I have learned from my colleague Nakicenovic, whom I have mentioned before, and who is working on the Global Energy Assessment, or from Juergen Kurths, from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, who is studying basic structures and dynamics of very different complex systems like air traffic networks, global infrastructures and social media networks. Managing big data allows you to see patterns which cannot be seen if you only work with case studies. However, to understand the dynamics of countries and sectors, new actor constellations or communities, you need to go into detail and in this specific moment, big data is only the starting point, the background: you also need qualified, serious, very often qualitative data on the ground. Big data and qualified, specific data: they complement each other.
For sure, an important aspect of big data is that for the most part, it is gathered and stored by private businesses. We started this interview talking about global commons and we actually just defined a global commons: data on development should be a global commons, and we need standards and rules of managing those. Private actors could play a role, but within a set of rules defined by societies and policies, and not the private business sector.
Dirk Messner is the Director of the "German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)" since 2003 and teaches at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen. He is Co-Director of the "Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR)", University Duisburg-Essen, which was established in 2012. He furthermore is Co-Chair of the "German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)", member of the "China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development", member of the "Global Knowledge Advisory Commission" of the World Bank and member of the "European Commission's Scientific Advisory Board for EU development policy". Dirk Messner's research interests and work areas include globalisation and global governance, climate change, transformation towards low carbon economies, and development policy. He directed many international research programs and thus created a close international research network.
related links:
Profile at German Development Institute Messner, Dirk / Guarín, Alejandro / Haun, Daniel (eds.) (2013): The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation, Global Cooperation Research Papers 1, Centre for Global Cooperation Research (pdf)
Read Jing Gu, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner's (2007) Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China here (pdf)
Messner, Dirk (2007): The European Union: Protagonist in a Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power in the »Asia-Pacific« Century? (pdf)
The international business environment is still changing dramatically and, although international growth may introduce added complexity it may be unavoidable for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) mainly due to the increasing globalization of markets (Levitt 1983) and industries (Yip 2003). In the face of rapid globalization, SMEs are a vital part of the economic systems of both emerging and developed countries. As Veloso (1991) points out, this type of companies may be an important organ for increasing the level of competitiveness of emerging markets. Some studies, for example, Yasuf (2001), go to the extent of suggesting that growth and employment in developing countries depend on the fate of SMEs. The incentive and the legal structures within which firms must operate have been drastically altered. SMEs are no longer protected from foreign competition and local buyers and suppliers are becoming more sophisticated. To compete effectively, SMEs must adapt and reshape themselves to facilitate adjustments and enhance learning for their growth and economic development. This article provides a typology to explain the degree of internationalization of SMEs. At one extreme is tangible internationalization, which is short-term and depends on macro and microeconomics factors exogenous to firms; at the other is a combination of tangible and intangible internationalization, which implies a strong commitment by firms to become competitive at international levels.I argue that different forces have forced the internationalization not only of firms, but also of markets, so that SMEs can become global without a physical presence in foreign markets. Furthermore, it may be necessary for these companies to become global if they are to remain competitive in their local markets. As a result of this paradigm shift, internationalization is based not only on geographical aspects, which are closely related to firm internationalization, but also on intangible considerations, which are closely related to market internationalization.Tangible internationalization is a restricted approach defined as a physical presence in a foreign market; it consists mainly of foreign sales, foreign direct investment (FDI), physical presence in foreign markets, and foreign suppliers. It fluctuates with exchange rates, costs of inputs, and other resource endowments that are tied to a particular geographic location. On the other hand, intangible internationalization implies a change in the comprehensive approach to the way firms should reconfigure, develop and secure resources. Intangible internationalization requires facilitating learning at all levels of a firm to increase the stock of knowledge, and, therefore, to improve flexibility on the production side and increase the likelihood of developing new resources and processes, thus enhancing the firm's critical invisible assets (Itami and Roehl 1987). An SME should aim for both in order to take advantage of a physical presence in foreign markets and provide constant incentives to facilitate learning and new organizational capabilities and processes. Tangible internationalization is a short-term expansion in foreign markets because it takes advantage of temporary macro- and microeconomics conditions; it does not require changes at the firm level. On the other hand, a combination of intangible and tangible internationalization has a higher probability to be sustainable in the long term and mostly depends on the firm's actions to meet international standards.This article emphasizes 5 crucial aspects of that managers need to be aware of: I. A matter of having an strategic plan II. An internal perspective of the firm III.The need of expanding the knowledge bases of SMEs IV.How to access and secure resources: networks V.The entrepreneurial aspectsI. A Matter of Having an Strategic PlanWhile firms have an important degree of freedom to make their own decisions, the effect of the environment cannot be discounted. This matter becomes critically important in the context of emerging economies because firms are not only facing changes in the structure of the industry in which they operate, but also in the surrounding and institutional environments. To be aware of the different courses of action available, decision makers must understand all the pro-market reforms, not just those that most affect their own industry. According to Weick (1995), the strategic decisions that managers make depend on their cognitive structures and how they make sense of the environment. Managers need to understand any intended change in a way that makes sense or fits an interpretative schema or system of meaning (Bartunek 1984). Andrews (1980) compares the role of the owner-manager to an architect who is in charge of doing the synthesis. Senior managers have the role of analyzing, interpreting, and making sense of clues so as to formulate and implement strategies. Senior managers should act as catalysts to understand and create new interpretative frameworks that provide purpose and direction to the members of the organization (Westley 1990).Laying a Formal Foundation: Making the Implicit Explicit The fact that SMEs have inadequate organizational structures and managerial expertise is a real problem in a changing environment. SMEs do not have the same level of support to increase their competitiveness, and given the lack of managerial expertise, building an adequate structure is not a straightforward process, even though it is a central one. Formalizing routines and processes within firms to make them less dependent on a specific individual is key. This is an important concern because SMEs not only have a less highly developed structure, but their fate is closely linked to one or a few individuals who posses knowledge or resources that have not been made explicit to the rest of the firm.Nevertheless, in a changing environment managers need to be proactive and to rethink their approaches regarding the future activities of their firms. A mere replication of previous strategies may no longer be a valid option when firms are competing in the international arena. The future can be imagined and enacted and that companies must be capable of fundamentally reconciling themselves by regenerating their core competencies and reinventing their industry. The role of managers is not to plan for the future, but to manage the process of learning and to be open to the possibility that new strategies can emerge.II. Analyzing the Firm's ResourcesAn analytical examination of the resources of a firm may help to develop an understanding not only of possible short-run business strategies, but also of future diversifications (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988), growth strategies (Penrose, 1959), and sustainability of long-term rents (Rumelt, 1984). SMEs can compete in the international arena, but they will face international competition from foreign SMEs as well as from multinational enterprises (MNEs). Focusing only on product-market strategies is not enough; instead, the long-term survival of a firm depends on the characteristics and endowment of its resources, which should be valuable and difficult to imitate (Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Grant 1991; Amit and Schoemaker 1993). To be able to compete, the manager-owners of SMEs must know the internal resources and capabilities of their companies. As Andrews (1980: 18-19) suggested, a firm should make its strategic plans "preferably in a way that focuses resources to convert distinctive competence into competitive advantage."Firms are a bundle of different kinds of resources and a set of commitments to certain technologies, human resources, processes, and know-how that manager-owners marshal. This issue is particularly important to the present study because it is not unusual that are controlled, managed, and run by one or a small group of individuals that have a deep, but tacit, knowledge of the firm. What is important is a clear identification—not just a vague idea—of the different resources on which a firm can depend.How to Reconfigure a Firm's Resources? Capabilities exist when two or more resources are combined to achieve a goal and they "emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring the internal and external organization skills, resources, and functional competences to match the requirements of changing environment" (Teece et al. 1997: 515). It is important to note that the relative endowment of firms may not necessarily relate to their financial performance because "only the service that the resource can render and not the resources themselves provide inputs into the production process" (Penrose 1972: 25). It is the deployment of a combination of those services that are critical to the rent generation of the firm. Firms need to exploit the existing firm-specific capabilities and also develop new ones (Penrose 1959; Teece 1982; Wernerfelt 1984) to compete internationally and to grow. Over time, SMEs have seen the nature of their rents change; we should expect a shift from Ricardian to Schumpeterian rents. A company may not have better resources, but achieve rents because it makes better use of its resources (Penrose 1959). Rents depend not only on the structure of the resources, but also on the ability of firms to reconfigure and transform those resources. The above discussion leads to the formation of the following hypotheses:III. The Need of Expanding the Knowledge Bases of SMEsThe capacity to exploit a new set of opportunities depends partly on the strategic decisions made by managers. In some cases, these opportunities require at least a reconfiguration of the activities of the firm, but more often, they require the incorporation of new resources and, especially, the introduction of new processes.Firms are as systems of purposeful actions engaging in economic activities to achieve objectives, therefore, they must learn adapt and survive in a complex environment. Organizational learning is the process by which firms can cope with uncertainty and environmental complexity, and their efficiency depends on learning how the environment is changing and then adapting to those changes (March and Olsen, 1976).SMEs need to enhance their learning in two different aspects. First, internal knowledge should be coded and made available to selected members in the company. The manager-owner is knowledgeable about almost all aspects of the business (Mintzberg 1979), and his or her knowledge is personal in the sense that it is located in the mind and not always encoded or available to the rest of the firm. Routines should be created in order to secure the long-term existence of the firm because routines capture the experiential lessons and make that knowledge obtainable by the members of the organization that were not part of the history of the company (Levitt and March 1988).The second way SMEs need to enhance their learning is to make changes in their knowledge base. When socio-economic environments change, firms need to assess the change in order to reformulate how they react to new incentives. The first step is developing a capability to understand the new dynamics. When regulatory and competitive conditions change rapidly, persistence in the same routines can be hazardous because managers and employees use organizational memory or knowledge to make decisions and to formulate the present strategy of the firm.The effectiveness of decisions taken by an SME is greatly influenced by its knowledge base which, in turn, is the result of learning processes that are no longer applicable and may be misleading. Changes in the knowledge base are probably requisite for any firms competing in an industry with tradable products. Supporting infrastructure and routines may prove essential to increase the learning pace and to effectively integrate the new knowledge and reduce the inertia due to outdated knowledge.IV. How to Access and Secure Resources: NetworksSMEs, compared to larger firms, face major challenges in terms of securing and updating resources. Where internal resources are important to accounting for a firm's performance (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001), resources also can be secured within networks that may allow firms to be competitive locally and internationally. Increasingly, networking is seen as a primarily means of rising required resources. Resources, such as information, equipment, and personnel, can be exchanged in networks because of relationships between. Networks are important instruments to ease the constraints facing SMEs in terms of access to: a) capital markets to obtain long-term finance both locally and internationally, b) narrow and highly regulated labor markets, c) information and technologies, d) inefficient tax codes, and e) highly bureaucratic and expansive legal procedures. SMEs may be part of a network not only because it may find complementary resources, but also because owners and managers may have friendship ties with other owners and mangers. These non-economic reasons may be as important as economic ones.A Particular Kind of Network: Industry Clusters An extensive literature exists on the topic of industry clusters. Ricardo's "comparative advantages" can be considered as a pioneering concept of industrial clusters; and Marshall's exposition about externalities is based on industrial localization. Industrial clusters are characterized by having extensive interfirm exchanges and an advantageous environment to pursue business activities. Marshall (1961) argues that industry localization may be an important factor because a) it creates a market for workers with certain industry-specific skills, b) it promotes production and exchange of non-tradable specialized input, and c) firms may take advantage of informational spillovers. Krugman (1991) points out that given the existence of market imperfection, pecuniary externalities may also play an important role in determining the concentration of industry in a specific geographic location. Pouder and St. John (1996) argue that clustered firms have a greater legitimacy than firms outside a cluster. Clusters can provide a critical mass to counterbalance the political influence of large firms and to increase the pressure for investments that affect the productivity of the cluster. Furthermore, competition within clusters increases productivity and new firm development (Porter 1998).V. The Entrepreneurial AspectsIntangible internationalization requires facilitating learning by its employees in order to constantly transform the firm. Implementing mechanisms to expand the knowledge base and to diffuse information should allow SMEs to increase their capacity to develop new goods and services, and to compete in new markets. Key characteristics of this type of internationalization are common interests, trust and openness that allow employees to challenge assumptions. Intangible internationalization is a more difficult international expansion, but it provides sustainable competitive advantages. Consequently, SMEs would become competitive by reducing their costs, introducing new products and expanding their potential markets.It is not possible to engage in tangible internationalization without having a minimum level of intangible internationalization or being competitive without some degree of valuable, rare, in-imitable, non-substitutable resources (Barney 1991). SMEs should aim for both types of internalization in order to take advantage of physical presence in foreign markets and constantly provide the incentives to facilitate learning, new organizational capabilities and processes.Firms have different combinations of internationalization. In order to analyze how SMEs can take advantage of both tangible and intangible internationalization, the foundation of the potential competitive advantages need to be identified. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how firms deliver products that have value for customers, but also to understand what makes these firms different from the rest (Hall 1998). I argue that there are three major categories of differential that have a strong impact on the nature of internationalization of SMEs. The first is called firm differential, and includes a) organizational (team level), b) managerial (individual level), c) physical endowment and d) technological capabilities differentials. The second category is based on the home country characteristics and it is called country differential. The final category,market differential, takes into consideration the specific features of local markets and industries. These differentials deeply influence the role of owner-manager. There are three basic approaches that a SME can adopt while anticipating and responding to the needs of its customers. The first one is the approach of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1934), a leader who breaks away from routine and introduces either new goods/services or new production processes for existing goods/services. The second one is related to Porter's (1980) concept of cost leadership even though Porter studied larger firms from developed countries. The last style of owner-manager is the Kirznerian entrepreneur, who is a person alert to opportunities (see figure 1). This type of role implies that the owner-manager acts as a broker in order to take advantage of over-optimistic or over-pessimistic reactions of economic agents (Kirzner 1973); therefore, the owner-manager will act "in regard to the changes occurring in the data of the markets" (Mises 1949: 255).ConclusionIn the business literature, internationalization involvement usually results from one of two factors: a) the firm possesses some monopolistic advantage that it can use in another country, or b) the host country owns resources that are valuable to the foreign firm. While these reasons may be necessary and sufficient conditions for larger companies, is not necessarily the case for SMEs whom have no option but to internationalization.Those two factors do not necessarily apply to SMEs because they need to become international even if they do not compete in international markets. The average level of competitiveness of SMEs is below that of multinational enterprises. SMEs are faced with international competition whether they decide to internationalize or to remain "local." Even SMEs providing non-tradable goods face a "demand side" pressure to meet the characteristic of similar product sell in other countries. SMEs may not have the time required, according to this model, to meet world-class standards. ReferencesAmit, R. and Schoemaker, P. (1993). "Strategic assets and organizational rent". Strategic Management Journal,14(1):33-46. Andrews, K. (1980). The concept of corporate strategy. Homewood, Irwin. Barney, J. (1991). ¨Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.¨ Journal of Management, 17(1): 99-120. Bartunek, J. (1984). "Changing interpretative schemes and organizational restructuring: the example of a religion order." Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(3):355-372. Child, J. (1972). "Organizational structure, environment and performance: the role of strategic choice". Sociology,6(1):1-22. Gnyawali, D. and Madhavan, R. (2001). "Cooperative networks and competitive dynamics: A structural embeddedness perspective." Academy of Management Review, 26(3):431-445. Grant, R. (1991). Contemporary Strategic Analysis: Concepts, Techniques, Application. Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, MA. Itami, H. and Roehl, T. (1987). "Mobilizing Invisible Assets". Harvard Business School Press. Kirzner, I. (1973). "Competition and entrepreneurship". University of Chicago Press, Krugman, P. (1991). "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography." The Journal of Political Economy, 99(3):483-499. Levitt, T. (1983). The globalization of markets. Harvard Business Review, 61(May-June): 92-102. Levitt, B. and March, J. (1988)."Organizational Learning." Annual Review of Sociology, (14):319-340. Mahoney, J. and Pandian, R. (1992). "The Resource-Based View Within the Conversation of Strategic Management." Strategic Management Journal, 13(5):363-380 . March, J. and Olsen, J.(1976). Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. Marshall, A., (1961 (1890)). Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan. Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations: a synthesis of the article. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Mises, L. (1949). "Human action; a treatise on economics". Yale University Press. Montgomery, C. and Wernerfelt, B. (1988). "Diversification, Ricardian Rents, and Tobin's q". RAND Journal of Economics, 19(4):623-632. Penrose, E. (1959). The theory of the Growth of the Firm. John Wiley: New York. Penrose, E. (1972). The theory of the Growth of the Firm. Originally published in 1959, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Porter, M. (1998). On Competition. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Porter, M. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. Free Press: New York. Pouder, R. and St. John, C. (1996). "Hot Spots and Blind Spots: Geographical Clusters of Firms and Innovation."The Academy of Management Review, 21(4):1192-1225. Rumelt, R. (1991). "How much does Industry Matter?" Strategic Management Journal, 12(3):167-185. Schumpeter, J. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University Press. Teece, D. Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (1997). "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management." Strategic Management Journal, 18(7):509-533. Teece, D (1982). "Toward an economic theory of the multiproduct firm". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3:39-63. Veloso, P. (1991). "International Competitiveness and the creation of an enabling environment." International competitiveness, ed. By Irfan ul Haque, pp. 29-36. Washington, DC: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank. Weick, K. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Wernerfelt, B. (1984). ¨A resource based view of the firm.¨ Strategic Management Journal, 5(2):171-180. Westley, F. 1990. "Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of Inclusion." Strategic Management Journal,11(5): 337-351. Yasuf, S. (2001). "Globalization and the Challenge for Developing Countries." Policy ArticleWorking Paper 2618, the World Bank Yip, G. (2003). Total Global Strategy II. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey.Sobre el autorCoordinador Académico de Finanzas FACS, Universidad ORT Uruguay
AbstractAs it is well known, Humboldt and Bonpland ended their almost five-years-journey throughout the American continent with a short but intense stay of nearly three months in the USA.As it has already been studied in a previous paper ('HiN' nº 3, 2001), Humboldt's political and economical thesis predicted the role and the place that would most probably correspond to the newly born American nations within the new post-Napoleonic world order.Afterward, Humboldt explicitly stated that not only the future but the present of the USA seemed very different to the one of the Latin American countries due to the many ethnic, social and cultural barriers, and specially to the many historical 'vices' that these had inherited from the colony. This conviction was shared with other 'illustrated' German thinkers of his time, such as G.F. Hegel, who thought that after the full consummation of the Iberoamerican independence from Europe a confrontation, even military, will be unavoidable and even necessary between the North and the South of the America as precondition for the rebirthing of the 'idea', 'reason' and 'spirit' into the 'new world'; it is, as precondition for the continuity of 'History'; in other words, for avoiding the 'end of History'.After 200 years of a complex and difficult coexistence between the USA and the rest of the continent, and after at least two failures of Iberoamerica to achieve a full reinsertion within the Western politics, culture and economy, the USA, having been a super world power for several decades, have offered, and even forced, a great continental alliance ('ALCA) 'that will lead in, a very short term (2005), to a unique and preferential continental market and, in some way, to a unique American economic culture.One of the many questions that arises about such a challenge is if the Iberoamerican countries have yet been able to overcome the mentioned historic and structural barriers and colonial 'vices' referred by Humboldt. And, if in despite of these barriers, would Iberoamerica, by the hand of the USA and Canada, finally be able to find an appropriate and deserved 'place' and 'role' within the 'new world order' of the so called 'globalization' era.This questioning is a new challenge for the Humboltian science and a possibility for it to analyze the 'present time' with the same premises used by Humboldt at his time to criticize the Hispano-American reality and to certain extent, predict its immediate future. This is what, with the required humbleness, this paper tries to formulate. ResumenComo es sabido, Humboldt y Bonpland concluyeron su largo periplo americano de casi 5 años con una corta e intensa estadía de casi 3 meses en los EE.UU., de América. Como ya se estudió en un estudio precedente ('HiN' nº 3, 2001) en un inciso de su obra político-económica, Humboldt auguró el papel y puesto que muy seguramente habría de corresponderles a los nacientes Estados americanos en el conjunto del nuevo orden mundial post-napoleónico. Sin que su obra involucrase a los 'jóvenes' EE. UU., en algún momento Humboldt dejó explícito que ese futuro pintaba muy diferente para los países hispanoamericanos, en particular en razón de las muchas barreras étnicas, sociales, culturales y sobre todo 'vicios' heredadas de la colonia. Tales convicciones fueron compartidos en su momento por otros connotados 'ilustrados' alemanes, entre ellos G.F. Hegel quien además veía casi inevitable –y hasta necesario- un enfrentamiento –incluso armado- entre el Norte y Sur de América. Esto último, como precondición para que la 'razón', la idea' y el 'espíritu' pudieran renacer en el 'nuevo mundo' una vez hubiera concluida, tras la plena emancipación iberoamericana, la dominación colonial europea en el continente; o lo que era lo mismo, para evitar el 'fin' de la 'Historia'.Después de 200 años de compleja y no fácil 'convivencia' entre los EE.UU., de América y el resto del continente 'suramericano', y después de haber fracasado Iberoamérica en al menos dos ocasiones por lograr una plena reinserción en la economía, política y cultura occidentales, los EE.UU., han tomado la iniciativa de ofrecer –e incluso forzar- una gran alianza continental que llevará en un cortísimo plazo –2005- a la formación de un solo mercado preferencial hemisférico, y si se quiere una única cultura económica americana.Una de las muchas preguntas que motiva semejante reto está en saber si los países iberoamericanos han superados las aludidas rigideces y 'vicios' histórico-estructurales que en su momento denunció Humboldt; y por lo mismo, si persistiendo éstas, cara sus eventuales socios del Norte, sería posible que Iberoamérica, de la mano de EE.UU., y Canadá, podrá por fin encontrar un sitio adecuado –y por lo demás un papel apropiado y digno- dentro del nuevo sistema mundial, ahora llamado de la 'globalización'.La mencionada inquietud constituye un nuevo reto para la 'ciencia humboldtiana' y por ello la posibilidad de intentar analizar el 'presente' con las mismas premisas que en su fecha utilizó Humboldt para criticar la realidad hispanoamericana y en alguna forma presagiar su futuro inmediato. Es lo que, una vez más con la modestia que el intento exige, lo que se pretende plantear en este trabajo. ; ResumenComo es sabido, Humboldt y Bonpland concluyeron su largo periplo americano de casi 5 años con una corta e intensa estadía de casi 3 meses en los EE.UU., de América. Como ya se estudió en un estudio precedente ('HiN' nº 3, 2001) en un inciso de su obra político-económica, Humboldt auguró el papel y puesto que muy seguramente habría de corresponderles a los nacientes Estados americanos en el conjunto del nuevo orden mundial post-napoleónico. Sin que su obra involucrase a los 'jóvenes' EE. UU., en algún momento Humboldt dejó explícito que ese futuro pintaba muy diferente para los países hispanoamericanos, en particular en razón de las muchas barreras étnicas, sociales, culturales y sobre todo 'vicios' heredadas de la colonia. Tales convicciones fueron compartidos en su momento por otros connotados 'ilustrados' alemanes, entre ellos G.F. Hegel quien además veía casi inevitable –y hasta necesario- un enfrentamiento –incluso armado- entre el Norte y Sur de América. Esto último, como precondición para que la 'razón', la idea' y el 'espíritu' pudieran renacer en el 'nuevo mundo' una vez hubiera concluida, tras la plena emancipación iberoamericana, la dominación colonial europea en el continente; o lo que era lo mismo, para evitar el 'fin' de la 'Historia'.Después de 200 años de compleja y no fácil 'convivencia' entre los EE.UU., de América y el resto del continente 'suramericano', y después de haber fracasado Iberoamérica en al menos dos ocasiones por lograr una plena reinserción en la economía, política y cultura occidentales, los EE.UU., han tomado la iniciativa de ofrecer –e incluso forzar- una gran alianza continental que llevará en un cortísimo plazo –2005- a la formación de un solo mercado preferencial hemisférico, y si se quiere una única cultura económica americana.Una de las muchas preguntas que motiva semejante reto está en saber si los países iberoamericanos han superados las aludidas rigideces y 'vicios' histórico-estructurales que en su momento denunció Humboldt; y por lo mismo, si persistiendo éstas, cara sus eventuales socios del Norte, sería posible que Iberoamérica, de la mano de EE.UU., y Canadá, podrá por fin encontrar un sitio adecuado –y por lo demás un papel apropiado y digno- dentro del nuevo sistema mundial, ahora llamado de la 'globalización'.La mencionada inquietud constituye un nuevo reto para la 'ciencia humboldtiana' y por ello la posibilidad de intentar analizar el 'presente' con las mismas premisas que en su fecha utilizó Humboldt para criticar la realidad hispanoamericana y en alguna forma presagiar su futuro inmediato. Es lo que, una vez más con la modestia que el intento exige, lo que se pretende plantear en este trabajo. AbstractAs it is well known, Humboldt and Bonpland ended their almost five-years-journey throughout the American continent with a short but intense stay of nearly three months in the USA.As it has already been studied in a previous paper ('HiN' nº 3, 2001), Humboldt's political and economical thesis predicted the role and the place that would most probably correspond to the newly born American nations within the new post-Napoleonic world order.Afterward, Humboldt explicitly stated that not only the future but the present of the USA seemed very different to the one of the Latin American countries due to the many ethnic, social and cultural barriers, and specially to the many historical 'vices' that these had inherited from the colony. This conviction was shared with other 'illustrated' German thinkers of his time, such as G.F. Hegel, who thought that after the full consummation of the Iberoamerican independence from Europe a confrontation, even military, will be unavoidable and even necessary between the North and the South of the America as precondition for the rebirthing of the 'idea', 'reason' and 'spirit' into the 'new world'; it is, as precondition for the continuity of 'History'; in other words, for avoiding the 'end of History'.After 200 years of a complex and difficult coexistence between the USA and the rest of the continent, and after at least two failures of Iberoamerica to achieve a full reinsertion within the Western politics, culture and economy, the USA, having been a super world power for several decades, have offered, and even forced, a great continental alliance ('ALCA) 'that will lead in, a very short term (2005), to a unique and preferential continental market and, in some way, to a unique American economic culture.One of the many questions that arises about such a challenge is if the Iberoamerican countries have yet been able to overcome the mentioned historic and structural barriers and colonial 'vices' referred by Humboldt. And, if in despite of these barriers, would Iberoamerica, by the hand of the USA and Canada, finally be able to find an appropriate and deserved 'place' and 'role' within the 'new world order' of the so called 'globalization' era.This questioning is a new challenge for the Humboltian science and a possibility for it to analyze the 'present time' with the same premises used by Humboldt at his time to criticize the Hispano-American reality and to certain extent, predict its immediate future. This is what, with the required humbleness, this paper tries to formulate.
Completely revised and updated, this textbook continues to offer the most comprehensive resource available. Concise chapters from a diverse mix of established and emerging global scholars offer accessible, in-depth coverage of the history and theories of international organization and global governance and discussions of the full range of state, intergovernmental, and non-state actors. All chapters have been revised and rewritten to reflect the rapid development of world events, with new chapters added on: Chinese approaches to international organization and global governance The UN System The Global South Sustaining the Peace Queering International Organization and Global Governance Post-colonial Global Governance The Sustainable Development Goal the English School Inequality Migration Divided into seven parts woven together by a comprehensive introduction, along with separate introductions to each part and helpful pointers to further reading, International Organization and Global Governance provides a balanced, critical perspective that enables readers to comprehend more fully the role of myriad actors in the governance of global life.
Worum handelt es sich bei Tianxia? - Chinas Auffassung von der "Welt" und ihrer Ordnung -- Das Dilemma von "China" -- China in der Welt aus deutscher Perspektive -- Es war eine intensive Zeit -- Neue Rahmenbedingungen für den internationalen Kulturaustausch -- Von Propaganda und Kommunikation zum gesellschaftlich-kulturellen Austausch -- Chinas gesellschaftliche, politische und wirtschaftliche Transformation und der Weg in die Moderne -- Zur Entwicklung der Forschungszusammenarbeit mit China -- Kultur im multilateralen Umfeld und der Begriff der Wissensgesellschaft -- Schatten des Universalismus -- China und Deutschland -- China und Deutschland vor globalen Herausforderungen -- Kulturdiplomatie und Kulturelles Erbe -- Schauen -- Gedanken zu einer neuen Debattenkultur zwischen Deutschland, Europa und China -- "Deutschland-Kompetenz" an chinesischen Mittelschulen im Jangtse-Delta -- Eine Studie zur Interaktion zwischen deutschen Internet-Berühmtheiten und jungen Chinesen auf Bilibili.
Die Moderne begann mit Hoffnungen auf eine egalitäre Bürgergesellschaft. Unerkannte Privilegien führten jedoch zur Konzentration von struktureller wirtschaftlicher und politischer Macht. Soziale Ungleichheit, Geschlechterhierarchie, Krisen, koloniale Expansionen, Kriege, Abstürze von Demokratien in Diktaturen sowie Wachstum und Naturzerstörung waren die Folgen. Bislang wird versucht, die Krisensymptome der kapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft realpolitisch zu mildern. Es gibt jedoch auch realutopische Denkansätze, das Geld auf seine dienende Funktion zu beschränken und natürliche Lebensgrundlagen als Gemeinschaftsgüter statt als Waren zu behandeln. In diesem Buch werden sie ideengeschichtlich und ordnungspolitisch rekonstruiert. Sichtbar werden dabei Umrisse einer Transformation der kapitalistischen Marktwirtschaft in eine "Marktwirtschaft ohne Kapitalismus" mit einer breiten Dezentralisierung des Geld-, Boden- und Realkapitals. Eine solche menschenrechtlich und demokratisch fundierte zweite Moderne könnte Chancen eröffnen für eine egalitäre Arbeitswelt, für eine Überwindung von Geschlechterhierarchie und Nord-Süd-Gefälle sowie für wirtschaftliche Stabilität ohne Wachstum.
"International Education Inquiries is a book series dedicated to realizing the global vision of Education 2030a. This vision involves "ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all." The founding editors seek to provide a forum for the diverse voices of scholars and practitioners from across the globe asking questions about transforming the vision of Education 2030 into a reality. Published chapters will reflect a variety of formats, free of methodological restrictions, involving disciplinary as well as interdisciplinary inquiries. We expect the series will be a leading forum for pioneers redefining the global discussion about the people, places and perspectives shaping Education 2030 outcomes"--
Wie sieht der Verkehr von heute und die Mobilität von morgen aus? Elektroautos sind auf dem Vormarsch und werden für viele Verkehrsprobleme als zentrale Lösung angepriesen. Allerdings greift dieser Wechsel der Antriebstechnologie zu kurz, denn er bringt neue soziale und ökologische Probleme für die Rohstoffpolitik und die globale Wertschöpfungskette mit sich. Aber auch Mobilitätskonzepte wie Carsharing, Ridepooling oder autonomes Fahren werfen viele Fragen auf und sind verknüpft mit gesellschaftlichen Konflikten. Die aus verschiedenen Disziplinen kommenden Autor*innen beschäftigen sich mit diesen hochaktuellen Entwicklungen und liefern Orientierung in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Transformation und Zukunft der (Auto-)Mobilität.
