Another Skirmish in the Battle over Democracies and War
In: International security, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 194
ISSN: 0162-2889
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In: International security, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 194
ISSN: 0162-2889
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 181
ISSN: 0022-0388
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 183
ISSN: 0032-3470
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 57, Heft 2, S. 258-284
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: Palgrave Studies in Political History
In: Springer eBooks
In: History
Chapter 1: Joost Augusteijn, Constant Hijzen, and Mark Leon de Vries - Introduction: Democracy, the Nation State, and their adversaries -- Section 1: learning to deal with anti-democratic groupings, 1870-1933 -- Section 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2: Mark Leon de Vries - "… a Wretched, Down Trodden and Impoverished People." The Louisiana White League and the Propaganda of Democratic Legitimacy -- Chapter 3: Kristian M. Mennen - Nazis, Violence and the State: Social Democratic Repertoire Discussions in Germany and the Netherlands around 1930 -- Chapter 4: Joris Gijsenbergh - Democracy's Various Defenders: The Struggle Against Political Extremism in the Netherlands, 1917-1940 -- Section 2: New Forms of Mobilisation in the age of civil resistance, 1960-1997 -- Section 2 Introduction -- Chapter 5: Joost Augusteijn and Jacco Pekelder - Terrorist Constituencies in Terrorist-State Conflicts. The debate on the use of violence among Irish nationalists and West Germany's Radical Left in the Mid 1970s -- Chapter 6: Constant Hijzen - The seeds of danger. The security service and its 'enemy image' of 'the movement' in the 1980s -- Chapter 7: Yavuz Yildirim - (In)effectiveness of Social Movements in Turkish Democracy: institutional and non-constitutional cases -- Chapter 8: Miina Kaarkoski - Parliamentary democracy versus direct democracy? Challenging liberal, representative democracy in the German Bundestag during the antinuclear demonstrations of 1995-1997 -- Section 3: Dealing with opposition in the post-Cold War period, 1998-2018 -- Section 3 Introduction -- Chapter 9: Henrik Vigh - Displaced without Moving. Loyalism and democratic haunting in Northern Ireland -- Chapter 10: Ana Maria Albulescu - Towards an understanding of incomplete secession in the Moldovan-Transnistrian case; between democracy and autocracy -- Chapter 11: Arianna Piacentini - Fragmented Democracy in Dayton's Bosnia Herzegovina. Institutions, Political Elite and Youth -- Conclusions -- Chapter 12: Joost Augusteijn, Constant Hijzen, and Mark Leon de Vries - Concluding Remarks --
In: International security, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 194-204
ISSN: 1531-4804
In: Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation; Programming for Peace, S. 11-47
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 67, Heft 4
ISSN: 1468-2478
Abstract
One of the most influential arguments suggests that new democracies are more inclined than others to commit to international human rights treaties. This paper examines whether new democracies are more likely to commit not only to the basic, but also to the more demanding and constraining treaties. We argue that despite the strategic utility of costly commitments, new democracies are often unwilling to pay for the increased costs of more demanding and constraining treaties. We test our argument by tackling some of the trickiest inferential challenges. We employ propensity score weighting to address the nonrandom assignment of new democracies and further specify marginal structural models to account for dynamic confounding. Our analyses reveal intriguing findings. While new democracies commit to the broad human rights conventions more quickly, they are more reluctant than established democracies to commit to the more demanding and constraining protocols.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association
ISSN: 1468-2478
One of the most influential arguments suggests that new democracies are more inclined than others to commit to international human rights treaties. This paper examines whether new democracies are more likely to commit not only to the basic, but also to the more demanding and constraining treaties. We argue that despite the strategic utility of costly commitments, new democracies are often unwilling to pay for the increased costs of more demanding and constraining treaties. We test our argument by tackling some of the trickiest inferential challenges. We employ propensity score weighting to address the nonrandom assignment of new democracies and further specify marginal structural models to account for dynamic confounding. Our analyses reveal intriguing findings. While new democracies commit to the broad human rights conventions more quickly, they are more reluctant than established democracies to commit to the more demanding and constraining protocols.
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of military history, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 663-665
ISSN: 0899-3718
In: Routledge advances in international relations and global politics
"Drawing on classic and contemporary scholarship and empirical analysis of elections and public expenditures in 80 countries, the author argues for the existence of primary and secondary laws of politics. Starting with how basic elements of politics-leadership, organization, ideology, resources, and force-coalesce in the formation of states, he proceeds to examine the operations of those laws in democracies and dictatorships. Primary laws constrain the support that incumbents draw from the electorate, limiting their time in office. They operate unimpeded in democracies. Secondary laws describe the general tendency of the state to expand vis-à-vis economy and society. They exert their greatest force in one-party states imbued with a totalitarian ideology. The author establishes the primary laws in a rigorous analysis of 1,100 parliamentary and presidential elections in 80 countries, plus another 1,000 U.S. gubernatorial elections. Evidence for the secondary laws is drawn from public expenditure data series, with findings presented in easily grasped tables and graphs. Having established these laws quantitatively, the author uses Cuba as a case study, adding qualitative analysis and a practical application to propose a constitutional framework for a future Cuban democracy. Written in an engaging, jargon-free style, this enlightening book will be of great interest to students and scholars in political science, especially those specializing in comparative politics, as well as opinion leaders and engaged citizens"--
In: International politics, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 25-44
ISSN: 1384-5748
In: Democratization, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 82-106
ISSN: 1743-890X
Research on autocracies and their consequences has been a growth industry in the latest decade. Nonetheless, the relationship between the type of autocracy and the violation of civil liberties has largely been ignored. In this article, we employ a new dataset, which includes cross-temporal data on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly/association, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement, to shed light on this issue. Analysing 182 countries in the period 1979-2008, we show that democracies repress civil liberties less than autocracies do, whereas we find little evidence to the effect that different kinds of autocracies violate civil liberties to different degrees. However, we also show that the differences between democracies and autocracies have declined starkly since the Cold War. Finally, our results demonstrate that the difference in the extent to which democracies and autocracies repress civil liberties is larger for the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly/association than for the freedom of religion and freedom of movement. We take the general difference between the two categories of liberties as evidence that autocracies repress political liberties more than private liberties because the former presents levers for oppositional activity. We argue that the cross-temporal differences are a consequence of the spread of more minimalist democracies since the end of the Cold War. Adapted from the source document.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 61, Heft 8, S. 1768-1794
ISSN: 1552-8766
Recent research concludes fighting or losing an interstate war is not costlier for democratic leaders than dictators, which implies most of our institutional explanations for differences in conflict behavior across regime type rest on empirically tenuous assumptions. I argue military mobilization, a fundamental but often overlooked aspect of war, should be costlier for democrats than dictators. Waging interstate war is associated with higher military spending and, often, lower social spending. Variation across regime type in the representation of the general public, civilian elite, and military in leaders' winning coalitions should make democrats more likely than dictators to lose power given wartime patterns of government spending. This argument finds support during the period from 1950 to 2001. My findings provide microfoundations for a number of existing empirical results and suggest that differences in the conflict behavior of democracies and dictatorships should be largest when waging war requires a significant mobilization effort.
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 61, Heft 8, S. 1768-1794
ISSN: 1552-8766
Recent research concludes fighting or losing an interstate war is not costlier for democratic leaders than dictators, which implies most of our institutional explanations for differences in conflict behavior across regime type rest on empirically tenuous assumptions. I argue military mobilization, a fundamental but often overlooked aspect of war, should be costlier for democrats than dictators. Waging interstate war is associated with higher military spending and, often, lower social spending. Variation across regime type in the representation of the general public, civilian elite, and military in leaders' winning coalitions should make democrats more likely than dictators to lose power given wartime patterns of government spending. This argument finds support during the period from 1950 to 2001. My findings provide microfoundations for a number of existing empirical results and suggest that differences in the conflict behavior of democracies and dictatorships should be largest when waging war requires a significant mobilization effort.