South Sudan is a fragile country beset by conflicts. The oil shutdown accompanied by a border closure in 2012 was resolved, but ongoing military clashes between factions of the ruling party have affected livelihoods since December 2013. Before the onset of these conflicts, large parts of the population were food insecure (2 out of 3 people) and lived in poverty (1 out of 2 people). This note estimates and juxtaposes the impact of the oil shutdown and the ongoing military conflict on livelihoods based on food price changes, predicted harvest losses and displacement. The resulting poverty estimates help to understand the structural implications of these conflicts. But to validate these numbers, test the underlying modeling assumptions and inform a policy response, new data needs to be collected urgently.
This thesis focuses on returnees' potential to contribute to reconstruction and development in post-conflict societies. Do returnees bring with them resources of any kind? If yes, how can these resources be utilized in order to contribute to reconstruction and development in the return areas? Through analyzing the experiences of South Sudanese returnees in Juba, these are the main questions this study seeks to answer. By drawing on the theoretical concepts of returnee (re)integration and returnee capital, the study seeks to explore returnees' (potential) contributions to their return areas. The results suggest that returnees possess various forms of capital (material, human, social, cultural) acquired either pre-flight or during exile. The case study shows a particularly high level of education and work experience among the returnees, as well as social changes in lifestyles, attitudes and values. However, the utilization of the returnee capital depends on the prevailing conditions of the return areas. This study shows that there are several aspects of the South Sudanese context that hinder an efficient utilization of returnee capital, with lack of employment opportunities, limited access to land, poor service delivery, and social discrimination being the most prominent. As a result, this study concludes that return migration theoretically represents a transfer of resources to the returnees' countries and/or areas of origin, however, the returnees are often unable to translate their capital into either micro or macro contributions.
Purpose The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been mediating the South Sudan conflict since 2013. IGAD's intervention in South Sudan is anchored on its founding norm of peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and in reference to the principle of subsidiarity, under the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). However, it is puzzling how violence continued unabated even as conflict parties negotiated and signed numerous agreements under the auspices of IGAD. The parties to conflict seem unwilling to implement the 2018 peace agreement, which is arguably un-implementable. Yet, it appears that IGAD mediators were privy to this situation all along. The question that then arises is why IGAD would continue engaging in a mediation process that neither ends violence nor offers a promise of a resolution? Drawing out on empirical data, this paper argues that IGAD's organisational structures and functionality are key to understanding and explaining the South Sudan phenomenon within broader discourses on peace and security regionalism in Africa. This paper suggests the need to pay attention to the embeddedness of political power dynamics in the structures and functionality of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as IGAD, as one of the ways to (re)thinking and (re)orienting norms and practices of regional conflict management within the APSA and in pursuit of the "African solutions to African problems."
Design/methodology/approach Data for this paper was obtained through document reviews and 39 elite interviews. The interviews were conducted with representatives of IGAD member states, bureaucrats of IGAD and its organs mediation support teams, conflict parties, diplomats and other relevant experts purposively selected based on their role in the mediation. The physical interviews were conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, with others conducted virtually. Analysis and presentation of findings are largely perspectival, highlighting coexistence of contending peacemaking ideas and practices. The discussions centre around inter-linked themes of IGAD's conceptions of peace and approaches to peacemaking as informed by its structural and functional designs.
Findings Findings illustrate the complexity of the peace process and the centrality of power politics in IGAD's peace and security arrangements. In view of the findings, this paper echoes the need for enhanced and predictable collaborative framework between IGAD and the African Union (AU) as central to the operationalisation of the APSA and pursuit of the African solutions to the African problems. Hence, this paper suggests transforming IGAD's political program into a robust political bureau with predictable interlinkages and structured engagements between IGAD's heads of state and government and the APSA's Panel of the Wise (PoW).
Originality/value The study is based on empirical data obtained through the researcher's own framed questions, and its argument is based on the researcher's own interpretations innovatively framed within existing theoretical framework, particularly hybrid peace theory. Based on the findings, this paper makes bold and practical recommendations for possible workable collaborative framework between IGAD and the AU under the APSA framework
Since Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, its border with Uganda has become a hub of activity. Contrasting developments on the Ugandan side of the border with those on the South Sudanese side, the paper draws on empirical fieldwork to argue that the CPA has created new centres of power in the margins of both states. However, in day-to-day dealings on either side of the border, South Sudanese military actors have become dominant. In the particular case of Arua and the South Sudan–Uganda border, past wartime authority structures determine access to opportunities in a tightly regulated, inconclusive peace. This means that small-scale Ugandan traders – although vital to South Sudan – have become more vulnerable to South Sudan's assertions of state authority. The experience of Ugandan traders calls into question the broad consensus that trade across the border is always beneficial for peace-building. The paper concludes that trade is not unconditionally helpful to the establishment of a peaceful environment for everyone.
International humanitarian actors and academics continue to struggle to understand armed group conduct and how to restrain this conduct when it violates moral, legal and humanitarian norms. Armed groups that lack a visible, explicit formal hierarchical command structure, equivalent to those found in state militaries, have proved a particular puzzle. A growing body of scholarship on the strategic functions of patterns of violence and restraint has usefully moved beyond assumptions that extreme violence is indicative of an absence of authority over armed actors. However, literature has tended to ignore the potential plurality and complexity of authority figures that shape violence and the constraining, conservative nature of certain moral orders. This article makes use of qualitative and ethnographic research in South Sudan to understand patterns of restraint among the gojam and titweng cattle-guarding defense forces from 2014 to 2017. The analysis documents how public authorities gained legitimacy within these groups by renegotiating a group's social order, moral boundaries, and restraint through their own reinterpretations of meta-ethical ideals and histories. Cultural norms of restraint were manipulated by elites but were also remade into acts of creative refusal against these same elites. The article specifically focuses on how the life-giving work of children, women and old friends was used to protect life as well as incite violence. The article has implications for how international humanitarians can engage with the remaking of custom to enhance armed group restraint and better protect civilians.
The secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 remains a significant development on Africa's political landscape. It will continue to shape and influence the direction of secessionist conflict management and resolution dynamics on the continent. This is not because it was the first secession case in Africa given the fact that, previously, Eritrea had seceded from Ethiopia in 1993. Rather, unlike the Eritrea-Ethiopian case, the South Sudan secession case has a unique and edifying pre- and post- colonial historical narrative whose instructive value to post-colonial governments and governance processes in Africa remains remotely studied and utilized. Despite numerous research on pre-secession Sudan, there has been limited constructively aligned research that unravels the root causes of South Sudan secession, and sift lessons that can be progressively applied to either avoid and prevent secession in Africa, or constructively manage secessionist pressures in a way that retains peace, stability and national development. Using secondary data analysis, this paper explores the root causes of South Sudan secession with a view to discern and deduce adaptable and appropriate lessons that can be learnt by African governments at a time when secessionist conflicts are on the rise.