Suchergebnisse

The pandemic caused by the spread of the infectious disease COVID-19, which affected the entire planet, caused not only the global health crisis, changing the usual way of life of the majority of the world's population, but also affected almost all areas of the state and social system. The health systems were most affected; however, in addition to them, the effects of measures adopted by national legislators or other competent authorities to eliminate or reduce the risk of spreading the disease have affected, inter alia, economic stability, but also challenged the judicial authorities given that in the new circumstances it was not easy to ensure their normal functioning. This primarily refers to the criminal justice, given the importance of cases and the need for urgent action, since it is necessary to ensure the conduct of trials and the work of all procedural entities in conditions that, at least in one period, implied drastic restrictions on some basic civil and human rights and freedoms. In that context, it is especially important to review the justification and legality of the measures introduced in the Republic of Serbia during the state of emergency with the aim of more or less normal operation of the judicial system in conditions when social life was almost completely paralyzed. In addition, there is the question of what challenges and controversial issues are generally posed before criminal law in a pandemic, as well as the analysis of data on the crime rate and the overall crime situation in the Republic of Serbia in the period since the introduction of the state of emergency and during the pandemic.

One of the ways by which the legal system has responded to different sets of problems is the blurring of the traditional boundaries of criminal law, both procedural and substantive. This study aims to explore under what conditions does this trend lead to the improvement of society's welfare by focusing on two distinguishing sanctions in criminal law, incarceration and social stigma. In analyzing how incarceration affects the incentive to an individual to violate a legal standard, we considered the crucial role of the time constraint. This aspect has not been fully explored in the literature on law and economics, especially with respect to the analysis of the beneficiality of imposing either a fine or a prison term. We observed that that when individuals are heterogeneous with respect to wealth and wage income, and when the level of activity can be considered a normal good, only the middle wage and middle income groups can be adequately deterred by a fixed fines alone regime. The existing literature only considers the case of the very poor, deemed as judgment proof. However, since imprisonment is a socially costly way to deprive individuals of their time, other alternatives may be sought such as the imposition of discriminatory monetary fine, partial incapacitation and other alternative sanctions. According to traditional legal theory, the reason why criminal law is obeyed is not mainly due to the monetary sanctions but to the stigma arising from the community's moral condemnation that accompanies conviction or merely suspicion. However, it is not sufficiently clear whether social stigma always accompanies a criminal conviction. We addressed this issue by identifying the circumstances wherein a criminal conviction carries an additional social stigma. Our results show that social stigma is seen to accompany a conviction under the following conditions: first, when the law coincides with the society's social norms; and second, when the prohibited act provides information on an unobservable attribute or trait of an individual -- crucial in establishing or maintaining social relationships beyond mere economic relationships. Thus, even if the social planner does not impose the social sanction directly, the impact of social stigma can still be influenced by the probability of conviction and the level of the monetary fine imposed as well as the varying degree of correlation between the legal standard violated and the social traits or attributes of the individual. In this respect, criminal law serves as an institution that facilitates cognitive efficiency in the process of imposing the social sanction to the extent that the rest of society is boundedly rational and use judgment heuristics. Paradoxically, using criminal law in order to invoke stigma for the violation of a legal standard may also serve to undermine its strength. To sum, the results of our analysis reveal that the scope of criminal law is narrow both for the purposes of deterrence and cognitive efficiency. While there are certain conditions where the enforcement of criminal law may lead to an increase in social welfare, particularly with respect to incarceration and stigma, we have also identified the channels through which they could affect behavior. Since such mechanisms can be replicated in less costly ways, society should first try or seek to employ these legal institutions before turning to criminal law as a last resort.

This article explores the understanding and use of the concept of vulnerability in European Union (EU) law, with a particular focus on the fields of criminal law and consumer protection law. It draws on Fineman's understanding of vulnerability as a universal phenomenon, and considers the scope for, and policy implications of, incorporating (further) such an approach within these fields of law. The article reveals that there is no common understanding of the concept of vulnerability in the fields of EU criminal law and consumer protection law, and there is a lack of overall coherence across these two fields of law. In fact, a common understanding is not even necessarily found within single fields. The purposes served by highlighting"vulnerable"groups and individuals in legislation differs, and references to"vulnerability" result in a stronger focus on the need for individualised assessments, and tailored measures, in EU criminal law than is the case for EU consumer protection law. Indeed, the provisions addressing "vulnerable" consumers are particularly brief and provide very little extra protection. However, both fields of EU law also reveal evidence of a universal approach to vulnerability being taken with regard to communication and information provision, which should be tailored to individual needs and abilities.

Large law firms have become a dominant feature of the legal landscape in the United States and elsewhere. This volume of Studies in Law, Politics, and Society examines the situation of large law firms. The articles collected here address the following questions: How has the large law firm altered, or adapted to, the ideals/ideology of the legal profession? How do law firms function as organizations? What happens to firms when they globalize their practices? What is the situation of scholarship on large law firms? Has the firm been incorporated into boarder interdisciplinary configurations? What, if any,new paradigms ofstudy of firms areon the horizon?.

The right to a fair trial is enshrined in international and domestic law around the world. This article makes the simple argument that the focus on the rights of victims of human trafficking and efforts to increase the rate of prosecutions of human traffickers should not come at the cost of alleged traffickers' rights to a fair trial, as a failure to uphold fair trial rights places them at risk of unfair prosecution. I consider the extent to which the transnational criminal legal regime regulating human trafficking at the international level provides for these fair trial rights, suggest that the fundamental purposes of transnational criminal law exist in a state of tension against the aims of the international human rights regime, and conclude that further empirical research on the legal experiences of human traffickers is necessary.

This article examines the relationship between law and social enterprise. More specifically, it explores ways in which the law and the law school can serve to refine and promote the development of social enterprise. The article begins by canvassing the existing conceptions of social enterprise to provide a basis for understanding and to identify points of access for legal intervention. At the end of this analysis, we arrive at a working definition of social enterprise: A legal entity engaged in socially responsible economic activity for the purpose of generating revenue that is to be used to advance a social mission. Building on the notion that a legal structure is integral to the concept, the article proceeds to explore the ways that the law may change to further promote social enterprise. Finally, the article shifts to examine the impact legal education and law schools have as catalysts for thought leadership and capacity-building for social enterprise.