Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- CHAPTER FOUR Myth and Folktale -- CONTRIBUTORS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1 GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE -- PART 1 Globalization and Changing Locations of Governance -- Chapter 2 THE LEVERAGE OF ECONOMIC THEORIES Explaining Governance in an Internationalized Industry -- Chapter 3 POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY -- Chapter 4 GLOBALIZATION AND FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION -- Chapter 5 GLOBALIZATION AND DEMANDS FOR REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN EUROPE -- Chapter 6 MONETARY GOVERNANCE IN A WORLD OF REGIONAL CURRENCIES -- Chapter 7 GOVERNING GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS International Responses to the Hedge-Fund Problem -- Chapter 8 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOVERNANCE IN SETTING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS -- Chapter 9 GLOBALIZATION AND INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION -- PART 2 Convergence in National Governance -- Chapter 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND NATIONAL POLICY DIVERGENCE -- Chapter 11 GLOBALIZATION AND POLICY DIFFUSION Explaining Three Decades of Liberalization -- Chapter 12 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Global Markets, National Politics -- Chapter 13 GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND CONVERGENCE Fiscal Adjustment in Europe -- PART 3 Democratic Deficits and the Problem of Accountability -- Chapter 14 DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND RIGHTS IN SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE -- Chapter 15 REDEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE -- GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY -- REFERENCES -- INDEX

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)