The central objective of this paper is to put the discussion of women's rights in Afghanistan in the context of the multiple transitions entailed by the process of post-conflict reconstruction: a security transition (from war to peace), a political transition (to the formation of a legitimate and effective state) and a socioeconomic transition (from a 'conflict' economy to sustainable growth). These transformations do not occur in a social vacuum but build upon existing societal arrangements that condition and limit the range of available opportunities. The first section contextualizes current attempts at securing women's rights in the troubled history of state-building and state-society relations in Afghanistan. The latter were marked by tensions between a rentier state bolstered by foreign subsidies, which had a relatively weak engagement with society, and a rural hinterland that both resisted the incursions of the state and attempted to represent tribal interests within it. Attempts at modernization, including the expansion of women's rights, were instigated by a male state elite whose bids to centralize power were thwarted at various junctures. The issue of women's rights was used as a bargaining counter in contests between social forces whose geopolitical entanglements produced sharp swings of the pendulum between extremes such as the Soviet-backed socialist experiment under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Islamist policies of the Pakistani-backed Taliban. However, in a context where the state's interface with local communities, whether in terms of the legal framework, revenue collection or service delivery, was always limited, attempts to analyse women's rights with reference only to government policies suffer from serious shortcomings. It is, rather, to the profound transformations brought about by years of protracted conflict that one must look for a better appraisal of obstacles to and opportunities for more gender-equitable development in Afghanistan. The second section discusses the implications of the far-reaching changes in social relations brought about by years of war and displacement following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A predominantly rural country whose population achieved relatively self-sufficient livelihoods was transformed into a fragmented polity where a significant proportion of the economy is based on illicit, criminalized networks of trade in drugs (opium poppy, in particular) and commodities such as timber and emeralds, smuggling of goods and human trafficking. The central argument put forward in this section is that routine violations of women's rights in Afghanistan are determined by analytically distinct but overlapping and mutually reinforcing sets of influences: the dynamics of gendered disadvantage, the erosion of local livelihoods and growing poverty, the criminalization of the economy, and insecurity due to the predations of armed groups and factions. Particular combinations of new pressures (such as poverty, indebtedness and predation by local strongmen) and existing practices (such as the early marriage of girls against the payment of brideprice) create outcomes that may easily be misidentified as unmediated expressions of local 'culture', thus detracting critical attention from the full nexus of influences that deepen the vulnerability of girls and women. The third section focuses on processes of institutional development and reform since the Bonn Agreement in 2001.The national machinery set up for the advancement of women consists of: the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA); the Office of the State Minister for Women (OSMOW), set up to provide policy guidance with particular reference to legislative and judicial reform processes; the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), tasked with the advancement of women's rights under one of its five programme areas; and the Gender Advisory Group (GAG), a donor-government co-ordination body that assists in formulating a national framework and budget for gender mainstreaming. The most tangible gains so far have been achieved in the area of legal rights, which were enshrined in the new Constitution of January 2004 and provide legal guarantees for women's equality as citizens and for their political representation. Many unresolved questions remain concerning the respective roles of Islamic and tribal laws and the stipulations of international treaties to which the government is a signatory (such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women/CEDAW which was ratified without reservations in March 2003). Without a process of consensus-building through political normalization and reconciliation, the risk that women's rights will be held hostage to factional politics remains high. The expansion of women's formal rights cannot, in any case, translate into substantive benefits in the absence of security and the rule of law. Moreover, women's formal rights to civic participation may have limited impact in a context where they remain wards of their households and communities and where their most basic entitlements to education and health continue to be denied. The conclusion draws attention to crippling disjunctures between different facets of post-conflict transition. Legal and governance reforms have advanced at a faster pace than has been achieved in the security sector or the transition to sustainable livelihoods. There is also a disjuncture between, on the one hand, the time frames adopted and outputs expected by international actors driving the women's rights agenda, and on the other, the length of time required for non-cosmetic changes in societal relations to develop as a result of peace-building. Since the issue of women's rights continues to occupy a highly politicized and sensitive place in the struggles between contending political factions in Afghanistan, this disjuncture may itself produce unintended effects, with disempowering consequences for women.
People who want to start their own business often try to survive or to die again on their own. The very fact that "others", apart from family, friends and fools who invest in their venture, are quickly seen as probable competitors, who want the steal the idea, prevent start ups from cooperation with partners. Setting up a personal network might even cause more risk, since one has to share ideas for technological development of the idea or look for a market for it. The consequence is that within 5 years most new start ups are already out of business (OECD, 1998). The key would be cooperation with others, but with whom and to what extent? Since most of the engineers know that they to develop an innovation, they might need up to a whole R&D lab to help, they might be less reluctant to cooperate than others. On the other hand, they might forget to look for a market or cooperate with a potential customer to design the product, for instance in the ICT-sector (see Van Luxemburg et al.), because of a technology push syndrome? Authors, such as Birley (Several publications from 1985 on) have not failed during the last ten years to develop the idea of and study the effect of networking and strategic alliancing between start ups, entrepreneurship as team work and at least a shared concept for starters who have the same objective in mind. University incubators, such as the one of the Imperial College in London are very successful in promoting the idea (see Theunissen, 2002), but is this the case only in the UK or the US, where the culture of free enterprise is more strongly developed? What about countries, such as France, The Netherlands, and Germany? What is the position, for instance of the entrepreneurial and innovative engineer who wants to start his/her own business? May a lack or a fear to cooperate with others be a result of how engineers traditionally educated in those countries? In 1998 Albert Rubinstein identified "technical entrepreneurship in the firm" as the focus of the future of our intellectual discourse on technology and innovation management. How entrepreneurial are French, German and Dutch engineers and what is their innovation culture and that of the firms they work for? Are those who are leaving those firms to start their own business, willing to cooperate with others, not to fade away in splendid isolation? This chapter certainly cannot answer all those questions, but it can try to develop a model of the entrepreneurial and innovative European engineer and his/her interaction with the environment through networks and cooperation illustrated with examples from the selected countries. This is backed up with some answers to 8 research questions related to data about the general economic environment the entrepreneur works in, the rate and difficulty of self-employment, such as the costs, satisfaction levels, and the possible effect of national culture on willingness to start and the profile traits of the successful innovator and entrepreneur from different empirical sources for France, The Netherlands and Germany. Cooperation between start ups in Europe is certainly not a question of only national culture, a merge or a clash between professional and corporate cultures might foster or hamper as well. Entrepreneurial and innovative engineers build up their experiences of such kind through life time. This chapter is based upon data from 3 different European countries which includes a survey among French engineers (questionnaires and interviews from entrepreneur and non entrepreneur engineers) and a case comparison of 12 innovative German and Dutch firms. How does this transition take place in different parts of Europe? How may engineers become successful entrepreneurs through a happy reconciliation of technological and marketing orientations within a given historical context. Finally this chapter addresses the question how to foster cooperation between European start ups for a better enterprising and innovative culture. Research projects aiming at this issue, might start as comparing national entrepreneurship phenomena, such as suggested partly by Lichtenberger and Naullean (1993) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1999), followed by studying cooperation, networks and alliances (Aliouat, 2000) including globalisation (Birley and Stockley, 1998) and the heterogeneity of teams, for instance by mixing marketers and engineers (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997, and Shaw and Shaw, 1998). Cooperation requires more mobility. Within the European Union, the individual member states face rather an influx of economic refugees (who might create excellent start ups, by the way) than that they can welcome an invasion of entrepreneurial and innovative engineers from another member state. Which French engineer would like to start a business with a German colleague who could implement his idea perfectly? Which German engineer seeks a market-oriented partner in Britain or The Netherlands to fulfill his dream of a successful start up? Which Dutch engineer looks for technology entrepreneurship in France and vice versa? It seems as if new virtual borders prevent start ups also to cooperate. That why this chapter presents a summarizing model of a new cultural identity of Europe based upon Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Mobility using the onion culture metaphor by Hofstede and Schein (both 1991) to increase the mobility of the European engineer (Ulijn and Gould, 2002). A new culture is needed to foster the cooperation between high, low and other tech start ups to facilitate a truly European technology entrepreneurship.
In: Ulijn , J M & Fayolle , A 2002 , Towards cooperation between European start ups : the position of the French, Dutch, and German entrepreneurial and innovative engineer . ECIS working paper series , vol. 200216 , Technische Universiteit Eindhoven , Eindhoven .
People who want to start their own business often try to survive or to die again on their own. The very fact that "others", apart from family, friends and fools who invest in their venture, are quickly seen as probable competitors, who want the steal the idea, prevent start ups from cooperation with partners. Setting up a personal network might even cause more risk, since one has to share ideas for technological development of the idea or look for a market for it. The consequence is that within 5 years most new start ups are already out of business (OECD, 1998). The key would be cooperation with others, but with whom and to what extent? Since most of the engineers know that they to develop an innovation, they might need up to a whole R&D lab to help, they might be less reluctant to cooperate than others. On the other hand, they might forget to look for a market or cooperate with a potential customer to design the product, for instance in the ICT-sector (see Van Luxemburg et al.), because of a technology push syndrome? Authors, such as Birley (Several publications from 1985 on) have not failed during the last ten years to develop the idea of and study the effect of networking and strategic alliancing between start ups, entrepreneurship as team work and at least a shared concept for starters who have the same objective in mind. University incubators, such as the one of the Imperial College in London are very successful in promoting the idea (see Theunissen, 2002), but is this the case only in the UK or the US, where the culture of free enterprise is more strongly developed? What about countries, such as France, The Netherlands, and Germany? What is the position, for instance of the entrepreneurial and innovative engineer who wants to start his/her own business? May a lack or a fear to cooperate with others be a result of how engineers traditionally educated in those countries? In 1998 Albert Rubinstein identified "technical entrepreneurship in the firm" as the focus of the future of our intellectual discourse on technology and innovation management. How entrepreneurial are French, German and Dutch engineers and what is their innovation culture and that of the firms they work for? Are those who are leaving those firms to start their own business, willing to cooperate with others, not to fade away in splendid isolation? This chapter certainly cannot answer all those questions, but it can try to develop a model of the entrepreneurial and innovative European engineer and his/her interaction with the environment through networks and cooperation illustrated with examples from the selected countries. This is backed up with some answers to 8 research questions related to data about the general economic environment the entrepreneur works in, the rate and difficulty of self-employment, such as the costs, satisfaction levels, and the possible effect of national culture on willingness to start and the profile traits of the successful innovator and entrepreneur from different empirical sources for France, The Netherlands and Germany. Cooperation between start ups in Europe is certainly not a question of only national culture, a merge or a clash between professional and corporate cultures might foster or hamper as well. Entrepreneurial and innovative engineers build up their experiences of such kind through life time. This chapter is based upon data from 3 different European countries which includes a survey among French engineers (questionnaires and interviews from entrepreneur and non entrepreneur engineers) and a case comparison of 12 innovative German and Dutch firms. How does this transition take place in different parts of Europe? How may engineers become successful entrepreneurs through a happy reconciliation of technological and marketing orientations within a given historical context. Finally this chapter addresses the question how to foster cooperation between European start ups for a better enterprising and innovative culture. Research projects aiming at this issue, might start as comparing national entrepreneurship phenomena, such as suggested partly by Lichtenberger and Naullean (1993) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1999), followed by studying cooperation, networks and alliances (Aliouat, 2000) including globalisation (Birley and Stockley, 1998) and the heterogeneity of teams, for instance by mixing marketers and engineers (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997, and Shaw and Shaw, 1998). Cooperation requires more mobility. Within the European Union, the individual member states face rather an influx of economic refugees (who might create excellent start ups, by the way) than that they can welcome an invasion of entrepreneurial and innovative engineers from another member state. Which French engineer would like to start a business with a German colleague who could implement his idea perfectly? Which German engineer seeks a market-oriented partner in Britain or The Netherlands to fulfill his dream of a successful start up? Which Dutch engineer looks for technology entrepreneurship in France and vice versa? It seems as if new virtual borders prevent start ups also to cooperate. That why this chapter presents a summarizing model of a new cultural identity of Europe based upon Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Mobility using the onion culture metaphor by Hofstede and Schein (both 1991) to increase the mobility of the European engineer (Ulijn and Gould, 2002). A new culture is needed to foster the cooperation between high, low and other tech start ups to facilitate a truly European technology entrepreneurship.
Immediately after the dicision of the Ambasador's Council of July 28, 1920,concerning the division of the Cieszyn Silesia, it became clear thet the said delimitation did not win the acceptance of any serious political forces in Poland. The Polish state's difficult international situation, however, made the Polish authorities abandon the idea of resolving the Zaolzie question by force. Fruitless negotiations were, at the same time, conducted to obtain the cossion of at least a part of the disputed territory in Poland's favour and various diplomatic interventions were undertaken to improve the situation of the Polish population inhabiting the Zaolzie Silesia. In spite of the low efficiency of such initiatives, in 1925 the political relation between Poland and Czechoslovakia were normalised and a liquidation agreement was signed, which led to a normalisation of mutual relations in the divided area. The actions of the Polish Republic in relation to the Zaolzie were influenced by various factors that were difficult to harmonise. One of them was the necessity to subjugate the Zaolzie question to the atate's general interests, which included an acceptance of the Versailles status quo, and attempts to find a platform of co-operation with Czechoslovakia in view of the growing German threat. Another factor was the desire to maintain the Polish national character of the Zaolzie motivated by the reluctance to give up that territory in an unequivocal way. The expectation of a cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the international context led to the policy of letting bygones be bygones. The democratic nature of the Chechoslovak state afforded a possibility of making the defence of the Polish national rights the responsibility of the Polish deputies in the parliament in Prague. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried then to persuade the leaders of the Polish community in the Zaolzie to assume a more activistic attitude. At the same time, the Polish Consul in Moravska Ostrava supported financially the institutions of the Polish national life nad tried to resist the assimilating policy of the Czech authorities. This tactics brought, up to a point, some results, but it did not prevent all attempts at an assimilation on the part of influential Czech organisations and bussiness circles, neither did it safeguard the conditions of the national life in the Zaolzie so as to obviate the need for the steady flow of the Polish financial aid without which the Polish educational and cultural institutions would not survive. In the late 1920s and early 1930s a rapprochement between Warsaw and Prague seemed to substantiate the hopes for a betterment of the situation of the Poles in the Zaolzie. In the wake of such hopes there appeared Polish-Czechoslovak societies and Czechoslovak-Polish clubs. These clubs reised high expectations in the consular centre in Moravska Ostrava, which hoped that they would help to break down the barriers between the Polish and Czech population and to obtain the support of influential Czech circles for the postulates of the Polish minority. The most committed members of the clubs (just like all, with no exceptions, Polish cosuits in Moravska Ostrava) were treated, however, with great suspicion and aversion by the Czech nationalist circles, as well as by the personalities representing the views of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most far-reaching initiative, that is the idea of calling a reconciliation conference concerning the matters of the Cieszyn Silesia in 1932, ended in a fiasco. Such factors as the way the 1930 sensus was carried out, the obvious deterioration of the living standards at the time of the Great Depression, and the attitude of the persons responsible for the Czech foreign policy who insisted on all Polish citizens leaving Czechoslovakia before "equitable" negotiations with Poland could begin, signalled the end of the period in which a positive and active conduct of the Polish population could seem an efficient antidote to the growing pressure for assimilation. The political events of 1933 changed the perception of the chances for a cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of them being situated between Germany and the Soviet Union, which, in early 1934, made the representatives of the Polish Republic change their policy in the Zaolzie. From then, on the support of the Polish authorities and society for the Polish minority was emphasised, also a pressure was being exerted on the Czechoslovak government by means of an organised press campaign in Poland. The Czechoslovak government, however, did not yield under pressure, and assumed an intransigent attitude, taking this opportunity to get rid of a certain number of the Poles in the Zaolzie. The assimilation of the local Poles both of a natural kind and enforced by political and economic pressure seemed to the Czech authorities to be the best way to pacify this important borderline region. The tactics to which the Polish side resorted did not then lead to an improvement of the situation of the ethnic Poles in Czechoslovakia, it had, however, a different result, namely it aroused the national feelings and kindled the hopes for the Polish state's stronger support for the minority aspirations. In Poland, on the other hand, the internal situation in Poland's southern neighbour state, beginning with the elections of 1935, started to be looked at from the perspective of the apparently imminent crisis. In view of this, while the idea of an intensive propaganda camping was abandoned, the Czech policy in relation to the ethnic minorities was carefully watched, and the internal integration of the Polish community in the Zaolzie was strongly supported.
International Law — Relation to municipal law — Municipal law enacted subsequent to treaty — Supremacy of international law — Provisions of Peace Treaty as lex fori for Conciliation Commission.Nationality — Proof of — Examination by Conciliation Commission of certificate of nationality — Probative value of certificate in international law — Review of validity of naturalization of ancestor on which claim of nationality jus sanguinis based — Refusal to examine circumstances of naturalization and subsequent conduct of ancestor — Examination of relevant Laws of naturalizing State — Review of statement made to passport or other authorities — Theory of effective nationality — Allegation of "apparent nationality" — Invocation of nationality for sake of temporary material advantage — Principle of "estoppel" or "non concedit venire contra factum proprium" — Rejection of doctrine.Nationality — Acquisition of — Jure sanguinis — Examination of circumstances of acquisition of nationality of ancestor — Relevance of animus redeundi.Naturalization — Consequent loss of nationality of origin. — Recovery of nationality of origin — Consequent loss of nationality of naturalization. — Effect on wife and minor children of person naturalized. — Option by children of person naturalized upon attaining majority. — Child of naturalized person who acquired further nationality by naturalization — Recovery of parent's former nationality of naturalization.For avoidance of military service — Prevention of — Bancroft Treaties between United States of America and German States.Nationality — Expatriation — Effect of expatriation of ancestor — Relevance of animus redeundi — The law of the United States of America.Nationality — Loss of — Loss of nationality of origin on naturalization abroad — Loss of nationality on re-naturalization — Effect on minor children.Double nationality — Theory of effective nationality. — Doctrine of apparent nationality — Rejection of.Treaties — Parties to — Composite States — Effect of unification — Treaties with German States — Effect of establishment of German Empire.Treaties — Conclusion and operation of — Effect on third parties — Invocation by third State of treaty affecting nationality.Treaties — Conclusion and operation of — Effect of subsequent legislation.Treaties — Termination of — Outbreak of war.Treaties — Interpretation of — Principles of interpretation — Interpretation by analogy with other treaties. — Clear meaning of text. — Intention of the Parties. — Lacuna in treaty — Filled by reference to municipal law of one Party. — Interpretation by reference to dictionary. — Interpretation by reference to purpose aimed at by the Parties. — Restrictive interpretation of treaty provision deviating from international law. — Interpretation by reference to relevant legislation of one Party. — Effect of subsequent "Memorandum of Understanding" between the Parties. — Interpretation by Reference to decision of municipal court on similar treaty. — Texts of multilingual treaties — Authenticated origlnals — Reconclliation of texts — Comparison of texts In different languages.Peace treaties — Restitution and compensation provisions — Meaning of "treated as enemy" — Allegation of obstruction of sale by Governmental authorities — Rejection of argument that delay constitutes hostile treatment — Critical dates for application of restitution provisions — Necessity for claimant to be national of claiming State when damage sustained.Conciliation — Conciliation Commissions——Evidence before — Examination of certificate of nationality — Probative value of certificate in international law — Need for caution in absence of previous doubts as to nationality invoked — Review of validity of naturalization of ancestor on which claim to nationality jus sanguinis based — Refusal to examine circumstances and subsequent conduct of ancestor — Relevance of fact that ancestor not a party to proceedings — Review of statements made by claimant to passport or other authorities — Principle of "estoppel" or "non concedit venire contra factum proprium" — Rejection of doctrine — Rejection of evidence conflicting with public documents.—Law applied by — Question of legal system applicable — Provisions of Peace Treaty as lex fori — Ouster of national law — Nationality — Claims — Examination of laws of naturalizing State — Examination of treaties — Question of supremacy of municipal law subsequent to treaty — Duty of Commission to give priority to international law. — Right of investigation in questions of nationality.State Responsibility — Claims — Nationality of claims — Examination by Conciliation Commission of certificate of nationality — Probative value of certificate in international law — Question of legal system applicable — Provisions of Peace Treaty as lex fori — Ouster of national law — Need for caution in absence of serious doubts as to nationality invoked — Review of validity of naturalization of ancestor on which claim to nationality jus sanguinis based — Refusal to examine circumstances of naturalization and subsequent conduct of ancestor — Relevance of fact that ancestor not a party to proceedings — Examination of relevant laws of naturalizing State — Review of statements made by claimant to passport authorities, etc. — Expatriation — Effect of ancestor's expatriation on nationality of claimant — Relevance of animus redeundi — The law of the United States of America — Bancroft Treaties between United States and German States, 1868 — Irrelevance of cancellation of treaties on outbreak of war between Parties to Treaty — Irrelevance of fact that party to dispute not Party to Treaty — Question of supremacy of municipal law subsequent to treaty — Duty of Commission to give priority to international law — Interpretation of Treaty concerning nationality — Relevance of decisions of municipal court in similar cases — Theory of effective nationality — Allegation of "apparent nationality" — Invocation of nationality for sake of temporary material advantage — Principle of "estoppel" or "non concedit venire contra factum proprium" — Rejection of doctrine — Question whether claimant "a United Nations National" or whether "treated as enemy" within Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947, Article 78, paragraph 9 — Examination of texts of treaties — Reconciliation of conflicting meaning in various languages — Relevance of "purpose aimed at by the Parties" — Sale of claimant's shares in Italy at undervalue — Allegation of obstruction of sale by Italian authorities — Rejection of argument that delay constitutes hostile treatment — Critical dates for applicability of restitution provisions of Treaty of Peace of 1947 — Necessity for claimant to be national of claiming State on date when damage sustained.
Celebrates the life and legacy of Bayard Rustin, the civil rights leader behind the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and FreedomWhile we can all recall images of Martin Luther King Jr. giving his "I Have a Dream" speech in front of a massive crowd at Lincoln Memorial, few of us remember the man who organized this watershed nonviolent protest in eight short weeks: Bayard Rustin. This was far from Rustin's first foray into the fight for civil rights. As a world-traveling pacifist, he brought Gandhi's protest techniques to the forefront of US civil rights demonstrations, helped build the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, led the fight for economic justice, and played a deeply influential role in the life of Dr. King by helping to mold him into an international symbol of nonviolent resistance. Rustin's legacy touches many areas of contemporary life-from civil resistance to violent uprisings, democracy to socialism, and criminal justice reform to war resistance. Despite these achievements, Rustin was often relegated to the background. He was silenced, threatened, arrested, beaten, imprisoned, and fired from important leadership positions, largely because he was an openly gay man in a fiercely homophobic era. With expansive, searching, and sometimes critical essays from a range of esteemed writers-including Rustin's own partner, Walter Naegle-this volume draws a full picture of Bayard Rustin: a gay, pacifist, socialist political radical who changed the course of US history and set a precedent for future civil rights activism, from LGBTQ+ Pride to Black Lives Matter
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Russia's war against Ukraine has brought back to the spotlight the question of China's (officially the People's Republic of China, PRC) potential attack on Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC). Beijing claims that the island is one of its provinces, whereas the current Taiwanese government maintains that it is already an independent country. A conflict over Taiwan – or even a Chinese blockade of the island – would have immediate economic and political implications for Europe which will likely impose sanctions on the PRC, the EU's second-largest trading partner.[1] The EU is not a security actor in East Asia, but has some formidable – and unique – soft power assets that could be leveraged to promote dialogue and understanding between China and Taiwan, with the objective of reducing tensions in the area and maintaining the status quo.In search of a thaw in Cross-Strait relations Cross-Strait relations – the relations between the PRC and ROC – have worsened in recent years.[2] Official lines of communication have been interrupted. Travel links between the two countries were frequent before the Covid-19 pandemic era – but no longer. Many Taiwanese are now avoiding the mainland, though they can still enter there by showing their identity card (the Taiwanese passport is not recognised by the PRC), while for many Chinese citizens it is almost impossible to travel to Taiwan for work, study or even tourism. A wall has been erected between the two sides, and each blames the other for this situation. On 20 May 2024, Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, who won the presidential election in January, will inaugurate his Presidency. As a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and vice-president under Tsai Ing-wen – the first female president of the country in power from 2016 to 2024 – Lai is known for his pro-independence stance. No wonder that his election has been met with uneasiness by Chinese leaders who were betting on the victory of the Kuomintang (KMT – or Guomindang, the Chinese Nationalist Party), a conservative party whose origin goes back to the establishment of the ROC and that traditionally seeks to promote dialogue and reconciliation with the mainland. In the last parliamentary elections also held in January, the KMT won 52 seats, making it the largest single party in the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan's Parliament). The DPP, having won 51 seats, declined to the second largest party while the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) – a recently created centre-left political force – ranked third with eight seats. In other words, while DPP candidate William Lai won the presidential race, his party failed to obtain the majority in a Parliament now controlled by the opposition. Thus, many analysts have suggested that while the Taiwanese continue to support the DPP pro-independence position, they also want to de-escalate tensions with China – hence the slight majority given to the KMT.[3] On the other side of the Strait, the PRC's leadership seems to recognise that it can no longer use economics to bring about unification and that the so-called 'one country, two systems' approach, after its failure in Hong Kong and the clear hostility toward it in Taiwan, no longer works. Although the possibility of an invasion of the island remains, it entails serious risks for the Chinese leadership, as the US and its allies would likely impose harsh sanctions on China. An economic downturn would undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly among the urban middle classes: having enjoyed rising standards of living in recent decades, the latter have then become the staunchest supporters of the Chinese regime – but they have much to lose from a war. The survival of the party is the top priority in Beijing, thus reunification with Taiwan by force can wait for the moment. In the meantime, President Xi Jinping has allegedly tasked Wang Huning, a member of the powerful CCP Politburo Standing Committee and the CCP's 'chief ideologue' as well as China's most senior official in charge of Taiwan's policy, to come up with a new framework for unification.[4] A new CCP approach to Taiwan seems to be emerging, one that emphasises "shared roots" – as seen during the meeting between Xi and former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou on 10 April 2024. On that occasion, Xi declared that "nobody can stop family reunion" with Taiwan, highlighting the importance of common history and culture between the two sides.[5] A similar tone was used at the end of April, when a delegation of 17 KMT lawmakers went to Beijing to meet Wang Huning in what was called an "ice breaker trip".[6] Yet, during the discussions between the two sides, more than 30 People's Liberation Army military aircraft were detected near Taiwan – one of the highest daily incursions in 2024, signalling that Beijing, while wanting to reset ties with Taiwan, continues however to maintain pressure over the island. In the current tense situation, it is not only the KMT which seeks dialogue with Beijing. President Lai has also repeatedly expressed his hope to re-establish communication with Beijing, based on equality and mutual respect. During the electoral campaign, Lai even said he hoped to meet with Xi Jinping over beef noodles and bubble tea.[7] As both China and Taiwan seek a thaw in their bilateral relations, it could be a perfect time for the EU to step up its involvement in Cross-Strait affairs to see whether dialogue and understanding can be increased, and tensions defused. The EU is not perceived as a threatening force and its image in East Asia is that of, mainly, a civilian and soft power actor. The EU could thus act as a facilitator of dialogue in a way that other major players cannot.Think trilateral: China-EU-Taiwan European governments continue to officially abide by the "One China" policy – that is, the acknowledgement of Beijing's position that there is only one Chinese government. Under this policy, the EU and its member states recognise and have formal ties with the PRC rather than Taiwan. In practice, however, EU institutions and European governments are treating Taiwan as a "de facto" independent state with which they are entitled to entertain economic and political relations.[8] The European Parliament is leading efforts aimed at upgrading relations with Taiwan. In December 2023, EU lawmakers unanimously passed a resolution on promoting EU-Taiwan trade and investment ties, calling for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo by force.[9] European lawmakers – both at the national and EU levels – continue to travel to the island to show support for Taiwan. Many EU member states regularly send government delegations notwithstanding criticism from Beijing. The Europeans, however, tend to avoid being confrontational vis-à-vis Beijing when it comes to Taiwan, contrary to the United States which does not shy away from openly provoking China. The EU has little real leverage on both Beijing and Washington regarding Cross-Strait relations. While the maintenance of the status-quo is in the long-term interest of the EU, the defence of the island from an attack – or blockade – from the mainland is left to the care of the US and its Asian allies. What the EU can instead do is to leverage its soft power assets in the region. The Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence scattered in many countries, including in China and Taiwan, are an asset that Brussels could use to promote dialogue and understanding between the two sides of the Strait. These centres are focal points of competence and knowledge on EU issues.[10] Managed by the European Commission, but with close links with the EU Delegation in the host country, they aim to promote knowledge of the EU, its policies and values, through academic research, partnerships and programmes of public activities. Until last year, Chinese and Taiwanese scholars working at the Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence in their respective countries regularly met to discuss – using the Chinese language – issues related to the EU, its history of reconciliation and the process of European integration. This year, due to heightened tensions, no such meeting is planned. It would be in the strategic interest of the EU to step in and facilitate such a meeting among EU experts located on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. And should such meeting be impossible to be held in either China or Taiwan for political reasons, the EU should offer to host it in Singapore, where there is a very active EU Centre. It would not be the first time that the EU Centres would be leveraged by the EU to promote the reasons of dialogue and mutual understanding in the region. For instance, the EU delegation in Seoul has consistently backed the Trilateral Cooperation process, a consultative mechanism which involves China-Japan-South Korea, by supporting, both politically and financially, various workshops and initiatives organised for young students with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and the sense of friendship among future leaders of the three countries. These activities are often supported by – and held at – the Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence located in the three North-East Asian nations. Recent developments inside China and Taiwan should thus invite the EU to consider doing something similar in the context of Cross-Strait relations. The EU should seriously start thinking 'trilateral': China-EU-Taiwan, finding ways to facilitate dialogue between Chinese and Taiwanese experts of the EU. A concrete step in this direction could be the establishment of a Think Tank Forum on China-EU-Taiwan relations. By keeping it at the level of scholars and by focusing on EU studies (avoiding, at least officially, sensitive issues) it may overcome resistance from various quarters. By doing that, the EU would make strategic use of some of its soft power capabilities. With little investment in terms of time and resources, it may contribute to dialogue and understanding in a region where, should tensions spiral out of control, the result could be very damaging not only for the EU, but for the entire world.Nicola Casarini is Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Taiwan Fellowship Program Visiting Scholar at the EU Centre, National Taiwan University, Taipei.[1] Niklas Swanström, Agust Börjesson and Yi-Chieh Chen (eds), "Why Taiwan Matters to Europe", in ISDP Special Papers, May 2024, https://www.isdp.eu/publication/why-taiwan-matters-to-europe.[2] Lindsay Maizland, "Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense", in CFR Backgrounders, 8 February 2024, https://www.cfr.org/node/227980.[3] Brian Hart et al., "Taiwan's 2024 Elections: Results and Implications", in CSIS Critical Questions, 19 January 2024, https://www.csis.org/node/108968.[4] John Dotson, "Wang Huning's First Year Supervising the United Front System: Taiwan Policy and Discourse", in Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 2024), p. 8-11, https://globaltaiwan.org/?p=25078.[5] "China's Xi Says Nobody Can Stop 'Family Reunion' with Taiwan", in Reuters, 10 April 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinese-president-xi-meets-former-taiwan-president-ma-beijing-2024-04-10.[6] "KMT Lawmakers' Trip to China Receives Mixed Responses in Taiwan", in Focus Taiwan, 29 April 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202404290022.[7] Courtney Donovan Smith, "Could China Employ an Insidious Boiled Frog Approach to Improve Taiwan Ties?", in Taipei Times, 14 May 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2024/05/14/2003817824.[8] Nicola Casarini, "Brussels–Taipei: Changing the Game?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 22|43 (September 2022), p. 1, https://www.iai.it/en/node/16049.[9] European Parliament, Resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Relations, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0472_EN.html.[10] For more information see the Erasmus+ website: Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence, https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/node/515.
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A full-scale confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel could easily destabilize other parts of the Middle East, exacerbate regional tensions, and create serious humanitarian disasters in Lebanon. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan says he is standing with Lebanon. Last month, he addressed Israel's war in Gaza and the dangers of a full-scale war in southern Lebanon. While calling Western support for Israel "pitiful" and warning about a "big catastrophe" as a result of "Netanyahu's plans to spread the [Gaza] war to the region," Erdogan declared that Turkey stands "in solidarity with Lebanon." While Turkey may not play a central role in any future conflict and its direct investments in Lebanon are limited, officials in Ankara are concerned that an Israel-Hezbollah war could spark a multi-continental crisis that would negatively affect Turkey's interests across many countries."Turkey's warnings against such an escalation reflect its commitment to regional stability and its desire to avoid severe humanitarian, geopolitical, security, and economic consequences," said Gökhan Ereli, the Gulf Studies Coordinator at ORSAM (an Ankara-based think tank), in an interview with RS.Changes in Turkey-Hezbollah relations?Despite past tensions between Turkey and Hezbollah, it is evident that the Israeli war on Gaza war and its regional expansion have arguably put Ankara and the Lebanese organization in the same boat, at least to some extent."Erdogan has positioned Turkey as leader of the Islamic World and champion of the Palestinians. Although Hezbollah and Turkey were adversaries during Syria's civil war – with [the former] supporting the Syrian Arab Army and [the latter] supporting the opposition militias, the two are now on the same side, supporting the Palestinians," explained Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, in an interview with RS.When addressing Erdogan's statement about being in "solidarity with Lebanon," Ereli told RS that such language "underscores Turkey's critical stance towards Israel's aggressive policies and their potential to exacerbate regional conflicts."He added that the Turkish president's "use of the term 'pitiful' to describe Western governments' support for Israel highlights Turkey's disapproval of what it sees as a one-sided approach that neglects the broader consequences for regional stability."But Ereli also stressed the importance of distinguishing between Erdogan's support for Lebanon as a state versus Hezbollah as a political entity."Erdogan's expression of solidarity with [the Lebanese] state should not be interpreted as support for Hezbollah or any other non-state actor. Rather, his remarks are directed towards the Lebanese state and the brotherly people of Lebanon, emphasizing Turkey's commitment to supporting the sovereignty and stability of Lebanon amidst the ongoing tensions," he told RS.Limits to Turkey's CloutAs much as Ankara would like to see Israel show restraint vis-à-vis Lebanon, some experts believe that Turkey is not necessarily positioned to do much to influence either Hezbollah or Israel. They also maintain that Ankara's political stakes in Lebanon are much lower than those which Turkey has in Palestine."Turkey would of course have to react to the crisis, especially if it were to engulf Syria and trigger more instability south of the Turkish border," said Aron Lund, a Middle East expert at Century International, in an RS interview."But I don't think Turkey has a lot of leverage or even, to be frank, a lot at stake in Lebanon. It's still some way removed from Turkey's home territory and core interests. Lebanon and Hezbollah do not hold the same emotional appeal as the cause of Palestine. Israel invading Lebanon would probably be seen as one more transgression to protest, but Erdogan and his supporters are already very worked up about Gaza," he added.Intensifying friction in Turkish-Israeli relationsMore than nine months into Israel's military campaign in Gaza, Ankara-Tel Aviv relations have significantly worsened. This is not just about strong rhetoric. Turkey's ban on trade with Israel in May, from which Azerbaijan's export of oil to Israel that depends on a Turkish port was exempted, highlighted the seriousness of bilateral tensions.Two main factors likely explain why Ankara has, until now, permitted Azerbaijan's oil to keep flowing to Israel via Turkey. First, cutting off these flows from Azerbaijan to Israel would harm Turkey's economy. Second, Baku is probably Ankara's single closest ally, and Turkish policymakers understand the negative impact that such a move would have on Azerbaijan.But if an all-out Hezbollah-Israel war erupts this summer, "Erdogan will be forced to ratchet up penalties on Israel," according to Landis, who believes that under such circumstances the Turkish government would likely find itself under serious popular pressure to extend the trade ban to Azerbaijan's oil.There have already been protests in Turkey against Azerbaijan's oil exemption. The Israeli war economy depends on this oil from Azerbaijan, which the Israelis have become significantly more reliant upon since the start of this year.Yet, the door to diplomacy between Ankara and Tel Aviv is not entirely shut. Despite all the friction with Israel, Erdogan's government has not severed diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, and a dialogue has continued between the two countries since October 7, 2023."Although political and diplomatic ties have been stressed, it is important to note that both countries have not permanently withdrawn their ambassadors but have called them back for security consultations and discussions," explained Ereli. "This indicates that Turkey is still leaving room for diplomatic channels with Israel."However, the Ankara-based analyst warned that "any new acts of aggression by Israel could jeopardize this delicate balance and potentially push relations to a new low."Ultimately, while Ankara has thus far kept some level of diplomatic engagement with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, it is worth considering how a major Israeli offensive in southern Lebanon could change the picture."Turkey remains committed to maintaining a level of diplomatic engagement, but continued hostilities could risk further deterioration of ties, making future reconciliation efforts between Turkey and Israel more challenging," Ereli told RS.
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Slovakia has been a solid supporter of its neighbor, Ukraine. It has supported Kyiv diplomatically in the UN, EU, and NATO. They were one of the first countries to provide military aid to Ukraine.Moreover, Slovakia has sent Ukraine ammunition, surface-to-air missiles, and helicopters. Along with Poland, they were the first country to transfer fighter jets — their entire fleet of retired MiG-29 fighters — and they were the first country to send an air defense system, the only S-300 air defense system they had.But on September 30, Robert Fico and his leftist-populist Smer-SSD party won 23% of the vote in the parliamentary elections on a platform that included the promise that if his party "enters government, we will not send a single round of ammunition to Ukraine." If SMER-SSD is able to create a majority coalition Fico will be Slovakia's prime minister for the third time. He resigned his last term in 2018 after the murder of a journalist who was reporting alleged ties between organized crime and government officials.The Progressive Slovakia party came in second with about 17% of the vote, followed by the Hlas party with 14.7%. Hlas split off from Smer in 2020, and its leader, Peter Pellegrini, has suggested that he leans toward supporting Fico. Pellegrini has said that Slovakia "had nothing left to donate" to Ukraine, but that Slovakia should continue manufacturing and shipping ammunition to Ukraine.Fico doubled down on Ukraine Sunday, saying his position "has not changed." He then explained that "People in Slovakia have bigger problems than Ukraine." He added that he is "prepared to help Ukraine in a humanitarian way … we are prepared to help with the reconstruction of the state. But you know our opinion on arming Ukraine."In addition to no longer arming Ukraine, Fico promised to "do everything" in his power to start peace talks to end the war. He also opposes EU sanctions on Russia and Ukraine joining NATO. Fico has also attributed blame equally to the political West and Ukraine for starting the war.Meanwhile, Poland has been, perhaps, the strongest supporter of Ukraine. It has given Ukraine about a third of its own weapons — about $4 billion worth — and been the major transit point for the movement of other NATO countries' weapons into Ukraine. It has been a forceful supporter of Ukraine's bids for more advanced weapons and for membership in NATO.But a dispute over the export of Ukrainian grain has exposed the fragility of that partnership. The fragility was irritated by Poland's annoyance over what it sees as Ukraine's unwillingness to confront a nationalist past that was hostile to Poland. In July, the Polish parliament adopted a resolution that includes "recognition of guilt" by Ukraine for the Volhynian massacre — anti-Polish ethnic cleansings conducted by Ukrainian nationalists in German occupied Poland through the summer of 1943. According to the resolution, "Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, which representatives of both nations have been building for years, should also include an admission of guilt and perpetuation of the memory of the victims of World War II." Meanwhile, Canadian officials had to apologize last week for paying tribute to a Ukrainian Canadian World War II veteran who was later revealed to be a member of the Nazi German Waffen-SS's Galizien Division. Poland's ambassador to Ukraine later told Canadian CTV News that "this is a person who participated in an organization that was targeting Poles, was committing mass murders of Poles, not only the military personnel but also civilians."But it is the recent grain dispute that threatens to tear the fragile relationship. Ukraine has accused Poland of abandoning them by restricting the import of Ukrainian grain to protect Polish farmers and markets. Poland shot back that Ukraine needs to be "more grateful" and suggested that Kiev "should start to appreciate the role that Poland has played for Ukraine in the past months and years." Ukraine then responded by calling in the Polish ambassador to Ukraine, a diplomatic maneuver Poland's Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said "should not have happened," calling it "a mistake . . . given the huge support Poland has provided to Ukraine."The row grew worse when, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Poland of betraying Ukraine and abetting Russia, complaining that "some in Europe play out solidarity in a political theatre – making thriller from the grain. They may seem to play their own role but in fact, they are helping set the stage to a Moscow actor."That accusation, together with Ukraine's taking Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia to the World Trade Organization over their import ban on Ukrainian grain, pushed Morawiecki to announce that Poland is "no longer transferring weapons to Ukraine, because we are now arming Poland with more modern weapons," though they would honor the arms agreements they already have with Ukraine and permit other countries to ship their arms to Ukraine through Poland.The last of the three countries that Ukraine has filed a complaint against with the WTO, Hungary, has also recently joined Poland and Slovakia in widening the crack in NATO. Hungary was the originator of the Eastern European fissure, refusing to send weapons to Ukraine, advocating peace talks as a solution to the war, and criticizing sanctions on Russia. But that widened on September 25 when Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban announced an end of support for Ukraine in international affairs. Orban's government is upset with Ukraine over a law that restricts the use of minority languages in Ukraine. Hungary claims that this law violates the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine to use Hungarian, especially in education. "They want to transform [Hungarian schools] into Ukrainian schools and if that does not work they want to close them," Orban said before adding that "We do not support Ukraine in any issue in the international scene until it restores the laws that guarantee the rights of Hungarians."Fico's election could put Slovakia in a triumvirate of countries with Poland and Hungary that all share borders with Ukraine, that all are members of NATO and that all, to a degree that remains to be seen, are widening the crack within NATO on its stance on the war in Ukraine.
RESUMEN: Las políticas educativas en Colombia han otorgado gran relevancia en mejorar los procesos formativos en las Instituciones Educativas. En particular en el área de Ciencias Naturales, han surgido un sinnúmero de proyectos educativos orientados desde las prácticas de enseñanza con el propósito de favorecer en los estudiantes la adquisición de habilidades científicas necesarias para proyectar en la sociedad; puesto que dicha sociedad no sólo requiere sujetos con conocimientos específicos, también demanda sujetos con habilidades sociales que les permitan convivir adecuadamente en el seno de una comunidad. No obstante, pese a todas las regulaciones y contribuciones de las políticas educativas, los procesos de enseñanza continúan siendo impartidos de un modo dogmático y ajeno a la realidad social, en los que se vislumbra que la formación ciudadana en la clase de ciencias no es importante de ser tratada. Dicha situación podría ser ocasionada por la mirada tradicional de la actividad científica la cual se ha arraigado culturalmente. Como supuesto de investigación en este proyecto se considera que esta manera de asumir la actividad científica ocasiona la falta de formación de sujetos políticos que contribuyan a la transformación social. De acuerdo a lo anterior, vale la pena preguntarse entonces ¿Cuál es el aporte de la educación en ciencias que favorezca los procesos de reconciliación y respeto por la diferencia? ¿Qué perspectivas y enfoques de la enseñanza de las ciencias son los adecuados y pertinentes para favorecer una formación ciudadana? Esta investigación asume que, una enseñanza de las ciencias contextualizada en reflexiones metacientíficas puede favorecer la articulación entre la formación en ciencias y la formación ciudadana. En atención a lo anterior, se expone una propuesta pedagógica dirigida a profesores, cuyo propósito es vincular algunas reflexiones metacientíficas en los procesos de enseñanza como una manera de articular la formación en ciencias y la formación ciudadana a la luz del uso de controversias históricas. Se proponen una serie de actividades tomando como referentes teóricos fragmentos de primera fuente que abordan episodios de controversias históricas de la astronomía. En particular, se retoma la controversia protagonizada por Galileo Galilei en el siglo XVII acerca del movimiento de la Tierra. En primer lugar, se muestra un análisis sobre las explicaciones científicas como discursos para favorecer la convivencia. Posteriormente, se presenta el carácter discursivo de la experimentación como una forma de pluralismo y transformación social. Para el análisis de la información se toman los discursos de un grupo de profesores en formación de la Licenciatura en Matemáticas y Física de la Facultad de Educación de la Universidad de Antioquia. De acuerdo al análisis de contenido de la información obtenida, se presentan los hallazgos a través de fundamentos teóricos, donde se pone de manifiesto el carácter socio-cultural de la actividad científica y simultáneamente se pone en práctica el ejercicio de la convivencia y la pluralidad en la clase de ciencias. Así mismo, se analiza el aporte de la propuesta pedagógica a través de los discursos de los participantes por medio de una rubrica que establece tres niveles de asimilación de la relación entre la formación en ciencias y formación ciudadana. ; ABSTRACT: Educational policies in Colombia have given great relevance in improving the teaching processes in Educational Institutions. In particular in the area of Natural Sciences, countless educational projects have emerged oriented from teaching practices, with the purpose of favoring in students the acquisition of scientific skills necessary to project in society. Since, society not only requires subjects with specific knowledge, it also demands subjects with social skills that allow them to live properly within a community. However, despite all the regulations and contributions of educational policies, the teaching processes continue to be taught in a dogmatic and foreign way to social reality, in which it is envisioned that citizen education in science class is not important to be treated. This situation could be caused by the traditionalist gaze of scientific activity which has been culturally rooted. As research assumption in this project, it is considered that this way of assuming scientific activity causes the lack of training of political subjects that contribute to social transformation. According to the above, it is worth asking then, what is the contribution of science education that favors the processes of reconciliation and respect for difference? What perspectives and focusing to science education are adequate and relevant to promote citizen education? This research assumes that a science teaching contextualized in meta-scientific reflections can favor the articulation between science training and citizen training. In view of the above, a pedagogical proposal directed to professors is exposed, whose purpose is to link some meta-scientific reflections in teaching processes as a way of articulating science education and citizen training in light of the use of historical controversies. A series of activities are proposed taking as theoretical references fragments of first source that address episodes of historical controversies of astronomy. In particular, the controversy starring Galileo Galilei in the seventeenth century about the movement of the Earth is resumed. Firstly, an analysis of the scientific explanations as discourses to favor coexistence is shown. Subsequently, the discursive nature of experimentation is presented as a form of pluralism and social transformation. For the analysis of the information the speeches of a group of teachers in formation of the Degree in Mathematics and Physics of the Facultad de Educación of the Universidad de Antioquia are taken. According to the content analysis of the information obtained, the findings are presented through theoretical foundations, where the socio-cultural nature of the scientific activity is revealed and simultaneously the exercise of coexistence and plurality are put into practice in science class. Likewise, the contribution of the pedagogical proposal is analyzed through the speeches of the participants through a rubric that establishes three levels of assimilation of the relationship between science education and citizen training.
Written from a practice-as-research perspective, this thesis focuses on the use of testimony in creating material for the stage. Designed as a reflexive performance ethnography and action research study, the work is concerned with developing a new performative strategy to address the memory of pain in the aftermath of conflict and to contribute to rebuilding communities dispersed by social and political unrest. Informed by methodologies and performance practices involved with the curation of testimonial content and conceptually inspired by the work of theatre director Augusto Boal, anthropologist Victor Turner and psychiatrist Dori Laub, Memodrome, as I named my technique, resides within the field of Applied Drama. It is intended to facilitate the direct interaction between a testifier and an empathic witness while generating simultaneous narratives based on the memories of the participants and their synergetic experiences. By using testimonial performance to explore aspects of the exilic and diasporic experience of Romanians in the UK and by making reference to the political and social tensions in the aftermath of the 1989 anti-communist revolution, this research aims at contributing to the understanding of how the experience of pain can reshape the cultural behaviour of a community and address feelings of belonging. Memodrome: Incubator, Memodrome: Roots and Memodrome: Home, the three performances I have created for the purpose of this PhD research, are experimental laboratories based on the particular and various experiences of life impacted by coercive and oppressive political governance. Memodrome: Incubator presents the testimony of a Romanian refugee artist who escaped a 30 years sentence in a communist prison by fleeing to the UK. Memodrome: Home explores testimonies of four Romanian migrants in the UK while Memodrome: Roots, constructed as a counter performance, captures the testimonies of six Romanians who are still based in their native country but reportedly feel that life under communism affected their feelings of belonging. The three case studies mentioned above constitute the foundation for developing a new performative strategy aimed at supporting communities affected by conflict to claim their past, commemorate painful experiences and celebrate survival. Examining the role of collective memory in the formation of public narratives, my proposal offers an alternative space where tensions can be negotiated through democratic means of spectatorship and collective authorship. This project demonstrates how capturing and performing personal testimonies can bring members of the community together and bridge differences. This work is structured in three main parts, each organised with several chapters and subchapters. In the first part of this thesis, I will provide a brief historical context and discuss how Romanian cultural behaviour has been reshaped in the shadows of the communist oppression. I will explore issues of identity in the aftermath of the anti-communist revolution in 1989 and argue that Romanians formed a new nation, one of people who lost their sense of place and belonging. I will also present my methodological approach articulating my affiliation with the practice of Applied Drama and explain how my academic and cultural background allowed me to engage with this work from a performative ethnographic perspective. In addition, in the first part of the written work, I will reflect on theoretical aspects with reference to memory, trauma, identity and nationhood and show how testimony can provide a powerful and restorative device in negotiating the tensions within communities affected by pain and oppression. In the second part of the research I will illustrate the conceptual framework of how I developed this new performative strategy to address the life of communities affected by painful pasts and to promote routines of reconciliation between its members by using testimony and performance. I will be reflecting on performativity, performance and the making of the self from an experiential perspective. Moreover, I will provide a theoretical framework to locate my practice alongside existing practices including Augusto Boals's Forum Theatre technique and his concept of simultaneous dramaturgy that has influenced my thinking and technical approach. I will be articulating performative aspects which inform my strategy and establishing in particular how participative performance, as an art of experience, can provide a valuable platform for democratic spectatorship and collaborative authorship. The present study is carried in the form of a practice-as-research PhD and therefore I will describe the process of creating three performances – Memodrome: Incubator, Memodrome: Home and Memodrome: Roots – and using them as investigation tools to design a new performative strategy I have called Memodrome. The third part of this work is concerned with the illustration of the practice and demonstrating how performance art, especially Applied Drama, is defined by the process rather than result. The three case studies that I will be presenting emphasise how performing testimony and the staging of oral histories can respond to questions of belonging and social interaction while driving the negotiation of identities in the public sphere. For example, Memodrome: Incubator – where I staged the story of Mariana Gordan, a Romanian exile living in Britain for the past thirty years and Memodrome: Home – where I staged the testimonies of four Romanian migrants living in London – can both be read as counter narratives to the story of Romanian migration in the UK. They all articulate frames of selfhood that have been only very rarely, if never, represented in the British mainstream public space with connection to the Romanian diaspora: the role of the artist, gender diversity, women activism, otherness versus togetherness. Likewise, Memodrome: Roots, produced in Romania, provides an insightful picture of the struggles concerning the identity of the Romanian self and the contrastive narratives of its cultural embodiment. I will conclude each case study with the learnings and reflections extracted from each performance and describe my decision making based on those findings. A relatively new way of engaging with both research and arts or producing new knowledge1, the practice-as-research model can yet pose some challenges and tensions within different academic frames. As a practitioner at core, my writing will be aiming at capturing the essence of the practice in the making, the process and the experience.