Suchergebnisse

The author deals with the possibility of the application of the formalized mod in the study of the public administration issue in the federally structured American administration. The theory of American federalism has taught us that the expenses of the implementation of political decisions are inversely proportionate to the administrative level of their application: the expenses are bigger if the implementation is done at lower administrative levels, i.e. state or local instead federal authorities. On the other hand, that theory claims that the decision-making expenses are proportionate to the level of decision-making: the lower the decision-making level, the smaller the expenses. The American experience in the arena of the policy of oil and gas exploitation confirms the model's rationale, and is applicable to other fields: the optimal effect and the minimal expenses have been achieved in the situation in which political regulations are decided upon at the state level, while their implementation lies within the domain of federal government. (SOI : PM: S. 162)

The author analyses the possibilities of a symbiosis of the democratic and the constitutional principle, the expression of the strain between the desire for popular sovereignty and the wish to establish the fundamental rules of political life as permanently as possible. Sieyes' distinction between the constituting and the constituted power can easily link the idea of popular sovereignty with the idea of constitutional state, but cannot answer the question of the constituting power's right to restrain the constituted power. Since its inception, the democratic constitutional state has been a dyadic entity i.e. a democratic and constitutional state. The dilemma is whether to respect the existing constitution and follow the procedure envisioned for amending it, or to make amendments following a revolutionary breach with the existing situation i.e. a direct manoeuvre of the constituting power. The author is in favour of separating what the constituting power may decide upon and what the constituted power may decide upon, since this maintains the balance of both types of powers in a constitutional state. (SOI : PM: S. 28)

The article problematizes dominant understandings of moral rights to territory and rejects the claim that the legitimacy of independence of the former Yugoslav republics can be grounded in the right of their peoples to self-determination, either within ethnic or then-existing administrative boundaries. Instead, the most promising normative justification for a decision to recognize Yugoslav republics as independent states follows from a particular interpretation of the all-affected interests principle in democratic theory, which leads to a radical reconceptualization of the idea of the people, 'its' territory, and the legitimate role of the international community. Adapted from the source document.

The author argues that in the debates about "democratic transition" of post- socialist societies the importance of development of state of law for the formation of democracy has not been sufficiently accounted for. The absence of state of law results in the formation of authoritarian structures of politi power which in the long run obstruct the process of democratization. Those structures include the concentration of political power in the hands of charismatic leaders, the transformation of political into economic power, the formation of clientelist structures, the development of a system of privileges and corruption, and the break-down of the state monopoly of the means of violence, resulting in the "refeudalization" of political power. In conclusion the author describes two developmental options for the post-socialist societies: the formation of a "Latin American" type of authoritarian-populist regimes or the gradual transformation towards a Western type of state of law and liberal democracy, initiated by the pressures from the international environment and internal forces. (SOI : PM: S. 85)

The author poses the question: what makes Francois Mitterrand the "classic" type of ruler i.e. what makes him above-the-average contemporary politician. Following the well-documented analysis of the entire period of his rule, the author concludes: history will reveal Mitterrand's various masks, but never his true face. He exploited the classical mise en scene of power, so his true persona should be sought in the interplay of his numerous disguises. Mitterrand stands out among the contemporary political figures in the ability to use his power to ward off all attempts at its usurpation, th transforming his own power into the memory of the coming generations. (SOI : S. 178)

The author analyses the role of the constitutional judiciary and the traditional theory of the tripartite division of power. His radical conclusion is: the division of power in Montesquieu's sense, as a tool of control and balance in modern state, does not exist. There is no social violence to which such balance, control or correction could be applied to. In such circumstances, the role, selection and work of constitutional judges is of utmost significance for the control, correction and balancing of political process. (SOI : PM: S. 87)