Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice
In: The Economic Journal, Band 91, Heft 361, S. 262
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In: The Economic Journal, Band 91, Heft 361, S. 262
In: 47 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (1994-1995)
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 41-48
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Working paper
In: Public Choice
Riker (Liberalism against populism, Waveland, New York, 1982) famously argued that Arrow's impossibility theorem undermined the logical foundations of "populism", the view that in a democracy, laws and policies ought to express "the will of the people". In response, his critics have questioned the use of Arrow's theorem on the grounds that not all configurations of preferences are likely to occur in practice; the critics allege, in particular, that majority preference cycles, whose possibility the theorem exploits, rarely happen. In this essay, I argue that the critics' rejoinder to Riker misses the mark even if its factual claim about preferences is correct: Arrow's theorem and related results threaten the populist's principle of democratic legitimacy even if majority preference cycles never occur. In this particular context, the assumption of an unrestricted domain is justified irrespective of the preferences citizens are likely to have.
In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 147-163
ISSN: 1573-0476
In: Public choice, Band 179, Heft 1-2, S. 97-111
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Pacific economic review, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 223-238
ISSN: 1468-0106
Since Sen's insightful analysis of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Arrow's theorem is often interpreted as a consequence of the exclusion of interpersonal information from Arrow's framework. Interpersonal comparability of either welfare levels or welfare units is known to be sufficient for circumventing Arrow's impossibility result. But it is less well known whether one of these types of comparability is also necessary or whether Arrow's conditions can already be satisfied in much narrower informational frameworks. This note explores such a framework: the assumption of (ONC + 0), ordinal measurability of welfare with the additional measurability of a "zero‐line", is shown to point towards new, albeit limited, escape routes from Arrow's theorem. Some existence and classification results are established, using the condition that social orderings be transitive as well as the condition that social orderings be quasi‐transitive.
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 179
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 442-443
ISSN: 1744-9324
In: Working Papers on the Profitable Economics No. 341
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Working paper
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 144-159
ISSN: 1467-9833
In 1951, Kenneth Arrow published his now celebrated book Social Choice and Individual Values. Although not the first book to be written on social choice, Arrow's work ushered in a voluminous literature mostly produced by economists but by philosophers and political scientists as well. Arrow's chief result was a proof of the impossibility of a social welfare function (hereafter "SWF"). He showed that there could be no decision procedure for aggregating individual preference orderings into a grand, overall social preference ordering. The result has been hailed by some as a sort of Godel Theorem of economics. It has seemed to many to have, if not the complexity of the Godel Theorem, at least the same astonishing counter‐intuitiveness. On the other hand, some social choice theorists, while conceding the validity of the Arrow Theorem, have challenged its soundness by quarreling with one or more of its presuppositions.
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 347-354
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow's desiderata).
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 94, S. 58-64