Contract and labour law: towards a more flexile concept of employer? The contract within the sphere of the labour law seems to rediscover a "second youth" , lend itself to act as from "pole of attraction" regarding most important and debated profiles of surveying of the labour law doctrine. If the contract, from the point of view of its "pathological" use, captured the attentions of theoretical and practical operators of labour law, above all regarding the issue of the entrepreneurial removal from the so called "garantismo individuale e collettivo" through the phenomenon of the illegal hiring, on the physiological side the institute in question is led back, in a generally residual dimension, the within of the widest phenomenon of the outsourcing. The intervention of the legislator in matter, always increasing and more detailed regarding the past, reproposes, however in partially new terms, the problematic, particularly "felt" in years seventy of the past century, of the protection, legislative and contractual, of the labour in "small" enterprise. The relative criticalities to the anchorage of the protection to a dimensional requirement, any it is, united to those relative ones to the uncertainty and to the caducity of the "borders" of the enterprise of XXI the century, placed in a perspective, by now, not more exclusively national, make to meet towards the labour law discipline of the contract an interesting series of interpretative and reconstructive issues, a lot on the level of qualifying and protective profile, than on that, to "regulatory" one. These are, as mentioned, profiles that are interlaced and "crossed" among them, which are not compartmentalized, within a dimension that is also European and international. The qualifying profile, in fact, proposes, next and beyond the distinction between public and private contract, the most traditional e controversial profile of the distinction between contract, temporary work and illegal hiring, on one side, and transfer of undertaking and/or a its business unit and contract (above all contract of services), from the other. The protective profile in strict sense finds a progressive development and "updating" of not unknown institutes and instruments to the labour law discipline, like the so called social clause of fair treatment, or in the public contracts or in those private ones. At European level, the crucial theme of labour protection concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services is regulated, mostly, by the Directive CE 96/71, which tries to link social and economic-competitive considerations in a context of mobility of labour and services within the European market. The attempt of linking the foretold aspects seems to be the central fulcrum of the ulterior characterizing profile of the labour law discipline of the contract and that I have characterized like regulative profile. With regard to, and for a first example, it is analyzed, on one side, technique of the jointly legal responsibility, which redistributes the employer "responsibilities" with reference to the economic and normative treatments to guarantee to the interested workers within the relationships of contractual integration arising from the outsourcing processes, and, from the other, trade-union control of the phenomena of outsourcing. The embryonic regulative profile shows, among other things, the emerging of new institutional and socio-economic actors (like authorities, observatories, but also not governmental organizations, consumer and environmental associations), and instruments (like global framework agreements, codes of conduct, but also the, so called, indici di congruità), that prelude to incipient and additional, regarding those "traditional ones", forms of labour regulation within outsourcing processes, also in a global perspective. Finally, as regards to the contract in particular, an interconnected analysis of the three above qualified profiles offers to us an interesting reconstructive framework in order to inquire a possible and embryonic tendency towards a "flexibilisation" of the "employer concept", at least in terms of Co-employment, that links competitive regulation, labour protection and socio-economic development in a systematic and coherent framework. 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I am not sure that the past month's headaches and insomnia are due to the challenges of thinking about the Israel-Palestine conflict, but I am going to use that as my intro to this effort to think through this stuff.Usual caveats apply: I am not a political theorist or moral philosopher, I am not an expert on the conflict itself. Oh, and I was raised Jewish and the education I got at Hebrew school did not adequately present the realities of the past. I did take one Mideast politics course in college, and I did spend one week on an amazing and amazingly depressing tour of Israel and Palestine with a bunch of other academics four years ago.One of the conversations that disturbed me most this past week was when a rabbi I met on that trip responded to my criticisms of Israel's attack upon the hospital. He asked what is the right way to attack a group using a hospital as a shield (and as a trap), and my answer was simplistic: don't. I get that he and some of my relatives feel as if there are unfair standards being applied to Israel. And I absolutely get that anti-semitism is on the rise in the US, Canada, and Europe, although I wonder how much of this pro-Palestinian and how much of this opportunist far right folks using this moment (something to discuss another day). But Israel is fucking up in a major way here, and I want to think through why I think that, and why it is legitimate to criticize Israel at this moment of crisis. Oh, and one more caveat: Hamas is more evil. It is bad to target the civilians of the adversary, but it is even worse to deliberately endanger one's own civilians. Netanyahu has indirectly engaged Israelis by empowering Hamas and by diverting troops to protect expansionist (irredentist!) settlers, leaving communities close to Gaza essentially unguarded. So, even as I criticize Israel, I am not apologizing for or supporting Hamas. I want Hamas to be defeated, but in the right way. More on that below.So, I am starting with first principles:Everyone is deserving of self-determination: Jews, Palestinians, Ukrainians, Taiwanese (oops), Quebecois, etc. Violence is bad, so it should only be used proportionately.Just because someone did something in the past, such as mass bombing of cities, does not legitimate folks using the same strategy today. The bible speaks of laws of war that we generally find abhorrent--there has been progress in our moral stances and also in our strategic understanding. The best way to provide people with self-determination is democracy. It is better, in my humble opinion, that infinite secession where every group has its own state, because the act of secession or partition will probably increase the grievances of some groups that are left behind. Quebec's separatism had a very small burst of violence largely because Quebecois could and did exert power via voting to get damn near everything they wanted. Not everything, but all the stuff that might have been worth fighting for.One state from sea to river with all Palestinians and all Jews sharing one state with heaps of religious and other rights .... would be cool, but, well, Jews want a Jewish state since bad things have happened in democracies where other groups have more votes. Alternatively, a single state where Jews have rights and Palestinians don't is inherently problematic and wrong--the apartheid label feels icky but when you run a massive open-air prison with no end in sight, it is hard to think of it in any other way. I have believed for quite some time that Israeli Jews faced a choice--Israel could remain a theocratic state or it remain a democracy, but not both. Some of my relatives have said that the Arab countries should welcome the Palestinians. The thing is: the Palestinians think they are a people, the Arab countries think the Palestinians are a people, and since nationalism is intersubjective, Jews can't wish away Palestinian identity. However, Netanyahu can use the Israeli military to destroy many symbols that resonate with Palestinian identity, and that gets us to the g word.Threatening a second nabka, which would expel the Palestinians from the occupied territories would be ethnic cleansing. If the Palestinians were to win and push the Jews out, that too would be ethnic cleansing. And it would not be legitimate even if one considers all Jews to be settlers-colonizers. We can't unwind history with heaps of bloodshed and call it justice. Anyhow, I try to avoid using the word genocide because it is very fraught. In the past, did Canadians practice genocide against its Indigenous peoples. Yeah. Now? I'd say no, as state policies are not aimed at reducing or eliminating these peoples, even if bad policies continue and are harmful. But I can see why some folks may argue this and I probably need more info to take a clearer stance.Is Israel engaged in genocide right now? It is using lots of violence to reduce the population of Palestinians in Gaza. It is not proportionate, and it is not well aimed at achieving military objectives, two of the requirements for the just use of force. Israel is making Gaza uninhabitable. While Israel has not been all that strategic/deliberate--this is mostly about revenge since 10/7--the way force has been used is suggestive--to solve the Gaza problem by getting rid of the residents. That has some echoes, doesn't it?So, the hospital: Hamas had some stuff based at the hospital? Does that make it either a legitimate (morally speaking) or sound (strategically speaking) target? No. Most of the folks at the hospital had limited agency--they neither voted for Hamas nor had power to remove Hamas, nor much ability to leave. So, one should not target many vulnerable civilians if the aim is to kill a few Palestinian leaders. With that specific campaign over, we are learning that the Israelis never had the best intelligence about the threat posed by those in the hospital, which is now a trend--Israeli intelligence failure. Would it be legitimate and smart to hit the hospital if it had a ticking weapon of mass destruction? Sure. Anything short of that? Not so much. The Hamas use of human shields is ... a TRAP! And the Israelis walked right into it. War is, as they say, politics by other means, and so the Israelis lost big time on the world stage by attacking a hospital Their strategic communications about all of this has been awful. International support matters for both sides, and Israel surrendered whatever moral authority and international support it gained on October 7th, much like the US gave up all of the goodwill from 9/11 by attacking Iraq. Jews are upset because Hamas is not getting as much criticism, and that is for a few reasons. One is that countries are siding with the Arab world due to strategy or convenience or cheap oil or whatever. Another is that Hamas being evil is baked in. It has been held to a lower standard because it is a terrorist group. Palestinians in Europe and North America support Hamas and cheer on Israeli defeats, including, alas, the attacks on kids. Jews in Israel and elsewhere are cheering on violence against Palestinians. Both are wrong--both because the people of both sides deserve human dignity and because the attacks are not going to achieve anything. We hold Israel to a higher standard because it is a democracy and it is the more powerful side, which means, yes, it has more responsibility.One of the ingredients of just war is whether an attack is actually going to accomplish something. If you repeatedly use violence with little expectation of changing the situation, that is morally problematic--revenge, for instance, is not a legitimate justification for the use of violence. If some violence can avert more violence and end a conflict, then it is more just (and more sound from a tactical or strategic standpoint). Ukraine has a morally superior position for continuing the war because Russia has abused those who have been on their side of the lines. Violence, targeted at Russian troops and Russian military assets, is legitimate and also strategically sound. Russian attacks on Ukrainian hospitals and other civilian locations is not. And no, I am not saying Russia and Israel are morally equivalent... but I am saying that Israel's actions are positioning Israel closer to Russia. And who would want that? During the insurgencies of the 2000's, scholars and American military folks came to the same conclusion, more or less: that the best way to win (or at least not lose) a counter-insurgency effort is to minimize civilian casualties. These casualties would undermine the war effort--not just by creating more insurgents--the family and friends of those killed-but also by undermining the legitimacy of the Irag and Afghan governments. So, a policy of "courageous restraint" was enunciated, although I am not sure how well it was observed. The basic idea is that if you want to attack a certain military leader or target, and there are a bunch of kids or other non-combatants present, you wait for a better time. Indeed, our rules of engagement for air attacks often lead to hitting targets at night when buildings are not as occupied.The point here is that there are ways to deal with a hospital that may have some "bad guys" in it. Leveling it is not one of them. Which leads to the question of a cease-fire. I don't always support cease-fires (I am clearly not a pacifist), as it make give one side a big advantage. In the case of Russia-Ukraine, a ceasefire with Russia on Ukrainian land would be bad because it would allow Russian to continue to abuse the Ukrainians and it would potentially create a semi-frozen conflict that limits Ukraine's ability to free its territory and enable Russia to fuck with Ukraine in a variety of ways. In this case? I think with so many civilians in harm's way, and with a cease-fire perhaps giving time for Israelis to think about what they are doing (like following Netanyahu), it might lead to a better, more humane outcome. Would Hamas benefit from a cease-fire? Probably, but so would Israel. This all has avoided the big questions: what should Israel's objectives be? Because you can't have a strategy unless you know what the goal is. If the objective is a one-state Israel with the occupied territories full of folks having no rights and no access to power, then buckle up for unending conflict. Eradicating Hamas should not be an end to itself because removing one organization from the territories will not change the fundamental challenge of two peoples living in this area between river and sea. Removing the Palestinians from Gaza might be the objective now, and, if so, that is horrifying.Until October 7th, Israel focused on tactics to perpetuate the status quo: deterrence by punishment. Or to put in pop culture terms, the strategy that Sean Connery told Kevin Costner in the Untouchables: they came with a knife, you come with a gun. They send your guy to the hospital, you send their guy to the morgue. I will always remember a conversation I had with a retired Israeli special ops general while our group was at the Golan Heights. He was being critical of Obama for not hitting harder than the US got hit by various attacks. That Israel's tactic was always to escalate a bit, to hit harder than have been hit. And I basically asked: how has that worked to end the threat to Israel and stop the violence. Maybe it was kind of working for Israel, but that ended on October 7th, when Hamas decided it was not just willing to take Israel's punishment for an attack that was far more aggressive and damaging to Israelis than previous ones, but actually eager for that punishment. Deterrence only works if the costs of punishment are both credible and greater than the costs of the status quo. To Hamas, they apparently felt the Abraham Accords and other moves were more threatening than getting shellacked by Israel. Maybe their own domestic political game needed as much distraction as Netanyahu did/has. Anyhow, it was a limited strategy since it was mostly kicking the can down the road and had episodes of violence priced in. It may still be working with Hezbollah, but mostly because Hezbollah is in no shape to get into a war with Israel with Lebanon being such a mess (I am guessing here). But the days of deterring Hamas are gone, so what now?Eradicating Hamas? Not so easy. Israel should be doing cost/benefit calculations of the various ways to attack Hamas, which would, yes, mean not attacking hospitals. I think Israel's old strategy was and is the best option: after the Munich Olympics, Israel went out and targeted each person responsible for that attack and, as far as I recall, killed most of them. Israel can do the same here with Hamas's leadership--they might miss a few, but better to miss a few awful Hamas leaders than to kill a lot of civilians. This, of course, requires patience, which Netanyahu does not and cannot have, given the precarity of his political position.And this gets to the one of the key problems: Israelis have voted for various far right parties that have trapped Israel into more and more dangerous paths. Making Israel more theocratic may be good for the Orthodox, but it is bad for the economy and for the political system. Destroying the possibility of a two-state solution not only angers Palestinians but reduces bargaining options and exit strategies. Putting corrupt, awful Netanyahu back into power again and again undermines Israel's democracy, its legitimacy, its military, and its security. And ultimately its future.I am so angry and frustrated not because this is a hard situation, but because it didn't have to be this bad, it didn't have to be this way. Netanyahu and the parties backing him have made things worse. My anger towards Hamas is baked in--never democratic, always autocratic, always determined to wipe Israel from the map. I never had any hope for that organization. I had some hope for the Palestinian Authority until I visited Israel and got a better understanding of its limits. But I had some hope that Israel would see the trap so visibly set in front of it and not hop into it so enthusiastically. It is hard to kill one's way through a counter-insurgency, it is both wrong and counter-productive to kill so many civilians along the way. As a scholar who used to study ethnic conflict, I understand that it is hard to end these kinds of disputes. But I also understand that conflicts end, that violence is not inevitable--that it is a choice. And as a scholar of civil-military relations, I am so glad I never studied Israel.I am not sure if any of this is coherent, but I am just trying to think through this situation. Do I feel any better now that I have spewed my thoughts here? Not really.
El Ecuador, como país intercultural y plurinacional recoge en su memoria social todas las costumbres, mitos, leyendas y tradiciones que transforman en direccionamientos para el desarrollo del país en todas sus áreas, ya que compila en el Derecho Consuetudinario de los pueblos originarios del Ecuador su forma de actuar, ya hoy en día gracias a la revolución ciudadana, lo podemos socializar y aplicar, mismos que deben ser cumplidos en forma coercitiva porque ese es su modo de vida, que con toda seguridad lo manifiesto, es la base para llegar al Sumak Kausay. El presente trabajo explica en resumen la historia de nuestros pueblos originarios, mismos que para llegar a la vida republicana y la colonización han sufrido un proceso de expansionismo y dominación incaica – española, en su debido orden, para luego entrar en la capitulación por las grandes empresas de conquistas, organizadas técnicamente en Centro América y expandirse hacia América del Sur e ingresar al proceso de formación del amerindio, que en el tránsito de Inca a indio y campesino, ha sufrido discriminaciones en todo sentido, llegando a ocultar toda la sabiduría ancestral que luego fue catalogado como actividades paganas en contra de Dios de acuerdo a la Biblia que nos trajeron del viejo mundo (Vera, 1989) En este proceso, el amerindio pasa por un período de tamizaje en donde se cumplió con el gran objetivo de la conquista; que desaparezca de una vez por todas los rasgos culturales de la cosmología andina, que el runa y la huarmi tengan vergüenza de sus ancestros, sus etnias y culturas; de este modo, terminaron con su vestimenta, culto, creencias, mitos, leyendas y tradiciones (Derecho Consuetudinario). Conscientes estamos que toda la memoria ancestral se resume en el Derecho Consuetudinario de los pueblos originarios del Ecuador, pero no se puede desarrollar, preservar y socializar sino existe un proceso de enseñanza básica para que sea transmitida de generación en generación, caso contrario, toda esa riqueza cultural quedaría en el olvido. Razón por la cual los maestros cumplen un papel importante en el proceso de enseñanza aprendizaje, ya que son los responsables del conocimiento histórico real del antes y el después de las comunidades y pueblos del Ecuador. Para que un docente pueda transmitir los conocimientos ancestrales inéditos a las futuras generaciones, debe dominar la norma y la sociología jurídica ya que nos da la sabiduría y todas las herramientas para hacerlo con eficiencia, efectividad, y eficacia de todos los conocimientos ancestrales en prácticas diarias; es así como, en la vida republicana, hasta la década de los 90 los educadores no podían realizar prácticas educativas reales en forma clara, transparente y cierta, porque los contenidos científicos se basaban sólo en conocimientos extranjeros o currículos de otros países y en el mejor de los casos al catecismo. Es la Sociología Jurídica, la filosofía y el Derecho Consuetudinario especialmente la danza el teatro y los juegos populares las únicas actividades que de una u otra manera utilizan legalmente los educadores para realizar el proceso de enseñanza aprendizaje con saberes ancestrales plasmados en mensajes a través de corografías, obras teatrales y juegos lúdicos o populares. Tanto en el Ecuador como en el resto de América Latina, existe un nuevo escenario político en la cual la: multi-pluri-inter-culturalidad está ganando espacio y legitimidad. Esta nueva coyuntura incluye el reconocimiento por parte de los estados sobre la diversidad étnica y cultural, así también la necesidad de reconocer derechos específicos, colectivos y de la naturaleza, lo que algunos autores llaman el nuevo "constitucionalismo multicultural", que está enfocado en una nueva forma de solución de conflictos, ya sea por la conciliación, mediación, arbitraje, pero principalmente la justicia indígena (Van, 2000) y su relación con la ciudadanía "étnica" "cultural". (Montoya, 2002). Ratifican la aplicación de los Métodos Alternativos y Solución de Conflictos (MASC) mismos que están amparados por la Constitución ecuatoriana en su Artículo 190. Como bien sabemos, a diferencia de otros países de la región, en el Ecuador este reconocimiento oficial es de mayor jerarquía; reflejo y resultado de luchas y demandas del movimiento indígena, de sus procesos de fortalecimiento identitario como actores sociales, políticos y culturales y de su cuestionamiento de los modelos existentes de ciudadanía, democracia, estado y nación liderados por los movimientos indígenas en sus diversas organizaciones de la costa, sierra y oriente. Las demandas de reconocimiento cultural de los pueblos indígenas y pueblos originarios del Ecuador, han puesto en duda la vigencia de un sistema jurídico mono cultural, aun teniendo en cuenta el escenario del multiculturalismo constitucional que recorrió las reformas constitucionales latinoamericanas desde la aprobación del Convenio No. 169 por parte de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo en 1989. En el Ecuador este proceso es primordial y de sumo interés, razón por la cual con la aprobación del referéndum de la nueva Constitución en el 2008, en la que se define como Estado Plurinacional de Derechos, reconociendo la coexistencia de una diversidad de sistemas jurídicos. Los países de la región, como Bolivia y Venezuela, entre otros, han transitado procesos similares, cuestionando la permanencia del denominado monismo jurídico quien plantea que las crisis son una precondición para el surgimiento de nuevas teorías y referentes para la solución de conflictos. El reconocimiento por parte del Estado de los sistemas jurídicos, no implica que las autoridades de los pueblos y nacionalidades indígenas tengan el objetivo de crear algo nuevo, sino el reconocimiento de una realidad histórica de ejercicio de derechos consuetudinarios, que en el marco de la construcción colonial de la dominación estatal fueron invisibilizados, negados y perseguidos, como prácticas al margen de la ley. El pluralismo jurídico no es una "alternativa" del derecho, sino un proceso de construcción de otras formas jurídicas que identifiquen al derecho con los sectores mayoritarios de la sociedad, y de respuestas institucionales a procesos de transición de una sociedad marcada por la colonialidad hacia una construcción social y estatal de carácter intercultural y plurinacional, en donde se compila todas las costumbres, tradiciones, leyendas y mitos ancestrales. Tal como lo plantea (Coutinho, 1990), "un pluralismo de sujetos colectivos fundado en un nuevo desafío: construir una nueva hegemonía que contemple el equilibrio entre el predominio de la voluntad general, sin negar el pluralismo de los intereses particulares". En los últimos cuatro años de vigencia de la nueva carta magna del Ecuador, la coexistencia de la justicia ordinaria y la justicia indígena no ha estado exenta de conflictos respecto de los alcances de la jurisdicción de la administración y justicia indígena, de la adaptación de procesos a los derechos humanos, de los mecanismos de coordinación entre autoridades estatales y autoridades indígenas, entre otros. En ciertos casos se alcanzan situaciones en las que las autoridades comunitarias fueran sometidas a la justicia ordinaria por exceder su jurisdicción (Ref. Caso La Cocha), así como fuertes reclamos por parte de las autoridades comunitarias respecto de la intervención no solicitada de operadores de justicia al margen de sus derechos colectivos. Razón por la cual sociólogos, filósofos e investigadores para dar jerarquía a toda la memoria, filosofía ancestral y la cosmovisión andina, enfocan como Derecho Consuetudinario para llegar al cumplimiento de la armonía comunitaria. ; Ecuador, as an intercultural and multinational country in its social memory, collects all customs, myths, legends and traditions that become the country's means for development in all areas, as compiled in the customary law of the indigenous peoples of Ecuador that nowadays, thanks to the citizen's revolution we can socialize and apply, these should executed as an imperative because that is their way of life, which I can surely say, is the foundation to achieve the Smac Kausay. In this paper we explain in brief the history of our people, whom to reach the republican status and colonization have undergone a process of expansionism and Inca- Spanish domination, thereafter entering the capitulation by the big companies conquests, technically organized in Central America to expand into South America and enter the process of formation of the Amerindian going from Inca to Indian and peasant, has suffered discrimination in every way; thus hiding all ancient wisdom since it was listed as pagan activities against God and the Bible that were brought from the old continent. In this process the Amerindian goes through a period of screening where he meets the great object of conquest, disappearing once and for all the cultural traits of the Andean cosmology, the run and huarmi are ashamed of their ancestors, their ethnicities and cultures; in this way the screening process finished with their costume, religion, beliefs, myths, legends and traditions. It is known that all the ancestral memory is summed up in the customary law of the indigenous peoples of Ecuador, however, it is not possible for it to develop, preserve and socialize, unless through a process of basic education to be transmitted from generation to generation; otherwise, all this cultural richness would be forgotten. This is why teachers play an important role in the teaching-learning process since they are responsible for the actual historical knowledge before and after the communities and people of Ecuador. For a teacher to transmit to future generations unpublished ancestral knowledge, you must 22 master the art, as only art gives us the wisdom and all the tools to do it with efficiency, effectiveness, and expertise of all ancient knowledge in daily practices; the reason being is that during the republican period until the 90s, educators could not make real educational practices in clear, transparent and authentic ways, because scientific contents are based only on foreign expertise or curricula of other countries. Performing arts are especially theater and dance popular games the only activities that one way or another legally used educators for the teaching-learning process with ancestral knowledge embodied in messages through choreographies, plays and recreational or popular games. Both in Ecuador and in the rest of Latin America, there is a new political scenario in which the multi- -inter-culture is gaining ground and legitimacy. This new bias includes the States recognition over ethnic and cultural diversity, and also the need to recognize personal and common rights, as well as those of nature, for which some authors call the new "multicultural constitutionalism." Van Cott (2000) and its relation to the cultural ethnicity. Montoya (2002). In relation to what is the Alternative Dispute Resolution mean (ADR) which are covered by the Constitution in Article 190. As we know, unlike other countries in the region, in Ecuador this official recognition is of major prominence; reflection and result of struggles and demands of the indigenous movement in the processes of strengthening identity and social, political and cultural actors and their questioning of existing models of citizenship; democracy, state and nation led by indigenous movements in their various organizations through the coast, mountains and east. The demand for cultural recognition of indigenous peoples and indigenous people of Ecuador have questioned the validity of a mono cultural legal system, even taking into account the stage of the constitutional multiculturalism that swept Latin American constitutional reforms since the adoption of Convention No. 169 by the International Labor Organization in 1989. In Ecuador this process is essential and of great interest, thus with the approval of the referendum on the new Constitution in 2008, which is defined as multinational State of Rights, recognizing the coexistence of a variety of legal systems in it. The countries of the region such as Bolivia, Venezuela and others, have passed similar processes, questioning the permanence of the so-called legal monism who argues that crises are a precondition for the emergence of new theories and relating to conflict resolution. The recognition by the State of legal systems does not imply that the authorities of the indigenous people and nationalities have the goal of creating something new, but the recognition of a historical reality exercise of customary rights, which under the colonial domination were invisible, denied and persecuted, and practices outside the law. We do not consider the legal pluralism as an "alternative" use of law but as a process of construction of other legal forms identifying the law with the majority sectors of society and institutional responses to processes of transition from a society marked by colonialism moving towards a social state characterized as intercultural and multinational where all the customs, traditions, legends and ancient myths are compiled. As stated by Coutinho (1990), "a pluralism of collective subjects based on a new challenge: to build a new hegemony that considers the balance between the dominance of the general will, without denying the pluralism of individual interests". In the last 4 years of validity of the new Constitution of Ecuador, the coexistence of ordinary justice and indigenous justice, has not been free of conflict over the scope of the jurisdiction of the administration and indigenous justice, the adaptation of cases to human rights, the mechanisms of coordination between state authorities and indigenous leaders, among others. Reaching in some cases, situations where the Community authorities were subjected to regular courts to "exceed" its jurisdiction (Ref. Case La Cocha) and strong complaints from the Community authorities regarding the unsolicited intervention of justice operators regardless of their collective rights. 24 In this research all cultural features of the main communities and indigenous nationalities of the three regions of Ecuador are also being analyzed, which have gone unnoticed in the social context and in the best case, taken as isolated activities, put in practice or socialized in the main festivities of the people. This is the reason for us as educators for basic education, to give all the memory hierarchy, ancient philosophy and the Andean world we take it as customary law to take into action with the community may it be as a voluntary act or coercively. Part of the study of this paper is also to extent the responsibility to the State-Government, to maintain all the values and principles of the ancestral memory and cultural heritage of the indigenous people of Ecuador in an intact and unchanged way, to transmit to future generations; goal which you can achieve only with the education and training of teachers in different areas, but mainly in performing arts ; as well, on how to handle: customs, traditions, ethnic and folk legends, which is part of the standard of living of the indigenous people and peasants, and serves as a relevant issue to the development of basic education curriculum. This research with proposed development schedule was fulfilling the objectives, analyzing the extent to which cultures of indigenous people of Ecuador are present in the teaching of basic education, teacher training, and the level of positioning in the absence the arts, the presence of popular traditions in the curriculum and teacher preparation for teaching and its impact on society, and only then get to know the cultures of indigenous people of Ecuador in basic education. A study on the contribution of arts and popular traditions in the curriculum of basic education to achieve the implementation of the common system of legal pluralism with coarse principles based on Andean philosophy. The methodology, as an instrument for the operationalization of variables and objectives of the research is based on the paradigm of functionalism and constructivism, with field research (indigenous community leaders, members of councils, cultural promoters, educational authorities, elders of the different communities , basic education teachers) as descriptive, bibliographic and documentary scientific contributions in the areas of study, collecting data with the technique of the survey, interview and observation, and tools such as questionnaire. Interview guide and observation sheets, which allowed establishing the relationships between variables and approving the alternative hypothesis. Thus affirm that in our country, knowledge of the cultures of the indigenous people of Ecuador have not been involved, but rather have been marginalized and forgotten, where only basic education devoted to teaching general knowledge and specified in the area of mathematics and language, which is why there is a lack of 80% of the current population, and especially of teachers, both Ecuadorian reality as ethnicities and cultures of our ancestors.
Tom Cyberbezpieczeństwo wyzwaniem XXI wieku jest opracowaniem, które wpisuje się w kontekst rozważań poświęconych wielorakim aspektom bezpieczeństwa w cyberprzestrzeni. Autorzy, którzy zostali zaproszeni do realizacji tego projektu, prezentują różne spojrzenia na tę problematykę. Pomysłodawcą pierwszego rozdziału – Główni aktorzy cyberprzestrzeni i ich działalność jest Tomasz Hoffman. Autor, piszący z perspektywy prawno-politologicznej, posiłkujący się dorobkiem nauk o bezpieczeństwie, koncentruje się na ukazaniu potencjalnych aktorów cyberprzestrzeni, ich działalności, a w tym również zachowań niezgodnych z prawem. Cyberbezpieczeństwo, zdaniem Hoffmana, jest nową dziedziną bezpieczeństwa narodowego, z którą nieodłącznie wiążą się takie wyzwania, jak cyberprzestępczość oraz cyberterroryzm. Drugi rozdział – Cyberbezpieczeństwo jako wyzwanie dla współczesnego państwa i społeczeństwa – wyszedł spod pióra Marka Górki. Badacz dokonał przeglądu aktualnego stanu bezpieczeństwa cybernetycznego w kontekście rozprzestrzeniania się zagrożeń pochodzących z cyberprzestrzeni, tworzonych przez organizacje państwowe oraz niepaństwowe. Górka stoi na stanowisku, że cyberprzestrzeń stała się podstawową cechą świata i stworzyła nową rzeczywistość dla prawie wszystkich krajów, co sprawia, że problemy z cyberprzestępczością oraz cyberbezpieczeństwem mają istotne, globalne znaczenie zarówno w wymiarze politycznym, jak i gospodarczym. Z przemyśleniami Górki koresponduje tekst Bogusława Węglińskiego – Cyberterroryści w cyfrowych czasach – profesjonalizacja i digitalizacja współczesnych organizacji terrorystycznych. Autor poddał analizie ewoluujące wraz z rozwojem technologii instrumentarium wykorzystywane przez grupy terrorystyczne, zwracając uwagę na Internet, który otworzył przed nimi nowe możliwości oddziaływania, a w tym także w sferze kreowania przekazu medialnego. W tekście zawarte są również dociekania dotyczące możliwości użycia przez terrorystów dronów. Nadmieńmy, że także czwarty rozdział Ataki cyberfizyczne a system bezpieczeństwa narodowego, którego autorem jest Bogusław Olszewski, wpisuje się w nurt wcześniejszych dociekań. W tej części tomu poruszone zostały sprawy związane z niepożądanym oddziaływaniem systemów cyberfizycznych na bezpieczeństwo otoczenia międzynarodowego. Zdaniem Olszewskiego, ich hybrydowy (cyfrowo-materialny) charakter sprawia, że wpływają nie tylko na logiczną warstwę cyberprzestrzeni, ale także na dziedzinę fizyczną. Umożliwiają m.in. destabilizację porządku wewnętrznego państwa, co w konsekwencji może prowadzić do destrukcyjnych zmian w szerszym, międzynarodowym kontekście. Stanowią zatem wielowymiarowe zagrożenie dla szeroko pojętego systemu bezpieczeństwa globalnego W rozdziale piątym, Marcin Adamczyk przedłożył tekst Cyberszpiegostwo w relacjach chińsko-amerykańskich w kontekście potencjalnej zmiany światowego hegemona. Opracowanie poświęcone jest działaniom Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w cyberprzestrzeni, ukierunkowanych na nielegalne pozyskanie amerykańskich technologii wojskowych i cywilnych. Zdaniem autora, Państwo Środka jest aktualnie jedynym krajem, który obecnie mógłby rzucić wyzwanie dominacji Stanów Zjednoczonych. Dążenie do uzyskania statusu państwa hegemonicznego wymaga zatem od Pekinu zbudowania odpowiedniej koalicji wspierającej Chiny na arenie międzynarodowej, ale również zmniejszenia dystansu ekonomicznego, jaki dzieli to państwo od Waszyngtonu. Autorem kolejnego rozdziału jest Kamil Baraniuk, którzy przygotował tekst Zarys przemian instytucjonalnych rosyjskiego wywiadu radioelektronicznego. Baraniuk podkreśla, że współczesny wysoki stopień zinformatyzowania społeczeństw i powszechności korzystania z technologii informatycznych sprawia, iż dane o charakterze sygnałowym i elektromagnetycznym stanowią bardzo istotne źródło informacji dla wyspecjalizowanych instytucji, zajmujących się ich gromadzeniem oraz przetwarzaniem. W tym kontekście zarysowuje genezę i przekształcenia instytucjonalne wywiadu radioelektronicznego Federacji Rosyjskiej, a co za tym idzie wojskowe i cywilne instytucje zajmujące się tego rodzaju działalnością na przestrzeni ostatnich kilkudziesięciu lat, przy uwzględnieniu ich zadań, a także zmian personalnych w ich kierownictwie. Rozdział siódmy napisany został przez dwie autorki z Ukrainy. Tetiana W. Nagachevskaya i Lyudmila Frliksowa przygotowały rozważania zatytułowane Napriamky formuwannia miżnarodnoji konkurentospromożnosti IT-sektoru Ukrajiny. Zawierają one analizę stanu i osobliwości kształtowania się międzynarodowej konkurencyjności sektora IT na Ukrainie. Nagachevskaya i Frliksowa zaprezentowały pozycję ukraińskiego sektora IT rozpatrywaną w kontekście Networked Readiness Index, który mierzy skłonność do wykorzystywania przez kraje możliwości oferowanych przez technologie informacyjno-komunikacyjne. Ponadto, ukazały przewagę konkurencyjną i wady ukraińskich firm IT na rynkach międzynarodowych oraz kierunki wzrostu międzynarodowej konkurencyjności sektora informatycznego Ukrainy. Kolejne dwa rozdziały dotykają problematyki religijnej w cyberprzestrzeni. Autorem dociekań – Religijne i parareligijne grupy destrukcyjne: wyzwania cyberprzestrzeni – jest Wojciech Gajewski, który zwraca uwagę na sprawę penetrowania wirtualnej przestrzeni przez destrukcyjne grupy religijne. Jego zdaniem, stanowią one wzrastające zagrożenie nie tylko dla jej indywidualnych użytkowników, ale także zbiorowości społecznych. Religioznawca jest zwolennikiem podejmowania szeroko zakrojonych działań badawczych, edukacyjnych, a także prawnych, które wpłyną na ograniczenie negatywnych następstw ich aktywności w cyberprzestrzeni. Z kolei, Lucjan Klimsza przedłożył tekst Filozoficzne aspekty działania Internetu w kontekście zadań misyjnych Kościoła. Autor, który jest duchownym ewangelickim, zwraca uwagę na możliwości, jakie otwiera przed współczesnym chrześcijaństwem dostęp do przestrzeni cyfrowej. Klimsza wyraźnie zaznacza, że obecny Kościół musi być wspólnotą multimedialną, jednakże nie wirtualną, która jest oddalona od człowieka i jego realnej egzystencji. Autor, Internet postrzega zatem jako metamedium umożliwiające przekazywanie treści religijnych, które może być pomocne m.in. w spotkaniu i relacjach człowieka z człowiekiem oraz Boga z człowiekiem. Dziesiąty rozdziały Cyberbezpieczeństwo jako konstrukt w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej, będący rozważaniami o nachyleniu politologicznym, napisał Przemysław Mikiewicz. Tekst jest refleksją nad obecnością kategorii cyberbezpieczeństwa w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej, którą autor zawęził do opiniotwórczego oddziaływania centralnych instytucji państwowych oraz partii politycznych. Autor wskazuje, że pojęcie cyberbezpieczeństwa jest obecne w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej w różnym stopniu w dokumentach rządowych i w programach partii politycznych. Zdaniem Mikiewicza, występuje zasadnicza asymetria pomiędzy oboma typami dokumentów: dokumenty urzędowe poświęcają uwagę cyberbezpieczeństwu w znacznym stopniu, podczas gdy w dokumentach partyjnych kwestia ta jest jedynie wzmiankowana. Tak więc, cyberbezpieczeństwo jawi się jako rodzaj konstruktu, za pomocą którego kreowany jest obraz świata pełnego nienamacalnych niebezpieczeństw, do zwalczania których nieodzowne wydaje się publikowanie dokumentów pod postacią kolejnych doktryn i strategii walki z zagrożeniami w cyberprzrestrzeni. W nurt rozważań politologicznych wpisują się także dwa kolejne teksty. Autorem pierwszego jest Grzegorz Tokarz, którego dociekania zostały zatytułowane Internet jako instrument nawoływania do przemocy – przykład organizacji "Krew i Honor" Polska. Tekst przybliża działalność polskiej sekcji neonazistowskiej organizacji "Krew i Honor", a w tym zawartość jej strony internetowej, która jest istotnym narzędziem w propagowaniu idei tego środowiska, jak również źródłem informacji o osobach oraz instytucji uznawanych za zdrajców "białej rasy". Drugi tekst, który zarazem kończy niniejszy tom przygotował Mariusz Kozerski. W rozdziale Dawne afery polityczne ze współczesnej perspektywy: przykład sprawy Barschela/Pffeifera analizowana jest rola, jaką media odgrywają w nagłaśnianiu afer politycznych. Autor poddał oglądowi wydarzenia, które rozegrały się w latach 80 XX wieku, w północnoniemieckim landzie Szlezwik-Holsztyn, a w których ważną rolę odegrał opiniotwórczy tygodnik "Der Spiegel". Dodajmy, że Kozerski podejmuje się również próby odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jaki sposób afera kilońska mogłaby przebiegać współcześnie, w kontekście potencjału informacyjnego/opiniotwórczego, którym charakteryzuje się globalna sieć komputerowa. ; "Cybersecurity as the challenge of the XXI century" is a collection of considerations dedicated to various aspects of security in cyberspace. Authors, who have been invited to this project, present different views on this subject. An author of the first chapter, "The main actors of cyberspace and their activities", is Tomasz Hoffman. Writing from a legal and political perspective, including the achievements of security sciences, he tries to present potential actors of cyberspace, and their activities, including behaviors against the law. Cybersecurity, according to Hoffman, is a new element of national security and is related to challenges, such as cybercrime and cyberterrorism. The second chapter, "Cybersecurity as a challenge for modern countries and societies", has been written by Marek Górka. The researcher has reviewed the current situation of the cybersecurity in the context of the spread of dangers in cyberspace, created by government and non-government organizations. Górka states that cyberspace has become a basic feature of the world and has created a new reality for almost all countries, what caused that the problems with cybercrime and cybersecurity became significant in both, the political and the economic aspect. A text, which corresponds to the Górka's thoughts, is the text "Cyberterrorists in digital times - professionalization and digitalization of modern terrorist organizations" by Bogusław Węgliński. The author has analyzed the instruments used by terrorist groups. The instruments which have been evolving along with the development of technology. The most important of them is the Internet, which has opened new opportunities for terrorists, including digital communicating. The text also includes aspects of the usage of drones by terrorists. The fourth chapter, "Cyber-physical attacks and the national security system", by Bogusław Olszewski, is also related to the previously mentioned issues. This part of the book deals with matters of the undesirable impact of cyber-physical systems on the safety of the international environment. According to Olszewski, their hybrid (digital-material) character causes that they affect not only the logical aspect of cyberspace but also the physical one. They enable destabilization of the internal structure of countries, what can lead to destructive changes in the wider, international context. They are a multifaceted danger to the broadly understood system of the global security. In the fifth chapter, Marcin Adamczyk has presented a text titled "Cyberspying in Chinese-American relations, in the context of the potential change of the world hegemon". The study is dedicated to the activities of the People's Republic of China in cyberspace, taken to acquire American military and civil technologies. The author claims that China is currently the only country that could challenge the global domination of the United States. However, to obtain the status of the hegemonic state, Beijing would need to build a solid coalition, supporting China on the international arena, but also reduce the economic distance between Beijing and Washington. An author of the next chapter is Kamil Baraniuk, who has prepared a text titled "Outline of the institutional changes in the Russian radio-electronic intelligence". Baraniuk emphasizes that the high level of computerization of societies and the common use of information technologies makes the signal and electromagnetic data a very important source of information for specialized institutions dealing with information collection and processing. In this context the author outlines the genesis and the institutional transformation of the Russian radio-electronic intelligence, as well as the military and civil institutions dealing with this kind of activities over the last decades, analyzing their tasks and personnel changes in their management. The seventh chapter has been written by two authors from Ukraine. Tetiana W. Nagachevskaya and Lyudmila Frliksowa prepared a text "Napryamky formuvannya mizhnarodnoyi konkurentospromozhnosti IT-sector Ukrayiny". This text contains an analysis of the current situation and peculiarities in the shaping of the international competitiveness of the IT sector in Ukraine. Nagachevskaya and Frliksowa have presented the position of the Ukrainian IT sector, considered in the context of the Networked Readiness Index, which measures the tendency of different countries to use the opportunities offered by informational and communicational technology. In addition, they have shown competitive advantages and disadvantages of Ukrainian IT companies on international markets, and directions of growth of the international competitiveness of the IT sector in Ukraine. Next two chapters have been related to religious issues in cyberspace. "Religious and pseudoreligious destructive groups: the challenges of cyberspace" has been written by Wojciech Gajewski, who pays attention to the matter of penetrating of the virtual space by various destructive religious groups. In his opinion, they become increasing dangers not only for individual users of the cyberspace but also for entire social groups. The religious scholar is a supporter of extensive research, educational and even legal activities, that suppose to reduce the negative consequences of the sectarian activity in cyberspace. Next author, Lucjan Klimsza, has presented a text "Philosophical aspects of the Internet in the context of missionary tasks of the Church". Klimsza, who is a Protestant pastor, pays attention to the possibilities that the access to the digital space opens to contemporary Christianity. He clearly states that the current Church must be a multimedia, but not a virtual community, distant from a man and his real existence. The author sees the Internet as a meta-medium enabling the transmission of religious content, which may be helpful in cognition and relationship between man and God, as well as between man and man. Tenth chapter, "Cybersecurity as a construct in the Polish public space", has been written by Przemysław Mikiewicz from a political perspective. The text is a reflection of the presence of the cybersecurity in Polish public space, which has been specified by the author as the opinion-making influence of the central government institutions and political parties. The author indicates that the concept of the cybersecurity is present in the Polish public space in government documents and programs of political parties. According to Mikiewicz, there is a fundamental asymmetry between these two types: government documents pay a lot of attention to cybersecurity, programs of political parties, however, only mention about the issue. Finally, cybersecurity appears as a kind of a construct used to create an image of the modern world, full of immaterial dangers, which might be eliminated only by publication of new doctrines and strategies, created to combat dangers in cyberspace. The political aspect of the cybersecurity issue is present also in the next two texts. An author of the first one is Grzegorz Tokarz, whose section has been titled "The Internet as an instrument to incite violence - an example of Poland". The text introduces activities of the Polish section of this neo- Nazi organization, including the content of its website, which is an important tool, used to promote the ideas of this environment, as well as a source of information about people and institutions considered to be the traitors of the "white race". The second text, which also ends this book, has been prepared by Mariusz Kozerski. In this chapter, titled "Former political scandals from a modern perspective: an example of the Barschel/Pffeifer case", the analyzed issue is the role played by media to publicize political scandals. The author has reviewed incidents that took place in the 1980s, in the German land of Schleswig-Holstein. A significant role in those happenings was played by "Der Spiegel", an opinion-forming weekly magazine. Let's add that Kozerski also tries to answer the question of how that, socalled "Kiel scandal" could look like if it happened today, in the context of the contemporary informational/opinion-forming potential, which characterizes the global computer network.
Inhaltsangabe:Introduction: We are living in an internationalized world; global trade keeps increasing and more companies from many countries around the world are going national at an astounding rate. This is a reflection of strong economic growth around the world and the globalization of the economy and corporations. Offices are spread from one continent to another and travel is essential to business. This is the reason why "business travel is increasing," states Hubert Joly, president and chief executive officer of CWT. In today's business world, you might well find yourself as an international manager in a foreign subsidiary of an American firm, facing on a daily basis all aspects of international management. Or you could end up at the home office in Germany coordinating operations with foreign affiliates. Or you could travel to countries like Japan or China, negotiating export sales or dealing with suppliers, customers, or franchise parties. Many different kinds of positions are available in the global arena, and training in international and cross-cultural management and negotiation styles is becoming a critical ingredient in moving up to high-level positions in global organizations. "In 2006, a record 30.1 million U.S. travelers visited overseas markets, an increase of five percent from 2005." One of the top five overseas markets visited by U.S. travelers in 2006 was Germany. China (if combining travel the PRC and Hong Kong) would have tied as second. Contributing to the new record for outbound travel, seven of the top 20 U.S. outbound destination markets posted records in 2006, including Japan and China. Hundreds of thousands of jobs in the Germany owe their existence and sustainment to business travel. In Germany, the effects of a growing European Union and worldwide business travel create a stable demand for modern transport infrastructures and services. The USA is one of the two most important business travel destinations for the German economy, closely followed by China. Two markets will dominate travel interests in the future: the USA and China. No other countries will be as important for business trips as these two different giants. China's economy still enjoys a huge growing potential although its gross domestic product (GDP) has maintained a double-digit growth for four straight years and hit a new high of 10.7 in the first three quarters of 2006. The growth rate of China's labor productivity stood at 9.5 percent last year, beating all other countries across the world. Since undergoing reform and being made more open, however, the speed of economic development has increased by an average of about 10% each year for the past twenty years. The challenge is that even with all the good will in the world, miscommunication is likely to happen, especially when there are significant cultural differences between communicators, such as from the United States, Germany, China and Japan. Whatever the size or nature of a firm, it is clear that an increasing number of managers around the world will be involved in international business. That involvement will include both foreign and/or domestic assignments requiring interactions with people and firms from other countries. The objective of this thesis is to understand and improve the interaction of businessmen from the four largest economies of the world - the United States, Japan, Germany and China. Furthermore it is tried to explain, describe, and compare cultural differences, identify culturally communication and negotiation practices, and to use effective cross-cultural negotiation techniques and strategies within countries and cultures in international business settings. Knowing how even small differences in culture might cause huge misunderstandings in everyday business life, we can foresee them, and hopefully make better communication and negotiation with our business relations in other cultures.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: Table of ContentsII List of FiguresIV List of TablesV List of AbbreviationsVI Introduction1 PART I Culture5 1.Definition of Culture5 2.Models to Classify Cultures7 2.1Cultural Dimensions according to Hofstede7 2.1.1Power Distance Index7 2.1.2Individualism - Collectivism8 2.1.3Uncertainty Avoidance Index8 2.1.4Masculinity - Femininity9 2.1.5Long-Term Orientation10 2.1.6Hofstede's Dimensions for the United States11 2.1.7Hofstede's Dimensions for Germany11 2.1.8Hofstede's Dimensions for Japan12 2.1.9Hofstede's Dimensions for China12 2.2The Iceberg Model of Culture13 2.3The Trompenaars' Model of Cultural Orientation14 PART II Negotiation and Communication Styles19 3.Time Conceptualization / Cultural Time Differences19 3.1Monochronic vs. Polychronic Time21 3.2Interactions between M-time and P-time Cultures24 3.3Working Times25 3.4Paid Annual Leave28 4.Nonverbal Communication31 4.1Body Language and Gestures31 4.2Greetings35 4.3Touch and Personal Space38 5.Cross-Cultural Etiquette42 5.1Table Etiquette / Table Manners42 5.2Dress Etiquette50 5.3Gift-Giving Etiquette53 6.The Do's and Don'ts of Business Behavior59 7.High-Context vs. Low-Context Cultures71 8.Face and Face Saving76 PART III Barriers to Cross-Cultural Communication83 9.Stereotypes and Prejudices83 9.1Definition of Stereotypes and Prejudices83 9.2Origins of Stereotypes87 9.3"Sophisticated" Stereotypes88 9.4Stereotypes Change90 10.Cross-Cultural Communication Problems92 10.1Language Difficulties92 10.2Cultural Barriers93 10.3Sentence Structure Differences94 10.4Nonverbal Communication Problems95 10.5Difficulties with Idioms95 10.6Reasons for Communication Problems97 10.6.1Potential Solutions98 Conclusion101 BibliographyVII Online SourcesXITextprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.3, Working Times: The working times and ethics of the four countries Japan, Germany, the United States and China differ greatly. In big Japanese cities, long working days (12 hours is typical) and long careers (a lifetime in the same company) are common. They use time to build harmonious agreements and harmonious relationships with each other. This means, effectively, putting people first. The Western visitor may think he is wasting yet more time on wining and dining after the official work day is over, while he is stuck between apparently inconclusive meetings and the final business decision.1 However, that time is everything but wasted. The kind of stiff patterns and conventions of Japanese office life fall away and the people can easier get in touch with each other. Japanese businessmen consider this also as a way to relieve business stress. The German view of time is extremely integrated with careful scheduling. Delegation, although practiced with thoroughness, usually has strings attached. This organization can make innovative decisions painful, since the subordinate's decision time with his boss is kept separate from his communication time with the business partner. The junior employee has full authority over an agreed and accorded range of decisions, but that range can never include the unexpected. If the employee takes the conservative way and blocks the upward progress of a surprise proposal of a foreign business partner, the answer they get to hear is always "I am not empowered to bring this matter to my boss's attention," the business negotiations are stuck. Even if German employees try the back door, and the boss likes the idea, he will be reluctant to overrule his subordinate. The economic emergency of the pas-war years when rules were frequently broken in order to get an urgent job done, was a long time ago. The German attitude to time is changing. Germans leave the office on time and keep themselves freehanded holidays. According to a senior manager of a German car firm: "Japanese competition is really unfair. We work efficiently; they work efficiently and long." Flexibility, enthusiasm, and teamwork are very important in the U.S. workplace. In general, Americans consider working and being productive very important and being busy as well as working extensively may also serve as their way of obtaining self-esteem. Speed in decision-making is in opposite proportion to bureaucracy. "North American industry is often hung on top-down decision-making systems; "why change a winning formula?" is a rhetorical question most frequently asked by the man at the top who invented the formula. For all their protestations about time being money, American middle managers frequently disappoint by their hesitations and procrastination." The decision making process of Chinese businessmen is slow. Foreigners should not expect to conclude their business quickly. Many Chinese will want to refer to the stars or wait for a lucky day before they make a decision. Basically nothing is possible without "guanxi" in China. "Guanxi" means "relations" and it stands for connections defined by reciprocity and mutual obligations." The basis of a contact varies. New relations must be raised intensively and carefully--for example, with invitations for dinners and with small favors or presents, as these will keep the relationship going. All business is personal: it is essential for success or failure to have "guanxi" and belong to a social network. The Chinese separate people into two groups: we and the others, no matter how it is in business life or in private life. Everything is based on reciprocal trust and accomplishment. The time it takes to establish such "guanxi" relationships is often underrated. Westerners should allow for adequate time in their business travels to establish and nurture their relations. Time spent by Western businessmen in building relationships is honored by the Chinese side. "The more time one invests in establishing good relations with business partners, the more important the partners feel and consequently the more face you give them." It is very difficult to compare the actual hours worked, because of a lack of uniform statistics. A major problem is that in some cases national figures distinguish between full- and part-time workers and in others they do not. Possibly, the best way of comparing working time among businessmen from Germany, Japan and the USA, is to look at annual working hours. The Japan Institute of Labor (JIL), based on several national figures, has produced estimates for annual total hours actually worked for Japan, the USA and Germany. The annual number of hours actually worked was 1,970 in Japan in 2000, which was virtually on par with the USA at 1,986 hours. Germany was far behind with 1,525 hours (1999). Therefore the average American worked about 450 hours more than the average German. Figures for average collectively agreed annual working hours are available from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) for eight European Union (EU) countries where working time is measured on this basis, while JIL has produced figures for "scheduled" annual working hours in Japan and the USA. Allowing for differences in calculation methods, the Table 6 shows that the differences among the EU countries, Japan and the USA are generally far less when considering normal/scheduled hours than for actual hours. This indicates that the differences between Germany, Japan and the USA lie more in the overtime and additional hours worked. Chapter 3.4, Paid Annual Leave: The amount of paid annual leave to which workers are entitled is another important aspect of working time (a factor which obviously influences the annual duration of working time). In the EU, figures are available from EIRO for the average number of days of collective agreed annual leave. These show an average annual leave entitlement in 2001 of 25.7 days. Germans have a 30-day average. For Japan, figures are available from JIL on the average paid holiday entitlement, which were 18.0 days in 2000. Nevertheless, entitled holidays in Japan are actually not taken. In 2000, only 49.5% of annual leave entitlement (8.9 days) was taken on average. The latest figures available for the USA from the U.S. Department of Labor are the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). They refer to 2001 and cover "average vacation days" in the medium and large private sector. No total figure is available for all workers, but separate ones for varying lengths of service. Therefore, annual vacation days stood at 9.6 days at one year's service, 13.8 days at five years' service, 16.9 days at 10 years' service and 20.3 days at 20 years' service. Special attention has been given to the issue of extensive working hours in China, but the extent and nature of the situation has never been fully understood. There has not been much information provided on exactly what feelings the Chinese workers have towards their working time. Also, depending on the length of the service, the annual paid leave varies between 5 and 15 days. The standard of annual working hours has been estimated to be set as 2,000 hours. The weekly working hours of employees with local urban household registration were found to be 44.2 hours, making it the shortest working time. Employees with rural household registration had the longest weekly working time which was 48.4 hours. The variable time is much more complex than it is possible to convey. It influences the course of communications, and can be responsible for conflict or the escalation of conflict when it leads to miscommunication or misinterpretation. A culturally-fluent approach to conflict means working over time to understand these and other ways communication varies across cultures, and applying these understandings in order to enhance business relationships among those from different countries.
This is a policy note following from the book Health Financing in the Republic of Gabon. The book is a comprehensive assessment of health financing in the Republic of Gabon. The book reviews the health financing situation in light of the government's introduction of a national health insurance program and its commitment to achieving universal health insurance coverage in the medium term. The book provides a diagnostic of the situation in light of recent data from the demographic and health survey, updated national health accounts, and a review of public expenditures in the health sector. Additionally, it performs a benchmarking exercise to assess how Gabon performs in its health spending and health outcomes compared to countries of similar income and compared to countries in the region. A forthcoming household survey is expected to provide better information on financial protection against illness costs. This book attempts to diagnose Gabon's current situation in regards to achieving universal health coverage. Gabon should be commended for its commitment to improving health indicators of the poor and the underserved. The book shows that while the government has set an ambitious goal for itself, several challenges exist in meeting these objectives in the medium term as follows (i) resource mobilization efforts are a priority to sustain its programs financially; (ii) to prioritize resources for areas considered, value for money, to improve equity in access and delivery of health services, with particular focus on primary care, public health program, and quality of care; (iii) to increase the population's coverage under the national health insurance program, with focus on the poor and the informal sector workers; and (v) to consider areas that would improve efficiency and reduce costs. The book is timely, given that the government has recently produced, the Plan Social. It provides a diagnostic of the health sector and provides key recommendations and options for the government to consider in the short to medium term.
Strengthening the rule of law is widely regarded among traditional donors, multilateral institutions, and a growing number of middle income and fragile states as a necessary precondition for sustainable peace, poverty alleviation, and development. Crime and violence deter investment and lower employment, undermine social institutions, and divert resources through direct and indirect costs, all of which hinder development. It is likely to disproportionately affect poor and marginalized populations by limiting access to basic services. The formal criminal justice system is seen in many environments as failing to deliver justice. Most states experiencing fragility do not have the capacity to effectively prevent crime, enforce laws, or peacefully resolve disputes across the whole of their territories. There is another powerful deterrent for communities to seek redress through state criminal justice institutions: they are frequently a primary instrument for the government and elites to maintain power and control through the perpetration of injustice. The informal system, however, is alone insufficient to handle the pressing justice requirements of fragile states, not least for preventing and responding to inter-communal conflict, to serious organized and cross-border crime, and to public corruption and other 'white collar' crime.
Nicht selten wird die Europäische Integration als ein Prozeß der regionalen Institutionenbildung begriffen, wobei internationale Regime als willkommene Zwischenstufen zu diesem Ziel gelten. Auf diese Weise aber wird der Begriff der "internationalen (funktionalen) Regime" gründlich mißverstanden (I); denn die wichtigsten internationalen Regime sind global oder transnational und lassen sich nicht für eine regionale Blockbildung einspannen. Tatsächlich gibt es nicht ein einziges exklusives und effektives europäisches Regime - nicht im Kapitalverkehr und in der Finanzordnung, nicht im Bereich der Telekommunikation oder des Umweltschutzes, kein europäisches Flüchtlings-, Einwanderungs- oder Asylregime, kein Drogen- und kein Terrorismusregime und selbstverständlich kein militärisches Sicherheitssystem (II). Infolgedessen wird es auch nie eine homogene und geschlossene europäische Integration geben - die aus der mittelost- wie südeuropäischen, aber auch der britischen und skandinavischen Perspektive ohnehin unerwünscht ist; vielmehr wird Europa auf vielfache Weise durch internationale Regime durchkreuzt und global geöffnet sein; doch könnte Europa auf diese Weise der erste "transnationale Staat" der Welt werden (III). (Zeitschrift für Politik / FUB)
The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8195 Security Council Seventy-third year 8195th meeting Wednesday, 28 February 2018, 10.35 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05507 (E) *1805507* S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 2/22 18-05507 The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/138, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: We have received a lot of questions about resolution 2401 (2018), which the Security Council adopted on Saturday, 22 February, and its demand for a cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria. I want to start today by answering the questions we have received. Is the United Nation ready to deliver to people who need humanitarian assistance? Yes. We have convoys ready to go to 10 besieged and hard-to-reach locations, including a 45-truck convoy with aid for 90,000 people to Douma and eastern Ghouta. Are you ready to support medical evacuations from eastern Ghouta? Yes, we are working very closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other health partners on that. Has resolution 2401 (2018) been implemented? Is there a ceasefire in Syria? No, and no. Have you got any inter-agency cross-line convoys through to hard-to-reach or besieged areas? No. Have you been given permission to access any of those locations? No. Have you received the necessary facilitation letters for convoys? No. Have there been any medical evacuations? No. Have any civilians left eastern Ghouta? No. Is there any actual improvement in the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta since the adoption of the resolution demanding, as it did, unimpeded access? No. Can you deliver assistance in eastern Ghouta during a humanitarian pause between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. local time? To quote the ICRC Middle East Director, who spoke about that yesterday: "It is impossible to bring a humanitarian convoy in five hours." Agencies now have years of experience in that area, and it can take a day simply to pass checkpoints, even when the parties have agreed. The goods then have to be offloaded. If there has been no humanitarian access since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, what has happened in the past few days? More bombing, fighting, death, destruction, maiming of women and children, hunger and misery — in other words, more of the same. On 26 February, two days ago, airstrikes, barrel bombs and artillery shelling were reported across eastern Ghouta, including in Harasta, Shafuniyeh, Otaya, Hosh Eldawahreh, Al-Ashari, Jobar, Beit Sawa, Hazerma, Hannnura, Nashabiyeh, Sagba and Douma. Reports indicate that at least 30 civilians, including women and children, were killed. In Shafuniyeh, 14 people, including three women and four children, were reportedly killed and many others injured by airstrikes. Eighteen civilians, including drivers of ambulances, women and children, were reportedly received at health facilities in Shafuniyeh with difficulties breathing, consistent with the use of chlorine. One child reportedly died as a result. On the same day, two workers from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reportedly killed as a result of shelling on the besieged enclave. It was also reported that two health-care facilities in Saqba were taken out of service by airstrikes. In the past few days, shells have also reportedly continued to fall on Damascus city from eastern Ghouta. Since 18 February, more than 580 people are now reported to have been killed due to air and ground strikes in eastern Ghouta, with many more than 1,000 people injured. At the same time, hundreds of rockets fired from eastern Ghouta into Damascus have reportedly killed 15 people and injured more than 200. I now want to update the Security Council on the situation in other parts of the country. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 3/22 In Idlib, fighting continues to kill and injure civilians, destroy civilian infrastructure and result in large population movements. Since December, an estimated 385,000 people have been displaced, with many civilians moving north. Half of Idlib's population was already displaced. People are being forced to move yet again, with each disruption increasing their vulnerability. Civilians are concentrated in an ever-smaller area. Many are forced to live in makeshift camps or in the open air. Formal camps are overwhelmed, operating at up to 400 per cent of their capacity. The response is being stretched to its limits. We are receiving reports of civilian deaths and injuries and of restriction on the movement of many civilians as a result of military operations in Afrin. Those who risk moving continue to be stopped at exit points by the local authorities in Afrin, preventing them from accessing safer areas. We believe that, so far, approximately 5,000 people have reached the surrounding villages and Aleppo city. Tens of thousands are believed to be displaced within Afrin. The Turkish authorities have emphasized to us their willingness to facilitate humanitarian access. We would like to see aid convoys operated from Damascus. However, to date that has not been agreed by the Syrian side. In Raqqa city, conditions remain unsafe for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Among those trying to return home, 637 people have been injured and more than 125 killed by unexploded ordinance since last October. Medical and other essential services are absent and access for humanitarian workers to the city remains precariously limited because the conditions are so dangerous. As I have said before, demining activities need to be accelerated as a matter of urgency. Humanitarian access for the United Nations and its implementing partners in Hasakah was limited for much of January due to the increased restrictions placed by the local authorities. United Nations convoys were blocked from travelling to the northeast from elsewhere within the country. The delivery of aid already in local warehouses was also blocked. While an agreement to resume humanitarian deliveries was reached on 30 January, that agreement will end in March. NGO partners continue to deliver goods and services across the north-east. However, sustainable access for the United Nations is critical. Any protracted interruption of humanitarian assistance and services in the IDP sites may drive the displaced people back to areas where they are not safe. Earlier this month, the United Nations received clearance for the first assessment visit to Deir ez-Zor after it had been under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for three and a half years. More than 100,000 people live in the town despite that fact that it is estimated to be 80 per cent destroyed. The infrastructure is almost completely destroyed, particularly in the central and the eastern areas, where ISIL was in control. In coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, the United Nations has dispatched 78 trucks carrying food, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, education, water and sanitation items since last September, when ISIL was driven out. Finally, we remain concerned about the tens of thousands of people stranded in Rukban, in south-eastern Syria. We continue to seek the necessary agreements for convoys of life-saving assistance to them. As I said last week (see S/PV. 8186), there was a severe reduction, of nearly 40 per cent, in cross-line access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017 as compared to 2016. On average in 2017, over the entire 12-month period, we reached 165,000 people a month with cross-line convoys. That was completely inadequate. So far this year, we have reached a total of only 7,200 people through a single small convoy earlier this month. In other words, we were reaching more than 50 times as many people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas last year as to date this year. The main reason for the reduction in the number of convoys has been the consistent refusal by the Government of Syria to provide the necessary approvals and facilitation letters to support delivery. As the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138) details, while we continue to reach millions of people in urgent need in areas controlled by the Government of Syria and through the cross-border programmes mandated in resolution 2393 (2017), assistance across conflict lines to millions of people in hard-to-reach and besieged areas has completely collapsed in recent months. Unless that changes, we will soon see even more people dying from starvation and disease than from the bombing and shelling. The United Nations remains focused on reaching those most in need throughout the country, including the 5.6 million people considered to be in acute need. The needs-based approach means that the United Nations will continue to seek to deliver aid and to S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 4/22 18-05507 provide services to millions of people in a principled manner regardless of where they are located. More than half of those in need are in Government-controlled areas. However, millions more people are not. What the Syrian people need has been made abundantly clear — protection, access to basic goods and services, an end to sieges and respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Security Council has unanimously supported all such needs in adopting resolution 2401 (2018). I started today by answering questions that we have received regarding resolution 2401 (2018). I would like to end with a question for the Security Council. When will the resolution be implemented? The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council following the comprehensive briefing by Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. In two weeks, we will mark the beginning of the eighth year of the Syrian conflict. There are no words to express our frustration over the collective failure of the international community to end this war, but that frustration is nothing compared to the suffering and destruction visited ceaselessly upon the Syrian people. We are here again today because the brief respite that the Council unanimously demanded only days ago in resolution 2401 (2018) has not materialized, as Mr. Lowcock just described. The air strikes, shelling and ground offensives continue. There are even reports of yet another chlorine gas attack. What we need is the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and that is not happening. Nearly seven years since the peaceful protests in Dar'a and the reaction that set in motion what would eventually become all-out war, we are still grasping for a political solution, which is the only way to end the bloodletting. The Secretary-General has called eastern Ghouta a hell on Earth. The United Nations will continue to work with Syrians and the international community to help bring about a durable political solution. We will also continue to demand that all the parties involved in the conflict respect international humanitarian law — the rules of war — and protect civilians. We will continue to demand the release of those who have been arbitrarily detained and the end of enforced disappearances. We will continue to forcefully call for justice and accountability. Those responsible for the catalogue of horrors that mark daily life in Syria, including chemical and terrorist attacks, torture and sexual violence, sieges and attacks on hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, must be held accountable. Those outrages continue in large part because the perpetrators have so far enjoyed impunity. As the Secretary-General said earlier this week, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The United Nations acknowledges Russia's announcement of a daily five-hour pause for eastern Ghouta. In addition to Mr. Lowcock's briefing and what the International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, we respectfully remind all parties that resolution 2401 (2018) demands the sustained delivery of humanitarian aid for a minimum of 30 consecutive days. The Secretariat and relevant agencies are united and pulling in one direction towards the immediate and continuous cessation of hostilities that can be sustained beyond 30 days for unimpeded aid delivery. We also urgently need to get humanitarian aid and services in and the sick and critically wounded evacuated from besieged eastern Ghouta and other locations. We are ready to deliver. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reminded parties of their absolute obligation under international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Earlier this month, Emergency Relief Coordinator Lowcock told the Council (see S/PV.8186) in no uncertain terms that that is an obligation, not a favour. He has just updated us all on the humanitarian situation and provided an update on the United Nations readiness to deliver aid and services, and the tireless efforts of humanitarians to reach all in need, wherever they are. But right now we must address the particular needs of those in besieged eastern Ghouta. Resolution 2401 (2018) affirms that the cessation of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front, and "all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council". (resolution 2401 (2018), para. 2). In our view, that rightly maintains the parameters set out in resolution 2254 (2015), but there must be 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 5/22 a frank assessment of what that means in relation to the humanitarian tragedy that we are witnessing in eastern Ghouta. First, we condemn all violations of international law by all parties, including shelling from eastern Ghouta, which has injured or killed civilians in Damascus. The scale of the Government's indiscriminate military attacks against eastern Ghouta — an area with a civilian population of 400,000 — cannot be justified based on targeting Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Efforts to combat terrorism do not supersede obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. Secondly, the United Nations has not seen any confirmation by the Government of Syria of its commitment to implement resolution 2401 (2018), although at the resolution's adoption Syria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations said, "As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism" (S/PV.8188, p. 12). Thirdly, yesterday the Head of the Syrian Negotiations Committee transmitted to the Secretary- General a letter on behalf of the three major non-State armed opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — and civil groups in eastern Ghouta regarding their full commitment to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Specifically, they committed to ensuring the necessary environment for United Nations humanitarian access as well as, "to expel all elements of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, Jabhat Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida and all who belong to these groups from eastern Ghouta". Fourthly, the United Nations has no independent verified reports that those three non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta created a coordination centre, as has been alleged regarding Jabhat Al-Nusra, nor has the United Nations seen any public announcement by those groups of such a centre. Jaysh Al-Islam has denied that claim. What the United Nations can verify is that non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta, over the past 24 hours, have expressed their readiness in writing to evacuate Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Previous negotiations on that issue among those groups and key members of the International Syrian Support Group humanitarian task force in Geneva and Damascus have not resulted in success. Alleviating the tragic situation in eastern Ghouta has the Council's full attention. Yet we cannot forget that resolution 2401 (2018) demands a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. Violence continues in Afrin, Idlib and the eastern part of the country. Council members have heard about the humanitarian challenges and suffering of the people in those areas as well. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that developments in those areas will undoubtedly render the situation in Syria even more complex. There will be no sustainable solution if the Council's resolutions are not implemented. That will require that the parties step back from the brink and fulfil their obligations to end the fighting in Syria. All our efforts will be in vain if there is no serious investment in a political solution. As Council members are aware, resolution 2401 (2018) calls on all Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations calls for a renewed commitment by all concerned Member States to work seriously to implement the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations also cautions against drawing the Organization into monitoring exercises. That has been tried in the past without success — not for lack of trying — but in the absence of political will among Member States to underpin United Nations efforts. Member States, especially those working within the Astana and Amman arrangements, should use their resources and clear influence over the parties to ensure the implementation of a sustained cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. The conflict in Syria continues to threaten regional and international stability because the warring parties believe there is a military solution. There is not. The United Nations remains convinced that a political solution is the only way forward. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura is pressing forward on facilitating the establishment of a constitutional committee in Geneva, as part of the overall intra-Syrian political process towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), for which the United Nations requires the positive and constructive engagement of both negotiating delegations. Special Envoy De Mistura will need the full support of the Council and the international community as a whole if the United Nations efforts are to have a chance of reinvigorating a serious and meaningful political process. I trust that he will have that support. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 6/22 18-05507 The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I make my remarks today on behalf of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders for the humanitarian track of the Security Council's work on the situation in Syria. I would like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock once again for a very sobering update. We share his sense of urgency following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) last weekend to fully take advantage of the 30- day pause so that the United Nations and its partners can dispatch life-saving aid convoys and begin medical evacuations. Since the resolution's adoption, we have been asked, as penholders, when the resolution would take effect and to whom it would apply. We are very clear: the resolution took effect upon its adoption and applies to all parties across the entire country. The clock is ticking. There is no time to lose. Let me also sincerely thank Mr. Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing today. We share his deep concern concerning reports of the flagrant lack of compliance with the ceasefire in eastern Ghouta. We would like to extend our sincere appreciation to all members of the Council for their constructive cooperation, which enabled the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). The resolution represents decisive and meaningful action by the Council in response to the calls from the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above all, the civilian population in Syria. However, the value of a resolution is not in its adoption, but in its implementation. We must now all build on the spirit of cooperation that led to the resolution's adoption and work together to ensure that it is enforced. Compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council is not optional; it is an obligation of all Member States. The humanitarian community stands ready to do its part. Having adopted this resolution, the Council must do its part. For the next few weeks, let us seize the opportunity that this resolution represents and focus on its implementation. We would like to make four concrete recommendations on the way forward. First, existing de-escalation agreements must be complied with most urgently in eastern Ghouta. We call on the three Astana guarantors to spare no effort to achieve this end. Resolution 2401 (2018) clearly demands that all parties cease hostilities; air strikes, the ground offensive and shelling must stop. We take note of the initial positive indications from armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta that they are ready to comply with the resolution. We also note their commitment to expel the Al-Nusra Front from the area. We must build on this, and we call on those with influence over armed opposition groups to secure their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. Clearly the Council has demanded in resolution 2401 (2018) that the Syrian Government cease all military operations without delay. Secondly, as Mr. Lowcock has told us, the United Nations and its implementing partners in the field are ready to commence life-saving convoys and medical evacuations. We urge the Syrian authorities to immediately issue facilitation letters for the convoy to Duma to proceed this week as a necessary first step. It can no longer be business as usual; the Council has demanded weekly convoys to all areas and populations in need. Thirdly, existing structures to strengthen compliance with and monitoring of the cessation must urgently be activated. We look to the Chairs of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group to undertake more frequent meetings, which are needed at least on a weekly basis. The Amman operations room should also be utilized. We see merit in making a clearer link between monitoring mechanisms and the Security Council. Fourthly, the Council must remain actively seized of this matter. Sweden and Kuwait will request an open briefing from the incoming presidency on the Secretary-General's report on implementation and compliance that is due 15 days after the resolution's adoption. We should also stand ready to meet and take appropriate action at any time necessary so as to ensure implementation of this resolution. Finally, we welcome any efforts to de-escalate violence and to allow and facilitate humanitarian access in Syria, but let us be clear — resolution 2401 (2018) demands a 30-day, nationwide ceasefire, with immediate access for weekly convoys and medical evacuations. A five-hour ceasefire does not meet the requirements of the resolution. The resolution is not primarily about the evacuation of civilians, but demands humanitarian access to civilians and medical evacuations. The 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 7/22 cessation of hostilities must be implemented fully and without delay. It is imperative that all parties uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law at all times. Last Saturday's unanimous action reinforced the legitimacy and credibility of the Security Council (see S/PV.8188). Today's briefings demonstrate that there is no time to rest on the laurels of this achievement. We must now move without delay to ensure our action here last Saturday is translated into the relief and assistance expected by the millions of people affected by this conflict. It is now incumbent on all the parties and all those with influence over the parties to spare no effort and use all channels available in order to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): First of all, I want to thank Mark Lowcock and Jeffrey Feltman for their very clear briefings. I would like today to focus my remarks on our shared road map, namely, the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously last Saturday (see S/PV. 8188). On behalf of France, I would like to express three main messages today. My first message is that we must not pay lip service. The situation on the ground remains dramatic and has not improved in recent days. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the offensive against the eastern Ghouta has continued relentlessly. France, of course, strongly condemns these indiscriminate bombings, which affect inhabited areas and civil infrastructure. In this context, the disastrous humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. No United Nations convoy has been able to reach the eastern Ghouta or any of the other besieged areas, no emergency medical evacuation has been carried out, no siege has been lifted. The Syrian regime is maintaining its stranglehold on the civilian population and is methodically pursuing its policy of destruction. More than 400,000 people remain under siege in eastern Ghouta, including 130,000 children. The demand sent by the United Nations to authorize a priority convoy for Duma, the main city in eastern Ghouta, has not received any response from the Syrian authorities to date. My second message is this. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 February makes very specific demands on the parties. Hostilities must cease without delay in order to establish a lasting humanitarian truce for at least 30 days, in order to allow both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. Let me stress this point. These demands are perfectly clear and cannot be distorted or reinterpreted. Contrary to what some would have us believe, the demands made by the resolution are absolutely clear. Our responsibility today is to implement, fully and in their totality, the provisions that we have unanimously adopted. If we do not that, what credibility can be given to our commitments? What credibility can be given to Security Council resolutions? The United Nations and its partners tell us that they are ready to deliver aid to the people of eastern Ghouta and other priority areas. There is therefore not a minute to lose because every minute that passes can turn lives upside down. At the conclusion of difficult negotiations, the Council managed to unite in the face of the gravity of the humanitarian situation and the escalation of the Syrian conflict in recent months. We must now work together, in the same spirit of unity, to effectively implement on the ground the resolution we unanimously adopted. This is my third message. Following yesterday's meeting in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, France is putting forward four concrete proposals for making progress and for doing so without delay. The first is to ensure that all parties implement the cessation of hostilities that resolution 2401 (2018) demands. I note that the three main opposition groups present in eastern Ghouta as well as Nassar Al Hariri, head of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition, have written to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Council to state that they would respect the truce. It is therefore urgent in the extreme — if I can put it that way — that the Damascus regime also unambiguously express its willingness to respect the Council resolution and to formalize it in writing. We have taken note of the Russian proposal of a daily five-hour humanitarian truce. It is a positive first step, but it is insufficient. We must go further. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands of the parties a minimum period of 30 consecutive days of cessation of hostilities. Respecting that demand is non-negotiable. That goal requires more than just symbolic declarations or political posturing. At a minimum, it requires that humanitarian personnel be allowed to do their work. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 8/22 18-05507 These workers are used to taking risks on a daily basis, but the parties must allow them to do their work. Given that the opposition groups have formally committed to doing just that, the regime must do so as well, and without delay. To that end, supporters of the regime, beginning with Russia, must bring the necessary pressure to bear. Our second proposal, by way of a demand, pertains to the need to immediately open the relevant, clearly identified checkpoints — beginning with Wafideen — in order to allow the access of priority convoys of the United Nations. We therefore demand that the Syrian authorities submit without delay the necessary letter to facilitate the deployment of humanitarian convoys. Thirdly, it is extremely urgent to allow medical evacuations for the most critical cases, giving priority to children. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent indicates that 1,065 people need emergency medical evacuations. We have not a minute to lose. Finally, France considers it essential to create a monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and compliance with the resolution by the parties. We are working diligently to establishing that mechanism now. Those are the French proposals to address the urgent need to put an end to the bombing and protect civilians, who beyond resolution 2401 (2018), are protected under international humanitarian law. It is also crucial to intensify our efforts to reach a political solution in the framework of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). It is the only way out of the conflict and the only way to prevent a looming escalation of tensions. France will not deviate from that path. The overall credibility of the Security Council and the responsibility of each of its members are crucially at stake today in the context of the Syrian tragedy. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-Generals Lowcock and Feltman for their clear, factual briefings and for reiterating to all of us on the Security Council the ongoing horror of the conflict in Syria — and in particular in eastern Ghouta, because that is where it is clear the situation is most dire by a huge order of magnitude. It was five days ago (see S/PV.8188) that we sat in this Chamber and all of us raised our hands in support of a 30-day ceasefire, which we hoped would provide some relief to Syria's people. That was a desperately needed step, one that came too late for many. In eastern Ghouta alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that at least 630 people were killed and 3,000 injured in the week before resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, with women and children representing nearly 60 per cent of the wounded and 50 per cent of the deceased. We also continue to condemn attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta. Let us recall the demands of our resolution. It called for at least a 30-day ceasefire without delay to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuation. "Without delay" means right now, immediately — that there should be no delay. We all voted for those demands and we committed to using our influence to ensure that. In response, Russia has declared a five-hour daily humanitarian window. That is not what the Council demanded, nor what Russia agreed to use its influence to ensure. A five-hour window has not delivered and cannot deliver any meaningful improvement on the ground. Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has made clear that the United Nations cannot get humanitarian convoys in and out within that time frame, as has the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarian pauses of a few meagre hours are no substitute for a sustained ceasefire, which is vital to ensuring the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations. If Russia is able to deliver a five-hour pause, let it deliver a 24-hour pause, as it agreed on Saturday. Let us now take stock of the situation in Syria, and specifically in eastern Ghouta, where the situation is at its most desperate. Let us review if any real change has occurred in the past five days. Has the resolution been implemented? Has there been a ceasefire? Has there been any delivery of humanitarian aid or any medical evacuations? Has the adoption of the resolution brought any relief to the people of Syria? The fighting has not stopped. All of the main armed opposition groups have committed to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The Al-Assad regime has not, and has in fact ignored the resolution we adopted. Reports of attacks and air strikes by pro-regime forces continue. Twenty-two air strikes reportedly took place even during Russia's so-called humanitarian pause. And, as if it could not get any worse, there have been disturbing reports of the use of chlorine gas. Doctors in eastern Ghouta reported to the Syrian-American Medical Society that 16 patients, including six children, were suffering from symptoms 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 9/22 indicative of exposure to chemical compounds, following an alleged regime attack on Sunday — only one day after the resolution was adopted. Since Saturday not a single aid convoy has been able to access eastern Ghouta to provide relief to the desperate civilians. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000 people are now in need of medical evacuation from eastern Ghouta. None have been evacuated since the resolution was adopted. The consequences of the failure to implement the resolution are clear: the casualties continue to rise and the horror continues. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports at least 14 civilians, including three children, were killed on Sunday. In short, in the words of one doctor from eastern Ghouta, "Nothing has changed." It is the responsibility of us all to ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is enacted in full. In the words of my Foreign Secretary, the Al-Assad regime must allow the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid, in compliance with resolution 2401 (2018), and we look to Russia and Iran to make sure this happens, in accordance with their own promises. I implore all those with influence over the Syrian regime to act now to ensure that the ceasefire that they supported in the Chamber is implemented in full and immediately. To do anything less is an affront to the Council, the United Nations and the international system that we live by. We will continue to monitor the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and commit to returning to the Council regularly until we see it respected. Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Every time the Security Council attempts to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, we take a small leap of faith. I say "we" in reference to the Security Council. I speak of faith because all Council members and most States Members of the United Nations still genuinely try to uphold the responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, including abiding by and fully implementing Security Council resolutions. Despite the grim updates we heard today, we must maintain the hope that we can help the Syrian people. If we do not have that hope, we are wasting our time here. Just four days ago, the Security Council took another leap of faith. We adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a 30-day ceasefire for all of Syria, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to deliver desperately needed food and medical supplies, and immediate and unconditional medical evacuations based on need and emergency. Our goal was clear and simple. The Al-Assad regime and its supporters have been pummelling eastern Ghouta, where 400,000 people live under siege and constant bombardment. Resolution 2401 (2018) demanded that the assault stop. That was the Council speaking in one, clear voice. The opposition groups operating in eastern Ghouta have made clear their commitment to the ceasefire. The Free Syrian Army, Jaysh al-Islam, the Al-Rahman Legion and Ahrar al-Sham all committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Against all odds, we hoped that Mr. Al-Assad might respect the resolution, cease hostilities and allow unfettered humanitarian access to all those who need it. Against all odds, we hoped that Russia would use its influence to ensure Mr. Al-Assad's commitment to resolution 2401 (2018). Once again, that hope has been crushed because so far, for the people of eastern Ghouta, nothing has changed. Despite the unanimous call for a ceasefire, the regime's attacks continue unabated. Hundreds of Syrians have been killed or injured since we adopted the resolution on Saturday. What is worse is that less than 24 hours after we demanded the ceasefire, there were reports that the Al-Assad regime again used chlorine gas as a weapon. Such attacks demonstrate Syria's complete and utter contempt for the Council and the United Nations. On Monday one human rights organization reported 18 attacks that defied the Council's demands. On Tuesday another organization reported at least 23 air strikes and four barrel bombs in eastern Ghouta. Syrians on the ground are reporting that Tuesday was worse than Monday with regard to strikes from the regime. How can that be? On the humanitarian front, as Mark Lowcock stated, the Al-Assad regime has allowed no deliveries of assistance into eastern Ghouta — not one. Opposition groups in the area have expressed their commitment to allowing aid in, but the Al-Assad regime still says no. Since we adopted resolution 2401 (2018), Russia has announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the aerial bombing of civilians in eastern Ghouta, which is cynical, callous and in flagrant defiance of the demands of resolution 2401 (2018). The cessation of hostilities is for at least 30 days — every day, all day. Russia does not get to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the resolution. It negotiated it and voted for it. Russia, S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 10/22 18-05507 Iran and the Al-Assad regime are not even trying to hide their intentions. They are asking civilians to leave eastern Ghouta on the false premise that they can then attack anyone left in the area as much as they would like. Let us call the actions what they are. Mr. Al-Assad and his allies want the civilians of eastern Ghouta to walk into the arms of a regime that has been attacking and starving them for the past seven years. That is not a humanitarian gesture. They do not care if the 400,000 people of eastern Ghouta suffer, as long as they can continue to pursue their military and political objectives. We know what Iran, Syria and the Al-Assad regime are doing because they have done the same thing in the past. It is the same playbook they used for Aleppo in 2016. Once again, we, including Russia, demanded in the Security Council Chamber that Mr. Al-Assad stop the bombing, and yet Russia, Iran and Mr. Al-Assad continue their attacks, defying the wishes of the Council and of the international community. Because we have been through this before, we know what Russia will say today. It will say that there are terrorists in eastern Ghouta so that the Al-Assad regime can bomb as ferociously and indiscriminately as it wants and kill as many civilians as it wants. That defies the principles governing the laws of war. The Al-Assad regime should not be allowed to bomb and starve its own people into submission under the guise of counter-terrorism. That Russian argument makes a mockery of the Council and of international law. Russia also accuses the United States of somehow being responsible for humanitarian crises in Syria, but such accusations are ludicrous. The United States does not block humanitarian aid in any area. In fact, the United States has provided more than $7 billion in humanitarian aid in response to the crisis. The Council must not fall for Russia's misdirections. When the ceasefire was adopted unanimously on Saturday, including by the Russians, Ambassador Haley stated that our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution would be tested. It has come to pass. Despite everything that has happened since Saturday, we are not casting aside the ceasefire in Syria; just the opposite. We would like to redouble our efforts in the Security Council to implement it, but the only way to change the situation on the ground is for all of us — every single one of us — around the table and each State Member of the United Nations to speak the truth about what is happening. The past four days should show us that when it comes to demanding a ceasefire, it is not enough to say that all parties should show restraint or commit to the ceasefire because in eastern Ghouta there is only one party dropping barrel bombs, gassing the Syrian people and denying deliveries of food and medical assistance. It is the Al-Assad regime, operating with the full support of Russia and Iran. On Saturday we stated that the only way to restore the credibility of the Council was to make the ceasefire a reality. Russia, Iran and the Al-Assad regime have not complied with the Council's demands and have not silenced their guns. Unless we take action, they will stop at nothing to destroy eastern Ghouta and we will again fail to help the Syrian people. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): First, let me thank Under-Secretaries-General Lowcock and Feltman for their briefings. In my statement I will address three points: implementation, implementation and implementation. First, I will speak about the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. Since the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, civilians are still dying in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in Syria. The humanitarian disaster continues worsen. We need a full, nationwide cessation of hostilities and we need it now. The Russian proposal for a humanitarian corridor and pauses of five hours per day cannot be a substitute for a humanitarian pause of 30 consecutive days, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018). Those five hours do not meet the obligations under the resolution and are not enough for the United Nations to be effective in delivering aid to the entire area of Ghouta, as Under- Secretary-General Lowcock just stated. We call upon the parties to the conflict and on those with influence on the parties to show decisive action and stop the violence. As Under-Secretary- General Feltman stated, three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta have announced that they are committed to fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018). We expect the regime to do the same. The air strikes, the shelling and the shooting must stop. For the credibility of the Council, it is crucial that its resolutions be fully implemented. That is the obligation of all States Members of the United Nations, under the Charter. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 11/22 The Kingdom of the Netherlands repeats the call made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to the Astana guarantors. She called on the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey to "take all necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and that urgent humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations are taking place". My second point is about the implementation of humanitarian access. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta, to be lifted immediately, and demands safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys. As Under-Secretary-General Lowcock just explained, the United Nations stands ready with 45 trucks to deliver essential aid to eastern Ghouta. But the necessary facilitation letters are still lacking, and the security conditions do not permit those deliveries. At this point, more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical care, but they are still trapped in eastern Ghouta. If they are not given the care they need in hospitals in Damascus or elsewhere, they may die. The United Nations and the Security Council have consistently pleaded for these medical evacuations, and yet there are still no developments with regard to them. We also need to see access to aid for those fleeing the fighting in Afrin. More generally, there should be delivery of humanitarian aid to the areas that are not under Government control. As Mr. Feltman just said, we should reach all who are in need, wherever they are. My third point is about implementing the protection of civilians. The exception on the cessation of hostilities in paragraph 2 of the resolution allows targeted action against terrorists who are designated as such by the Council. However, that does not mean that absolutely anything is allowed. International humanitarian law applies to all military combat operations and counter-terrorism actions. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must be respected in all circumstances. The civilians in the conflict must be protected. There is talk of humanitarian corridors for civilians who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but evacuations should always be voluntary. We are concerned about the possibility that humanitarian corridors will be used for forced population transfers. Civilians cannot be forced to leave, and neither should they be forced to stay. If voluntary evacuations do take place, we will call on the United Nations to monitor them. Currently, the most urgent humanitarian situation is in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, but needs remain high elsewhere in Syria as well. We welcomed the January delivery of aid to Rukban, but we want to stress the importance of sustained access and a durable solution. As others have said today, the demining activities in Raqqa should be increased, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is doing its part in that regard. The media coverage of the issue of the exploitation of Syrian women in exchange for aid is very disturbing. There should be no tolerance of such behaviour, as the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have already said. The probity of any United Nations implementing parties should be beyond any doubt. In conclusion, we must ensure that resolution 2254 (2015) is fully implemented. There can be no military solution to the conflict, and we call on all the parties to engage seriously in the United Nations-led political process as a matter of urgency. The suffering of the people of Syria has lasted for more than seven years. For the sake of the millions of women, children and men trapped in this horrendous war, it is high time that all parties started putting the protection, interests and well-being of the Syrian people on the top of their agenda. Yesterday, my Minister, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, said that humanitarian access and the protection of civilians are cornerstones of international humanitarian law. They are part of our shared values and shared humanity. The Security Council must do justice to those values and to our shared humanity. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you for convening today's meeting, Mr. President, and for the briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman on the situation in Syria. On Saturday, when we adopted resolution 2401 (2018) after long and complex negotiations, we highlighted the commitment that Council members have shown to achieving a humanitarian ceasefire in Syria. As we said at the time, it will be crucial to closely monitor its proper implementation and to maintain the Council's unity with regard to its responsibility to protect the civilian population, in line with international law and international humanitarian law. Four days in, we are still being forced to lament and condemn the attacks on civilians and to reiterate S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 12/22 18-05507 our calls for the immediate and comprehensive implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the Secretary-General has pointed out, Council resolutions make sense only if they are effectively implemented. The credibility of the Security Council as a whole, and of those of its members with the greatest potential influence on the ground in particular, is at stake. In the light of this, we want to emphasize that the cessation of hostilities that the Council has demanded clearly covers the whole of Syrian territory, including eastern Ghouta and Afrin, and should last for a minimum of 30 days. If we are to ensure that, in our view we should mobilize the International Syria Support Group's Ceasefire Task Force. It is essential to ensure that all the parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and that the Council is able to closely monitor that compliance. In that regard, we support the four recommendations outlined by Sweden and Kuwait. We must remind the Syrian authorities of their responsibility to protect their people, and we firmly condemn the military operations in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country that have continued even after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). However, we welcome the strenuous efforts of the Organization, and of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in particular, to prepare 45 trucks carrying supplies and ready to enter eastern Ghouta as soon as the necessary permits are granted. The first report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) will be presented in less than two weeks, and we hope that it will be able to inform us that the humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian conflict has been alleviated, because we cannot wait any longer. It is the Security Council's duty to continue working relentlessly to achieve what we have all unanimously agreed on. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I very much appreciate today's clear and informative briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman, and I would like to share a few thoughts from Poland's point of view. Since the Council's adoption on Saturday of resolution 2401 (2018), we have been seeing yet more extremely worrying developments on the ground. As I said in my last statement on the subject (see S/PV.8188), the heavy fighting in Syria has unfortunately not only continued but is increasing. In that context, we should persist in our efforts to take every possible action to ensure the resolution's full and safe implementation. We call on all to work to alleviate the suffering of civilians, including children, by giving them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance. That should include voluntary evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and its implementing partners and based solely on medical need, in order to ensure that the process is genuinely voluntary. We would like to stress that all the relevant actors should use all their influence to help to improve the conditions on the ground immediately. We urgently call for a cessation of hostilities throughout all of Syria for 30 days, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018). In that context, it is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also offer an opportunity for the talks being held under United Nations auspices in Geneva to gain momentum, so that a political solution can finally be reached. For that reason, we call on all parties to fulfil their commitments to the existing ceasefire agreements. It should be emphasized that the implementation of the ceasefire announced by resolution 2401 (2018) should ensure the safe entrance and stay of humanitarian and medical personnel without prejudice to their health or life. When such personnel enter hard-to-reach areas, we should know precisely how long they can stay while delivering assistance under the ceasefire, otherwise their lives could also be in danger. In conclusion, let me stress the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the implementation of humanitarian resolutions. The unanimous adoption of the resolution is just the beginning of the process. We call on all actors with influence on the ground to take all steps necessary to ensure that the fighting stops, that the Syrian people are protected and, finally, that urgent humanitarian access is enabled and that the necessary medical evacuations can take place. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their respective briefings. Once again, we would like to say how appalled we are at the terrible situation suffered by the Syrian people, as the past two months have been the most violent since the start of the conflict, and civilians, primarily women and children, are the ones that are suffering the gravest consequences of this intensification of the war. We call the attention of the Security Council to the continuing 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 13/22 violations of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as these attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and homes. My delegation would like to express once again its gratitude to the delegations of Sweden and Kuwait for their work in promoting the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which imposes a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria, which is as urgent as it is necessary. We urge the parties to implement the resolution immediately in order to speed up access of humanitarian assistance without any restrictions, allow urgent medical evacuations and the entry of humanitarian convoys, and ensure the protection of hospitals and medical facilities, especially in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and north of Hama. We wish to underscore once again the need for continued cooperation and coordination among the Syrian Government and the various humanitarian assistance agencies, so that the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be effective, especially in hard-to-reach areas, and to prevent administrative obstacles from derailing or negatively affecting the deployment of the required humanitarian assistance. We also stress the need to begin, as soon as possible, humanitarian mine-clearing in areas that require it, in particular in the city of Raqqa, to allow the return in dignified and safe conditions of people who were forced to flee their homes because of the conflict. As we have stated previously, we believe that if our aim is to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people in the face of armed violence, the Security Council has the major challenge of maintaining its unity so as to ensure that this organ's decisions are implemented. We reiterate that the solution to this conflict can be found only through an inclusive political process based on dialogue and coordination, led by the Syrian people and for the Syrian people, that will make it possible to reach a peaceful solution among all parties involved. With this in mind, we wish to highlight the various forums for dialogue, specifically the Astana process, at which de-escalation zones were agreed on that must be respected by all parties. We will be closely following the next round of the process. We wish also to highlight the other opportunities for dialogue that could make it possible to reach further compromises to achieve a definitive end to hostilities, such as the Sochi national dialogue, which is aimed at strengthening the Geneva political process, with respect for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and its right to choose its own political, economic and social system without any external pressure or interference. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. Jeffrey Feltman and Mr. Mark Lowcock for their respective briefings on recent developments in the situation in Syria following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. My delegation commends the Secretary-General for his unstinting efforts as part of the political dialogue among the Syrian parties with the aim of arriving at a lasting solution to the protracted crisis ravaging that country. In that regard, my country welcomes the holding of intra-Syrian peace talks on 25 and 26 January in Vienna in the framework of the Geneva process, followed by the talks held in Sochi on 29 and 30 January. My delegation cherishes the hope that the proposals stemming from the Sochi talks, including the establishment of a committee tasked with drawing up a new constitution, will receive consistent attention from the international community, as part of the concerted quest to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Syria. The situation on the ground is deeply alarming. Military operations that include the use of non-conventional weapons are leading to mass displacements of people, the loss of human lives, injuries and the destruction of public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. The grave humanitarian crisis spawned by the fighting led to the adoption by the Security Council this past Saturday, 24 February, of resolution 2401 (2018), with a view to the cessation without delay of hostilities for a 30-day period to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need as well as medical evacuations. My delegation notes with regret that the adoption of the resolution did not contribute to restoring calm on the ground. The ceasefire proposed was short-lived, despite the numerous appeals for a cessation of hostilities. Even the very minimum one called for by the Russian Federation, an ally of the Damascus Government, on Monday 26 February did not lead to a positive response. Air raids and rocket launches continue on the ground, thereby obstructing the work of humanitarian personnel. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 14/22 18-05507 We deplore the ongoing loss of life among humanitarian workers — 22 United Nations personnel and 66 staff members or volunteers of the International Red Cross — and we deplore also the material damage that has been wrought, which includes the destruction of 25 vehicles and 44 facilities, according to the information we have received. Nonetheless, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes the fact that United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners have managed to assist people in need by conducting 1,567 deliveries. My country reaffirms that a resolution of the crisis in Syria must be part of an inclusive dialogue and political process, as set out in the road map under resolution 2254 (2015). In that regard, my country calls for full compliance with the 30-day ceasefire, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018), which will not only allow humanitarian actors to respond to critical emergencies but also create the conditions for a return to the negotiating table by all parties to the Syrian crisis. To that end, Côte d'Ivoire urges the members of the Security Council to unite and surmount their differences in order to send a message of hope and solidarity of the international community to the Syrian people. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): As usual, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman just gave us detailed briefings on the humanitarian and political situation in Syria. Those were the first briefings to be delivered to the Security Council following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), on 24 February. I take this opportunity to thank both Under-Secretaries-General, as well as to acknowledge the willingness of the United Nations and its partners to send convoys of trucks with the necessary humanitarian aid and begin medical evacuations as soon as conditions on the ground allow. As Secretary-General António Guterres said two days ago in his statement before the Human Rights Council, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The Republic of Equatorial Guinea hopes resolution 2401 (2018) is meaningful in that way in order to relieve the affected population of the suffering it has endured, especially in eastern Ghouta, that is, we hope for it to be immediately implemented. We want to reiterate that the Syrian conflict has no military solution. The opponents therefore must take a seat at the negotiating table to engage in direct and frank dialogue, without exclusions, however complicated it may be to do so. It must be the Syrians who determine the future they want for their country. The international community must redouble its efforts in making sure the opponents engage in negotiations, and the countries that have influence need to wield it to establish trust, with the ultimate goal of achieving lasting and just peace in Syria. We commend the intention expressed by the largest opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — to respect the ceasefire, and we invite all the other parties involved to take the same decision. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that the only reason that the humanitarian situation remains of concern is because the opponents do not agree on negotiating to reach a peace agreement, which consequently causes more civilian victims, leads to the destruction of hospital facilities and hampers humanitarian aid operations. The conflict has recently intensified around the town of eastern Ghouta and some other parts of Syria, which has resulted in civilian casualties, the destruction of a considerable number of medical and relief facilities and the obstruction of humanitarian relief operations led by the United Nations. Equatorial Guinea is very touched and horrified by the critical situation the Syrian people are experiencing, and we must not show indifference to so much pain and suffering. It is therefore imperative that the parties to the conflict implement and uphold the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the most recent, resolution 2401 (2018), including allowing access to humanitarian aid, halting hostilities and ultimately, cooperating with the United Nations in its efforts to assuage the conflict and make humanitarian operations effective by ensuring aid deliveries reach the affected populations and evacuating the sick and seriously injured so that they can receive the necessary medical care. The international community, while striving to help Syria, must not forget the neighbouring countries that have welcomed refugees and shown a spirit of solidarity worthy of praise. I would like to conclude my statement by expressing well-deserved tribute to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and all those who work with it on the ground for their bravery and determination in fulfilling their humanitarian mission to deliver aid to 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 15/22 those in need. We encourage them to persist in their noble efforts. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General Feltman for their comprehensive and sobering briefings. Kazakhstan welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). That document should be urgently implemented to ensure a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria. The ceasefire regime should be implemented fully, especially in the areas of eastern Ghouta, southern Idlib and northern Hama, to resolve their long-accumulated acute humanitarian problems, deliver aid to the most difficult regions and evacuate the wounded and sick. Turning to the situation on the ground in the country, according to our humanitarian colleagues, over the past 78 hours and to our deep regret, military operations continued to be reported in besieged eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, including women and children. Attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta are also continuing. To our great disappointment, a Syrian Arab Red Crescent warehouse in a Damascus suburb was reportedly struck by shelling. During the same period, attacks on the city of Damascus and the governorate resulted in 14 deaths and 214 injured. We are glad to know that the United Nations has mobilized and is ready to immediately support life-saving aid convoys in several areas in eastern Ghouta. We therefore call on the Council members and the wider United Nations membership to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in operationalizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in eastern Ghouta, as well as in carrying out hundreds of medical evacuations. We echo the United Nations calls on all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and take all measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law. It is equally important to ensure, in close coordination with OCHA, the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. We must also insist that parties support United Nation agencies in the fulfilment of their mandates. In that context, Kazakhstan proposes that all-round assistance be provided to the inter-Syrian negotiations through the Astana process and that positive developments be taken advantage of to improve the humanitarian situation. My country stands for a solution in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and agreements on the de-escalation zones reached through the Astana process. We regret the lack of full agreement and close coordination among the key stakeholders in managing the Syrian crisis. We also attach great importance to strengthening the inter-Syrian political dialogue with greater support from the world community. Lastly, Kazakhstan notes the need to establish closer interaction among the leading stakeholders in Syria, in particular between the Russian Federation and the United States, to improve the political process and ensure positive changes on the humanitarian track. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. China commends the United Nations aid agencies for their humanitarian relief efforts in Syria. The security situation in various parts of Syria, including Damascus and eastern Ghouta, has escalated recently, causing significant civilian casualties. We sympathize profoundly with the suffering of the Syrian people and condemn all acts of violence against innocent civilians. The parties concerned should take immediate measures to de-escalate the tensions in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) demonstrates the consensus and unity of its members on the humanitarian issue in Syria. We appreciate the positive efforts of the parties concerned. China welcomed Russia's announcement by Russia that it will implement the ceasefire measures and assist with the evacuation of people from conflict areas. We call on the parties in Syria to put an immediate end to hostilities in accordance with the resolution, actively coordinate with United Nations relief efforts and ensure safe humanitarian corridors in the relevant areas. A political settlement is the only viable solution to the Syrian issue. The Syrian National Dialogue Congress was recently held successfully in Sochi and has had positive results. Special Envoy de Mistura is making ongoing efforts to advance the Syrian political process. The international community should support the Syrian parties in resuming dialogue and negotiations under the auspices of United Nations mediation as soon S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 16/22 18-05507 as possible and in seeking a solution that is acceptable to all parties through a Syrian-owned and -led political process. That is the only way to fundamentally ease the humanitarian situation in Syria and end the suffering of the Syrian people without delay. Terrorist organizations are still launching attacks in Syria, causing significant civilian casualties and impeding United Nations humanitarian relief efforts. The international community should strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism, adopt unified standards and resolutely combat all terrorist organizations that are designated as such by the Security Council. Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for their comprehensive briefings. We would like to express our gratitude to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for their continuing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of Syrians. As Mr. Lowcock said, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to be a devastating one. Military activities in various parts of the country, including eastern Ghouta, have affected the ability of the United Nations to deliver lifesaving assistance to all in need. As the report of the Secretary- General (S/2018/138) says, the conflict and other obstacles have had a disastrous effect on the level of humanitarian access. In order to address those challenges and to alleviate the Syrians' suffering, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding the institution without delay of a cessation of hostilities for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations. As we all emphasized on Saturday after welcoming the resolution's adoption (see S/PV.8186), what is now required is its full and comprehensive implementation with the immediate engagement of all parties and those with influence on them. Of course, we understand and appreciate the fact that the United Nations is ready to provide immediate humanitarian aid across the country. However, as Mr. Lowcock just highlighted, there are still military activities in various areas. In that regard, we call on all the parties to fully implement resolution 2401 (2018) for the sake of the Syrian people, who have continued to bear the brunt of the conflict for almost eight years. We appreciate any measure taken by Member States to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire, including the humanitarian pause and humanitarian corridor announced by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is obvious that more needs to be done to fully implement the resolution. It is therefore imperative to take urgent and coordinated action to bring about an immediate ceasefire, thereby ensuring that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have safe, sustained and needs-based access in order to deliver humanitarian aid to all Syrians in need of assistance. In conclusion, it is ultimately a comprehensive, Syrian-led political solution, facilitated by the United Nations on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), that can sustainably end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. By the way, at the outset I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask Mr. Lowcock where the United Nations is getting its evidence and data on deaths in Damascus, for instance. According to the Syrian authorities' information, for example, just since 22 January, 12 people have died in Damascus, while the United Nations figure is 11 for the whole month. Where is he getting his information from? The White Helmets, maybe? Today, as has been usual recently, the United States delegation devoted its statement to Russia. It told us that it knew what we were going to say today, which it does not. And I am pleased about that, because it means that it did not see our statement before the meeting began. On 24 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), in an important decision aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Syria, especially in areas where the danger of military clashes remains or there are obstacles of one kind or another to the civilian population's access to essential assistance. Today many questions have been asked — emphatic questions, rhetorical questions, questions aimed directly at us. We answered the questions asked of us during our discussion at the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). There are a lot of people here who like to pick citations from the resolution that they like and forget the ones that do not suit them. If I may, I will quote two extracts from it, from paragraph 1 and paragraph 10. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 17/22 (spoke in English) "Demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of this demand by all parties, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and … medical evacuations". "[U]nderscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria". (spoke in Russian) Has everyone read the resolution? We have said, and we will say it again, that any sustained pause must be preceded by an agreement between the parties on de-escalation. The demands that military activity end overnight are either the result of a misunderstanding of the realities or a deliberate exploitation of this human tragedy. The statement by the United States delegation simply rewrote resolution 2401 (2018). What sort of joint effort, such as the Permanent Representative of France called for today, can we talk about in these circumstances after what we heard today in the United States delegation's statement? Russia has announced the establishment in eastern Ghouta of daily five-hour humanitarian pauses. Everything possible is being done to ensure that they function successfully. Specifically, medical and temporary accommodation posts have been equipped, ambulance teams organized, motor transport provided. We call on the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other recognized humanitarian organizations to join these efforts. However, on the very first day, the militias took advantage of the announcement of the pause to go on the offensive. The same thing happened on the second day. The mortar shelling continued, including in the humanitarian operations corridors. Not a single person was able to leave the danger area. We took note of the relevant letters submitted on behalf of the illegal armed groups. We were told previously that the most convenient way of informing Council members about them was being sought. It has been found and it is indeed highly original — directly through the work e-mail addresses of all the political coordinators, meaning that someone deliberately sent the relevant contact information to dubious individuals from the ranks of the radical Syrian opposition. It is very similar to the situation that occurred when information about the closed negotiations on humanitarian resolutions became available to Western media agencies. However, we hope that the opposition leaders are serious and that their deeds will match their words. We are expecting clear guarantees in that regard from the militias' foreign sponsors, many of whom are seated around this table. The first thing that is needed is a definitive repudiation of the terrorist organizations. It has to be understood that terrorists continue to be a legitimate target of military operations, and we will not stand on ceremony with them. Overall, we have to decide on the most effective way to neutralize Jabhat Al-Nusra in eastern Ghouta. Why can't some members show a willingness to cooperate on that issue? Or do they not want to? The information background to this issue is overheated to the point of no return. If we had not adopted resolution 2401 (2018), it is difficult even to imagine what the Western media outlets would have made of it or how they would have portrayed Russia. But even now, when the resolution has been adopted, our Western partners act as if everything in it pertains solely to Damascus and Russia, and that its successful implementation depends almost entirely on the will of our two countries, while they, the self-styled champions of humanity, somehow imagine that they have an exclusive right to lecture us on the subject. In various media outlets, especially American ones, there have been false allegations that we mock the tragedy of this war and the situation in eastern Ghouta, and that we say that the campaign is exaggerated and fake. I will ask these humanistic gentlemen once again: Where were they when American aircraft blew Raqqa off the face of the Earth? Where were the cries and the hand-wringing? Months have passed since the terrorists were banished from that city and yet it is still uninhabitable. On top of that, there are new reports of 24 civilian casualties from Coalition air strikes in Deir ez-Zor province. Who are they — second-class citizens? Or when innocent people die from democratic bombs, is that somehow immaterial — perhaps even honourable? We urge the United Nations — in fact, we insist — to send an assessment mission to Raqqa as soon as possible, and that the Coalition, which is in de facto control of the area, give it all necessary support. We also expect that instead of establishing quasi- S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 18/22 18-05507 administrations in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Coalition leadership will come up with a plan to turn them over to the central authorities, in consideration of the Security Council's repeated affirmations of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That would be a great deal more constructive than the relentless quest to find what is a non-existent basis in international law for maintaining its presence on Syrian territory. If Council members have interesting ideas on how to raise the profile of local Government and find effective ways to rebuild the ethnic and religious balance that existed before the war, they should present them to the Syrians in the negotiations in Geneva and let them decide the issues for themselves through the mediation of the United Nations. We also demand that the Coalition open humanitarian access to the territory it is occupying around the Al-Tanf military base in order to bring aid to the residents of the Rukban camp as soon as possible. By the way, that is also a provision of resolution 2401 (2018). It is not for nothing that we keep saying that what is going on is painfully reminiscent of the situation in eastern Aleppo when the West unleashed a wave of monstrous anti-Russian hysteria. We are the only country being asked to implement resolution 2401 (2018). We are being criticized for instituting humanitarian pauses. Some claim that there are not enough of them. Demands, demands, demands. For some reason, someone is always bossily demanding something of Russia. Britain's Foreign Secretary has altogether decided that he is the prosecutor who is threatening to punish our country. Apparently, he called for today's meeting to be convened. He said so himself. The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic is making daily and hourly efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities, establish humanitarian pauses and ease the suffering of civilians. May I ask what other members have done to implement resolution 2401 (2018)? Has even one of their countries lifted a finger? Have they brought their influence to bear on those whom they consider the moderate opposition? Have they persuaded them to lay down their weapons and stop taking hostages? The hugely complex issue that the Syrian conflict represents is being used for unscrupulous purposes. The rivers of tears roll down only when the next stronghold where militias and terrorists mingle is threatened, at which point an unheard-of level of action kicks in. The real aim is the regime, as some members like to refer to the lawful Syrian authorities. Any hint of its success in fighting terrorism on its own territory is a thorn in their side. They are ready to use any means to stop it. This is a warning. We know about the chemical evidence being fabricated in order to blame Damascus. We know about the meetings on the subject, where they are being held and who is taking part in them. Today we once again heard unsubstantiated allegations about the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons. I am tired of asking if members understand the futility of Damascus using chemical weapons from both a military and a political point of view, and the completely believable probability of militias using chemical provocations. I think they do understand it perfectly, but they persist in seeking an excuse for military intervention. United States officials, and the head of the Foreign Office and others, have already talked about military strikes against Syria, and it is obvious where that intellectual activity is heading. We urge everyone to stop the dirty tricks and join the concerted efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Syria by implementing the resolution we have just adopted. We hope that the United Nations generally and Mr. Lowcock personally, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, will rise to the occasion. We have circulated a draft presidential statement on the resolution's implementation. We have placed it under the silence procedure until 1 p.m., and we call on the Council to adopt it. We hope that there will be no objections before one o'clock. I will take the liberty of reading it out. (spoke in English) The Security Council, with reference to its resolution 2401 (2018), urges all parties to implement it and, to this end, further urges all armed groups and all Member States with influence on them to ensure the safety of the announced humanitarian corridors for evacuation from eastern Ghouta. The Security Council calls for the establishment of similar humanitarian corridors in Al-Tanf and Rukban. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to expeditiously send a mission to Raqqa to assess humanitarian needs there. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 19/22 (spoke in Russian) And by the way, we, like the other members of the Security Council, believe that there can only be a political solution to the Syrian conflict. We are doing everything we can to achieve that, and certainly somewhat more than those who have been spreading fire and fury today. We propose, as we have always proposed, that they join in these efforts, rather than throw up road blocks in an attempt to serve their own geopolitical agendas. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. First of all, the delegation of Kuwait aligns itself to the statement made by the representative of Sweden on behalf of our two countries as co-penholders on the issue of Syria. We thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under- Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their briefings. Four days after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties cease hostilities throughout Syrian territory for 30 days, I would like to make the following points. We have said from the outset that resolution 2401 (2018) is only the first step towards improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, to date we have not seen the implementation of the provisions of the resolution — not even a partial implementation — as we heard from Mr. Lowcock this morning, in particular in eastern Ghouta. The Council demonstrated unity in adopting the resolution and it is up to us now to ensure that all its provisions are implemented in full and immediately in order to alleviate the suffering of our brethren in Syria and to protect civilians. The resolution is binding on all, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, we welcome the fact that the United Nations is ready to come to eastern Ghouta and other besieged areas so as to deliver all kinds of aid and assistance to those that need them. We call on all the parties to the conflict in Syria to uphold international humanitarian law and abide by the provisions of the resolution, which cover all the various aspects that are causing the daily suffering of the Syrian people. Thirdly, we underscore the importance of members of the Council making their contribution by spurring all the parties to the conflict in Syria to immediately implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), keeping in mind that, as co-penholders, we are committed to closely follow its implementation, including ensuring a briefing by the Secretariat 15 days after the adoption of the resolution. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. In accordance with to rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The Syrian Government has examined the forty-eighth monthly report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and, yesterday morning, as usual, we sent a formal letter to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council setting forth the position of the Syrian Government on the report. We are realistic. We know well that the United Nations is not a charitable organization. That is clear given that it has been unable to implement the principles of the Charter and international law since its inception — and the Palestinian question is a case in point. There have been other failures by the United Nations: in Iraq, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Grenada — for those who have forgotten Grenada — Nicaragua, and the list goes on. However, I hope we can preserve the United Nations as an organization even as it continues to lack charitability. I would now like to make the following points. First, the Syrian Government is fully committed to the principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as well as Syrian law and the Syrian Constitution, all of which stipulate that the Syrian Government has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Syrian citizens and protect them from terrorist groups. Secondly, the current report, just like previous reports, has a great flaw, namely, that the authors of the report continue to rely on politicized sources, open sources and unreliable figures. At the same time, the report continues to ignore credible Government sources and even the reports issued by the representatives of the United Nations in Syria. Those representatives, along with the reports they have submitted to the United Nations in New York, acknowledge the efforts S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 20/22 18-05507 of the Syrian Government and its cooperation on the humanitarian issue. However, none of this information that reaches New York appears to be mentioned in the report, as if by miracle. Thirdly, the Syrian Government condemns the authors of the report — the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — especially after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), for their failure to mention the Turkish aggression against the Syrian city of Afrin. That aggression has claimed the lives of many people, including women and children, destroyed public and private facilities and has led to the displacement of the city's inhabitants and a severe shortage of humanitarian goods. However, Afrin is not eastern Ghouta, eastern Aleppo, Fo'ah or Kefreya. Fourthly, the Syrian Government fully rejects the failure of the authors of the report to mention the catastrophic impact of the so-called International Coalition and its members. The Coalition, which has claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and members of the Syrian forces who are fighting Da'esh, committed two new massacres yesterday that claimed the lives of 29 civilians and injured dozens, most of them women and children, in the villages of Sha'fa and Thahret Allouni in eastern Deir ez-Zor. It appears that the International Coalition is focused on this part of eastern Deir ez-Zor because it is home to civilians who do not host Da'esh or Al-Nusra Front terrorists. The Coalition has also destroyed the city of Raqqa, as my colleague the representative of the Russian Federation just noted. My Government calls once again for dismantling this illegitimate aggressive Coalition and for an immediately stop to its crimes against the Syrian people. The Russian military issued a communiqué today saying that the areas under the control of the allies and agents of the United States in Syria are witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis currently in the country. Those areas have become black holes, just like the black holes in outer space. With regard to the situation in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian Government believes that the current deterioration in the situation is due to the fact that terrorist groups there have launched attacks against residential zones and military targets. Up until yesterday, they had launched more than 2,180 missiles and mortars against the city of Damascus. Those attacks claimed the lives of 66 civilians and injured 474 others. Government forces have been forced to respond to those attacks and to carry out their constitutional responsibility in guaranteeing security and safety for the citizens. My Government condemns the use, by the authors of the report, of the term "besieged areas" when considering the situation in eastern Ghouta, in rural Damascus. Under pressure from influential countries in and outside of the Council, they continue to deliberately ignore the fact that people in eastern Ghouta are besieged from within by the various armed terrorist organizations operating there. Those terrorist organizations are exploiting civilians and using them as human shields. They are seizing and monopolizing humanitarian assistance, distributing the aid to their supporters or selling it at exorbitant prices, as was the case in eastern Aleppo. Syria regrets the failure of the authors of the report to refer to the suffering of thousands of kidnapped people who are in eastern Ghouta prisons and other places where the terrorist groups are spread. The kidnapped people include women, children and elderly. These people were kidnapped from their homes and places of work and have been subjected to the worst forms of torture. There are civilians, including from city of Adra and from Latakia, who were kidnapped from their homes five years ago. The Syrian Government also condemns the statements by the Secretariat and reports of the Secretary-General, which continue up till now to disregard the suffering of 8 million civilians in the capital Damascus as a result of hundreds of missiles and mortars launched daily from terrorist groups within eastern Ghouta. The accusations by the authors of the report, like those of the Western countries that have influence on them, that the Syrian Government is allegedly besieging Ghouta have been consistently refuted. They have proven to be unfounded, as we have seen in recent reports noting that the Saudi regime provided "aid" to eastern Ghouta in February. That proves, first, that eastern Ghouta is not besieged and, secondly, that it is possible to access it. In particular, the terrorist groups in Ghouta continue to receive arms and munitions from Governments that support terrorism, including Saudi Arabia's so-called humanitarian assistance. The Syrian Government is more committed than anyone to protecting its citizens across Syria. In that 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 21/22 regard, it has taken all necessary measures to protect its citizens and to respond to the attacks of terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta. We have sought to protect these civilians from the terrorists by establishing a humanitarian corridor to ensure their exit from eastern Ghouta. We announced the humanitarian corridor only hours after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) in order to ensure the safety of civilians — in cooperation with our Russian friends and allies. We have provided them with shelter, food, medicine and medical care at the expense of the Syrian Government, not the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Syrian Government has also called on members of the armed groups to lay down their weapons, cease their terrorist activities inside residential areas and engage in national reconciliation efforts. However, those terrorist groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh al-Islam and Faylak ar-Rahman, have forcibly prevented civilians from reaching the corridor, as some members of the Council may know. They also sought to target the humanitarian corridor after it was announced, through the use of mortars. As for the letter sent by the terrorist Mohamed Alloush, it is a clear indication that he rejects the exit of civilians from Ghouta. It is clear that he wants to use them as human shields. There seems to be a new trend in the United Nations to circulate a letter from a terrorist group as an official document. That is an innovation at the United Nations. There is no respect for the Member States concerned. We have followed closely the way resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted and today's statements and briefings. We can clearly say that the main goal behind the adoption of the resolution is neither to reach a clear truce or ceasefire, as some may claim, nor to protect civilians and meet their needs. The main goal was to use the Security Council once again as a means to prevent any progress by the Syrian army and its allies in the fight against the terrorist groups that are targeting the city of Damascus. I say that for the thousandth time. How else to explain the fact that the resolution fails to refer to any Council resolution on counter-terrorism? Who can explain to us the strong resistance of some States during the negotiations on the draft resolution to any text that excludes Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and the terrorist groups affiliated with them from the supposed ceasefire? For three days, the Council has continued to negotiate the issue of whether to include or exclude them. The false humanitarian propaganda on the situation in eastern Ghouta coincided with another campaign under the supervision of the United States, claiming the use of chemical weapons again in Syria, in areas under the exclusive control of terrorists or, I should say, the White Helmets. Today, The New York Times published a Tin-Tin style, childish report claiming that there is cooperation on the chemical issue between my country and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The article is a full-page report on the front page of The New York Times. It seeks to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It ends by saying that this information is not substantiated. "Though experts who viewed the report said the evidence it cited did not prove definitively that there was current, continuing collaboration between North Korea and Syria on chemical weapons." That is a word-for-word quote from The New York Times. It seems that The New York Times is not up to date on what is going on in the world. It seems that the New York Times does not know that the American vessel, the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the chemical arsenal voluntarily submitted by the Syrian Government after joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as a full member. That is old information, déjà vu, as is said in French. However, it seems that The New York Times has decided to address this issue today. I will read a communiqué that we received just now of information that I think should be taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. And I can tell the Council that terrorists will use chemical weapons in Syria. On the morning of 20 February, four days ago, three Turkish trucks carrying chlorine entered Idlib governorate through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing. I think that The New York Times should verify that information. Two trucks stopped in the village of Qalb Loze in Idlib, and the third continued its way to Al-Habit village in northern Idlib. Information available to the Syrian Government points to the fact that terrorists are currently preparing for a chemical weapon using the substance of chlorine on a large scale and to then accuse the Syrian Arab Army of using such weapons. Those terrorists have clear instructions from Western and Turkish intelligence to fabricate a chemical attack before 13 March, because S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 22/22 18-05507 it is on that date that the eighty-seventh session of the Executive Council of the OPCW will be held. According to the information I received just now, the two trucks are currently in the school of Qalb Loze village. Other cars and terrorists are also currently in the school, which they have turned into a warehouse for chemical weapons. As for the third truck, it is currently in a centre belonging to the Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, which is a Turkish agent, in the north-eastern part of Al-Habit village. A vast number of terrorists are currently unloading the truck there. In providing the Security Council with this information, we affirm that these terrorists, at the instructions of their operators, will use these chemical weapons before 13 March. The main responsibility for ending hostilities lies with those countries that have real influence with terrorist groups in Ghouta and other parts of Syria. They should compel these terrorist groups to stop their terrorist activities and allow civilians to leave those areas, which are used by these groups as a base to launch their terrorist attacks. There is in this Organization a group of five countries that are shedding tears over the humanitarian situation in Syria. Unfortunately, some of them are members of the Council. They have invited Member States to watch a movie about the White Helmets, two days from now in the Economic and Social Council Chamber here at the United Nations. Some members of the Council are advocating for a group that has been designated as a terrorist group by the Council. I hope that the Council will address the information I have provided seriously and appropriately. The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of February, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Kuwait to the members of the Security Council, especially my colleagues the Permanent Representatives, their respective staff and to the secretariat of the Council for all the support they have given to us. Indeed, February has been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of all the delegations and the representatives of the Secretariat, as well as all the relevant conference service officers, interpreters, translators and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of the Netherlands good luck in the month of March. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
En un cuarto de segundo el buscador Google devuelve más de 193 millones de resultados ante la búsqueda de las palabras "Al Qaeda". Evidentemente, la cantidad de información disponible acerca del tema es inabarcable, máxime si consideramos que constantemente se están generando nuevos contenidos relacionados. Sin embargo, a pesar de la incontable información existente acerca de su historia, miembros y acciones, o tal vez debido a ello, se torna complicado encontrar una definición concreta de este fenómeno tan complejo y heterogéneo. Podemos introducir de forma simple tres aspectos fundamentales de Al Qaeda con el fin de ayudar a su comprensión: su origen, su organización y sus pilares ideológicos.OrigenEl 27 de abril del año 1978 comenzó en Afganistán una revolución que desembocaría en la instalación de un régimen marxista apoyado por la Unión Soviética, que fue prontamente enfrentado por los Muyahidines. Con el fin de provocar la derrota soviética, Estados Unidos destinó cientos de millones de dólares para financiar las actividades de los Muyahidines a través de los servicios de inteligencia pakistaníes (1). Osama Bin Laden se instaló en la frontera de este país con Afganistán (en la zona de Pesahwar) y asumió el compromiso de organizar y financiar brigadas de voluntarios islámicos de todo el mundo, utilizando no sólo recursos propios sino también procedentes de los Estados Unidos, Pakistán y Arabia Saudí (2). En 1989 Bin Laden fundó Al Qaeda, una organización pensada para entrenar jihadistas (3). Ese mismo año las fuerzas soviéticas abandonaron Afganistán, mas el gobierno comunista resistió en el poder hasta 1992, cuando los muyahidines tomaron el control de Kabul y fue instaurado el Estado Islámico de Afganistán. Luego de haber vencido a los soviéticos, que era el primer objetivo cuando la organización fue creada, Al Qaeda adoptó como fin último la creación de un califato de estados islámicos (4).OrganizaciónActualmente se cree que Al Qaeda opera en más de 40 países del Medio Oriente, África, Asia, Norteamérica y Europa (5). La organización funciona mediante células de forma sumamente descentralizada, impidiendo de este modo que la caída de una parte afecte a otra. De hecho, existen muchas facciones que son completamente independientes: "algunos analistas han sugerido que la palabra Al Qaeda es usada para referirse a una variedad de grupos conectados por poco más que objetivos compartidos, ideales y métodos" (6).Luego de la invasión a Afganistán el ejército de los Estados Unidos capturó una especie de constitución de Al Qaeda que establece, entre otras cosas, el modo en que el nuevo Emir (comandante) es elegido en caso de que el actual Emir sea asesinado (7), como sucedió con Bin Laden. Esto da la pauta de que Al Qaeda, a pesar de no ser una agrupación completamente uniforme, sí está organizada y existen estructuras que marcan el funcionamiento de la organización (8).Pilares ideológicosSi bien pueden resultar incomprensibles, las acciones que lleva adelante Al Qaeda están inspiradas en ciertos pilares ideológicos que le dan coherencia a la organización y acercan a todos sus militantes. De acuerdo con Al Zawahiri (9), estos pilares son:1-Gobierno liderado por el Corán: Al Qaeda procura la creación de un Estado basado enteramente en la Sharía (Ley Islámica), considerando a los gobiernos seculares inaceptables y contrarios a la fe islámica. Al Qaeda busca la conformación de un liderazgo político unificado en todo el mundo musulmán (10).2-Liberación de las tierras: uno de los principales objetivos de Al Qaeda es liberar "las tierras musulmanas"(11) de sus agresores: "Los militantes creen que están en una batalla por la supervivencia de su sociedad, cultura, religión y estilo de vida" (12).3-La liberación del ser humano: de acuerdo con Al Zawahiri las personas no sólo tienen el derecho de elegir y criticar a sus líderes, sino que además, aquellos gobernantes que violen las leyes y principios islámicos deben ser resistidos y derrocados, ya que ningún hombre puede encontrarse por encima de la Sharía.Es relevante notar que Al Qaeda ha justificado su accionar, entre otras cosas, en la intromisión de occidente en los asuntos internos del mundo musulmán. Sin embargo, estos actos han incrementado la intervención de las potencias occidentales en Medio Oriente, retroalimentando el argumento de liberación de los radicales islámicos, entrando en una especie de círculo vicioso difícil de eliminar por la fuerza. En países invadidos por potencias enemigas es inevitable que surjan sectores motivados por esta causa. Parece ser que un objetivo primordial de los Estados Unidos en Afganistán debería ser forjar alianzas con sectores moderados de la sociedad que permitan ofrecer a los jóvenes un discurso diferente, que no diga "Occidente odia a tu gente y no respeta tu fe. Únetenos en los campos de entrenamiento para aprender cómo ser un buen musulmán" (13). Después de Al Qaeda, la guerra de IrakExisten diferentes perspectivas desde las cuales se puede comprender la Guerra de Irak. Podemos enfocarnos en dos puntos que son esenciales para comprender cómo se gestó la guerra: los antecedentes y el concepto de "guerra preventiva".AntecedentesLuego de la invasión de Kuwait por parte de Irak en 1990, la ONU autorizó una operación militar liderada por los Estados Unidos que tenía como objetivo liberar al Estado ocupado. El 28 de febrero del año siguiente la coalición venció al ejército iraquí que tras rendirse emprendió la retirada. Una de las consecuencias más importantes de esta guerra y que resulta imprescindible considerar para comprender la invasión a Irak en el 2003 fue la Resolución 687 (14) del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas que, entre otras cosas, obligaba a Irak a deshacerse completamente de todas su armas químicas, biológicas y misiles de largo alcance y establecía el envío de inspectores que se aseguraran que no quedasen en Irak armas de este tipo y que no se desarrollase o se adquierese armamento nuclear. Además, determinaba que el embargo económico que había sido establecido por la Resolución 661 (15) se mantuviera hasta tanto Irak no llevara a cabo las exigencias del Consejo. Para palear los efectos del embargo, se creó el programa llamado "Petróleo por Alimentos" (16) que, administrado por la ONU, permitía a Irak la exportación de petróleo a cambio de alimentos. A pesar de haberse terminado la Guerra, Irak siguió siendo el escenario de operaciones de menor envergadura durante toda la década del noventa, ente las cuales se destaca la operación Zorro del Desierto, emprendida por los Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido en diciembre de 1998 luego de que Irak expulsara a los inspectores de la ONU. Según el Ministerio de Defensa de los Estados Unidos, la operación tenía como objetivos "Disminuir las posibilidades de Saddam Hussein de hacer y usar armas de destrucción masiva. Disminuir la capacidad del régimen de hacerles la guerra a sus vecinos. Demostrar a Hussein las consecuencias de violar sus obligaciones internacionales" (17).En enero del 2002, George W. Bush incluyó en un discurso a Irak dentro del "Eje del Mal", junto con Corea del Norte e Irán. La Resolución 1441 de noviembre de 2002 estableció que tras 11 años sin cumplir lo señalado en la Resolución 687 de 1991, Irak debía permitir el ingreso de inspectores de la Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica y de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas de Vigilancia, Verificación e Inspección. A finales de ese mes, los inspectores entraron a Irak sin encontrar nada relevante hasta mediados de enero del 2003, cuando fueron halladas ojivas vacías (18). El equipo de inspectores declaró ante el Consejo de Seguridad que no era posible asegurar que Irak se haya desarmado, a pesar de que no fueron encontradas pruebas de que existieran armas de destrucción masiva. A partir de entonces, a pesar de que los Estados Unidos, con el apoyo de España e Inglaterra intentaron demostrar que existía una amenaza real por parte de Irak, no consiguieron el consenso necesario dentro del Consejo de Seguridad para realizar una acción legitimada por la ONU.El 20 de marzo de 2003 una coalición liderada por los Estados Unidas (sin el respaldo del Consejo de Seguridad) integrada por Inglaterra, España, Australia y Polonia, invadieron Irak y en menos de un mes lograron poner fin al gobierno de Saddam Hussein.Guerra PreventivaLa Carta de las Naciones Unidas, con el fin de mantener la paz y la seguridad internacional, prohíbe la utilización de la fuerza, con dos excepciones: la legítima defensa y las acciones emprendidas con autorización del Consejo de Seguridad, órgano responsable de la seguridad internacional. Sin embargo, la invasión a Irak no puede englobarse en ninguna de las dos opciones: ni fue autorizada por el Consejo de Seguridad por constatarse un quebrantamiento de la paz o acto de agresión, ni puede ser catalogado de legítima defensa (recordemos que para esto debería haberse consumado la agresión o esté a punto de llevarse a cabo (19), (20)).En cambio, la Invasión a Irak fue incluida dentro de lo que se conoce como Guerra Preventiva. El presidente George W. Bush (2001-2009) definió el concepto de la siguiente manera:"Tenemos que estar preparados para detener a los estados delincuentes y a sus clientes terroristas antes de que sean capaces de amenazar o usar armas de destrucción masiva contra Estados Unidos y nuestros aliados y amigos (…) Teniendo en cuenta los objetivos de Estados delincuentes y terroristas, los Estados Unidos ya no pueden depender exclusivamente de una posición de reacción, como hemos hecho en el pasado. La incapacidad para frenar a un atacante potencial, la inminencia de las amenazas actuales y la magnitud del daño potencial que podría ser causada por la elección de nuestros adversarios de las armas, no permiten tal opción. No podemos dejar que nuestros enemigos golpeen primero" (21).No se puede explicar la guerra en Irak sin hacer hincapié en la relevancia que posee esta definición. No debería sorprendernos que haya quienes consideren que "La doctrina Bush de la guerra preventiva es un sobre-esfuerzo por darle apariencia de juricidad a una conducta que, a la luz del sistema actual, es abiertamente ilegal" (22).La guerra se sostuvo en parte en una creencia: un Medio Oriente más democrático redundaría en un mundo menos amenazante para los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, ocho años después del comienzo de la guerra, parece difícil seguir creyendo en la posibilidad que la democracia sea exportada por la vía militar.La lucha contra el terrorismo es uno de los principales desafíos al que deberá enfrentarse la comunidad internacional en el siglo XXI. La posibilidad de que mediante sufragios democráticos los pueblos legitimen en el poder a líderes extremistas parece poner a las principales potencias en una encrucijada: fomentar la democracia parece ser una actividad loable, pero el proceso de consolidación puede suponer graves peligros para la comunidad internacional. De acuerdo con Mansfeld y Snyder "empujar a los países demasiado pronto a elecciones competitivas no solo supone el riesgo de fomentar guerras, sectarismos y terrorismo, sino que también hace la futura consolidación de la democracia más difícil" (23). La Historia dirá si una real consolidación democrática del Medio Oriente contribuirá a la construcción de un mundo más plural y seguro.(1) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/jan/17/yemen.islam. Bin Laden provenía de una familia multimillonaria. Su padre había sido uno de los constructores preferidos del Rey.(2) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1551100.stm(3) http://www.forbes.com/2001/09/14/0914whoisobl.html(4)http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=al%20qaeda&st=cse(5) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1670089.stm(6) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1670089.stm(7) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8579487/Ayman-al-Zawahiri-new-al-Qaeda-head-how-does-succession-work.html(8) Un riguroso trabajo de investigación sobre el origen y derrotero de Al Qaeda lo ha realizado Lawrence Wright en su premiado libro "La torre elevada. Al-Qaeda y los orígenes del 11-S", publicado en español por Debate (2011).(9) Principal líder de Al Qaeda luego de la muerto de Bin Laden. Puede verse una breve biografía en http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11489337(10) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1551100.stm(11) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf p. 10(12) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/21/alqaida.terrorism(13)http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/eboo_patel/2010/01/how_to_defeat_al_qaeda.html(14) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/597/49/IMG/NR059749.pdf?OpenElement(15) http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/6987151.html(16) http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2003/02/internacional/irak/petroleoporalimentos.html(17) http://www.defense.gov/specials/desert_fox/(18) http://www.lanacion.com.ar/467497-ultima-oportunidad-de-la-onu-a-irak(19) http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/fichero_articulo?codigo=2367474&orden=88741(20) http://www.un.org/spanish/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm(21) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html(22) http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/fichero_articulo?codigo=2367474&orden=88741(23) Edward D. Mansfield y Jack Snyder "Prone to Violence, The Paradox of the Democratic Peace". National Interest, invierno 2005. Página 1. * Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales. Depto. de Estudios Internacionales. FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay
