Suchergebnisse

In a wide-ranging and in-depth study of the recent history of anthropology, David Price offers a provocative account of the ways anthropology has been influenced by U.S. imperial projects around the world, and by CIA funding in particular. DUAL USE ANTHROPOLOGY is the third in Price's trilogy on the history of the discipline of anthropology and its tangled relationship with the American military complex. He argues that anthropologists' interactions with Cold War military and intelligence agencies shaped mid-century American anthropology and that governmental and private funding of anthropological research programs connected witting and unwitting anthropologists with research of interest to military and intelligence agencies. Price gives careful accounts of CIA interactions with the American Anthropological Association (AAA), the development of post-war area studies programs, and new governmental funding programs articulated with Cold War projects. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, American anthropologists became increasingly critical of anthropologists' collaborations with military and intelligence agencies, particularly when these interactions contributed to counterinsurgency projects. Awareness of these uses of anthropology led to several public clashes within the AAA, and to the development of the Association's first ethics code. Price compares this history of anthropological knowledge being used by military and intelligence agencies during the Cold War to post-9/11 projects. This title was made Open Access by libraries from around the world through Knowledge Unlatched.

To deal with the development of Cold War history means to summarize a part of international debates. Nevertheless, the (West) German approach originally had much to do with Allied responsibility of the German question, meaning partition in two states and the possibilities of re-unification. This meant that Cold War history in most cases placed the German question in the centre of research. Only since the 1970s a broader approach not only to European and transatlantic aspects emerged, but also to the inclusion of a world wide view. This was accompanied by the reception and advancement of international methodological debates. Adapted from the source document.

Jonathan P.G. Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and Identity after 1989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999)David F. Patton, Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999)Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1999)

Abstract
During the Cold War, U.S. strategic leaders had to deal with policies and issues in every part of the globe. The main theater was in Europe, but there were other regions that demanded attention. Korea was an important one. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the peninsula was on the brink of conflict as North Korea initiated a series of operations that were legitimate acts of war. There was a strong desire among South Korean government officials for a military response, but U.S. government leaders said no. Officials in Washington recognized the limits of U.S. power at the time, and designed their responses to maintain the status quo. The story of how the United States handled its undertakings in areas of marginal importance was a chapter in the larger history of the Cold War. A number of historians have suggested that the Third World played a key role in shaping developments in the Cold War, but U.S. actions in Korea indicate something a bit more complicated. Knowing when to become involved and when to limit losses was crucial in how the United States managed events along the periphery of the Cold War.