Suchergebnisse

The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.

The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.

Competition policy and economics -- Overview of EU and UK competition law -- Article 101 (1) -- Article 101 (3) -- Article 102 -- The obligations of Member States under the EU competition rules -- Articles 101 and 102 : public enforcement by the European Commission and national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003 -- Articles 101 and 102 : private enforcement in the courts of Member States -- Competition Act 1998 : substantive provisions -- Competition Act 1998 and the cartel offence : public enforcement and procedure -- Enterprise Act 2002 : market studies and market investigations -- The international dimension of competition law -- Horizontal agreements (1) : cartels -- Horizontal agreements (2) : oligopoly, tacit collusion, and collective dominance -- Horizontal agreements (3) : cooperation agreements -- Vertical agreements -- Abuse of dominance (1) : non-pricing practices -- Abuse of dominance (2) : pricing practices -- The relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law -- Mergers (1) : introduction -- Mergers (2) : EU law -- Mergers (3) : UK law -- Particular sectors.

What are the implications of Big Data and Big Analytics on competition policy? EU and US competition authorities are currently grappling with this question. The EU Commission has recently issued preliminary results of its e-commerce sector inquiry. The European Data Protection Supervisor and the UK House of Lords, among others, have issued reports and convened roundtables on the issue. The OECD will host in late 2016 an enforcer roundtable on this subject. The significance of these inquires cannot be overstated, as their conclusions will determine the dynamics of future technology markets and level of antitrust intervention.