Suchergebnisse

Reflektion der Studentenproteste im chinesischen Partei- und Staatsapparat: Sieg einer Koalition von konservativen Reformkräften und orthodoxen Marxisten-Leninisten über den radikalen Reformflügel um den entmachteten ZK-Generalsekretär Zhao Ziyang. Taktik der Konservativen, mit dem Einsatz ihnen getreuer Armeeteile ein hartes und gewaltsames Durchgreifen gegenüber den Studenten durchzusetzen. Beschreibung der Fraktionierungen in Partei, Staat und Armee. (DÜI-Rmb)

The Labour government is formally committed to tackling poverty, unemployment and social exclusion and sees a major role for area‐based policies in dealing with some of these problems. The government's flagship New Deals are primarily aimed at groups of individuals with high rates of joblessness. However, the New Deal for Communities is aimed at areas suffering from high concentrations of poverty and unemployment. In addition different government departments have launched their own zone initiatives in often‐overlapping local areas.Much political discussion has focussed on the problem of coordinating all of this activity. However, behind these initiatives lies a decades‐long debate over how effective area‐based polices can actually be and it is this debate which is reflected in this issue of New Economy.We also look at the argument that the big hole in the Government's armoury is the lack of any policies to actually create jobs in areas of the country with high unemployment.When at the Treasury, Daniel Hulls helped design the New Deal for Communities, which makes him well placed to explain the analytical basis for the government's area‐based policies as well as to explore where those policies might go next. Their underlying rationale is that concentrationsof deprivation give rise to problems greater than the sum of its parts. So individuals with characteristics likely to put them at high risk of social exclusion are further disadvantaged if they live in neighbourhoods where there is a high concentration of people with similar characteristics. Mark Kleinman takes issue precisely with this justification, arguing that the empirical evidence suggests that family and individual characteristics are more important than neighbourhood effects and that families and individuals should therefore be the primary target of policy intervention. There may still be a case for locally‐based service delivery and for area based programmes to supplement mainstream resources for the most hard‐pressed areas. Soit is not a case of targeting either individuals or areas – rather it is the balance between these two approaches which is under discussion.In practice the area regeneration budget, at ??1.35 billion in 1999‐00, is only a fraction of the resources spent on families and individuals through social transfers and other mainstream public spending. Moreover, spending on regeneration at the end of this Parliament will be 11 per cent less in real terms than the Conservatives were spending in 1993‐94.The Government, or more accurately the Treasury, points to the vacancy statistics to 'prove' that there is no shortage of employment opportunity anywhere in the UK. Few people living in the real world would agree with this view. David Webster presents the directly opposite argument that the New Deals cannot work unless more jobs are directly created in narrowly‐defined areas, especially in the cities, which have witnessed a significant loss of blue collar jobs.While agreeing that the Treasury line is unsustainable, Ian Gordon agues that narrowly‐targeted job creation programmes will not work. Fundamentally, the case for such policies is that labour market imperfections prevent aggregate demand and employment in the economy as a whole growing fast enough without generating serious inflationary pressures. The problems of demand‐deficiency within 'northern' urban areas are essentially issues of regional policy, not urban regeneration, while the reduction of concentrations of high unemployment in London and most other 'southern' urban areas relies on sustaining employment growth at the national level. Peter Tyler asks whether the policy recommendations of the Urban Task Force chaired by Lord Rogers ?žt with the perceived needs of urban regeneration. The general answer is yes, though we need to be wary of who really benefits from tax incentives. However, if all that Rogers aspires to is to be achieved it will require far more resources than have currently been planned for. Stephen Hall and John Mawson trace the evolution of regeneration policies and ask critical questions about how joined up the Government's policies really are. It is only at the local level that programmes can really be made cohesive and they point to the importance of the New Commitment to Regeneration directly involving local authorities and other local partners.Housing policy plays an important role in generating concentrations of deprivation. Sue Regan argues that it is increasingly difficult to generalise about social housing, with abandoned estates in the 'North' set alongside some well‐run, popular estates with vibrant tenant participation. There is a growing consensus about the benefits of mixed communities, which sits uneasily with the current composition of social housing.The IPPR indicators section points out that the funds which have come from HM Treasury to promote regional policy are very unfairly skewed, with Scotland and Wales doing much better than equivalent English regions. The North East really does have something to complain about. With some irony the funds that have emanated from Brussels are much more evenly distributed according to need. There is precious little correlation between how a local authorityscores on the Index of Local Deprivation and GDP per head. According to the data used by the EU, 14 out of the 20 most deprived local authorities in England have GDP per head at or above the EU average. This might suggest that GDP per head is a poor measure to use for targeting resources at anything below regional level. Andrea Westall and Marc Cowling question whether the proposed model for the Small Business Service will be appropriate and argue that the 'one‐stop shop' approach to offering business advice fails to recognise the differences between small ?žrms, especially across sectors.The article by Brendan Walsh is entitled 'The Irish Economic Miracle'. Whether intended or not the irony of the title is that miracles defy rational explanation. The problem is timing: all the factors put forward to explain the recent excellent performance of the Irish economy have been around for many years and sometimes even decades. Why were these factors for so long associated with lacklustre economic performance, with the Irish economy only taking off in the early 1990s? Graham Bird and Ramkishen Rajan revisit proposals for a Tobin tax in the light of the international financial crises of the late 1990s. They suggest that such a tax on currency transactions would work best in preventing crises from occurring by countering excessive inflows of capital in the first place. They also suggest that even if the tax had limited effects in this respect it could still raise a lot of revenue which could perhaps be used to finance a new international lender of last resort or to augment the resources of the IMF. Eamon O'Shea questions the emphasis on education as the route to material well‐being and argues for a less narrow conception of human welfare. Education can play an important role in developing social as well as human capital and in so‐doing help underpin the micro‐institutional foundations upon which macroeconomic success is based. Peter Robinson Editor

SUMMARY: Étienne François explores the way in which the French project of creating "symbolic history" through studies of memory initiated by Pierre Nora's work can be continued in a different national context. For François, it is the question of whether history of memory can be pursued in the German case. François notes that despite Nora's insistence on the exclusivity of the French case, Germans have not less a "neurotic" attitude to their past.

At the same time, François admits that in Germany attitude to the national past memorial projects is profoundly different from the French case. Among such points of difference François notes that if in France national history is usually perceived as a long-term development rooted in the Middle Ages, in Germany looking at the past usually implies focusing on such topics as Nazism or "the second German dictatorship" in GDR. History of memory is problematic in Germany partly because most well known "places of memory" are concentration camps. It is also that in Germany perceptions of national identity are questioned to a greater extent than in France, which is a result of German history divided for the most part of the second half of the 20 th century.

Despite these profound differences, François insists that France and Germany entered the "memorial period" simultaneously about 20 years ago. The Franco-German rapprochement and the development of mass cultural tourism greatly contributed to that process. This "memorial boom" is reflected in three major developments: the growth of and greater attention to memorial events, such as the celebration of "Luther's year" in 1983; the public fascination with historical exhibitions; and the rise in popularity of historical museums. A development parallel to the growth of "memory" in Germany can be noticed in professional historical studies: in Germany, at the roots of the study of memory were Thomas Nipperdey and Reinhart Koselleck, while today the leading scholars in the field are Jan and Alaida Assman. The unification of Germany and the disappearance of the "German question" combined with dramatic improvements in the relationships between Germany and its neighbors created most favorable conditions for German memorial projects.

François touches upon the work of the conferences on "Nation and Emotion" held in Berlin in October 1993 and May 1995. At these events researchers agreed that the paradigm of "places of memory" that allows to create a symbolic history of a nation can be successfully implemented not only in France but elsewhere. The second conclusion of researchers was that it was impossible to replicate the French case in other national traditions. François notes four major principles that emerged out of the French-German cooperation in the studies of memory: the first is the preservation of a critical attitude to one's own work and resistance to temptations to legitimate the existing political situation; second, the specifics of German history required more attention to conflicts, ruptures, and breaks in the past; third, such research should be open and pluralistic with respect to chronology and geography, without limiting one's project to XIX and XX centuries or to the national level; finally, the pan-European context should be always taken into account, for varieties of national memory are often shaped by or in contact with "foreigners".

In the last paragraphs of his contribution François informs the reader about the seminar on cultural memory that he and Hagen Schulze conducted in Berlin, as well as touches upon the structure and methodology of the project of German "places of memory" study. François explains the decision to structure the project around the list of key memorial terms, such as "Reich", "Leistung", "Schuld", etc. François ends his article by pointing out the importance of German cultural memory in European context and in German national history.
Tony Judt explores the emergence of Pierre Nora's project of describing the French places of memory by locating it in the context of transformations that France was undergoing in the post-World War II period. As Judt argues, in 1956 France still reminded one the France of 1856 in terms of the social composition of its population, the structure of its economy defined by late industrialization and the importance of agriculture, and the authoritarian political regime. In the 1960s, fundamental changes in the economy led to the growth of urbanization. Rising prosperity undermined the position of the French Communist party and the departure of Charles de Gaulle combined with Mitterand's reluctance to pursue radically socialist policies left behind most divisive political distinctions between the conservative France and the left France. At the same time, the decline in importance of the French language combined with the revival of interest in regional identities and the loss of the French dominant position in world and European affairs contributed to the French perception that by 1980s their country was simultaneously undergoing several transformations: France was shrinking, breaking apart, and loosing its traditional identity. Pierre Nora's project was initiated during this period of flux and uncertainty. Thus, Nora's project was a response to the sense of loss of traditional France in public consciousness and an attempt to fixate in historical categories elements of public memory.

Judt notes the contradiction of Nora's project: designed as an attempt to fixate, explore, and repudiate various historical myths, the project itself finally turned into the celebration of the past. Judt sees several reasons for this transformation. First, Pierre Nora is an important figure on the French intellectual landscape, and he attracted best specialists to write articles in the collection. Second, there is no more consensus on the canon of the past and people disagree profoundly on what can or should be included in such a project. Taking possession of past events and places brought together accidentally underscores the break of the historical tradition. Third, despite many genius insights in the articles of the collection, it turned into a text that displays emotional attraction of researchers to the object of their study. The fact that the collection curiously omitted any references to the legacy of Napoleon Bonaparte or his nephew Louis Napoleon underscores how the project reflects French ambiguities about France's past. Judt also critically surveys Nora's claims of the specificity and exclusivity of the French historical experiences, which, allegedly, make France into a "nation of memory" like no any other nation.

Judt also analyses particular contributions to the volume, focusing on such topics as Catholicism and other religions in French memory. He notes that in the collection those studies that are dedicated to Protestants and Jews are characterized by more methodological innovation then the more traditional explorations of the role of Catholicism in French history and serve as a reminder to the editor of the collection, which avoided the memory of St. Bartholomew's Night. Judt also explores the ambiguity of perceptions of the countryside always characterized positively and of the province and the provincial always characterized negatively in the French history. Judt explores the role played in French history by memory of wars.

From Judt's point of view, Nora's project is informed by the fact that today (unlike earlier in French history) French public memory shaped by official representation differs from history as told by historians. As Judt argues, public memory without a foundation in narrative history looses coherence and turns into "places of forgetting".

According to Judt, Nora's project of describing "places of memory" was a response to the loss of the sense of eternal identity experienced by the French society at the juncture when two leading historical schools – the Annales and the (neo)Marxist historiography of the French revolution – lost their predominant position. Nora's story is about that meaning that the French ascribe to France and its identity, and those aspects of French history, such as Bonaparte's legacy of national minorities, were either omitted or pushed to the periphery of the narrative. In that sense, Nora's collection represents an example of a modern mythology and cannot be called a historical study properly, despite high quality contributions by professional historians.

Concerning the applicability of the French project to the Soviet context, Judt argues that it has little to offer to an understanding of a multinational state. In France, history is an established and respected discipline and Nora can offer an alternative approach to the past, while in post-Soviet societies the task is to return to scholarly writing of history. Finally, Nora's project is the product of the Parisian intelligentsia, self-assured and well versed in all details of French history. It has not been repeated elsewhere in Europe. It is a jeu d'esprit that can hardly be replicated elsewhere.
Marina Loskutova points out that "memory" is an imported methodology in Russia. At the same time, as most researchers of memory explain, the studies of memory are related to profound changes in Western societies in the post-war period. Correspondingly, the importation of memory studies will depend on similarity of experiences. In particular, the sense of the local landscape permeated by memorials of the past, the omnipresence of places of memory in Russia is not a given fact. Despite agricultural and peasant roots of most post-Soviet citizens, very few people will seek to uncover their village roots, and if they do, not industry of memorabilia exists for them. The study of memory in Western societies is also related to the communications revolution and to the new generation of mass-media, which brings forth the problem of the visual image as a sign of the past. It is the prevalence of visual culture, according to the author, that informs the upsurge in memory studies.

Loskutova then focuses on the contents of the concept of "memory". According to the author, it implies 1) social cadres that allow an autobio graphical memory to take shape; 2) oral memories circulating in society; 3) collective commemorations; 4) information devices, from newspaper to CD, delivering information about the past to an audience larger than professional historians' community; 5) habits of the body. As the author argues, these aspects are hardly related, and their combination within one research framework obscures rather then helps to solve the problem. At the same time, none of them is specifically related to the nation-state (with the exception of commemorations). It is traditional narrative history that provides the basis for national identity, even if we consider the explosive "memory" of ethnic minorities, which is often based on semi-professional historical accounts popularized by mass media.

Loskutova agrees with Judt's argument concerning the importance of a historical narrative taught at school; at the same time, she takes issue with him concerning the presence of such a narrative in Eastern Europe. She notes that in post-Soviet Russia there is little doubt about historians' right to talk about the past authoritatively and there is little criticism of traditional narrative historical modes.

For Loskutova, the experience of importing oral history methods into the Russian context is telling. On the one hand, the community of professional historians is skeptical about the use of oral histories interviews, pointing to the need to verify data using traditional methods anyway. Historians are also reluctant to accept the possibility that contemporary perceptions of the past should be in their sphere of competence. With respect to the Soviet past seen through oral history two drastically different positions are prevalent: "Soviet history is only possible on the basis of oral data for historians have always lied to us" and "People don't remember much and they do they won't tell". Loskutova notes that many memories of the Siege of Leningrad in World War II are told according to one scenario, which implies likely following prescribed expectations of such a memory. At the same time, research into what was told in families demonstrated significant variations in memories, thus undermining the interview method. Finally, Loskutova argues that it is possible to study "imperial memory" as informal knowledge of imperial social and political mechanisms. Nevertheless, such studies of memory cannot be an alternative to a meta-narrative of imperial history.
Igor Narskii points out that historiography knows works on functions of collective memory in imperial and Soviet Russia (Lotman, Wortman, Plaggenborg). Narskii criticizes approaches to memory in the editorial introduction as too narrow. For Narskii, memory is cultural context and includes not only images of the past but also mechanisms of their formation, circulation, manipulation, etc. Imperial memory is heterogeneous as much as the national memory. Narskii also focuses on varieties of imperial memory that support/maintain supranational unit without being totalitarian. The author refers to particular junctures in history when addressing the past becomes an important societal aspect. He also argues that the Russian scholarly community focuses on such issues as memory belatedly, when the problem has already been discussed in the West and triggers idiosyncratic reactions from Western colleagues.

For Narskii, historical memory is the field for research in the framework of new social and cultural history and it can become a key in interpreting the subjective world of people in the past. Narskii reminds that it is not just the concept itself but the hard work of adapting it to the needs of historical scholarship that matters.

По мнению Матта Мацуды , память империи следует скорее рассматривать не как коллективную (Хольбвакс), но как память "собранную" ( collected ), состоящую из отдельных фрагментов, артефактов, частей мозаики, порождающих "невольное", а не преднамеренно сконструированное значение. Мнемонические качества таких фрагментов гарантируются их разделенностью, фактом невозможности единого нарратива. Соответственно, противопоставление памяти и истории неправомерно: скорее, речь должна идти о памяти как об одном из видов истории, в котором главную роль играют не хроники развития, а моменты значения. По мнению Мацуды, проекты, подобные "Местам памяти" Пьера Нора, не являются оппозицией истории, они даже не являются "антинациональными": скорее, это – варианты национальных историй, в которых собраны различные субъекты. Такие истории выглядят странными только по сравнению с телеологическими историческими нарративами. Специфика исследований памяти состоит в том, что они делают процесс дистанцирования от прошлого предметом рефлексии. Если в 1950-60-е и затем в 1980-е гг. речь шла о распаде грандиозных территориальных империй, в начале ХХI века вопрос стоит о хроно-политической деколонизации субьектов, колонизированных телеологическими нарративами социализма или империализма.

Традиционное понимание империи состоит в представлении о территориальной замкнутости, множественности подданных и наличии центра власти. Можно, тем не менее, последовать примеру "мест памяти" и представить себе империю не как закрытую территорию власти, но как множество локальностей, каждая из которых является пространством соревнования меняющихся императивов. Исследования национализма говорят о нациях как практиках, а не как о реальных сущностях. Такой же подход должен быть применен к империи. Соответственно, в той же мере, в какой империи не суть закрытые историографические доминантные миры, память не является оппозицией истории. В терминах памяти можно говорить об империи как о наррации правил; при этом имперское пространство характеризуется неровным распространением этих правил. Подход к империи как ко множеству локальностей, определяемых и доминируемых политической, экономической или культурной властью, позволяет уйти от противопоставления "модерного" концепта памяти и "архаичного" концепта империи. Именно "архаичность" памяти об империи (Британской или Российской) позволяет глобальным империям XXI века (США) не замечать имперского характера собственного доминирования в мире.

Касаясь вопроса об "имперской памяти", Мацуда замечает, что она, скорее, является ширмой, за которой осуществляется непростое сосуществование разных народов, взаимоисключающих претензий на культурное наследие или различных культур. Освобождение от имперских уз часто ведет к реконституированию национального, причем агенты такого реконституирования предпочитают не помнить о том, что нации сыграли свою роль в создании империй. Касаясь вопроса о моделях памяти, воплощенных в обществах типа "Памяти" и "Мемориала", Мацуда отмечает, что и ностальгия как исторический принцип, и моральное банкротство попыток использования нарративов прогрессивных перемен для исправления исторических несправедливостей одинаково опасны.

В заключении Мацуда обращается к известной теме восстановления исторической справедливости, к требованиям платежей и репараций, выдвигаемым на основе памяти. По сути, вопрос стоит так: может ли память требовать репараций у истории? Вопросы исторической вины и компенсации в огромной степени зависят от факта признания, т.е. от допущения памяти. Это само по себе – вызов имперскому наследию, ведь главной задачей империи является забывание (поскольку сама империя расколота и неоднородна). Обращаясь к проблематике памяти, исследователи невольно напоминают нам об этой характеристике империи.

Old postcards and posters were used as illustrations to the roundtable.

В оформлении круглого стола использовались старые почтовые открытки и плакаты.