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Machine-generated contents note: 1. Introduction -- 1. Purpose of the Book -- 2. North Korea's Class System of Songbun -- 3. North Korea's Paradox -- 4. Structure of the Book -- 2. The Unification Scenarios and Cost -- 1. Gradual and Peaceful (Confederation) Unification -- 1.1. Analysis: Gradual and Peaceful Process -- 2. Unification Through War -- 2.1. Analysis: War -- 3. Collapse and Absorption -- 3.1. Analysis: Collapse and Absorption -- 4. Unification Cost -- 5. Summary -- 3. Thinking About Collapse: Indicators and Triggers -- 1. Indicators of Collapse -- 1.1. Economic System and the Provision for Basic Needs -- 1.2. External Assistance -- 1.3. Information Control -- 1.4. Leadership Succession and Power Consolidation -- 1.5. Elites -- 1.6. Defectors -- 2. Triggers -- 2.1. Elite Disaffection and Factionalism -- 2.2. Famine and Mass Migration -- 2.3. Mass Opposition -- 4. Geopolitical Landscape and Regional Bilateral Issues -- 1. Geopolitical Landscape -- 2. Deepening Economic Relations -- 3. Regional Powers' National Interests -- 3.1. United States -- 3.2. China -- 3.3. Japan -- 3.4. Russia -- 3.5. South Korea -- 4. Bilateral Issues -- 4.1. United States-South Korea -- 4.2. China-South Korea -- 4.3. Japan-South Korea -- 5. Areas for Future Cooperation -- 5.1. Pre-collapse: Plan and Coordinate -- 5.2. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program -- 5.3. Stability and Economic Development -- 6. Summary -- 5. Preparing for and Responding to Collapse -- 1. Control of Nuclear Weapons -- 1.1. Nuclear Weapons Accountability -- 1.2. Nunn-Lugar Act (Cooperative Threat Reduction Program) -- 2. Disorder in the Immediate Aftermath of Collapse -- 2.1. System of Control -- 2.2. Stability Operations -- 2.3. Rescue Operation: Political Camp Prisoners -- 3. Providing for Basic Needs -- 3.1. Lack of Basic Goods and Services -- 3.2. Basic Services Provision -- 4. Migration -- 4.1. Short-term Migration -- 4.2. Medium-to Long-Term Migration -- 4.3. Education and Retraining -- 5. Elites -- 6. Infrastructure -- 7. Unemployment (Medium-to Long-Term) -- 8. Social Integration -- 8.1. Defectors in South Korea -- 8.2. Education -- 9. Military Integration -- 10. Economic Development -- 10.1. Unification Cost and Financing -- 10.2. North's Labour -- 10.3. North's Mineral Wealth -- 11. Reforestation and Flood Mitigation -- 12. Developing the DMZ -- 6. Summary -- 1. Unification Scenarios -- 2. Collapse Indicators and Triggers -- 2.1. Economic System -- 2.2. External Assistance for Sustenance -- 2.3. Information Control -- 2.4. Leadership Succession and Power Consolidation -- 2.5. Elite Disaffection and Factionalism -- 2.6. Defectors -- 3. The Roles of the Regional Powers -- 3.1. National Interests -- 3.2. Regional Cooperation -- 3.3. Nuclear Weapons and Regional Relations -- 4. Preparing for and Responding to Collapse -- 4.1. Control of Nuclear Weapons -- 4.2. Disorder in the Immediate Aftermath of Collapse -- 4.3. Providing for Basic Needs -- 4.4. Migration -- 4.5. Elites -- 4.6. Infrastructure -- 4.7. Unemployment -- 4.8. Social Integration -- 4.9. Military Integration -- 4.10. Economic Development -- 4.11. Other Efforts -- 5. Conclusion -- Appendix 1 -- Unification and South Korea -- Unification and Reunification -- Korean Names and Spelling -- Various Ways to Express "Korea

Nine months after the 1 February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, an estimated 2,000 soldiers of the 300,000-350,000 strong Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, had defected. This has occurred in the context of massive popular resistance to the coup, which the military leadership has tried to quell with large-scale arrests, killings of civilians and various forms of intimidation. Since the first defections in late February, resistance has shifted from being exclusively non-violent to waging a low intensity and defensive warfare against the Tatmadaw's troops. As a result, the gap between the civilian population and the armed forces has widened, with significant loses on both sides. Yet this trend has been challenged mainly by some of the younger, lower-ranking soldiers, who have joined 'the people's side'. Some defectors take part in the armed resistance, while others are actively engaged in campaigns to mobilise more soldiers to leave the army or to tacitly circumvent orders from within. Increasingly, these defector groups have been supported by the political opposition to the military. This report draws on the narratives of active defectors to analyse what has motivated soldiers to defect after the military coup, and to conversely understand what obstacles there are to an increased scale of defections. We argue that while moral concerns regarding the violence against civilians after the coup has been a strong motivating factor, defections are also driven by deep dissatisfaction with the internal workings of the military system that existed prior to the coup. The support mechanisms, exit options, and alternative visions of order proclaimed by the civilian opposition to the coup also play an increasingly important role and would likely be decisive in motivating more defections. Yet the obstacles to defection are also pertinent and are intrinsically woven into the fabric of the Tatmadaw's long tradition of nurturing cohesion and loyalty among its armed forces - e.g., through ideological programming, isolation, hierarchical patron-client relations and a stringent system of commands, rewards, and punishments. While defectors suggest that many more rank-and-file soldiers would desert or defect if they did not fear punishment and for their family's security, our analysis also points to the fundamental structural obstacles that likely inhibit the cultivation of wide-spread motivations to split from the Tatmadaw. This report offers insights into the increasingly strong conviction that the disintegration of the Tatmadaw through internal splits and large-scale mutinies will be decisive in reversing the coup and for bringing Myanmar onto a genuinely democratic path. So far in Myanmar, there are no clear signs of impending major military splits, but the defections that have occurred can be considered a significant, albeit mainly symbolic, blow to the Tatmadaw's internal coherence and stability.

Abstract
Cooperation is a great challenge for natural selection. Some scholars assume that cooperation could not evolve within the framework of natural selection. It is undeniable that natural selection, at least at the individual level, favors selfishness and defectors. Nonetheless, this selfish tendency does not necessarily imply that cooperation could not evolve by means of natural selection. In this paper, we specifically acknowledge certain basic challenges for the evolution of the human ability to cooperate at the level of large groups. In this paper, we discuss topics like the human ability for "supercooperation," the importance of repetition and reputation, and Multilevel Selection Theory as the basic mechanisms of evolution of cooperation.

This article looks at China's possible courses of action, post-Donald Trump's declaration of a new policy towards South Asia. Given the fact that China shares an "all weather friendship" with Pakistan, public shaming of Pakistan for shielding terrorists is clearly not something that is acceptable to China. However, with respect to terrorism, China has its own woes emanating primarily from its Xinjiang province, and several defectors from the province have been reported to have taken refuge in Pakistan. Additionally, China's energy interests find a place in Afghanistan. Therefore, the American policy in South Asia, which in all probability will see greater American involvement in the region, will have to be carefully considered by the foreign policy mandarins in Beijing.

The author examines the role of pseudo operations in several foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very successful. A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1747/thumbnail.jpg

This monography examines the role of pseudo operations in several foreign coutnerinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo operations are those in which government forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate as teams to infiltrate insurgent areas. This technique has been used by the security forces of several other countries in their operations, and typically it has been very successful. A number of factors must be taken into account before attempting pseudo operations, especially their role in the intelligence and operational systems. Although it is likely that most insurgent movements have become more sophisticated, many of the lessons learned from previous pseudo operations suggest their continued usefulness in counterinsurgency campaigns. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.

Intro -- Title Page -- Dedication -- Introduction -- 1. The Best Fake Friends You'll Ever Have -- 2. I'm Positive That You Suck -- 3. The Ladybosses -- 4. That Time of the Month -- 5. Lots of Dollars and Absolutely No Sense -- 6. "Licking" Things to Claim Them as Your Own -- 7. The Party Never Ends and Neither Does Your Anxiety -- 8. It's Lonely (and Ugly) at the Top -- 9. Elbow, Elbow, Wrist, Wrist -- 10. Pray to the Gurus and Goddesses -- 11. Cult Defectors Pay the Price -- 12. You Can Check Out, but You Can Never Leave -- 13. Escaping the Pyramid -- 14. Life Takes on a New Shape (and It's Not a Pyramid) -- Postscript -- Acknowledgments -- About the Author -- Bibliography -- Resources -- Copyright.

AbstractThe defection thesis holds that members of marginalized social groups are obligated not to express views important to others in the group that are regarded by the others as substantively wrong. In this essay, I evaluate arguments that seek to vindicate the defection thesis and conclude they all fail. Then, I argue that we have reason to believe sanctioning defectors in certain ways is wrongful and that the expression of their contentious ideas is good for members of marginalized groups. We are left to conclude both that members of marginalized groups have no obligation to suppress certain heterodox views and that it is likely wrong to sanction them for expressing these views even if it were wrong for them to do so.

This article examines British deception during the early years of the Cold War, and how a Soviet defector named Grigori Tokaev contributed to British plans and operations. Tokaev provided valuable insights into the Soviet Union, allowing British intelligence to craft more intricate deception operations, political and military. The manner in which he was used, and the extent to which his idiosyncrasies were tolerated, underline the difficulties the British authorities faced as they attempted to apply the lessons of the Second World War deception to the Cold War environment. The case offers new perspectives on both the relatively under-examined subject British deception operations against the USSR, and the history of one of the most prominent Cold War defectors.

This article examines British deception during the early years of the Cold War, and how a Soviet defector named Grigori Tokaev contributed to British plans and operations. Tokaev provided valuable insights into the Soviet Union, allowing British intelligence to craft more intricate deception operations, political and military. The manner in which he was used, and the extent to which his idiosyncrasies were tolerated, underline the difficulties the British authorities faced as they attempted to apply the lessons of the Second World War deception to the Cold War environment. The case offers new perspectives on both the relatively under-examined subject of British deception operations against the USSR, and the history of one of the most prominent Cold War defectors.

FEATURES: Special Commentary. Limits of Negative Peace, Faces of Positive Peace — Patricia M. Shields. A Wake for Counterinsurgency? Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy—Steven Metz. Insurgent Defectors in Counterinsurgencies—Jacqueline L. Hazelton. War among (& for) the People. Rethinking NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians—Sten Rynning. Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe—Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen. War and Social Perception. Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan—Paolo G. Tripodi and David M. Todd. Third-Force Influences: Hollywood's War Films—John Chapin, Marissa Mendoza- Burcham, and Mari Pierce. Army Expansibility. Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?—Esli T. Pitts. Rapid Expansion and the Army's Matériel: Is There Enough?—Robb C. Mitchell.

The two decades between 1955 and 1976, bookended by the beginning of amilitary coup that ousted populist President Juan Perón in 1955 and the dictatorshipthat replaced a democratically elected government in 1976, was a periodof tremendous political radicalism that would leave a permanent impression onArgentina's political history. During this period, left wing parties in Argentina,already "extensive, prolific, [with] countless complexities and contradictions," 2gradually transformed from traditional orthodox parties of the left and the labormovement into a 'new left,' introducing a wide range of ideological influences.The nueva izquierda drew from crowds of intellectuals, university students,defectors from traditional parties, guerrillas, and social movements, raisinga challenge to the legitimacy of traditional leftist parties in representing thespectrum of political concerns and ambitions of the left.