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On 14 January, Nauru re-established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) ending nearly 20 years of links with Taiwan. The news came as a surprise to some, especially since former Nauru President ...

24 January 2022 marked the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Israel and China. Celebrations included a series of high-level meetings, highlighting what was perceived as warm relations between the two nations. And indeed, in the past two decades, China-Israel relations had shown a steady rise in economic aspects, while experiencing an observable standstill in all … Continued

Theme Fifty years on from the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and the People's Republic of China, this analysis examines the main features of the evolution of bilateral relations during the period and reflects on their current status and potential scenarios going forward. Summary After an uncertain start, ties between Spain and China have […]
La entrada A look at the future of relations between Spain and China se publicó primero en Elcano Royal Institute.

Traditionally close partners, Morocco and France have seen their relationship deteriorate in recent years under a variety of pressures. Much analysis has focused on the role of high politics and diplomatic considerations, such as the question of the sovereignty of Western Sahara. This article argues that while these are important, bottom-up approaches must also be considered. In particular, we highlight the impact of visa restrictions on inter-societal links, and how these affect the core of bilateral relations by damaging the human fabric of politics. The "exceptional partnership" between France and Morocco is a thing of the past, or at least severely damaged. Over the last two years, new crises have erupted at regular intervals. The most recent source of tension ...

A year after borders reopened between Burundi and Rwanda, diplomatic relations between these two east African countries are yet again deteriorating

Activists Maryam Bahrami and Setayesh Hadizadeh share their 80-day sit-in experiences in Berlin, advocating for reduced Germany-Iran diplomatic relations to protest human rights violations in Iran.

Australia has a long relationship with the Middle East and strong trusting partnerships. With energy and economic transformation on the agenda for the region, Australia stands to gain considerably with more investment, and with a nimble diplomatic approach.

After 7 years of rupturing diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia- Iran, the motivations, implications and prospects for the durability of the resuming relation between the two countries are still in debate. The agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran to renew their diplomatic relations, facilitated by China, Iraq and Oman, announced on March 10, was welcomed by … Continued

To many observers, the leadership of President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has marked an emerging shift in the Indo-American relationship, pointing towards a new era of mutual alignment. A plethora of bilateral summits proclaiming a "high-level of engagement" to craft "an enduring India-U.S. partnership," expanded joint-defense collaboration, the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues, deepening technological linkages, and shared security interests regarding the rise of China indicate there may have been a substantial shift in Indian strategy.While relations are undeniably strong, policymakers should remain skeptical that this stems from an underlying geopolitical alignment. Despite moving closer to the Western camp, India maintains a strategy of multi-alignment and will likely continue to do so in the coming decades.We Have Been Here BeforeThis is not the first time that there has been an apparent Indo-American rapprochement. India's doctrine of nonalignment, combined with their linkages to the Soviet Union and American diplomatic relations with Pakistan, caused distrust throughout the Cold War. Yet, the partnership blossomed after the turn of the millennium under the Bush administration, with significant cooperation in counter-terrorism, advanced technological development, democracy promotion, and environmental protection.Despite India's nuclear program and subsequent nuclear tests violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), George W. Bush lifted economic and military sanctions in 2001. In 2006, India and the United States signed the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which allowed access to civilian nuclear reactor technology.Much like today, there were several joint agreements. If you file off the dates, many mirror Biden and Modi's pledges, with commitments to expand joint exercises, defend democracy, and create cooperative groups such as the Defense Policy Group (DPG), which resulted in new American arms sales to India.There was considerable optimism at the start of the Obama administration that India would officially pivot into the Western camp. However, this hope was illusory. New elections in India brought in elites who favored strategic autonomy. Obama inflamed fears around American credibility by improving relations with China and discussing a potential G-2, a core Indian concern. Despite inching closer towards alignment for the past decade, India rapidly flipped away from the United States by joining China-led initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Furthermore, India continued to maintain its reliance on Russian arms, which limited the potential for joint military planning.Obama tried to mend the rift, but it was too little, too late, and the alliance has maintained a distinctly transactional feel until the present day. A lesson should be learned: seemingly strong Indo-American bonds can crack when security interests shift.Flashpoints for TensionsMuch like in the Obama administration, a confluence of factors could easily reverse recent gains. India and Russia remain partners despite the invasion of Ukraine. In line with much of the Global South, they have consistently abstained from condemning Russian actions and refused to sanction Russian oil (although allegedly this may have been in line with Washington's desire to stabilize oil prices). Perhaps most importantly, India's military remains reliant on Russian arms. Recently, they started to somewhat distance themselves from the Russian defense industry, but India still calculates that a strong relationship with Moscow is necessary to prevent isolationism that would push them further into China's strategic orbit.This limits India's commitment to one of the main American security architectures in the Indo-Pacific, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Russian arms are not interoperable with the rest of the QUAD's forces, which could dampen air and sea superiority in a crisis. But even if India tried to fully transition away from Russian arms, Russia has sold them the largest share of weapons for decades. The limited interoperability of Russian and American arms complicates any large-scale shift by magnifying costs and risking Indian defenses in the meantime. Regardless of how the American relationship develops, Russia will continue to be a fixture in Indian security interests for the foreseeable future. India has new concerns about American reliability, especially after the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Already, there are concerns that the weapons left behind are arming Kashmir separatists trying to split from India in favor of Pakistan. While relations under the Trump administration were not hostile, a return to an 'America First' foreign policy could make India calculate they need to hedge their bets away from the United States if they don't trust Trump's willingness to assist in a crisis.Perhaps the most recent flash point in the relationship was the attempted assassination against Sikh activist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, an American citizen, on American soil. All signs point to Indian officials being directly involved with the plot, which could be unacceptable to the United States.This points to a broader divergence between New Delhi and Washington: Indian democratic backsliding. It seems increasingly doubtful that Indo-American relations, as some have argued, can be grounded by shared ideological values. The rise of Hindu nationalism has tarnished Indian democracy, leading to discriminatory legislation against Muslim Indians and a substantial increase in hate crimes. Modi himself recently implied Muslims were "infiltrators," a common Islamophobic trope in Hindu nationalist hate speech. Outside extra-judicial killings, Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has increasingly escalated assaults against India's democratic principles. Political opponents, from politicians to activists to journalists, have been jailed under the pretense of anti-corruption measures, with peaceful protests violently stamped out. Most measurements of democratization have downgraded democratic India's status to "partly free" or even an "electoral autocracy."None of this is to gloss over the United States' electoral flaws, but India's trajectory is directly contradictory to the "shared values" expressed in the joint summits and implies that should security interests diverge, there won't be much tethering Indo-American coordination.Indian Multi-Alignment and Great Power AmbitionsIt is undeniable that Modi's foreign policy choices are motivated by great power desires. India is the world's most populous country and in a position to surge economically. A consumer boom and wage growth are likely incoming, with plenty of room for industries to meet the needs of the growing consumer class. Its population size will create a powerhouse working class to power growing markets for emerging technologies, clean energy, and businesses seeking new supply chains outside of China. Additionally, India is increasingly trying to position itself as the voice of the Global South, which often puts it in opposition to American and European interests. India has one of the strongest militaries in Asia and the ability to project power regionally. The Indian Ocean's name is no coincidence. India will not give up regional hegemony without a fight. To achieve these goals, India cannot play second fiddle to America forever. It is increasingly clear that India's strategic approach is to keep its options open so it can take advantage of whatever side best suits its interests. This is not to imply that there will be an imminent breakup. For the time being, there is a growing bipartisan understanding in Washington that China is the largest long-term threat to American security, which makes for a natural partnership with India, which fears Chinese territorial encroachment. India's threat perceptions seem to be locked in after military crises in 2014, 2017, 2020, and 2022.As of now, the BJP is positioned to maintain power after the 2024 election, making it unlikely to impact the trajectory of the relationship barring an unforeseen anti-American faction gaining footing. Should the party expand its hold over Parliament, the surface of the relationship may remain the same, but centralizing Modi's power would only exacerbate his authoritarian and hawkish leanings.Still, India's growing illiberalism shouldn't be a barrier for the moment. The United States has a long history of working with dictatorships that have questionable human rights records. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pinochet-controlled Chile immediately come to mind. Security interests frequently trump moral qualms. But should the security situation change — as a result of U.S.-China rapprochement, a surprise change in Indian or American leadership, or a crisis of credibility — policymakers may find that there is not much at the core of the relationship. India may be useful to American strategists who want to balance China for now, but make no mistake, India will not sacrifice its core interests to appease the United States. Security relationships can seem momentarily strong, but they are a house of cards vulnerable to shifting geopolitical winds.

As the war in Ukraine moves into its third year, Russo-Japanese relations continue to deteriorate from the level that existed prior to the Russian invasion in 2022. Relations between the two countries have never been smooth. Relations have been hampered since World War II by the inability to conclude a treaty formally ending hostilities between the two countries and a disagreement resulting from an old territorial dispute involving a chain of Pacific islands known in Japan as the Northern Territories and in Russia as the Southern Kuriles. Even before the Ukraine conflict, Tokyo had complained about increased Russian military deployments on the islands. Despite these lingering post-World War II hostilities, Shinzo Abe, who served as prime minister from 2012 to 2020, helped foster warmer relations with Moscow as he attempted to court Russia as a buffer against China, Japan's greatest security threat. According to TASS, Putin and Abe met in person over 25 times and held about ten phone calls. Their last meeting took place in the fall of 2019 and their last telephone conversation was held on August 31, 2020, when Putin called Abe.The cornerstone of the Putin-Abe relationship was based on strong personal respect as well as mutual interests in increased trade, particularly to feed Japan's need for commodities. Abe also saw Russia as a potential buffer against an increasingly hostile China. In 2013, Russo-Japan trade approached a record $34.8 billion and remained strong throughout the decade despite fluctuating oil prices. As recently as 2021, total trade turnover was still above $20 billion, with 45% percent consisting of fuel exports to Japan. After the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Tokyo revoked Russia's most-favored-nation status as part of a series of economic sanctions, including asset freezes targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian central bank. According to The Japan Times: "without the most-favored-nation status under the World Trade Organization rules…tariffs imposed on salmon imported from Russia have been raised to 5% from 3.5% and those on crab to 6% from 4%." As a result of these and fuel-related sanctions, total trade amounted to barely $10 billion in 2023.A decrease in imports of Russian coal by 67.1%, as well as a 44.9% drop in supplies of cars to Russia and Japanese spare parts and components by 32.5% amid sanctions against Moscow were the main factors behind the contraction of trade turnover. Energy resources and transport vehicles still account for over 69% of total trade turnover. Despite the decrease in total trade, a February report from JETRO, the Japanese External Trade Organization, claims that 156 companies and economic organizations were active in Russia before 2022 and 35% reported they continue business without any changes.Until the fall of 2023, Japan's $12.1 billion contribution to Ukraine over the past two years consisted mostly of financial and humanitarian aid as its military equipment provisions have primarily been limited to non-lethal weapons. However, in December, Moscow reacted angrily when Japan stated it would be prepared to ship Patriot air defense missiles to the United States after revising its arms export guidelines. This represents Tokyo's first major overhaul of such export curbs in nine years. Although Japan's new export controls still prevent it from shipping weapons to countries that are at war, it may "indirectly benefit Ukraine in its war with Russia as it gives the United States extra capacity to provide military aid to Kiev."The diplomatic situation has taken on a more contentious character recently as well.The Moscow Times reports that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on February 20 "slammed Japan's prime minister after he said his government remains committed to signing a peace treaty with Moscow to resolve the territorial dispute over an island chain claimed by Tokyo." Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said in a policy speech to parliament earlier that day that Tokyo "remains fully committed" to negotiations over what Japan refers to as the Northern Territories and signing an agreement formally ending World War II. Kishida also said that his government's support of Ukraine and sanctions against Russia "would not waver." Mevedev responded on X: "We don't give a damn about the 'feelings of the Japanese' concerning the so-called 'Northern territories." He added, "They're not 'disputed territories,' but Russia." This is indicative of the stance the Russian government has taken to Japan as an "unfriendly" country.Japan has also taken economic initiatives towards reconstruction in Ukraine that are not pleasing to Moscow. In mid-February, the government of Japan hosted the Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Growth and Reconstruction. The conference, organized by the Japanese and Ukrainian governments as well as business organizations and JETRO, can only be viewed as an indicator of Japanese geopolitical priorities in support of the status quo in Europe. Moreover, Japanese efforts to spearhead reconstruction efforts send a clear indication that its priorities are allied with the United States and Europe Union. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Japanese and Ukrainian government agencies and companies signed more than 50 deals, Japan pledged 15.8 billion yen ($105 million) in new aid for Ukraine to fund demining and other urgently needed reconstruction projects in the energy and transportation sectors, and President Kishida also announced the opening of a new government trade office Kyiv. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine its military cooperation with China has gotten stronger. Japan views their growing military cooperation as an unprecedented threat as it could become isolated in the region. As a result, it continues to try and demonstrate its commitment to the status quo in terms of supporting international sovereignty and law and order. While Japan's elites would like to continue the stability offered by its Cold War military alliance with the United States and South Korea, they understand the U.S. may no longer share the same interests in the region. Moreover, relations with South Korea are fractured and can make the alliance with the United States dysfunctional at times. This requires Japan to continue to seek openings with Russia that are in its own national interests. Although the Abe administration may have represented the peak for Russo-Japanese relations and such a level of relations is not replicable in the short term (particularly while Russia is still at war with Ukraine) it is in both Russia and Japan's interests to foster cordial relations, if not entirely friendly ones, via business, cultural and other non-government exchanges. Japanese companies still share a desire to resume business operations and invest in Russia once the war concludes in Ukraine. In April 2022, negotiations were concluded between the two countries regarding salmon and trout fishing and other potential fishing agreements could be concluded in the future.In addition, January 2024 saw double the number of Russian visitors to Japan as in January 2023. These are just two areas for positive interaction. However, a considerable measure of restraint will be required as a long war with Ukraine may erode possibilities even in these areas.

Taiwanese voters elected Vice President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as their next president on Saturday, which will be the third consecutive presidential win for the party and an indication voters want to stay the course — in policy and in current US-China-Taiwan relations.Whether it will result in heightened tensions between the island and mainland China, and Beijing and Washington, remains to be seen, and will likely be determined by the public actions and reactions by each party in the immediate days and weeks.Despite a late tightening of the presidential race between Lai and his main opponent, Hou You-ih of the Kuomintang (KMT), the candidate of the incumbent party prevailed with 40% of the vote in a three-way race that included Ko Wen-je of the Taiwanese People's Party.The failure of the two main opposition parties to unite on a joint ticket last fall paved the way for Lai's victory. While opposition campaign rhetoric painted a win for Lai as a vote for confrontation and conflict with China, enough Taiwanese voters opted to stick with the policies of outgoing president Tsai Ing-wen to give the DPP the unprecedented third term in office. Lai campaigned on a message of continuity with Tsai. In a popular campaign ad, Tsai and Lai were seen driving in a car together and then the outgoing president got out and let Lai get behind the wheel, saying to him, "You can drive better than me." Despite Tsai's somewhat low overall approval ratings, the appeal to staying on the same course was effective enough to secure Lai the win. Lai's victory is unlikely to trigger a major crisis right away, but it will ensure that cross-Strait dialogue will not resume. The lack of dialogue between Taiwan and China has coincided with and contributed to a period of increasing Chinese pressure and deteriorating relations between the United States and China. As a result, the tensions that have built up between Taiwan and China and between the U.S. and China over the last eight years will remain high for the foreseeable future. The Biden administration was already adding to those tensions last week with the announcement that it would be sending a delegation of former high-level officials to Taiwan after Saturday's election. This move was unwelcome to Beijing, and the Chinese government condemned the decision, saying that the administration should "stop sending wrong signals to 'Taiwan independence separatist forces and refrain from interfering in elections in the Taiwan region in any form."For their part, the Chinese government had been putting additional pressure on Taiwan in the weeks leading up to the election with threats of punitive trade measures. The DPP triumph is not in itself a prelude to war, but it could encourage hardliners in Washington to pursue more aggressive and provocative policies toward China while making the Chinese use of coercive tactics more likely. As the Quincy Institute's Michael Swaine said in response to the election result, Lai's victory "will likely worsen the negative dynamics" in the U.S.-China relationship that he and his colleague James Park discussed in their recent QI brief. Depending on how Lai manages relations with the U.S. in the coming years, there is a danger that his efforts to strengthen ties with Washington will cause a backlash from China that brings all parties closer to a new crisis. Lai has expressed a desire to see a Taiwanese president visit the White House sometime in the future. If Lai were to pursue such a visit, and if the Biden administration indulged him in this, that would almost certainly be met with significant Chinese punitive measures, whether in the form of economic warfare, military drills, or some combination of the two. More modest efforts to build up the relationship with the U.S. may not have such dramatic consequences, but they will contribute to the ongoing strains in U.S.-Chinese relations. The old status quo between the U.S. and China has been steadily eroding for at least the last eight years, and this has accelerated over the last three years under Biden. The bipartisan consensus in Washington in favor of containment and rivalry and ill-conceived gestures of "support" for Taiwan have fed a cycle of threat inflation and overreaction in both countries. Officials in both governments tend to assume the worst about the intentions of the other side, and there are few safeguards in place in the event of a crisis. Cross-Strait relations and relations between the U.S. and China have both suffered significantly since then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei in 2022. Following that and the spy balloon incident, it took almost all of last year for the Biden administration to stabilize the relationship between Washington and Beijing. That has left Taiwan measurably worse off under the "new normal" conditions that have been created. It has also undermined the peace in East Asia that has endured for more than 40 years. It is against this backdrop of growing mutual mistrust and hostility that we need to view the implications of the Taiwanese election results. The U.S. can expect and should prepare for at least four more years of heightened tensions and worsening relations with China.That is why it is imperative that the U.S. approach become much more cautious and responsible than it has been in a long time. The U.S. not only needs to avoid taking provocative actions like extending an explicit security guarantee to Taiwan or restoring normal diplomatic ties, but it must also seek to offer credible assurances to Beijing that it has no interest in encouraging what the Chinese government considers separatism.Reassurance is as important as, and possibly more important than, making deterrent threats. As Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen recently explained in their article in Foreign Affairs, "For effective deterrence, both threats and assurances must be credible." The U.S. has no trouble in convincing other states that it is prepared to use force. The difficulty is in getting other states to believe that the U.S. can be trusted to leave well enough alone. The U.S. should take care in the coming months not to make any moves that suggest that it is upgrading the relationship with Taiwan. The post-election delegation that Biden is sending should be the last one of its kind for a long time. The Chinese government already perceives a gap between the Biden administration's rhetoric and its actions, so it is crucial that this gap not get any wider than it already is. The administration also needs to communicate privately to the incoming president that he should not take any actions that are likely to antagonize Beijing. Given the political incentives in an election year to engage in gratuitous China-bashing, that may be a tall order, but it is what needs to happen if the U.S. and Taiwan are going to navigate the year ahead without serious incident.

Next month, President Biden could hold two separate meetings with Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.


These meetings, which reporting suggests could happen at both the UN General Assembly in New York and the G20 in India, represent an opportunity to kickstart a lackluster U.S.-Brazil relationship. Past tensions between the U.S. and Brazil, exemplified by the fallout from the 2010 Tehran Declaration, serve as a cautionary tale to the Biden administration to not let a difference in perspective on Ukraine cloud other areas of potential collaboration.


Disagreements over the war in Ukraine have put the U.S.-Brazil relationship in hot water in recent months. On the campaign trail, Lula suggested, with some controversy, that Ukraine and Russia are equally responsible for the conflict. Once in office, Lula's visit to the White House in February was short and understated; Biden initially only offered $50 million to the Amazon Fund, a figure so low it was omitted from the official joint statement.


Additionally, Lula's proposal to create a peace club of nonaligned countries appears to have been a nonstarter in Washington. In a particularly heated back and forth, Lula said the U.S. should stop "encouraging" the war and start talking about peace. U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby responded by accusing Lula of "parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda."


Most observers agree that Ukraine has become something of a flashpoint for U.S.-Brazil relations and soured expectations of a more expansive reset in the wake of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro's 2022 electoral defeat.


Despite this international criticism, Lula has continued to speak about the need for a negotiated peace settlement in Ukraine. Just last week, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said this week's BRICS summit should be used to debate the war in Ukraine. Lula sees a universalist foreign policy as crucial to becoming a major global player in an increasingly multipolar world, which involves taking on global issues of international security like Ukraine that have historically been left to the great powers.


In other words, Biden isn't going to change Lula's mind on Ukraine, and Lula doesn't seem likely to give up on what has become one of his signature foreign policies. As a result, the two presidents shouldn't allow disagreements over Ukraine to spill over into other areas of cooperation.


The fallout between the U.S. and Brazil over the 2010 Tehran Declaration, an event both Lula and Biden will remember well, can serve as a cautionary tale.


In 2010, Lula and his advisers sought a fuel-swap agreement between Turkey and Iran intended to facilitate Iran's nuclear cooperation. Initially, then-President Barack Obama pledged that the United States would "support and facilitate action on a proposal that would supply Iran with nuclear fuel using Iran's enriched uranium." Only when that proposal was successful did the United States — and its European allies — change course. Just a month later, the United Nations Security Council imposed a series of harsh sanctions on Iran.


From this, Brazilian diplomats concluded that the U.S. did not think Brazil would succeed and even sought to privately press against the behind-the-scenes negotiations. Then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim summarized Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's attitude in his memoir as, "I have not read (the Declaration). But I don't like it."


When the U.S. dismissed the Tehran Declaration in 2010, it led to what Federal University of São Paulo professor Cristina Pecequilo has labeled the "low point of Lula's foreign policy" for complicating the U.S.-Brazil relationship. According to Pecequilo, this was part of Obama's "changing US policy from accommodation to containment of emerging nations." Brazil, in response, distanced itself further from the United States. The new "reset" of bilateral relations didn't come until 2014 when then Vice President Joe Biden visited Brazil during the World Cup.


These events should offer a warning to Biden. Oliver Stunekel, an associate professor of international relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, writes that "[j]ust as Brazil's ambitious Iran initiative failed because it lacked Western buy-in — and ultimately complicated Brasília's ties to Washington — Lula's desire to negotiate a peace deal in Ukraine could have the same fate."


Rather than disengage with Brazil over Lula's comments on Ukraine, Biden should look to areas of more natural potential collaboration such as energy, deforestation, jobs creation, and trade. The two presidents recently shared a 30-minute phone call that suggested some positive signs of doing just that, even discussing a joint initiative focused on improving labor conditions. A congressional delegation of progressives also spent several days in Brazil last week, meeting with key Lula advisers and carving out another blueprint for constructive engagement between the two countries based on shared domestic priorities.


Even if Ukraine is a flashpoint for the current relationship, that doesn't mean Biden should ignore other thorny questions of international security with Lula. But doing so requires recognition that any U.S.-led proposal will inevitably look different from a joint initiative or Brazil-led proposal. At the G7 in Japan, Lula expressed interest in working to resolve other conflicts outside of Europe.


"Israelis and Palestinians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Kosovars and Serbs need peace," Lula exclaimed. "Yemenis, Syrians, Libyans and Sudanese all deserve to live in peace. These conflicts should receive the same degree of international mobilization." If Lula takes on these issues, Biden should work with him on areas of mutual interest rather than view it as a challenge to U.S. hegemony.


Another potential area of collaboration could be in Latin America. Relations between the U.S. and Venezuela have shown some signs of thawing, but the U.S. still refuses to formally recognize Nicolás Maduro as the president. The Biden administration has also restored some engagement with Cuba, yet Cuba remains on the State Department's state sponsors of terrorism list. These complicated realities make Brazil a valuable potential partner for possible backchannel talks or track II diplomatic efforts, given Brazil's positive relations with the two countries.


Brazil has occupied this role before, attempting to mediate the Cuban Missile Crisis and broker U.S.-Cuban reconciliation during the 1960s. As Obama once acknowledged, according to Amorim, "we need friends who can talk to countries that refuse to talk to us."


One of the lessons of the Tehran Declaration should be that the U.S. needs to sometimes accept taking on a smaller role when it serves its interests. Brazil brings many strengths as an outsider and a diplomatic heavyweight, but also simply by not being the U.S. As Camila Feix Vidal, professor at the Federal University of Santa Catarina, points out: "Brazil is respected internationally…Countries don't have a negative history with Brazil so it can be easier for Brazil to arbitrate, unlike the United States."


For instance, Brazil's success as an advocate against nuclear weapons is taken more seriously given that it renounced interest in nuclear weapons in the 1990s. By contrast, the U.S. today has well over 5,000.


Nearly a decade and a half on from the Tehran Declaration, the United States is operating in a more multipolar world. That may require more compromise, especially with emerging powers such as Brazil as they gain more leverage. Even if the two countries are at an impasse on Ukraine for the time being, the U.S. should heed the lessons of 2010 and consider the benefits of pursuing a more constructive partnership with Brazil.

After seven years of severed diplomatic relations, the China-brokered renormalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, signed on March 10, marked a major breakthrough in the Middle East's shift toward de-escalation between regional rivals. Nearly six months later, the Iranian-Saudi détente remains on track. Last month, Iran's chief diplomat, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, or MbS, in Jeddah and invited him to Tehran. Then on September 5, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, who was previously the Kingdom's ambassador to Oman, arrived in Tehran. That same day, Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, who previously served as the Islamic Republic's Kuwait envoy, arrived in Riyadh. Such developments speak to both sides' interest in further improving bilateral ties. As Ambassador Alanazi put it, Saudi officials recognize the "importance of strengthening ties, increasing engagement…and taking the [relationship] to broader horizons."Tehran and Riyadh did not sign the diplomatic agreement in Beijing after almost two years of Iraqi- and Omani-facilitated mediation out of mutual love. Instead, the deal resulted from their respective interests in détente at a particular time. Ultimately, hostilities between the two regional powers over the past decade were not serving either side. Rather than continuing down the path of steadily mounting tension, Tehran and Riyadh both saw a "cold peace" as their best option, albeit for different reasons.Motivations for détenteCentral to the Ebrahim Raisi administration's foreign policy is the "Neighbors First" doctrine. As relations between Iran and the West continue deteriorating, Tehran wants not only to cultivate closer ties with China and Russia, but also have better relationships with Islamic countries in its own neighborhood, including with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Central Asian states and Pakistan. Iran hopes this will reap economic benefits while better positioning the Islamic Republic to circumvent U.S. sanctions and pressure.Riyadh understood that attracting sufficient foreign investment to make MbS's Vision 2030 succeed requires greater stability at home and throughout the region. This made de-escalating tensions with Iran necessary, especially given Tehran's influence over Yemen's Houthi insurgents, whose drone and missile attacks against Saudi infrastructure had caused considerable damage until the April 2022 truce's implementation."The decision to restore relations was made by both sides with cold calculation," Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center, told RS. "Iran wants to prove it is not isolated regionally while Saudi Arabia wants an insurance policy against external attacks while it tries to realize its ambitious economic goals."Yet Tehran and Riyadh continue harboring suspicions of each other. From Iran's vantagepoint, Riyadh's partnership with Washington remains a major threat to Gulf security, while Saudi Arabia still sees Iran's regional conduct as destabilizing.Indeed, nearly six months in, the Iranian-Saudi diplomatic agreement has only gone so far. "It hasn't evolved into a real rapprochement, but that was always far-fetched as long as Iran is at daggers-drawn with Riyadh's key strategic ally: the United States," said the International Crisis Group's Ali Vaez in an interview with RS. "The long shadow of the nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. will prevent the reestablishment of economic ties between Tehran and Riyadh and could eventually flare up regional tensions that could once again spill over into the bilateral relationship."The recent deployment of 3,000 American sailors and Marines to waters near Iran has only resulted in more threats from Tehran to the U.S. This development could have major implications for Iranian-Saudi relations."Like all diplomatic deals, the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iranian diplomatic effort, is—at best—a work in progress," Joseph A. Kechichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, told RS. "While many hastened to conclude that the two countries, under close Chinese supervision, would rapidly embark on fresh initiatives, reality stepped in because Riyadh was and still is wary of Tehran's pledges to end its interferences in internal Arab affairs. (Almost) six months in, neither side seems ready to be blinded by lofty declarations, which often belie serious differences."Enter IsraelSaudi Arabia has thus far refused to follow in Abu Dhabi's footsteps and join the Abraham Accords. Riyadh stresses that normalization with Tel Aviv would require significant Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, and with Israel's far-right government that is currently in power, such concessions are unlikely to be offered. Nonetheless, trying to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords is a top foreign policy priority for Team Biden. It is worth asking how this stands to impact the Iranian-Saudi détente.Depending on the degree to which there is convergence between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, there could be negative consequences for Iranian-Saudi relations. Ultimately, Tehran does not see diplomatic relations between GCC states and Israel as a threat per se. It is far more concerned with how the Abraham Accords could lead to a growing Israeli military footprint near Iranian territory."Iran will feel obliged to condemn Riyadh if it normalizes with Israel and will be on the alert for any military or intelligence component to such a deal. That it will not tolerate," explained Slavin."Iran is afraid of greater military and security convergence of the Persian Gulf Arabs with Israel in formats such as the joint air defense system," Javad Heiran-Nia, the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told RS."Iran knows that by forming such a system, a 'balance deficit' will be detrimental to it. For this reason, Iran has announced the unveiling of hypersonic missiles capable of passing through any missile defense system. Iran sends the message to the Persian Gulf states that expanding their relations and forming a strong convergence in the region with Israel will not ensure their security," added Heiran-Nia.Signs of improved tiesLooking ahead, certain indicators can help assess the evolving state of Iranian-Saudi relations.As Iran and Saudi Arabia have previously enjoyed periods of détente, such as during the 1990s and early 2000s, Vaez told RS that "this one is unlikely to withstand the test of time unless it is institutionalized in the form of frequent high-level political engagement, standing bilateral committees that would proactively work to deepen ties between the two nations on multiple levels, and an inclusive regional security dialogue that starts thinking about a mutually tolerable and sustainable modus vivendi for all the key stakeholders."The main indicator of how Iranian-Saudi relations develop will not be the absence of conflict or disagreement, explained Aziz Alghashian, a fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. "Rather, it is how both Iran and Saudi react to these sensitive issues [such as the Dorra/Arash Gas Field dispute and unresolved tensions over Yemen], what kind of language will they use, and what kind of sentiments will they have in negotiating these sensitivities."Roughly six months after the diplomatic deal was announced in China, Slavin has somewhat low expectations for improved bilateral ties. "I would expect an improved atmosphere for Iranian pilgrims going on the hajj and a modest uptick in sports and other exchanges, plus limited trade in non-sanctioned goods." But she assesses that Iranian-Saudi reconciliation will be "very superficial."Nonetheless, as much as any optimism about a full rapprochement must be tempered, the current state of Iranian-Saudi relations is far more stable than the 2011-22 period. That is positive for the whole Middle East. The Gulf and the wider region stand to benefit, at least to some degree, from Tehran and Riyadh finding a way to "share the neighborhood," as former President Barack Obama once put it."A cold peace is…better than the alternative," said Slavin.

While the United States remains the dominant extra-regional superpower as the war between Hamas and Israel threatens to spread more broadly, China's growing presence across the Middle East raises important questions about how it conceives its response to the crisis.Enjoying close ties to Israel and decent relations with major Palestinian and Lebanese players, including Hamas and Hezbollah, Beijing's foreign policy in the post-Mao era has been quite balanced between Israel and Arab actors. But Israel's conduct of the war is pushing Beijing to take a stance that is increasingly pro-Palestinian, which risks harming its relations with Tel Aviv.China's main interestsUltimately, what China wants in the Middle East more than anything else is stability. The region is extremely important to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, which will face serious problems if wars continue to plague the region. To help stabilize the Gulf, in particular, China played a catalyzing role in the renormalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran almost eight months ago. Now, he escalating conflict in Israel/Palestine and along the Israeli border with Lebanon has raised growing concern in Beijing about the possibility of a wider war. Beijing has called for a ceasefire, followed by a lasting political settlement to the conflict based on the implementation of a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians as the best course.China and Israel's multifaceted and complicated bilateral relationship has evolved over the decades. Under Chairman Mao Zedong's rule (1949-76), China supported left-wing and "radical" Arab regimes — namely Algeria, Egypt, South Yemen, and Syria — as well as national liberation movements in the Middle East, including the Palestinian struggle. By contrast, Mao saw Israel as a base of Western imperialism in the Arab world. But since Beijing and Tel Aviv established diplomatic relations in 1992, economic relations between China and Israel have flourished across countless sectors, including technology, infrastructure, tourism, health, education, logistics, ports, and cosmetics. There is also a history of a military-tech exchange between the two countries going back to the 1980s. Sino-Israeli relations have deepened to the point where U.S. officials have pressured Tel Aviv to cool its ties with the Asian giant.Despite these deep economic relations, however, China has opposed Israel's occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territory outside its United Nations-recognized borders and criticized its past bombing campaigns against Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. Unlike Israel, the United States and some other Western states, China has refused to designate Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, instead viewing them as legitimate representatives of segments of the population in Palestine and Lebanon.Beijing reacts to Hamas' surprise attackIn response to Hamas' unprecedented incursion into southern Israel on October 7 and the Israeli bombing campaign of Gaza that followed, Beijing has stressed three main messages. First, it condemned all attacks on civilians. Second, it called for the reactivation of dialogue between the warring sides. Finally, it has called for the effective establishment of a Palestinian state based alongside Israel's 1949-67 borders."China has tried to maintain [neutrality], criticize attacks on civilians, and call for de-escalation and ceasefire," said Yun Sun, co-director of the China Program at the Washington-based Stimson Center, in an interview with RS. "Hamas's attacks on civilians are inexcusable. But for China, Israel's illegal occupation of Palestinian territory is also the origin of the attacks."China's response to October 7 was similar to the way Beijing positioned itself after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, according to some experts. "If in Ukraine there was talk of a 'pro-Russian neutrality,' in this case it is a 'pro-Palestinian neutrality,'" according to Enrico Fardella, Director of the Italy-based ChinaMED Project."Neutrality is functional to maximize [China's] diplomatic flexibility by presenting itself as the only major power capable of dialogue with both sides," he told RS. "This serves to win consensus at the center (among all those actors critical of the [Benjamin] Netanyahu government but at the same time disgusted by Hamas' brutalities), showing the superiority of its own diplomatic action in the face of the American one that is decidedly pro-Israel. The pro-Palestinian component, on the other hand, serves to gather support on the left, i.e., in the pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel (and therefore anti-American) area inside and outside the Middle East."Can China help de-escalate?Earlier this year, the Chinese offered to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians. Now more than ever, the region could benefit from an outside actor playing an effective peacemaking role. But given Beijing's apparent inability to muster the leverage necessary to bring the Israelis and Palestinians toward a peaceful settlement, it is doubtful that China can succeed."We know that Beijing wants to prevent the escalation of the crisis, but I do not think that it has enough instruments to defuse the crisis," said Nurettin Akçay, of the Center for Global Studies at Shanghai University. He explained that China's limited leverage over Israel is a major obstacle to Beijing successfully de-escalating this conflict through diplomatic means. "It is my belief that China's position in the Middle East is somewhat overstated. Its actual power to shape events in the region is quite limited, despite its economic clout. The ongoing crisis has highlighted the fact that China lacks the necessary hard power to pursue its objectives," he told RS."I think all countries that call for de-escalation will help," noted Sun. "Beijing has relatively good relationships with both Israel and Palestine, as well as other regional players. But such good relationships do not necessarily translate into influence on such a major issue," she added. "To assume that Beijing can effectively help de-escalate is to assume that parties to the conflict are willing to change their course, which I do not see as probable at this point."Implications for U.S.-Israel tiesHow much the ongoing violence in Israel-Palestine and Lebanon will impact China's relationship with Israel is unclear. In recent years, China has become more vocal about the Palestinian cause, which serves to boost Beijing's standing among governments and societies across the Islamic world and much of the Global South. This has served to differentiate China from the U.S. and helps Beijing to depict Washington as the isolated player on this issue while countering Western efforts to use the Xinjiang human rights file to distance Muslim-majority countries from China.While the Chinese and Israelis have generally managed to separate their political disagreements from their economic ties in recent years, China's increasingly pro-Palestinian position has the potential to create considerable irritation in the bilateral relationship. And while Netanyahu was flirting earlier this year with the idea of traveling to China and meeting with President Xi Jinping in the face of Biden administration's criticism of the Israeli leader's far-right domestic agenda, such a show of defiance and independence seems highly unlikely given both Washington's strong backing for Israel in the current conflict and Beijing's more pro-Palestinian position.

As traditional diplomatic norms face challenges, Taiwan and Somaliland, two states not recognized by the UN and a majority of countries, are pioneering a unique approach toward international relations.