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Examines whether inaction in the 1996 Zairian crisis and the earlier Rwandan and Burundi crises can be attributed to the absence of early-warning information or to international disagreement about the value of the information available.

This paper addresses model design and data-related issues pertaining to the use of risk assessment models in support of conflict early warning systems. The paper first examines the data needed for risk assessment models. It argues that there are actually two types of data that we must collect and use: data to determine the theories that best explain the outbreak or escalation of violent conflict and data corresponding to variables that have been demonstrated to have predictive power and thus are appropriate for use in a risk assessment model. With respect to intrastate conflicts there remains a dearth of data of the first type that is only slowly being corrected. Collecting data of the second type will continue to be an inefficient process until better theories have been formulated and tested with the first type of data. The paper then examines a number of models germane to risk assessment and conflict early warning. It finds that except for one class of models, so-called correlational models, there has been only limited work done even though the alternatives appear to have promise. ; Das Papier behandelt Modellierungsfragen und Datenprobleme bezüglich der Zweckmäßigkeit sog. risk-assessment-Modelle bzw. zur Klärung von Frühwarnmodellen. Zunächst wird generell die Datenlage überprüft. Dabei läßt sich argumentieren, daß zwei Typen von Daten im Mittelpunkt stehen: einerseits Daten, die zur Erklärung des Auftretens und der Eskalation von gewaltsamen Konflikten herangezogen werden können, andererseits Daten, die sich für die Fundierung von risk-assessment-Modellen eignen. Während beim ersten Typus vor allem ein eklatanter Mangel bezüglich innerstaatlicher Konflikte herrscht, sind wir beim zweiten Typ mit dem Problem konfrontiert, daß das Generieren von immer neuen Daten solange ein wirkungsloses Unterfangen bleiben wird, wie es nicht mehr theoretische Klarheit über die Prozeß- und Strukturbedingungen von Gewalt gibt. Anschließend werden noch zentrale Modelle überprüft, die sich mit dem risk-assessment und der Frühwarnung befassen. Es wird gezeigt, daß – mit Ausnahme von Korrelationsmodellierungen – noch immer zuwenig Arbeit investiert wird, wenngleich die Alternativen durchaus vielversprechend sind.

Early warning systems (EWSs) are subject to restrictions that apply to exchange rates in general: fundamentals matter but their influence is small and unstable. Despite this limitation four major lessons emerge: First, EWSs have robust forecasting power and thus help policy-makers to prevent crises. Second, policy-makers must decide about some EWSs' elements, such as the sensitivity of the forecasts. Third, EWSs' performance is increased by taking a logit model, shorter samples and a regional approach. Fourth, the finding of contagion may motivate policy to shield its economy against inefficient international financial markets.

Is it possible to see famines coming, to be prepared and to save possibly hundreds of thousands of lives? Or is this the wrong question? A famine is not a single natural catastrophe: it has different stages. Many societies have sophisticated strategies for coping - but these are becoming dramatically limited. Famine Early Warning System is about the people who are caught up in the process of famine. Peter Walker looks at how they perceive their predicament and what they do to avert mass starvation: and at what genuinely useful help can be offered in order to prevent irreversible disaster. Orig

Focuses on ways of coping with socio-economic and employment challenges of responding to crises arising from natural disaster, man-made catastrophe, or war. Reports on best practices and new avenues for crisis response and early warning, with examples from 14 developing countries around the world