Suchergebnisse

The extent of government deficits and debt has been one of the most debated issues in recent years. However, very little has been contributed about their dynamics . Yet, the issue of entering into and exiting from excessive deficits will be critical in the European monetary union since the Stability and Growth Pact rules out deficits larger than 3 percent of GDP, except under strictly defined unusual conditions. This paper provides a transition data analysis of the dynamics of public deficits. It shows the asymmetric role pl a yed by the economic determinants in theses dynamics and estimates the evolution of the probability of entering into and exiting from excessive deficits for each one of the member states of the European Union since 1970. It also reveals how the concurrence of some minor changes may produce a major switchover in public finance outcomes. Finally, it points to the fragility of some countries even if they are now out of excessive deficits.

Which member states could leave the European Union in the years ahead? To answer this question, I develop the 'EU Exit Index' measuring the exit propensities of all European Union member states. The index highlights that the United Kingdom was an outlier and uniquely positioned to leave the European Union. While all other states are far behind the United Kingdom, the index still reveals substantial variation among them. Moreover, the index allows monitoring the development of exit propensities over time. It shows that the European Union is in better shape today than before the Brexit referendum and that, currently, no further exits are on the horizon. Still, this could change in the future and the EU Exit Index provides systematic and reproducible measurements to track this development.

Following the vote to leave the EU, the Government is likely to trigger exit negotiations set out under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The British Government does not have to do this immediately and Prime Minister Cameron has signalled that this process will start after the election of a new Conservative party leader in October 2016.

Following the vote to leave the EU, the Government is likely to trigger exit negotiations set out under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The British Government does not have to do this immediately and Prime Minister Cameron has signalled that this process will start after the election of a new Conservative party leader in October 2016.

The extent of government deficits and debt has been one of the most debated issues in recent years. However, much less has been contributed about their dynamics. Yet, the issue of entering into and exiting from excessive deficits is critical in the Economic and Monetary Union since the Stability and Growth Pact rules out deficits larger than 3 percent of GDP, unless countries face strictly defined unusual conditions. This paper provides a transition data analysis of the dynamics of public deficits. It shows the asymmetric role played by the economic determinants in these dynamics and estimates the evolution of the probability of entering into and exiting from excessive deficits for every individual member state of the European Union that signed the Maastricht Treaty, since 1970. It also reveals how the concurrence of some minor changes may produce a major switchover in public finance outcomes. Finally, it analyses the evolution over time of the probabilities that countries will enter or escape from the state of having excessive deficit, and hence the fragility of some countries even if they are now out of excessive deficits.

The British decision to leave the European Union after the 2016 referendum raises questions about who could be next. This article analyzes why citizens in East European Member States would vote to leave the European Union in the event of further referendums. It proposes an analytical framework that seeks to explain this strong form of Euroscepticism through four variables that are rarely linked to the European Union: political apathy and alienation, dissatisfaction with domestic democracy and economy, conservative values, and social isolation. We use individual-level data from the 2018 wave of the European Social Survey to show that citizens' conservative attitudes and social isolation are robust determinants of a potential European Union exit vote in Eastern Europe. We also identify several country-specific causes, which means that the European Union faces particular challenges across political settings.

Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of the member states both with and without the country which might leave the union. Our results show a pattern connected to a change in the number of states required to meet the 55% threshold. An exit that modifies this number benefits the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small member states. According to our calculations, only the exit of Poland would be supported by the qualified majority of the Council.

Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of the member states both with and without the country which might leave the union. Our results show a pattern connected to a change in the number of states required to meet the 55% threshold. An exit that modifies this number benefits the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small member states. According to our calculations, only the exit of Poland would be supported by the qualified majority of the Council.

While the European Union (EU) is facing a further aggravation of the recession, accompanied by the consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis, the support for economic activities is proving to be more than necessary. Primary concerns of member states must be based on increased efforts in competitiveness, employment, innovation, and assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), to boost economic growth on a short-term basis or on a longer-term horizon. In this regard, this article firstly suggests that the temporary support for economic activities is absolutely necessary and the possible arrangements are examined in detail. In addition, more emphasis must be put on innovation, as it plays a crucial role for economic growth. Particular attention is also drawn to SMEs, their potential impact on the productive fabric and their financial constraints. The concluding remarks are focused on the European market size, and the antagonism between competition policy and industrial policy is highlighted.

Preferences about the vertical distribution of power in federal systems are not well understood. I argue that negative historical experiences with higher-level governments can plausibly raise demands for exit strategies and a devolution of power. But integration, for instance delegating power from the nation-state to a supra-national level or international organization, can also serve the purpose of overcoming history by constraining nation-state actions. I specify conditions for affecting current preferences, and apply this framework to the European Union. Empirically, the quasi-random division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine allows estimating differences in support for integration in a spatial regression discontinuity design. More negative exposure to nation-state actions causes persistently higher support for European integration in three referenda and less euroscepticism in European elections. Survey evidence supports exit and integration as two complementary alternatives, revealing preferences to move power away from the nation-state, either to the regional or European level.

What are the effects on public support for the European Union (EU) when a member state exits? We examine this question in the context of Britain's momentous decision to leave the EU. Combining analyses of the European Election Study 2019 and a unique survey-embedded experiment conducted in all member states, we analyse the effect of Brexit on support for membership among citizens in the EU-27. The experimental evidence shows that while information about the negative economic consequences of Brexit had no significant effect, positive information about Britain's sovereignty significantly increased optimism about leaving the EU. Our findings suggest that Brexit acts as a benchmark for citizens' evaluations of EU membership across EU-27, and that it may not continue to act as a deterrent in the future.

First published online: 15 March 2021 ; Which member states could leave the European Union in the years ahead? To answer this question, I develop the 'EU Exit Index' measuring the exit propensities of all European Union member states. The index highlights that the United Kingdom was an outlier and uniquely positioned to leave the European Union. While all other states are far behind the United Kingdom, the index still reveals substantial variation among them. Moreover, the index allows monitoring the development of exit propensities over time. It shows that the European Union is in better shape today than before the Brexit referendum and that, currently, no further exits are on the horizon. Still, this could change in the future and the EU Exit Index provides systematic and reproducible measurements to track this development. ; This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 840135.

The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by financial markets' greed and instability. The crisis led public debts and deficits to rise substantially in developed countries. Financial markets and international institutions claim for a "fiscal exit strategy" through rapid reductions in public deficits and substantial falls in public debts owing to large public spending cuts (especially social expenditure). The article shows that the state of public finances was generally satisfactory before the crisis; the rise in deficits was needed for macroeconomic stabilisation purposes and does not signal higher future interest rates or inflation. 'Crisis exit strategies' should keep interest rates at low levels and government deficits, as long as they are necessary to support activity; they should question financial globalisation and macroeconomic strategies in neo-mercantilist and in liberal countries. The crisis should not be an opportunity for leading classes and European technocracies to cut social spending. Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact would be dangerous if it deprived Member States of policy tools that were helpful in the crisis. The euro area should fight against speculation on public debts by ensuring that public debts are collectively guaranteed by the ECB and the Member States. World economic stability is not threatened by public finances imbalances, but by growing speculative financial activity.

The 2007-2009 financial crisis was caused by financial markets' greed and instability. The crisis led public debts and deficits to rise substantially in developed countries. Financial markets and international institutions claim for a "fiscal exit strategy" through rapid reductions in public deficits and substantial falls in public debts owing to large public spending cuts (especially social expenditure). The article shows that the state of public finances was generally satisfactory before the crisis; the rise in deficits was needed for macroeconomic stabilisation purposes and does not signal higher future interest rates or inflation. 'Crisis exit strategies' should keep interest rates at low levels and government deficits, as long as they are necessary to support activity; they should question financial globalisation and macroeconomic strategies in neo-mercantilist and in liberal countries. The crisis should not be an opportunity for leading classes and European technocracies to cut social spending. Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact would be dangerous if it deprived Member States of policy tools that were helpful in the crisis. The euro area should fight against speculation on public debts by ensuring that public debts are collectively guaranteed by the ECB and the Member States. World economic stability is not threatened by public finances imbalances, but by growing speculative financial activity.

This study introduces a population-ecological approach to the entry and exit of political parties. A primary proposition of population ecology is that organizational entry and exit depends on the number of organizations already present: that is, density. We propose that political parties mainly experience competition from parties in the same ideological niche (left, centre, right). Pooled time-series analyses of 410 parties, 263 elections and 18 West-European countries largely support our expectations. We find that political parties are more likely to exit when density within their niche increases. Also there is competition between adjacent ideological niches, i.e. between centrist and right-wing niches. In contrast to our expectations, neither density nor institutional rules impact party entry. This raises important questions about the rationale of prospective entrants.