Suchergebnisse

Master in International Social Welfare and Health Policy ; The 2008 Argentine pension reform represented a new change of paradigm in the country's pension policy. It encompassed the elimination of the fully funded, defined contribution (DC), private tier of the so-called Integrated Retirement and Pensions System (SIJP) – a two-tiered arrangement implemented in 1994 and inspired by the World Bank's recommendations contained in the work Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank 1994). And the shift back to a publicly managed, single-tiered pension system provided in a pay-as-you-go defined benefit (PAYG-DB) basis: the Argentine Integrated Retirement System (SIPA). In order to finally explain these events, in this thesis I present a detailed account of the events that took place in 2008, divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic, its background and the research question: Why did Argentina change its pension system back to a one-tiered, pay as you go DB system in 2008? The second explains the appropriateness of the research strategy and the design chosen for this study. In the third chapter, the reader is introduced to the events under analysis and the possible explanations or "suspects" to be explored upon. The fourth chapter provides the framework and settings to understand Argentina's policy making process. Chapter five brings in with detail the sequence of decisions that resulted in the shift back to a pay-as-you-go DB public pension design in Argentina, connecting them with that group of "suspects" (11 hypotheses) that may explain why it happened. Finally, chapter six rounds up and analyses the findings and closes with the final conclusions and recommendation for further investigation. To briefly summarize some of the findings that made possible this shift back to pay-as-you-go: (a) the effect that changes in public representations of social problems have over the sustainability of their associated social arrangements. (b) The transformations in the private-public mix that have been happening in Argentine society since 2003, and the development of a different understanding of role of the State. (c) The multidimensional feature of social policy – and in particular pension policy – and the way the various dimensions are prioritized and discussed upon during the policy formulation process, leading to a certain "consensual" understanding of what the problem is and how it should be solved. (d) The impact that certain aspects of political cultures – such as the presence of machine politics or ideology – may have over policy and the process of policy change, influencing arguments and final outcomes. (e) The shaping role of institutions and electoral results in the whole policy making process. (f) The new map of international relationships, in particular with the IMF and the World Bank. (g) And how local and international contexts create certain settings that can affect the views of all actors involved.

Includes bibliographical references. ; This dissertation seeks to demonstrate and propose a resolution to modernism in the form of the thought and literature of GK Chesterton. Chesterton, whilst constantly touted as either a harmless kind of literary clown or as a Christian crypto-fascist, has largely been ignored within all serious academic discourse. Therefore, the work of this dissertation takes place in three, interconnected and inter-weaved, stages. Firstly, the core of modernism – its problems, inconsistencies, and political ramifications - is elucidated; secondly, the central ideas of Chesterton's work are explored; and, finally, the way in which Chesterton's work presents a viable resolution to modernism's problems, is explained. In this explanation, I propose an academic return to Chesterton as a serious and coherent counter-voice to the literature of canonical high modernism. At the heart of this thesis is the presupposition that the primal energy of modernism stems from the crisis of representation - the doubt that any reality, other than that which is subjective, can ever be known or represented. I suggest that this turn towards subjectivity exposed the modern world firstly to a kind of negative liberalism that tends to dehumanise politics, and secondly to an authoritarianism that enlarges the subjective to grand proportions in a bid to include absolutely everything into its ambit. Chesterton's thought counters such scepticism with his faith in the coherence and goodness of Being, and the organic participation of Mind and language within that Being. In his opposition to scepticism, Chesterton proposes an allegorical view of literature that has at its heart a belief in the priestly nature of writing and its ability to transfigure language into an allegory of reality. Not only is this a mere counter, but I argue that it becomes an attempt to reposition modernism itself within a scheme of Being, so as to re-configure its sceptical nature as a necessary pre- which offers a kind of sacred humanism as the new centre for a liberalism that is neither totalitarian nor relativist, but rather democratic in its proposal of an objective reality accessible to all people. In Chesterton's vista, the artist is reduced from modernist master to servant of reality. My thesis works along the theoretical lines proposed by figures such as Erich Auerbach and Pericles Lewis in their analysis of mimesis and modernism in the Western canon, as well as, in particular, Lewis's theorising of the political nature of the modernist novel, in its bid to intervene upon the liberal crisis of subjectivity and thus pre-empt an organic totalitarianism. Overarching such theoretical underpinnings, however, is an analysis of Chesterton's deployment of Thomas Aquinas, and the way in which Chesterton approaches Thomism as the philosophical means by which he attempts to unite the literal graphics of writing with metaphysical reality. In so doing, this dissertation argues that Chesterton charts a way beyond both modernism and anti-modernism toward a new kind of literary sublimity that is able to incarnate objective reality.

China is rapidly transforming into one of the world's most powerful economies, and the state encourages technological innovation to ensure that this trend continues. In particular, the state entices its citizens to receive education abroad and then return home to apply particular experience and expertise to their homeland's continued development. Yet despite these apparent advantages, Chinese technological products are generally not competitive with Western ones in the global market. Why does this paradox exist? This dissertation explores this puzzle, focusing on how technological innovation is being re-defined and produced by the Chinese government as well as by transnational Chinese professionals within the context of the global economy.Through archival research, discourse analysis, and 12 months of participant observation and interviews in Beijing, China, I arrive at the following conclusions. First, innovation development in China is constructed by the state as a political imagination driven by nationalistic entrepreneurialism. I call this mode of innovation development "imagined innovation." Moreover, through governing specific people and constructing nationalistic discourses, the state aims at consolidating capital, expertise, and other resources at the transnational level to reinforce state sovereignty. While this nationalistic strategy is successful in attracting foreign-trained Chinese to return to China in order to develop indigenous innovation, these professionals, labeled as "Haigui," also face various cultural obstacles in their everyday operations, which at times impede original innovation from taking place, due to the utilitarian nature of imagined innovation that favors political agendas and economic profits over cultivating original creativity.Nationalistic entrepreneurialism creates conditions in which Haigui can mainly rely on the efficient imitation and modification of Western technologies to gain competitive advantages in the Chinese market. However, driven by professional entrepreneurialism, Haigui also find themselves uniquely situated to identify innovative markets as well as develop socially creative practices to manage Chinese employees and promote their products. They do so in part through objectifying themselves by drawing on their cross-cultural experience, thus enabling them to flexibly develop technological and entrepreneurial practices. I call this form of subject-making "reflexive subjectivity" to illustrate how Haigui engage in reflexive thinking as they negotiate the difficult terrain of state power, market variations, and cultural differences.Therefore, I use the term "innovative entrepreneurship" to articulate the dynamic and multiple ways in which innovation is understood and produced in China under global influences. It is a constellation of political strategies, cultural practices, and business ethics that aims to build technological innovation in heterogeneous socio-cultural contexts. Ultimately, the rise of China in the global economy poses new questions about how to conceptualize innovation, as well as its relationship to international and Chinese markets. This research offers a new perspective on contemporary Chinese culture and politics with respect to innovation, and its arguments offer theoretical contributions as well as insights for policymakers and prospective Haigui entrepreneurs.

In the monasteries of the autonomous monastic Republic of Mount Athos, the term 'economy' means the 'law (nomos) of the house (ecos)'. The term is as old as the rule of the Avaton (meaning 'no pass'), the thousand year old prohibition of all females from the peninsula,which separates monastic from secular life. The economy of the Athonian monasteries has internal and external aspects: Internal exchanges take place in the night through a set of private and collective practices associated to spiritual activities regarding the cultivation of the self in terms of apatheia (meaning 'no passions'). Such activities take place within an informal and spiritual hierarchical system, that equally emphasizes both on the detachment of each monk from his materialist and sexual desires, and from the emotional ties that he carries into the monastery from his secular past, in order to liberate him from such 'passions'. On the other hand, external activities refer to the daily work that needs to be done regarding the financial survival, legal status, and vocation of the Monastery as a contemporary institution in the Orthodox world. The two realms are conceived separately: the spiritual hierarchy is headed by the priest-monks with liturgical duties in the night and working tasks in the day regarding the running of the community from inside, while the administrative hierarchy is headed by the Elders, who are responsible for administrative, financial, and legal matters of the monastery. However, as I shall show, in everyday practice, the spiritual and material realms are complementary to each other. Their interdependence becomes evident by looking at the impact of recent changes in monastic life, namely, the importation of new technologies such as the Internet that undermine the Avaton, the impact of the increasing religious tourism that burdens the daily timetable of the monks, the exploitation of the forest for logging and exporting wood, the exploitation of Athonian tradition by selling copies of 'miraculous' items through the Internet and a network of shops and churches from Greece to the US, the consequences of accepting funding from the EU, the issue of monastic properties outside Athos (metochia) and taxation, and the political involvement of the monasteries in Greek public life regarding 'matters of faith', all reveal the increasing tension between the spiritual conduct of each monk inside the monasteries, in contrast to the external conduct of the monastic institutions outside Athos, which largely contradicts their 'virgin' way of life and communal values inside. The paper will briefly investigate these tensions between internal(informal) and external (formal) aspects of monastic economy, by comparing the economic organization of two rival monasteries, in order to highlight the contradictions and moral dilemmas rising from their conduct within the neo-liberal market and contemporary politics of faith. Key Words : economy, virginity, Avaton, apatheia, tamata, metochia, kosmikos, Old Calendar

The purpose of this research was to understand the moral political socialization of members of the House of Representatives of Thailand. The researcher aimed to understand the processes occurring in moral political socialization by agents in terms of socialization technique, socializing agents' climate and context; and received outcomes especially regarding issues relevant to performance of duties by the members. Qualitative methodology was using in the form of a case study. Data was collected for three cases by oral history or life history. Key informants were the members of the House of Representatives in sitting in 2009.The results revealed that the processes of moral political socialization by the agents were as follows; 1) Family Agent: Family Parent, ancestors and relations were their model in three issues comprising (1) belief and way of life in accordance with Buddhist instruction regarding benevolence, concern for people's happiness and sorrow, and the offering of advice (2) devotion of subject's family to work for the public sector; and (3) their own commitment deriving from their family's support for a political party. A further factor was the home atmosphere and ethical attitude towards democracy. 2) Religious Agent: Institutionally religious institute subjects had been members of the priesthood. Their minds were socialized aesthetically and concentrated on Buddhism, benevolence, and on being ashamed of bad behavior and corruption. 3) Subjects with a background in educational institutions had studied in political science or law faculties, so they had a knowledge and understanding of their roles and duties. They had participated in extra activities about democratic activism. 4) Media Agent: Subjects had been interested in political news and current events and the work of members of the House of Representative and political parties since they were young. This affected their political consciousness, feelings about political efficacy and party identification. 5) Political Party Affiliation: Subjects from political backgrounds had learned the way of politics of the party with which they were affiliated by participating in projects of the party before becoming a member of the party. After becoming Representatives, they were socialized, communicated and worked together with others. They received some commitment from a role model comprising concepts and the work performance of other membersKey words : Moral Political Socialization, Moral Politician, Members of the House of Representativesบทคัดย่อการวิจัยมีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อทำความเข้าใจกับกระบวนการอบรมกล่อมเกลา ทางการเมืองด้านจริยธรรมที่สมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎรได้รับจากตัวการที่มีความเกี่ยวข้องในกระบวนการอบรมกล่อมเกลาทางการเมือง ได้แก่ สถาบันครอบครัว สถาบันศาสนา สถาบันการศึกษา สื่อมวลชน และพรรคการเมือง ในช่วงก่อนเข้าดำรงตำแหน่ง สมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎร และศึกษาต่อเนื่องไปถึงภายหลังเข้าดำรงตำแหน่ง ใช้ระเบียบวิธีวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพแบบการศึกษารายกรณี เก็บข้อมูลด้วยการสัมภาษณ์ประวัติชีวิตร่วมกับสัมภาษณ์เจาะลึก มีกรณีศึกษา คือ สมาชิกสภา ผู้แทนราษฎรแบบแบ่งเขตเลือกตั้งที่ดำรงตำแหน่งอยู่ในปี พ.ศ. 2552 ผู้วิจัยเลือกกรณีศึกษาแบบเจาะจงเพื่อให้ได้ กรณีศึกษาที่มีคุณลักษณะตรงตามที่กำหนดไว้ โดยพิจารณาจากฐานข้อมูลประวัติ รวมถึงการคัดเลือกโดยผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิ ซึ่งในการวิจัยครั้งนี้ศึกษาเชิงลึกกับสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎรที่เป็นกรณีศึกษาทั้งสิ้น 3 รายผลการวิจัยพบว่า ตัวการการอบรมกล่อมเกลาทางการเมืองด้านจริยธรรมให้กับกรณีศึกษาทั้ง 3 ราย ได้แก่สถาบันครอบครัว สถาบันศาสนา สถาบันการศึกษา สื่อมวลชน และพรรคการเมือง โดยมี 1) สถาบันครอบครัวมีบิดามารดา บรรพบุรุษ และเครือญาติ เป็นต้นแบบใน 3 ประเด็น คือ (1) มีความเชื่อและวิถีชีวิตตามแนวพระพุทธศาสนา (2)การเสียสละทำงานเพื่อส่วนรวม และ(3) การสนับสนุนพรรคการเมือง ประกอบกับภายในครอบครัวมีบรรยากาศหรือมีการอบรมเลี้ยงดูแบบประชาธิปไตย 2) สถาบันศาสนาได้ผ่านการเป็นพระภิกษุ และสามเณร ส่งผลให้กรณีศึกษาได้รับการอบรมกล่อมเกลาจิตใจให้มีความบริสุทธิ์ มีจิตใจฝักใฝ่ในพระพุทธศาสนา มีความเมตตา กรุณา มีการละเว้นและละอายต่อการกระทำชั่ว การทุจริตและประพฤติมิชอบ 3) สถาบันการศึกษามีการเรียนในคณะรัฐศาสตร์ และคณะนิติศาสตร์ ทำให้มีความรู้ ความเข้าใจในเรื่องเกี่ยวกับการปฏิบัติงานตามบทบาทหน้าที่ ได้มีส่วนร่วมในกิจกรรมเสริมหลักสูตรที่เกี่ยวข้องกับเรื่องการเมืองการปกครอง 4) สื่อมวลชนมีการเปิดรับข่าวสารทางการเมืองเกี่ยวกับสถานการณ์ทางการเมือง การทำงานของสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎรและพรรคการเมืองมาตั้งแต่วัยเด็กส่งผลให้กรณีศึกษามีความสำนึกทางการเมือง ความรู้สึกมีประสิทธิภาพทางการเมือง และมีความผูกพันต่อพรรคการเมือง และ 5) พรรคการเมืองที่สังกัดมีการเรียนรู้ทางการเมืองจากพรรคเหล่านั้น ด้วยการมีส่วนร่วมในโครงการของพรรคก่อนเข้าเป็นสมาชิกของพรรค และภายหลังจากที่เป็นสมาชิกของพรรคแล้วกรณีศึกษาได้เรียนรู้การเมืองผ่านกระบวนการต่างๆ ภายในพรรคจนทำให้เกิดความรู้สึกมีความผูกพันต่อพรรคดังกล่าวคำสำคัญ : กระบวนอบรมกล่อมเกลาทางการเมือง, จริยธรรมนักการเมือง , สมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎร

El artículo se centra, inicialmente, en la demonización del otro para analizar dos variantes o imágenes del demonio: una mítica, alimento del discurso religioso-teológico, y otra secularizada. En ambos casos el demonio es la figuración del mal en sí mismo, en su propia consistencia o raíz. La primera se analiza en el discurso "occidentalista", la imagen que ciertos círculos religioso-políticos orientales construyen de Occidente, en función de su política de la violencia, y se cierra con la función política de la demonización. La segunda, la secularización del demonio, es construida por el filósofo francés L. Ferry para dar cuenta de episodios de violencia extrema que excede los límites del sentido común ocurridos en la Europa balcánica y en el centro de África en los años 90 del siglo pasado. La crítica de la versión secularizada del demonio da lugar a la entrada en juego de otra explicación del mal realizado en esos mismos episodios, a cargo, ahora, del filósofo norteamericano R. Rorty. Rorty explica esa violencia excesiva, ese mal, mediante la animalización y la feminización, dos nuevas formas de deshumanización. Por último, las limitaciones de la posición de Rorty apuntan a una cuarta modalidad de deshumanización que él no considera formalmente: el racismo. El artículo termina, precisamente, con un análisis de los elementos básicos del racismo: su función política, su estructura teórico-moral y su desarrollo histórico-filosófico. This article initially focuses on the demonization of the other in order to analyze two variants or depictions of the demon: one is mythical, the nourishment of religious-theological discourse, and the other is secularized. In both cases the demon is the representation of evil in itself, in its own makeup or root. The first is analyzed in "Occidentalist" discourse, the image that certain Eastern religious and political circles have of the West, used in their politics of violence, and it is completed by the political role played by demonization. The second is the secularization of the demon, and it was proposed by the French philosopher L. Ferry in order to make sense of episodes of extreme violence that exceeded the limits of common sense, episodes which occurred in the Balkans and in Central Africa in the nineteen nineties. The critique of the secularized version of the devil makes way for another explanation of the evil that was apparent in those episodes; it was offered by the American philosopher R. Rorty. Rorty explains this excessive violence, this evil, through animalization and feminization, two new forms of dehumanization. Finally, the limits of Rorty's theory allow for a fourth kind of dehumanization that he does not explicitly consider: racism. The article ends by analyzing the basic elements of racism: its political function, its theoretical and moral structure, and its historical and philosophical development.

The Bedouin of South Sinai have been significantly affected by the politics of external powers for a long time. However, never had the interest of external powers in Sinai been so strong as since the Israeli-Egyptian wars in the second half of the 20th century when Bedouin interests started to collide with Egypt's plans for a development of luxury tourism in South Sinai. rnrnThe tourism boom that has started in the 1980s has brought economic and infrastructure development to the Bedouin and tourism has become the most important source of income for the Bedouin. However, while the absolute increase of tourists to Sinai has trickled down to the Bedouin to some extent, the participation of Bedouin in the overall tourism development is under-proportionate. Moreover, the Bedouin have become increasingly dependent on monetary income and consequently from tourism as the only significant source of income while at the same time they have lost much of their land as well as their self-determination.rnrnIn this context, the Bedouin livelihoods have become very vulnerable due to repeated depressions in the tourism industry as well as marginalization. Major marginalization processes the Bedouin are facing are the loss of land, barriers to market entry, especially increasingly strict rules and regulations in the tourism industry, as well as discrimination by the authorities. Social differentiation and Bedouin preferences are identified as further factors in Bedouin marginalization.rnrnThe strategies Bedouin have developed in response to all these problems are coping strategies, which try to deal with the present problem at the individual level. Basically no strategies have been developed at the collective level that would aim to actively shape the Bedouin's present and future. Collective action has been hampered by a variety of factors, such as the speed of the developments, the distribution of power or the decay of tribal structures.rnWhile some Bedouin might be able to continue their tourism activities, a large number of informal jobs will not be feasible anymore. The majority of the previously mostly self-employed Bedouin will probably be forced to work as day-laborers who will have lost much of their pride, dignity, sovereignty and freedom. Moreover, with a return to subsistence being impossible for the majority of the Bedouin, it is likely that an increasing number of marginalized Bedouin will turn to illegal income generating activities such as smuggling or drug cultivation. This in turn will lead to further repression and discrimination and could escalate in a serious violent conflict between the Bedouin and the government.rnrnDevelopment plans and projects should address the general lack of civil rights, local participation and protection of minorities in Egypt and promote Bedouin community development and the consideration of Bedouin interests in tourism development.rnrnWether the political upheavals and the resignation of president Mubarak at the beginning of 2011 will have a positive effect on the situation of the Bedouin remains to be seen.rn

SUMMARY:
Anatoliy Remnev's article focuses on the applicability of postcolonial studies to contemporary Kazakhstan and raises the question of whether "post-Soviet" equals "postcolonial." Distinguishing between anticolonialism and postcolonialism, the author describes the ways in which postcolonial studies criticize modernity and uncover mechanisms of power and domination connected to modern colonialism. Remnev points out "correctives" to colonialism and postcolonialism in the heterogeneous situation of the Russian Empire. He suggests that often Kazakh activists functioned within the imperial space allying themselves with Russian and other progressives and accepting the modernizing framework of the imperial state and society, while the imperial government conducted contradictory policies of modernization, Christianization, and islamization, fighting off perceived dangers of pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, and so on. Multiple roles and identities complicate simple dichotomies of the colonizer vs. the colonized. Remnev explores the "awakened" sense of nationality as a shock: multiple ruptures – linguistic, cultural, and social – continue to divide Kazakh society while the politics of history ranges from constructivist calls for the invention of Kazakh tradition to essentialist searches for authentic nationhood. A significant role in Kazakh historical narratives is played by the Soviet versions of "tsarist colonialism" and the "national-liberation struggle of the Kazakh people," which is now recast in nationalist terms to describe the continuous existence of the Kazakh nation. The author points out that these narratives focus on the traumas of the colonized and gloss over the influences those nomadic cultures and practices had upon the imperial bureaucrats. Focusing on the current state of historical studies of Kazakhstan in Russia, Remnev points out the striking lack of attention to the region. Despite the rise of empire studies, Kazakh history remains marginal for Russian scholars and only minimal coordination and interaction with colleagues in Kazakhstan occurs. Historically, the Russian Empire pursued "colonial" policies on the Kazakh lands. Although initially modernizing efforts of the empire were in vain due to the "metropole's" own recent Europeanization and weakness of its agents, gradually the life of nomadic societies was increasingly transformed. Remnev points out the complex and interwoven processes of the "civilizing mission" and state building in the Russian empire, which did not necessarily preclude upward social mobility of the Kazakhs within imperial hierarchies, and questions the contemporary Kazakh historiography that depicts the Russian Empire as particularly repressive, backward, and colonialist. Finally, the author explores the porous boundaries between the colonizer and the colonized and suggests that the case of the Kazakh steppe was typologically closer to Siberian territories and that the postcolonial rhetoric promotes the self-orientalization and self-exoticization of Kazakh history. As scholars search for alternatives to the colonizing power of modernity, postcolonial studies expand the horizon of imagination with respect to the imperial history of the Kazakh steppe.

Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es zu untersuchen, wie das Image der umstrittenen Medienpersönlichkeit Howard Stern konstruiert wird. Seine Allgegenwärtigkeit in den Medien inklusive Radio, Verlagswesen und Kino war der ausschlaggebende Grund für diese Studie. Das Geheimnis von Sterns Erfolg scheint an seinem Drang zu liegen, alles, auch sein eigenes Privatleben, der Öffentlichkeit zu präsentieren. Für diese Arbeit werden somit seine öffentliche und seine augenscheinlich private Persönlichkeit berücksichtigt. Diese Dualität ist notwendig, um unser Verständnis für die Person Howard Stern zu formen.Die Analyse basiert auf Richard Dyers vier Kategorien welche essentiell sind, um ein Star-Image aufzubauen: Promotion, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Film und Kritik. Eine semiotische Analyse dient dazu, die ideologischen Werte und den Gedanken von kultureller Identität näher zu beleuchten. Sterns biographischer Film Private Parts und diverse Berichte über seine Person in anderen Bildmedien dienen als Bezugspunkte um die öffentliche und private Person sowie deren Darstellung zu vergleichen. Während die Medien das rebellische Image bestätigen, wird versucht, dieses im Film umzukehren. Trotz der Unterschiede der bevorzugten Persönlichkeitsdarstellung heben der Film und die Medien gleichermaßen Sterns Authentizität und Ehrlichkeit hervor. Schlussendlich lässt sich behaupten, dass Stern selbst gezielt sein Image kontrolliert.Diese Arbeit bezieht sich in erster Linie auf Howard Stern während der 80er und 90er, da er in dieser Periode am erfolgreichsten war. Das Leben von Stern nach 1997 wird nicht berücksichtigt. Deshalb sollten Studien über die Evolution des Talk-Radios und Internets inklusive sozialer Netzwerke weitere ergiebige Resultate über Sterns Persönlichkeit liefern. Weitere Einschränkungen liegen in den Bereichen Fangemeinde, Geschlechterforschung und Politik, welche nur am Rande adressiert werden. ; The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the image of the controversial media personality Howard Stern is constructed. His omnipresence in the media including radio, publishing and cinema represents the main reason for this study. Stern?s secret of success appears to be his urge to expose everything to the public including his own private life. For this study, both his public and his ostensible private persona are taken into account. This duality is necessary to shape our understanding of Howard Stern.As far as the methods are concerned the analysis is based around Richard Dyer?s four categories that are essential to construct a star image: Promotion, publicity, film and criticism. A semiotic analysis seems to be most appropriate to observe the ideological values as well as the notion of cultural identity evoked by the signs of the star?s public and private image. In order to compare the two personas and their representations Stern?s biographical movie Private Parts and various articles and interviews in other visual media are used as reference purposes. Both entities use manipulative means to create the preferred image. Whereas the media confirms his notorious image, the movie attempts to revert it. Despite the difference of the preferred images, the movie and the media highlight Stern?s authenticity and honesty in equal measure. In closing, it can be argued that Stern himself has well-directed control over his image.This study primarily focuses on Howard Stern during the 80s and 90s representing the most successful period of his career. Stern?s life past 1997 is not taken into account. Therefore, future research regarding the evolution of talk radio and the internet, including social networks should deliver further fertile results in terms of Stern?s persona. Other limitations exist in the fields of fandom, gender or politics which are only addressed marginally. ; vorgelegt von Roland Habersack ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung der Verfasserin/des Verfassers ; Zsfassung in dt. u. engl. Sprache ; Graz, Univ., Dipl.-Arb., 2011 ; (VLID)215744

El artículo se centra, inicialmente, en la demonización del otro para analizar dos variantes o imágenes del demonio: una mítica, alimento del discurso religioso-teológico, y otra secularizada. En ambos casos el demonio es la figuración del mal en sí mismo, en su propia consistencia o raíz. La primera se analiza en el discurso "occidentalista", la imagen que ciertos círculos religioso-políticos orientales construyen de Occidente, en función de su política de la violencia, y se cierra con la función política de la demonización. La segunda, la secularización del demonio, es construida por el filósofo francés L. Ferry para dar cuenta de episodios de violencia extrema que excede los límites del sentido común ocurridos en la Europa balcánica y en el centro de África en los años 90 del siglo pasado. La crítica de la versión secularizada del demonio da lugar a la entrada en juego de otra explicación del mal realizado en esos mismos episodios, a cargo, ahora, del filósofo norteamericano R. Rorty. Rorty explica esa violencia excesiva, ese mal, mediante la animalización y la feminización, dos nuevas formas de deshumanización. Por último, las limitaciones de la posición de Rorty apuntan a una cuarta modalidad de deshumanización que él no considera formalmente: el racismo. El artículo termina, precisamente, con un análisis de los elementos básicos del racismo: su función política, su estructura teórico-moral y su desarrollo histórico-filosófico. ; This article initially focuses on the demonization of the other in order to analyze two variants or depictions of the demon: one is mythical, the nourishment of religious-theological discourse, and the other is secularized. In both cases the demon is the representation of evil in itself, in its own makeup or root. The first is analyzed in "Occidentalist" discourse, the image that certain Eastern religious and political circles have of the West, used in their politics of violence, and it is completed by the political role played by demonization. The second is the secularization of the demon, and it was proposed by the French philosopher L. Ferry in order to make sense of episodes of extreme violence that exceeded the limits of common sense, episodes which occurred in the Balkans and in Central Africa in the nineteen nineties. The critique of the secularized version of the devil makes way for another explanation of the evil that was apparent in those episodes; it was offered by the American philosopher R. Rorty. Rorty explains this excessive violence, this evil, through animalization and feminization, two new forms of dehumanization. Finally, the limits of Rorty's theory allow for a fourth kind of dehumanization that he does not explicitly consider: racism. The article ends by analyzing the basic elements of racism: its political function, its theoretical and moral structure, and its historical and philosophical development.

Historically, periods of accelerating immigration have been accompanied by nativist alarms, perceptions of threat, and pervasive stereotypes of the newcomers, particularly during economic downturns or national crises, and when immigrants have arrived en masse and differed from the native born in language, race, religion, and national origin. Stereotypes about immigrants and crime not only take root in public opinion and popular myth, but can also provide the underpinnings for public policies and shape political behavior. Such stereotypes, fueled by media coverage of singular events and reinforced in popular culture, project an enduring image of immigrant communities permeated by criminal elements. Moral panics can be spread by "agents of indignation" (the media, pundits, political figures) and propel public support for the need to "police the crisis." Immigrants are commonly stereotyped as more likely to become involved with crime and to be arrested and incarcerated. This is especially true for Mexican and Central American immigrants, who are often young men from racialized minorities with little formal education coming to work in low-wage manual labor jobs. The fact that many of these immigrants enter the country through unauthorized channels or overstay their visas is further framed as an assault against the "rule of law," reinforcing the impression that immigration and criminality are linked; and those who are deported are perceived as not only "undocumented laborers" but "criminal aliens." This article reviews research findings on immigration and crime in Southern California, and deportation and crime in El Salvador. We focus on the experiences of young adult children of immigrants, mainly Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans who together account for two-thirds or more of the undocumented immigrant population in the U.S.; and on men, including former gang members, who have been deported to El Salvador on criminal and non-criminal charges. The evidence rebuts popular myths that immigrants and deportees are more prone to criminal behavior than natives and citizens. Nationally, rates of incarceration among immigrant men are much lower than among their U.S.-born counterparts. Like crime generally, the problem of gangs in the U.S. is primarily one that involves the U.S. born, who as citizens are not deportable; and despite the aim of public policies to remove problematic "criminal" and "illegal" beings, deportation is not the end of the cycle of migration. Stereotypes endure because they serve basic defensive social functions, maintain belief consistency, and preclude cognitive dissonance; they are rooted in emotion and impervious to fact. A politics of fear, xenophobia, and hyperbolic moral indignation about "law breaking" by "illegal aliens" may help "rally the base," especially in times of rapid demographic change and perceived social and economic threats. But it is no substitute for scientific evidence and reasoned analysis in law making, formulation of policy, and the understanding of complex social problems.

AbstractThe Asian American Avant-Garde: Universalist Aspirations in Early Asian American LiteraturebyAudrey Wu ClarkDoctor of Philosophy in EnglishUniversity of California, BerkeleyProfessor Colleen Lye, Co-ChairProfessor Richard Cándida Smith, Co-ChairMy project traces a genealogy of universalism in early Asian American literature that led to the panethnic formation of the Asian American literary canon in the 1960s and 1970s. I contribute to the recent criticisms of panethnicity as the organizing principle of the field by arguing that the panethnic paradigm, based solely on the anachronistically imposed alliance of excluded diverse Asian ethnic groups, did not structure early Asian American literature. Instead, I argue that the authors of these early texts represented the racial particularity of their "Asian American" protagonists as universal. The protagonists' performances of universalism exposed the doubleness of American universalism--that is, the failed universalism that excluded racial minorities and the promised inclusive universalism that is yet to come. My conceptualization of Asian American universalism fortifies the theoretical aspect of the sociological paradigm of panethnicity by offering a different and more historically specific approach than the deconstructive readings of political resistance and melancholic abjection that have very recently theorized panethnicity. Since Americanism was conceived through liberal universalism during the period of Asian exclusion (1882-1943), becoming "Asian American" for these authors and their protagonists impossibly and yet productively universalized their racial particularity to their predominantly white audiences. For some critics, Asian American subjectivity is imagined through only the impossibility of Asian American universalism. By contrast, I argue that the Asian American is formed through the dialectic between racial particularity as an "alien ineligible to citizenship" and liberal universalism. The aim of the dialectic in each of the works I study is framed by the historical moment of each work's publication: In my first two chapters on Sui Sin Far's Mrs. Spring Fragrance and Sadakichi Hartmann's and Yone Noguchi's modernist haikus, I demonstrate that their protagonists and poetic personas attempt to claim space within the American literary imagination during the Progressive Era. In the latter two chapters, I examine the ways in which the protagonists of Dhan Gopal Mukerji's Caste and Outcast and Younghill Kang's East Goes West , and Carlos Bulosan's America Is in the Heart employ modernist forms of temporal nonlinearity to transcend the capitalist commodification of linear time during the Popular Front era. Through performances of American racial, gender, and class norms, all of the Asian American protagonists of my study not only reveal the exclusions and limitations of American universalism but also attempt to redeem it by articulating new sets of demands for racial, gender, and class equality. The empirical non-existence of Asian American universalism poses a baseline problem of invisibility and thus the demands of racial egalitarianism mobilized by the "not-yet" of Asian American universalism take the visible or more easily identifiable forms of modernist avant-gardism and progressive gender politics in all four of my chapters.

This project addresses the cultural and environmental politics of slum demolitions in the making of a "world-class city." If "modern" cities are supposed to be built through techno-scientific procedures of urban planning and government--such as maps, censuses, and surveys--the conspicuous absence of such techniques in the world-class redevelopment of Delhi raises the question of how rule there is achieved. Based on an ethnography of the judiciary, state, and property owners' associations, I find that what I call a world-class aesthetic--an idealized vision of a privatized, "green," and slum-free city assembled from transnationally circulating images of "global cities"--has replaced these techniques as the key instrumentality of rule in contemporary Delhi. To explore how this aesthetic regime of planning operates, I begin by demonstrating how the city's new "good governance" initiative, called Bhagidari, has reconfigured state space, providing property owners' with privileged channels of access to the judiciary and bureaucracy. By tracing the circulation of key representations of the slum through and beyond these channels, I show how discourse depicting slums as "nuisances"--i.e., as illegal environments--constructs an aesthetic grid that demarcates the "world-class" on the one hand, and the "polluting" on the other. I further reveal how the judiciary has codified this world-class aesthetic through a reinterpretation of nuisance law, recalibrating the axes of legality and planning such that those spaces appearing polluting and dirty (e.g., slums) are deemed unplanned and illegal, regardless of their statutory basis in planning law or actual environmental impact. Conversely, spaces that have a world-class "look" (e.g., shopping malls, sports stadia), despite violating land-use codes and environmental standards, are deemed planned and legal. More than just reconfiguring state power, this aesthetic regime of planning alters how citizens see and engage the state, as well as how they envision their place in the city. Based on a year of ethnographic fieldwork in a Delhi slum, I show how residents have begun to shift the basis on which they advance citizenship claims away from an earlier idiom of historical entitlement to public land and toward one of potential self-improvement via home ownership. This shift, however, cannot be reduced to an overarching neoliberal rationality, but must rather be located in residents' changing affective ties to place and city. Specifically, I trace how a series of political technologies--including government-run slum surveys, media campaigns, and a broad set of changes in the meaning of landscape--train slum residents to see the city through the lens of world-class aesthetics. In arguing that projects of rule are secured as much through embodied practices and aesthetic dispositions as through reason or ideology, the dissertation argues for the importance of everyday aesthetic practices as a key terrain on which political possibilities and urban visions are produced.

Diese Dissertation gibt einen umfassenden Einblick über das Ausmaß von "Participatory Planning" in thailändischen Gemeinden im Kontext eines stark zentralisierten Staates und der Vorherrschaft ortsansässiger Geschäftsleute im öffentlichen Entscheidungsprozess. Diese alternative Art der Planung gibt den verschiedenen Interessengruppen die Möglichkeit zusammen über ihre regionale Entwicklung zu bestimmen. Im Grunde zielt diese Planung darauf ab, unterschiedlichen Interessengruppen in der heutigen pluralistischen Gesellschaft einen politischen Spielraum zu bieten. Die Arbeit untersucht die Ergebnisse des Prozesses der Dezentralisierung in Bezug auf die kommunalen Fähigkeiten bei der lokalen Entwicklungsplanung, die gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen für die Förderung der Mitwirkung der Bürger an öffentlichen Entscheidungen, die Haltung kommunaler Politiker (welche im Grunde Geschäftsleute sind) zu "Participatory Planning" und die Beteiligung ortsansässiger Vereine an der kommunalen Entwicklung insbesondere am örtlichen Planungsverfahren. Die Studie stellt fest, dass die stark zentralisierte staatliche Politik das lokale Planungsverfahren untergräbt. Die Gemeinden haben nur unzureichende Möglichkeiten (Befugnisse, Pflichten, Ressourcen) um ihre lokale Planung effektiv zu gestalten. Innerhalb des gesetzlichen Rahmens benutzt die Regierung die Bürgerbeteiligung um Informationen von der Basis zu erhalten anstatt öffentliche Entscheidungen gemeinschaftlich zu treffen. Alle wesentlichen Entscheidungen werden nach wie vor in einer repräsentativen Form (durch die kommunale Führungskräfte und Räte) getroffen. In der Lokalpolitik beherrschen die dortigen Wirtschaftseliten die thailändischen Gemeinden und manipulieren die Bürgerbeteiligungen zu Gunsten persönlicher Vorteile. Solch ein Kräfteungleichgewicht in der Zivilgesellschaft schwächt die Leistungsfähigkeit anderer Interessen bei der Beteiligung an den öffentlichen Entscheidungen. Obwohl in der kommunalen Praxis an vielen Stellen eine Beteiligung stattfindet, scheitert das öffentliche Planungsverfahren am zentralen politischen Spielraum in dem verschiedene Interessen an den kommunalen öffentlichen Entscheidungen mitwirken können. Einige Gruppen die ein hohes Wählerpotenzial haben profitieren vom rechtlichen Planungsverfahren, andere nutzen ihre engen Beziehungen zu Politikern, um ihre Ziele außerhalb der planungsrechtlichen Verfahren zu verfolgen aber es gibt auch solche die weder die Unterstützung der Massen noch die Unterstützung von Politikern besitzen und daher kaum eine Chance haben ihre Interessen zu verfolgen. ; This dissertation offers a full understanding of the extent of participatory planning in Thai municipalities within the context of a highly centralized state and dominance of local business people in public decision determination. In this 'alternative' mode of planning, various interests groups determine their local development plans collectively. Essentially, such planning aims to provide a political sphere of different groups of interests within the current pluralistic society. The research examines outcomes of the decentralization process regarding: municipal ability for local development planning; the legal framework promoting citizen participation in local public decisions; attitudes of local politicians (who are essentially business people) towards participatory planning; and the contributions of local associations in municipal development, particularly the local planning system. The study finds that highly centralized state policy undermines the local planning system. Municipalities have insufficient necessities (authority, duties, resources) for performing their local planning effectively. In the legal framework, the government aims to use citizen participation to obtain information from the grassroots, rather than collective public decision determination. All significant public decisions remain within representative forms (municipal executives and councils). In local politics, local business elites dominate Thai municipalities and manipulate citizen participation for their personal benefits. Such an imbalance of power among civil society reduces the ability of other interests to be involved in public decisions. Although much participation is taking place in municipal practice, the local planning system fails to be a central political sphere for various interests to participate in local public decision. Some local groups who have high electoral vote power benefit from legal planning procedures; others use their tight connections to politicians to pursue their aims outside legal planning procedures; there are also those who neither have mass support, nor support of politicians and therefore stand little chance for pursuing their interests.

Muslim entrepreneurs from Kerala, South India, are at the forefront of India's liberalizing economy, keen innovators who have adopted the business and labour practices of global capitalism in both Kerala and the Gulf. They are also heavily involved in both charity and politics through activity in Kerala's Muslim public life. They talk about their 'social mindedness' as a combination of piety and economic calculation, the two seen not as excluding but reinforcing each other. By promoting modern education among Muslims, entrepreneurs seek to promote economic development while also embedding economic practices within a framework of ethics and moral responsibilities deemed to be 'Islamic'. Inscribing business into the rhetoric of the 'common good' also legitimizes claims to leadership and political influence. Orientations towards self‐transformation through education, adoption of a 'systematic' lifestyle, and a generalized rationalization of practices have acquired wider currency amongst Muslims following the rise of reformist influence and are now mobilized to sustain novel forms of capital accumulation. At the same time, Islam is called upon to set moral and ethical boundaries for engagement with the neoliberal economy. Instrumentalist analyses cannot adequately explain the vast amounts of time and money which Muslim entrepreneurs put into innumerable 'social' projects, and neither 'political Islam' nor public pietism adequately captures the possibilities or motivations for engagement among contemporary reformist‐orientated Muslims.RésuméLes entrepreneurs musulmans de l'état indien du Kerala sont en première ligne dans l'économie indienne en voie de libéralisation. Ces innovateurs ont adopté les pratiques d'entreprise et de gestion de la main‐d'œuvre du capitalisme global, aussi bien dans le Kerala que dans le Golfe Persique. Ils sont également très engagés dans la bienfaisance et la politique, par leur activité dans la vie publique des musulmans du Kerala. Ils parlent de leur « esprit social » comme d'une combinaison de piété et de calcul économique, lesquelles sont perçues non pas comme mutuellement exclusives mais comme se renforçant mutuellement. En promouvant une éducation moderne des musulmans, ils tentent de favoriser le développement économique tout en plaçant leurs pratiques économiques dans un cadre d'éthique et de responsabilités morales considéré comme « islamique ». En inscrivant les affaires dans la rhétorique du « bien commun », ils légitiment du même coup leurs revendications de leadership et d'influence politique. L'orientation vers la transformation de soi par le biais de l'éducation, l'adoption d'un mode de vie « systématique » et une rationalisation généralisée des pratiques ont été largement adoptées parmi les musulmans sous l'effet de l'influence croissante des réformistes, et elles sont à présent mobilisées à l'appui de nouvelles formes d'accumulation de capital. Dans le même temps, on invoque l'islam pour fixer des limites morales et éthiques à l'engagement dans l'économie néolibérale. Les analyses instrumentalistes ne suffissent pas à expliquer la masse de temps et d'argent que les entrepreneurs musulmans consacrent à d'innombrables projets « sociaux ». Ni l'islam « politique » ni le piétisme public ne peuvent non plus rendre compte de façon adéquate des possibilités ou motivations d'engagement des musulmans réformistes contemporains.