Suchergebnisse

The Tweed Family Papers consists primarily of correspondence between Mrs. Richard Tweed and her children, relatives, and friends. Diaries, essays and poetry written by family members, newspaper clippings (photocopies), and financial and legal material are also included, as are a handful of photographs. All related primarily to the life of Mrs. Richard Tweed and her descendants. ; Mrs. Richard Tweed, upon whom the majority of the materials focus, was the sister-in-law of William Marcy ("Boss") Tweed, who controlled the Democratic political machine at New York City's Tammany Hall during the mid-19th century. He and his associates misappropriated public funds on a large scale, leading to his arrest and imprisonment in 1871. ; The Tweed Family Papers are organized by the following categories: Correspondence, Newspapers, Literary Production, Photographs, Financial Material, Printed Material, Scrapbook Material, Legal Material, and Artifacts. ; Tweed Family Papers, 1836-1932 and undated, Southwest Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas ; Box 1, File 14

A magisterial exploration of whistleblowing in America, from the Revolutionary War to the Trump era Misconduct by those in high places is always dangerous to reveal. Whistleblowers thus face conflicting impulses: by challenging and exposing transgressions by the powerful, they perform a vital public service—yet they always suffer for it. This episodic history brings to light how whistleblowing, an important but unrecognized cousin of civil disobedience, has held powerful elites accountable in America. Analyzing a range of whistleblowing episodes, from the corrupt Revolutionary War commodore Esek Hopkins (whose dismissal led in 1778 to the first whistleblower protection law) to Edward Snowden, to the dishonesty of Donald Trump, Allison Stanger reveals the centrality of whistleblowing to the health of American democracy. She also shows that with changing technology and increasing militarization, the exposure of misconduct has grown more difficult to do and more personally costly for those who do it—yet American freedom, especially today, depends on it

"A debate for the predominant disposition of humanity rages between two actors: Honesty and Deception"--

ABSTRACTAs a pillar of Data Access and Research Transparency (DA-RT), analytic transparency calls for radical honesty about how political scientists infer conclusions from their data. However, honesty about one's research practices often means discarding the linguistic template of deductive proceduralism that structures most writing, which in turn diminishes the prospects for successful publication. This dissonance reflects a unique dilemma: transparency initiatives reflect a vision of research drawn from the biomedical and natural sciences, and struggle with the messier, iterative, and open-ended nature of political science scholarship. Analytic transparency requires not only better individual practices, such as active citations, but also institutional strategies that reward radical honesty. Journals can provide authors with protected space to reveal research practices, further blind the review process, and experiment with special issues. More broadly, analytic openness can be mandated through procedural monitoring, such as real-time recording of research activities and keystroke logging for statistical programs.

The nonprofit sector aims to provide services with a public benefit, but how honest is it? Since the nonprofit sector relies on fundraising efforts to support its administration and program costs, and since poor financial performance can scare potential contributors away, nonprofit organizations have an incentive to appear fiscally healthy regardless of their true condition. We examine the factors associated with the honesty of organizations in the nonprofit sector using Benford's Law, which tests for abnormalities in data that result from intentional falsification. Using the 990 tax filings for 51,010 nonprofits in the United States from 2012 and 2013, we find evidence of problems in the accuracy of their financial reporting. Those organizations with more external users of their financial information tend to conform more closely with Benford's Law, suggesting more external monitoring of non-profit organizations may decrease the likelihood of misreported financial information.

A magisterial exploration of whistleblowing in America, from the Revolutionary War to the Trump era. Misconduct by those in high places is always dangerous to reveal. Whistleblowers thus face conflicting impulses: by challenging and exposing transgressions by the powerful, they perform a vital public service-yet they always suffer for it. This episodic history brings to light how whistleblowing, an important but unrecognized cousin of civil disobedience, has held powerful elites accountable in America. Analyzing a range of whistleblowing episodes, from the corrupt Revolutionary War commodore Esek Hopkins (whose dismissal led in 1778 to the first whistleblower protection law) to Edward Snowden, to the dishonesty of Donald Trump, Allison Stanger reveals the centrality of whistleblowing to the health of American democracy. She also shows that with changing technology and increasing militarization, the exposure of misconduct has grown more difficult to do and more personally costly for those who do it-yet American freedom, especially today, depends on it.

In many situations, people can lie strategically, for their own benefit. Since individuals differ with respect to their willingness to lie, the credibility of statements will crucially depend on who self-selects into such cheap-talk situations. We study this process in a two-stage political competition setting. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party's candidate in an election. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making promises to voters. Confirming the model's key prediction, we find in our experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race and thereby lower voters' welfare.

We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the fi rst stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs.