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On Tuesday, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution introduced by Egypt and Mauritania and co-sponsored by more than 100 states demanding an "immediate humanitarian ceasefire" in Gaza. The measure won by 153 votes, with only 10 opposed and 23 abstentions. The resolution was triggered by the UN Secretary-General Guterres' invocation of Article 99 of the UN Charter citing a likely "complete collapse" of humanitarian services in Gaza. Article 99 enables the Secretary-General "to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."The UN Security Council's own resolution calling for a ceasefire failed after the U.S. vetoed it in a 13 to 1 vote on Friday.The General Assembly's vote margin on Tuesday was much bigger than the October 27 vote on a resolution calling for a "humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities" (somewhat weaker language than the latest resolution). That one was adopted with a huge margin of 121 votes in favor and 14 opposed. Most of the Global South states that had not supported the Oct 27 resolution were in favor this time around. These included India, Cambodia, Philippines, Jamaica, Zambia, Ethiopia, Fiji, and Benin. The shift of India, Philippines, Ethiopia, and Fiji is particularly notable from a geopolitical perspective.On the flip side, Argentina was one of the very few Global South states that flipped from being in favor to abstaining. This is likely an effect of the recent election of Javier Milei as president. Milei has taken a strongly pro-Israel stance. (Malawi and Equatorial Guinea were other two states who shifted their votes more toward the Israeli and U.S. positions.)A small set of Global South states maintained their stance against a ceasefire from the last vote, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Liberia, South Sudan, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and several Pacific Island countries. Overall, out of 116 Global South states outside the Greater Middle East (defined as spanning a zone from Morocco to Pakistan), an overwhelming 80% voted for the ceasefire. Only about 20% did not. Of course, the percentage of affirmative votes becomes even more dominant (close to 90%) if we add greater Middle East states to this mix. Some divides over Hamas that emerged during this process are worth noting. During the October 27 voting process, the United States had introduced an amendment explicitly condemning Hamas. That amendment failed but garnered a respectable tally of 88 votes in favor. This time around, a similar amendment introduced by the United States "unequivocally" condemned "the heinous terrorist attacks by Hamas" on October 7 and "the taking of hostages." It garnered 84 votes in favor. About 28% of Global South states outside the Greater Middle East voted with the United States on the amendment. Of these, Chile, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Kenya, Peru, Philippines, and Singapore also backed the ceasefire resolution. Several other key Global South states abstained on the U.S. amendment, including Angola, Brazil, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam.This indicates that there remains considerable sentiment in the Global South that would like to go on record condemning Hamas and its actions on October 7 as terrorist in nature. It is however more noteworthy that this preference did not prevent almost all of these states from also calling for an immediate ceasefire. Their ceasefire demand was thus unconditional. Most Global South states have strongly opposed the Israeli war on Gaza and backed a ceasefire for many weeks. But the December 12 vote indicates that sentiment against Israel and the United States is hardening, and now represents a near-consensus among the developing world. There should be no doubt whatsoever that the United States and Israel stand isolated across Africa, Asia, and Latin America when it comes to Israel's ongoing bombardments of Gaza. Washington should take note and use its leverage with Israel to stop the civilian bloodshed — which is what this body clearly wants — fast.

Our memory of philosphy is that all the really hard work comes at the beginning, with the definition of terms. Only once it is clear that we are using words to describe things both accurately and precisely is it possible to then go on to use words to walk through a discussion of those things. Admittedly, some here have a deeper understanding of the subject than that but even so we really are sure that definitions are vital to the subject.We are therefore surprised to see this from a philosopher: Common to both approaches is a wrongheaded presumption that we can carry on growing while managing to hold off the floods and fires of growth-driven capitalism. Both also take it for granted that the consumerist lifestyle is essential to the wellbeing of rich societies and the ideal to which less developed economies should aspire.It is true that measures to alleviate poverty will be an integral part of any national or international green transition. And some economic growth will be required in areas such as renewable energy, housing, care and education. But overall growth is not, as many of its advocates seem to presuppose, essential to any effective economy.Nothing much wrong with that. Growth isn't essential, it's merely something humans desire. Of course we don't want growth that then consumes us - sustainable growth is indeed a desire. And so on - we might not agree with what's said there but it's all defensible. This isn't:Conversely, there is much to recommend a slower-paced, less work-centred and more community-oriented way of living. A work culture less dominated by profit-driven ideas of efficiency would free time for other activities.The first sentence, sure, why not? None of us do work every hour God gave therefore we all agree, to greater or lesser extent, with the idea. How much we agree, 70 hours a week or 10 is something probably best left to the individual - as long as they're willing to accept the corollary, the living standard, rich though it is in other compensations, that will accompany the associated income.The second sentence is simply nonsense. Profit is the value added in an activity. Inputs are this, outputs that, profit is the difference between them. The greater the efficiency with which we do things then yes, the greater the profit. But then that means that the greater the efficiency the more value we gain from any specific amount of effort or resource use. Which means, for any specific amount of value to be enjoyed by us all collectively, greater efficiency means more time for other activities. Start this simply, we're growing wheat for the daily bread. If we sow by hand, plough with a stick, scythe the stalks and hand sort the chaff then there's an enormous amount of human effort in a slice. Effort that cannot be used for other activities at risk of not gaining our necessary 2k calories a day. So, now we do this more efficiently. We spend less time on the bread, we have more time for everything else. As we've noted before it's the invention of the tractor which allows civilisation - the NHS, ballet, libraries, schools, would not exist if 90% of all human labour had to be in fields. Efficiency in the use of human time is exactly what allows all those other things which lead to a greater richness of human existence. Profit-driven efficiency is not what prevents us from having that richer and less grubbing life, it's exactly the thing which allows it.As we say, philosophy really does start with the definitions of terms. Profit, efficiency, these are desirable things. Clearly so, for without them we'd not have the societal surplus to enable the existence of philosophers emerita.

The Biden administration's funding request for Israel and Ukraine will be a boon for the American economy, argued Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in a high profile hearing on Tuesday."When we send our friends munitions from our stockpiles, the money to replenish our supplies strengthens our military readiness, and we invest in American industry and American workers," Austin told the Senate Appropriations Committee. "Some $50 billion of this supplemental request would flow through our defense industrial base, creating American jobs in more than 30 states."The argument has become central to the Biden administration's messaging in recent weeks as it seeks Republican support for its $105 billion request to fund aid for Ukraine and Israel; disaster relief; and border security.It is unclear whether the "jobs" argument has convinced Ukraine aid skeptics in the House, who have pushed for greater restrictions on future funding. But it resonated with many senators on the Appropriations Committee, who applauded the potential investment in America's economy and defense industrial base.Experts, for their part, argue that weapons spending is far less effective at creating jobs than other forms of government investment, including education and healthcare.On Monday, Newly minted House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) introduced a separate bill that only includes funding for Israel. Blinken argued against the move, contending that Russia's war on Ukraine and Hamas's attack on Israel are fundamentally linked. Austin added that the Ukrainian military would collapse if American support were cut off.Protestors repeatedly interrupted Blinken's remarks in the first half hour of the hearing, with at least six different demonstrators calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and accusing the White House of supporting "genocide." Multiple participants in the protest appeared to be affiliated with Code Pink, a prominent antiwar organization."I also hear very much the passions expressed in this room," Blinken said after demonstrators were removed. "All of us are committed to the protection of civilian life.""But all of us know the imperative of standing up with our allies and partners when their security, when their democracies are threatened," he added. "We stand resolutely with them even as we stand resolutely for the protection of innocent civilians."Blinken and Austin defended U.S. policy in Ukraine and Israel, frequently invoking alleged war crimes committed by Russian forces and Hamas. "Israel has not only the right but the duty to defend itself," Blinken said, echoing a frequent argument from the Biden administration in recent weeks. "No nation would tolerate" Hamas continuing to operate on their territory, he continued.Neither official directly addressed claims that Israel has violated international law through alleged disproportionate violence against Gazan civilians, use of banned munitions like white phosphorus, and efforts to prevent aid from reaching Gaza. Blinken "stressed the need for Israel to abide by the law of war" but accused Hamas of using civilians as "human shields."Blinken highlighted that Gazans "desperately need" humanitarian assistance in order to survive. He also noted that the U.S., Israel, and Egypt have established a system whereby every United Nations-operated truck "is checked by Israel" and Egyptian authorities in order to prevent Hamas from transporting weapons in aid shipments. Blinken added that no aid has been diverted to help the militant organization, which both he and Austin repeatedly compared to the Islamic State.Austin, for his part, addressed the escalation of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria by Iranian-backed militias, which the Pentagon has responded to with at least one set of airstrikes on a militia base in Syria. "We reserve the right to respond at a place and time of our choosing," he said. "We will do what's necessary to protect our troops and deter this type of behavior."When pressed by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Austin refused to commit to a direct attack on Iran if an Iranian-backed militia killed an American soldier in a strike in Iraq or Syria.

UPDATE 10/25: The Pentagon is blaming Iranian-backed militias for a wave of attacks including several that were not reported earlier on Thursday and over the weekend. According to the Washington Post, in addition to the incidents below, there were attacks on Oct. 19 at Mission Support Site Euphrates in Syria, Ain al-Asad Air Base, and the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center in Iraq, with no casualties or infrastructure damage in those incidents.Furthermore, there were one-way drone attacks between Friday and Sunday, hitting unoccupied areas in Bashur, Iraq, and targeting Ain al-Asad and al-Tanf bases. The military is now saying some 24 US troops have sustained minor injuries, with 20 affected in one incident, but they have since returned to work. "What we are seeing," said Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, Pentagon spokesman, "is the prospect for more significant escalation against U.S. forces and personnel across the region in the very near-term coming from Iranian proxy forces and ultimately from Iran."The U.S. military has been quietly reacting to a spate of drone and rocket attacks against its troops in the Middle East this week, mindful that the region has become a tinderbox and the chances for the situation slipping into a wider war are growing every day."Right now, this conflict is contained between Israel and Hamas, and we're going to do everything we can to ensure deterrence in the region, so that this does not become a broader" conflict, said Pentagon spokesman Brig. General Patrick Ryder to reporters on Thursday. He added that any armed U.S. response "will come at a time and a manner of our choosing."He was answering questions about two missiles and several drones that were fired from Yemen and intercepted by an anti-missile system on a U.S. Navy ship in the Red Sea on Thursday. Officials say believe the drones and missiles were launched by what the New York Times called "pro-Iranian Houthis" and may have been headed to Israel. "We cannot say for certain what these missiles and drones were targeting, but they were launched from Yemen heading north along the Red Sea, potentially towards targets in Israel," Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder, the Pentagon spokesman, told reporters.Meanwhile, U.S. bases in Iraq and reportedly Syria, too, have been targeted by drones that reports have suggested but have yet to be confirmed were fired by Iranian-backed militias. Though the estimated 900 troops in Syria and 2,500 in Iraq have been targeted on and off before for years, there has been an "uptick" in the last week acknowledged Ryder, and at least two of the attacks resulted in minor injuries. Here is the breakdown:— On Wednesday, the Pentagon reported that the military had "engaged" two drones headed to the Al-Asad air base where American troops are stationed in the western part of Iraq. Both were intercepted but resulted in "minor injuries." On the same day, a third drone was "engaged" at a base in Irbil, Northern Iraq, and destroyed, and no injuries were reported."In this moment of heightened alert, we are vigilantly monitoring the situation in Iraq and the region," according to a statement from U.S. Central Command "U.S. forces will defend U.S. and Coalition forces against any threat."— Also on Wednesday, U.S. officials reported two drones attacked the U.S. occupied base at Al-Tanf in Syria, which has taken repeated fire over the last three years. One was destroyed and the other "impacted" causing minor injuries. Another attack was reported in Northeastern Syria the same day. The Pentagon has not yet confirmed reports of a third attack in Syria that same day but said a U.S. contractor had died of a heart attack sheltering in place after a false alarm at the Al-Asad base in Iraq. — On Thursday, sources and officials said that rockets and drones had been fired again at U.S. troops stationed at the Al-Asad base in Iraq with "multiple blasts" reportedly heard from inside the installation. Reports indicated that U.S. troops had come under attack at a base near Baghdad's international airport as well. There were few details on these fresh attacks as of Friday morning.

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) and Sen. Jim Risch (R-Idaho) slammed the Biden administration's approach to Ukraine, arguing in an open letter that the White House has "failed to articulate a strategy outlining how U.S. assistance to Ukraine will help them achieve victory over Russia, while also prioritizing and advancing American interests.""A pledge to support Ukraine 'for as long as it takes' is not a strategy," wrote the powerful lawmakers, each of whom is the top Republican in their chamber's foreign affairs committee.The letter appears aimed at reframing Republican calls for a strategy to end the war, which have grown increasingly loud in recent months amid polls showing a drop in support for continuing to arm Ukraine.While other GOP lawmakers have argued that President Joe Biden is giving too much to Kyiv, McCaul and Risch contend that the White House has sent aid at a "deliberately slow pace" in a way that "stops short of helping Ukraine decisively defeat Russian forces."Notably, the missive also took aim at reports of talks between former U.S. officials and current and former Russian leaders, which the administration claims not to have approved."These meetings have not been briefed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That is unacceptable," McCaul and Risch wrote, noting their concerns that Ukrainians were not involved in the talks. "[A]s it is Ukrainian—not American—soldiers fighting, it would be reprehensible to exclude Kyiv from discussions about its own future."The letter revives the debate over the reported talks, which NBC News first revealed back in July. The discussions reportedly included former high-level U.S. officials and, on at least one occasion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, marking the closest equivalent to direct talks between Moscow and Washington since the early days of the war.The Biden administration has so far dodged questions about the talks and denied playing any role in them, but it remains unclear whether the White House has received briefs from the former officials who participated. The lack of clarity should come as no surprise given the secretive nature of the discussions, which reportedly included talks about issues that have become taboo in Washington, including potential concessions to Russia."We suggested setting up a number of diplomatic channels in order to satisfy the desires of all the parties involved," one participant in the talks told the Moscow Times in late July. "There firstly needs to be a serious U.S.-Russia channel, as these are the only two countries powerful enough to negotiate security in Europe. There must of course be a channel between Ukraine and Russia, another between Russia and the EU; and one between Russia and the Global South." Track II diplomacy — sometimes known as "backchanneling" — is a common practice in international politics in which influential non-government stakeholders in different countries hold secret talks in order to exchange views. It is often difficult to determine whether any government has formally approved such discussions.But Risch and McCaul are determined to get answers. The pair of lawmakers asked the administration whether it knew about the talks in advance, whether the White House received readouts of the discussions, and who participated in the effort. They also demanded to know if the talks have had any influence on U.S. policy.While Risch and McCaul make clear that they seek a maximalist approach to the conflict and oppose talks of any sort, their questions indirectly get at the heart of whether the Biden administration is prepared to seek a diplomatic end to the war short of an all-out Ukrainian victory. The powerful Republicans gave the administration until early November to respond to their questions. They did not, however, demand that the answers be given in an unclassified format, meaning that the responses may never become public.

Eliot A. Cohen, former adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, recently wrote in the Atlantic that "Taiwan is an independent country." Based on this flawed assumption, Cohen suggests that the United States should treat Taiwan as a military ally, rapidly increase arms sales, and openly engage in high-level exchanges with its leaders. The problem with this argument is that, according to recent polling, a simple majority of Taiwanese do not express support for independence, and the Republic of China's (ROC) constitution does not define Taiwan as an independent country. Were the United States to abandon its one-China policy based on recognition for Taiwan's sovereignty, it would only undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.According to the latest survey by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, 48.9 percent of Taiwanese "support independence." While this figure stands 22 points above support for the "status quo" and 37.1 points above support for "unification," it still fails to constitute a simple majority. Moreover, it is one thing to support independence in an anonymous poll and quite another to engage in a political process by which Taiwan codifies independence.Despite claims by Democratic Progressive Party leaders that Taiwan is "already independent," the ROC constitution has never delimited its territory to the island of Taiwan and its offshore islands. Drafted in 1947, when the Kuomintang-led government claimed to be the legal representative for all of China, the ROC constitution states that the "territory of the Republic of China within its existing national boundaries shall not be altered except by a resolution of the National Assembly." When the ROC constitution was revised in 2005, it merely shifted the authority to alter the ROC's national territory from the National Assembly (now called the Legislative Yuan) to that of a public referendum. Nonetheless, a referendum to delimit Taiwan's territory has never been passed or held. Finally, the Cross-Strait Act, amended most recently in 2022, still considers mainland China to be "territory of the Republic of China." The political parties that do support de jure independence, such as the New Power Party, the Formosa Alliance, and the Taiwan Statebuilding Party, are among the island's least popular.Unless and until the people of Taiwan unequivocally codify their own independence, U.S. policymakers cannot assume that the premise on which the U.S. one-China policy is based is false: that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China."It is true, as Cohen argues, that Taiwan has many of the trappings of an independent state: "its own currency, a thriving economy, lively democratic politics, sizable armed forces." Taiwan's de facto autonomy has allowed it to become the strong, democratic, and prosperous partner that many Americans admire. This success story is one of the reasons that the United States does not need to change its policy toward Taiwan. Beijing, on the other hand, clearly seeks to undermine the status quo, as evidenced by official statements and military coercion toward the island.Maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is not easy. Taiwan is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Stability requires the United States to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, while at the same time respecting Beijing's red lines. Taiwan's leaders are also cautious about making any moves that would undermine the status quo. Rather than preemptively and unilaterally recognize Taiwan's independence, as Cohen suggests, the United States should continue to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, deepen economic and cultural ties, maintain unofficial exchanges, and effectively advocate for Taiwan's participation in international organizations.Respecting Taiwan's unofficial status may not satisfy the desire by some to see the flourishing of democratic self-determination around the globe. But it is the best way for the United States to contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future for Taiwan.

Update 9/19, 2 p.m.: A United States official said that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken will hold urgent talks in the next 24 hours with all sides to end the "egregious" operation by Azerbaijan. A press statement by Blinken called "for an immediate end to hostilities and for respectful dialogue between Baku and representatives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh."It appears that Azerbaijan has decided to finish off by force what remains of the ethnic Armenian population in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh; and judging by the response of the international community to Azerbaijani moves in recent years, nobody appears willing to do much to prevent it. In the early afternoon of September 19, the Azerbaijani military launched a "local anti-terrorist" operation against the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to "...ultimately restore the constitutional order of the Republic of Azerbaijan." The move follows their disputed claims that mines "planted by the reconnaissance-subversion groups of Armenia's armed forces" blew up civilian and military vehicles, resulting in six dead. This development comes after weeks of anticipation of such an attack given Azerbaijani troop movements near the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, the increased airborne deliveries from Israel which supplies Azerbaijan with a large proportion of its armaments, and counter-preparations by the ethnic Armenian forces amidst an over nine-month long blockade of the Lachin Corridor.The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense statement claimed that "the civilian population and civilian infrastructure facilities are not targeted. Only legitimate military targets are being incapacitated." However, reports from on the ground in the de facto capital of Stepanakert show shelling and civilian casualties. Since the Moscow-brokered ceasefire that ended the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and brought Russian peacekeepers to the region, tensions have been escalating as Baku has sought to fully assert its control over the long-disputed territory. At first, the peacekeepers were generally able to protect what remained of Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh after the successful Azerbaijani 2020 assault. However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the huge commitment and losses of Russian forces there, Russia's military ability to intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh seems largely to have vanished. Azerbaijan for its part had repeatedly and unequivocally stated that there is no need for outside intervention in its domestic affairs as Yerevan, Brussels, and Washington increased their calls for the future guarantee of the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians under Azerbaijani rule.Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has said that Azerbaijan wants to involve Armenia into a large-scale war but that Armenia is not and will not become involved in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, said on X, formerly Twitter, that the "Military actions of Azerbaijan must be immediately halted to allow for a genuine dialogue between Baku and Karabakh Armenians." The office of EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell issued a statement condemning the military escalation.Russia has urged the conflicting parties to "stop the bloodshed, immediately cease hostilities and return to the path of a political and diplomatic settlement." Moscow also rejected Baku's claim that they had informed the Russian side in advance of the assault. The U.S. still has yet to make any statement on the situation. However, in comments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Yuri Kim, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs made clear that the U.S. condemns the use of force and will not accept any moves "to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh."What the fate of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh illustrates with tragic force is that while for a generation the United States and its NATO allies have been implacably hostile to Russia's presence in the South Caucasus, they have neither the ability nor the will to replace Russia — which is now bogged down in Ukraine — as a security provider in the region, and to resolve or contain its ethnic disputes. Therefore, for Armenians, the tragedy of the war in Ukraine and its repercussions are being felt directly in the South Caucasus.

Colleen Hroncich


Just like one size doesn't fit all students, one size doesn't fit all teachers, either. Shiren Rattigan experienced this first‐​hand. A fourth generation educator, Shiren says she was destined to be a teacher. It just took her some time to find the right environment.
"As an educator for over 10 years, I taught at public schools, private elite international schools, and a Montessori school, but none of them quite reflected my vision of education," she recalls. "I saw myself as Ms. Frizzle from The Magic School Bus—whisking the students away on some great unforgettable adventure. I wanted to ignite the love of learning in children with deep connections, hands‐​on activities, and soulful experiences."









Shiren Rattigan
Then came COVID-19. Shiren's three daughters were doing remote school while she was trying to teach her Montessori classes online. Some families asked her if she would tutor their children for the upcoming school year and she agreed. She created kits and dropped them off for the students every Sunday so they could have the Montessori environment right in their homes instead of trying to create it on a screen. She would then direct them to get the appropriate box for each lesson.
"This was working pretty well," she says. "We decided to meet once a week, then twice a week, and then three times a week. I wanted to offer this opportunity to more children and be accessible to a diverse socioeconomic background. I decided the best way to do that was to become a licensed private school and participate in Florida's school choice scholarship program."
Colossal Academy focuses on what Shiren calls 21st century foundational skills—literacy, numeracy, scientific literacy, cultural and civic literacy, and financial literacy. The more traditional academic classes are in the morning, and the students all have their own individual learning plans. They have an hour of unstructured time for lunch where they're able to just be together as a group. After lunch, they have specials, which can include farming, cooking, and textiles. While Colossal Academy is an official private school, Shiren welcomes homeschoolers as well with her three‐​day a week hybrid option.







The initial focus of Colossal Academy was middle school, but Shiren is adding a high school starting with ninth grade this year. "We are working towards relevancy‐​based education," she notes. "As we bridge into high school, all students will graduate as the CEO of their company. By junior year they will have decided formally what their business will be, created business plans, launched a website, and gone to pitch and raise money for their ventures or non‐​profits."
Shiren has also gotten external validation—Colossal received a Next Step Grant from VELA Education Fund and was a Yass Prize quarterfinalist. No wonder she's looking to help others start their own microschools. The Colossal Architect Accelerator assists with securing a space, designing a project‐​based curriculum, marketing, enrollment, and more. This will help teachers as well as other students.
"One exciting aspect that I've grown to understand is that I'm also creating a fertile ground for educators. A place where they can be creative, have deep connections, and thrive," Shiren explains. "I want to fortify teachers to be the professionals that they aim to be—that they thought they were signing up for when they went into education. So it's kind of two‐​fold: serving learners, but also creating a better environment for teachers."
The excitement and passion Shiren has for Colossal Academy is impossible to miss. She sees it as the learning sanctuary she wishes she'd had, the vision she had in becoming a teacher, and the educational environment she wants for her own children.
"In many ways, Colossal Academy is completing a circle," Shiren says. "My great‐​grandmother taught in a one‐​room schoolhouse on a farm. My grandma and mom taught in public schools like we see today. And now I've created a modern version of the one‐​room schoolhouse that lets me individualize education for my students. I guess it's true that everything old is new again."

Of course, at times like this everyone brings out their own bugbears for a good trot around the paddock. Liz Truss will launch a new international task force to revive flagging economic growth in the West.The former prime minister has convened the non-partisan group, which is being called The Growth Commission, to investigate the causes of sluggish growth.The commission, which is to be chaired by Douglas McWilliams, the leading economist, will also analyse the impact different policy decisions have on GDP per capita.Our particular bee in the bonnet is counting. It's vital to recall that like so many economic numbers GDP is a proxy. And reifying proxies doesn't work - because it loses sight of the fact that it is a proxy.Yes, we all know the standard critiques of GDP, it doesn't count household work, includes cleaning up pollution as growth and so on. But the real biggie is that it doesn't include the consumer surplus. A useful definition of the consumer surplus (one to horrify actual economists but one that works all the same) is the amount we are richer that doesn't get included in GDP.If the relationship is stable - say, the consumer surplus is equal to 100% of GDP, always - then there's no problem. GDP still works as a proxy. If that relationship changes, which we would insist it is doing, then GDP becomes an ever worse measure of societal income and wealth. To construct a ludicrous example. Someone invents the black box which provides power at zero cost. OK, we're all vastly richer because power is now free (to continue with the example being ludicrous, no distribution costs etc etc - power finally too cheap to meter). But at the same time GDP has fallen - fallen by the amount we used to pay for power but now don't. The consumer surplus has soared - hey, free power! - and GDP has fallen.Don't reify the proxy. This is, of course, also Hal Varian's point, "GDP doesn't deal well with free".Now to give a non-ludicrous example. WhatsApp (at least did at one point in time) carries no advertising, makes no charge. The output associated with WhatsApp is zero in GDP. The costs, the couple of hundred engineers at Facebook that work on it, they're still there, counted properly. So, labour costs but no output, WhatsApp appears in the GDP accounts as a fall in productivity. Yet some billion people are gaining some or all of their telecoms, for free. The consumer surplus has soared. To the extent that folk use WhatsApp instead of metered phone calls GDP falls. And the whole is measured as lower productivity, us getting poorer per hour of labour put in. Any real examination of growth needs to deal with this problem. Much of the growth in the modern economy is digital, is free at the point of use. The consumer surplus of all of this is very large, entirely out of proportion with the usual rule of thumb that the consumer surplus and GDP about equal each other. That is, we're getting vastly richer and not counting the fact that we are doing so.If we're really going to examine the counting of growth then we need to really examine the counting of growth.There is also an obvious corollary to this. If ever more of the growth is turning up not as GDP - where we measure the distribution - but as the consumer surplus - where we don't measure the distribution - then all claims about the inequality of society are wrong.Think on it. You, me, Granny, Zuckerberg and that peasant on the paddy in Pakistan all have exactly the same access to WhatsApp - and therefore telecoms - at exactly the same price of nothing. And yet there are people claiming that society is becoming more unequal, are there?

Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar


Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is in the United States for a state visit that is expected to highlight India's importance as a rising economic and military power, and the only country in Asia that can be a counter to China in the 21st century. Modi's Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has long promoted its Hindu nationalist agenda by claiming that India was the world's richest region under glorious Hindu rule for thousands of years before being conquered by Muslim invaders in the 11th century and British invaders in the 18th century. The BJP says foreign invaders transformed a sone ki chidiya—a golden bird—into an impoverished chattel. Modi has promised to make India a great world power again, and his U.S. visit aims to be a step in that direction.
The BJP often cites historian Angus Maddison, who estimated that India accounted for 32 percent of world GDP in 1 CE (during the Hindu period), a share that sank to just 4 percent by the time British rule ended in 1947. However, the BJP is cherry picking data from Maddison's work to create a false historical narrative of a once‐​rich country impoverished by foreign invaders. For a full picture, read my new Cato Policy Analysis, "Indian Nationalism and the Historical Fantasy of a Golden Hindu Period."
A close look at Maddison's magnum opus, Contours of the World Economy 1–2030 AD: Essays in Macro‐​Economic History, tells a less flattering story. India's high share of world GDP in 1 CE was due mainly to its high share (33.2 percent) in world population. Since this yielded a GDP share of 32 percent, India per capita income was slightly below the world average at just $450 per year. This did not rise at all in a thousand subsequent years of Hindu rule. So, this supposedly golden period was one of stark poverty and economic stagnancy. Conditions were almost as bad in the rest of the world. High mortality, arising from disease, drought, and war kept India's population stagnant at 75 million for a thousand years till 1000 CE. Simply staying alive was a challenge.
Under Muslim and British rule, India's GDP edged up. Falling mortality rates meant a significant rise in the population too. This rising population partly offset the rise in GDP, so per capita income grew slowly. Maddison estimates it at $550 in 1700, towards the end of the Muslim period. This edged up to $619 by the time British rule ended. Progress was very slow in the thousand years of Muslim and British rule yet was better than the stagnancy in the preceding thousand years of Hindu rule.
Colonial‐​era history books spoke of the great blessings that British imperialism had brought to India. Maddison's figures show those claims to be absurd. But they also disprove the claim that colonial rule impoverished India.
After becoming independent, India's GDP rose much faster and mortality rate fell more dramatically than ever before. By 2003, says Maddison, India's per capita income was up to $2,160. Both in terms of income and life expectancy, India's golden period—if you can call it that—is today, not in the ancient Hindu past.
India is still a lower middle‐​income country, but in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms is already the third largest economy in the world. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund estimate that it was the fastest‐​growing major economy in the world in 2022 and will continue to be so this year. It runs a fiercely independent foreign policy and has refrained from condemning Russia for invading Ukraine. India is a major buyer of Russian oil. Even so the United States sees India as an important strategic partner, though not an ally. That is why Modi's visit is expected to include the signing of military deals for U.S. supply and coproduction of high‐​tech aircraft engines and drones. Despite foreign policy disagreements and worries about the suppression of dissent and liberal values in India, the United States wants to help Modi build an India that will become a major Asian power that can check China's dominance.

Abstract: How come the Dominican Republic has become a stable electoral democracy while Haiti has descended into authoritarianism? Back in the mid-20th century, both countries found themselves on a similar plane, yet by the turn of the century their outcomes could not be more different, with Dominicans currently enjoying competitive elections while Haitians witness their country being gripped by political violence. This article examines post-authoritarian transitions in the Dominican Republic and Haiti after both nations endured lengthy neosultanistic dictatorships. The central hypothesis of this work is that although the Dominican Republic and Haiti followed similar historical paths in and out of neosultanistic dictatorships (those of General Rafael Trujillo and the Duvalier family, respectively), in the long term specific domestic factors and missed opportunities—combined with dissimilar international scenarios—led to vastly different outcomes on the road to democratization. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2021 "Democracy Index," the Dominican Republic has become an electoral democracy while Haiti has recently been downgraded from a "hybrid regime" into the authoritarian category. As such, the nature of their post-authoritarian transitions, current political systems, and quality of democracy merit comparative examination. Resumen: ¿Cómo es que la República Dominicana se ha convertido en una democracia electoral estable mientras que Haití ha caído en el autoritarismo? A mediados del siglo XX, ambos países se encontraban en un plano similar, pero para el cambio de siglo sus resultados no podrían ser más diferentes, con los dominicanos actualmente celebrando elecciones competitivas mientras que los haitianos ven cómo su país se ve afectado por la violencia política. Este artículo examina las transiciones post-autoritarias en República Dominicana y Haití después de que ambas naciones soportaran largas dictaduras neosultanistas. La hipótesis central de este trabajo es que si bien República Dominicana y Haití siguieron trayectorias históricas similares dentro y fuera de las dictaduras neosultanistas (las del General Rafael Trujillo y la de la familia Duvalier, respectivamente), en el largo plazo factores domésticos específicos y oportunidades perdidas —combinadas con escenarios internacionales disímiles— llevaron a resultados muy diferentes en el camino hacia la democratización. Según el "Índice de democracia" de 2021 de The Economist Intelligence Unit, la República Dominicana se ha convertido en una democracia electoral, mientras que Haití ha sido degradado recientemente de un "régimen híbrido" a la categoría autoritaria. Como tal, la naturaleza de sus transiciones post-autoritarias, los sistemas políticos actuales y la calidad de la democracia merecen un examen comparativo. Résumé: Comment se fait-il que la République Dominicaine soit devenue une démocratie électorale stable alors qu'Haïti a sombré dans l'autoritarisme? Au milieu du XXe siècle, les deux pays se sont retrouvés sur un plan similaire, mais au tournant du siècle, leurs résultats ne pourraient pas être plus différents, les Dominicains bénéficiant actuellement d'élections compétitives tandis que les Haïtiens voient leur pays en proie à la violence politique. Cet article examine les transitions post-autoritaires en République Dominicaine et en Haïti après que les deux nations ont enduré de longues dictatures néosultanistes. L'hypothèse centrale de ce travail est que bien que la République Dominicaine et Haïti aient suivi des chemins historiques similaires dans et hors des dictatures néosultanistes (celles du général Rafael Trujillo et de la famille Duvalier, respectivement), à long terme, des facteurs nationaux spécifiques et des opportunités manquées —combinés à des scénarios internationaux dissemblables— ont conduit à des résultats très différents sur la voie de la démocratisation. Selon l'indice de démocratie 2021 de l'Economist Intelligence Unit, la République Dominicaine est devenue une démocratie électorale tandis qu'Haïti a récemment été rétrogradé d'un "régime hybride" à la catégorie autoritaire. À ce titre, la nature de leurs transitions post-autoritaires, les systèmes politiques actuels et la qualité de la démocratie méritent un examen comparatif.

Pressure from the international community after the disintegration and independence of Timor Leste has prompted the issuance of Law Number 26 of 2000 concerning the Court of Human Rights. However, far from being burnt, the a quo law has received a lot of criticism because it is considered incompatible with its original purpose. This article discusses the fate of regulating war crimes that are not included in the jurisdiction of Law Number 26 of 2000 concerning the Human Rights Court. Through the perspective of legal politics using a conceptual and historical approach, this research answers two problem formulations, first, how is the legal politics of the formation of Law Number 26 of 2000 concerning the Human Rights Court? Second, why does Law Number 26 of 2000 concerning the Human Rights Court not accommodate war crimes? First, it can be concluded that, even though it was born during the reformation period, the a quo law is actually very New Order nuanced. There are inconsistencies in the political will for the formation of the a quo law and its substance. Second, there was the involvement of the TNI and Polri factions in the formulation of Law Number 26 of 2000 concerning the Human Rights Court, which at that time was suspected of being an actor in human rights crimes during the disintegration of Timor Leste after the popular consultation.Keywords: Legal policy; political will; war crimesAbstrakDesakan dari dunia internasional pasca disintegrasi dan kemerdekaan Timor Leste telah mendorong lahirnya Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia. Namun, jauh api dari panggang, undang-undang a quo banyak mendapat kritik karena dianggap tidak sesuai dengan tujuan awalnya. Artikel ini membahas mengenai nasib pengaturan tindak pidana kejahatan perang yang tidak dimasukkan dalam yurisdiksi Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia. Melalui kaca mata politik hukum yang menggunakan pendekatan konseptual dan historis, penelitian ini menjawab dua rumusan masalah, pertama, bagaimana politik hukum pembentukan Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia? Kedua, mengapa Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia tidak mengakomodir tindak pidana kejahatan perang? Dapat disimpulkan pertama, meskipun lahir di masa reformasi, undang-undang a quo justru sangat bernuansa Orde Baru. Terdapat inkonsistensi pada political will pembentukan undang-undang a quo dengan hasil isi substansinya. Kedua, terdapat keterlibatan fraksi TNI dan Polri dalam pembentukan Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia, yang saat itu diduga menjadi aktor kejahatan hak asasi manusia selama masa disintegrasi Timor Leste pasca jajak pendapat.Kata Kunci: Kejahatan perang; politik hukum; political will ; Desakan dari dunia internasional pasca disintegrasi dan kemerdekaan Timor Leste telah mendorong lahirnya Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia. Namun, jauh api dari panggang, undang-undang a quo banyak mendapat kritik karena dianggap tidak sesuai dengan tujuan awalnya. Artikel ini membahas mengenai nasib pengaturan tindak pidana kejahatan perang yang tidak dimasukkan dalam yurisdiksi Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia. Melalui kaca mata politik hukum yang menggunakan pendekatan konseptual dan historis, penelitian ini menjawab dua rumusan masalah, yaitu: Bagaimana politik hukum pembentukan Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia? Dan, mengapa Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia tidak mengakomodir tindak pidana kejahatan perang? Dapat disimpulkan bahwa rupanya, meskipun lahir di masa Reformasi, undang-undang a quo justru sangat bernuansa Orde Baru. Terdapat inkonsistensi pada political will pembentukan undang-undang a quo dengan hasil isi substansinya. Selain itu, terdapat keterlibatan fraksi TNI dan Polri dalam pembentukan Undang-Undang Nomor 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia, yang saat itu diduga menjadi aktor kejahatan hak asasi manusia selama masa disintegrasi Timor Leste pasca jajak pendapat.

International audience ; This paper aims to find mechanisms to align commercial interests with underwater noise reductions from commercial shipping. Through a survey and a series of interviews with representative stakeholders, we find that, while recognizing the large variations in the specificities of ports, port measures could promote the reduction of underwater noise emissions from commercial navigation by changes in hull, propeller and engine design; and through operational measures associated with speed reduction, rerouting and convoy transport. Although the impact of underwater noise emissions on marine fauna is increasingly severe and widespread, there is uncertainty as to the mechanisms, contexts and levels that should lead to actions, requiring preventive management. Ship owners already face significant investment and operating costs to comply with fuel, ballast water, NOx and CO2 requirements. To be successful, underwater noise programs must align with these factors.Based on a multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach, we find a set of compromise solutions for a wide range of stakeholders. Ports could come up with measures such as reduced port fees and reduced waiting times for ships in ports, both depending on underwater noise performance. Cooperation between ports to step up actions through environmental indices and classification society ratings, and integration with actions of other ports could help support this. However, few ships know their baseline for underwater noise, as there are very few hydrophonic stations and measurement methods are not standardized. Costs increase and availability drops dramatically if the purchaser of the vessel wishes to improve the sound profile. With local demands for airborne noise near airports, global pressure on the aviation industry has been stimulated to adopt existing calming technology. This experience with aviation noise control may shed light on the underwater noise process. ; Ce document vise à trouver des mécanismes pour aligner les intérêts commerciaux sur les réductions du bruit sous-marin de la navigation commerciale. Grâce à une enquête et à une série d'entrevues avec des intervenants représentatifs, nous constatons que, tout en reconnaissant les grandes variations dans les spécificités des ports, les mesures portuaires pourraient favoriser la réduction des émissions sonores sous-marines de la navigation commerciale par des changements dans la conception de la coque, de l'hélice et du moteur, et par des mesures opérationnelles associées à la réduction de la vitesse, au changement d'itinéraire et au transport en convoi. Bien que l'impact des émissions sonores sous-marines sur la faune marine soit de plus en plus grave et répandu, il existe une incertitude quant aux mécanismes, aux contextes et aux niveaux qui devraient conduire à des mesures, nécessitant une gestion préventive. Les propriétaires de navires doivent déjà faire face à des coûts d'investissement et d'exploitation importants pour se conformer au carburant, eau de ballast, les exigences en matière de NOx et de CO2. Pour réussir, les programmes de bruit sous-marin doivent s'aligner sur ces facteurs.Sur la base d'une approche de prise de décision à critères multiples (MCDM), nous trouvons un ensemble de solutions de compromis pour un large éventail de parties prenantes. Les ports pourraient proposer des mesures telles que des frais portuaires réduits et des temps d'attente réduits pour les navires dans les ports, tous deux en fonction des performances en matière de bruit sous-marin. La coopération entre les ports pour intensifier les actions par le biais d'indices environnementaux et de notations des sociétés de classification, et l'intégration avec les actions d'autres ports pourraient contribuer à soutenir cela. Cependant, peu de navires connaissent leur base de référence en matière de bruit sous-marin, car il y a très peu de stations hydrophoniques et les méthodes de mesure ne sont pas normalisées. Les coûts augmentent et la disponibilité diminue considérablement si l'acheteur du navire souhaite améliorer le profil sonore. Demandes locales concernant bruit aérien à proximité des aéroports, la pression mondiale sur l'industrie de l'aviation a été stimulée pour qu'elle adopte la technologie d'apaisement existante. Cette expérience du contrôle du bruit de l'aviation pourrait éclairer le processus de bruit sous-marin.

The World Values Survey (WVS) is an international research program devoted to the scientific and academic study of social, political, economic, religious and cultural values of people in the world. The project's goal is to assess which impact values stability or change over time has on the social, political and economic development of countries and societies. The project grew out of the European Values Study and was started in 1981 by its Founder and first President (1981-2013) Professor Ronald Inglehart from the University of Michigan (USA) and his team, and since then has been operating in more than 120 world societies. The main research instrument of the project is a representative comparative social survey which is conducted globally every 5 years. Extensive geographical and thematic scope, free availability of survey data and project findings for broad public turned the WVS into one of the most authoritative and widely-used cross-national surveys in the social sciences. At the moment, WVS is the largest non-commercial cross-national empirical time-series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed. ; The target population is defined as: individuals aged 18 (16/17 is acceptable in the countries with such voting age) or older (with no upper age limit), regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language, that have been residing in the [country] within private households for the past 6 months prior to the date of beginning of fieldwork (or in the date of the first visit to the household, in case of random-route selection). ; The sampling procedures differ from country to country; probability Sample: Multistage Sample Probability Sample, Simple Random SampleRepresentative single stage or multi-stage sampling of the adult population of the country 18 (16) years old and older was used for the WVS 1981-2022.In 1981-2012, the required sample size for each coutnry was N=1000 or above. In 2017-2022, the sample size was set as effective sample size: 1200 for countries with population over 2 million, 1000 for countries with population less than 2 million. As an exception, few surveys with smaller sample sizes have been accepted into the WVS 1981-2020 through the WVSA's history.Sample design and other relevant information about sampling are reviewed by the WVS Scientific Advisory Committee and approved prior to contracting of fieldwork agency or starting of data collection. The sampling is documented using the Survey Design Form delivered by the national teams which included the description of the sampling frame and each sampling stage as well as the calculation of the planned gross and net sample size to achieve the required effective sample. Additionally, it included the analytical description of the inclusion probabilities of the sampling design that are used to calculate design weights. ; Interview ; Mode of collection: mixed mode Face-to-face interview: CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) Face-to-face interview: PAPI (Paper and Pencil Interview) Telephone interview: CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) Self-administered questionnaire: CAWI (Computer-Assisted Web Interview) Self-administered questionnaire: PaperIn all countries, fieldwork was conducted on the basis of detailed and uniform instructions prepared by the WVS Scientific Committee and WVSA secretariat.The main data collection mode in 1981-2012 was face to face (interviewer-administered) interview with the printed questionnaire. Postal surveys (respondent-administered) have been used in Canada, New Zealanda, Japan, Australia. CAPI and online data collection modes have been introduced first in WVS-6 in 2012-2014.The main data collection mode in WVS 2017-2022 is face to face (interviewer-administered). Several countries employed mixed-mode approach to data collection: USA (CAWI; CATI); Australia and Japan (CAWI; postal survey); Hong Kong SAR (PAPI; CAWI); Malaysia (CAWI; PAPI).The WVS Master Questionnaire is always provided in English and each national survey team has to ensure that the questionnaire was translated into all the languages spoken by 15% or more of the population in the country. A central team monitors the translation process.

In 2015-2017, the fourth round of the World Health Organization (WHO) European Childhood Obesity Surveillance Initiative (COSI) was conducted in 36 countries. National representative samples of children aged 6–9 (203,323) were measured by trained staff, with similar equipment and using a standardized protocol. This paper assesses the children's body weight status and compares the burden of childhood overweight, obesity, and thinness in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Europe and Central Asia. The results show great geographic variability in height, weight, and body mass index. On average, the children of Northern Europe were the tallest, those of Southern Europe the heaviest, and the children living in Central Asia the lightest and the shortest. Overall, 28.7% of boys and 26.5% of girls were overweight (including obesity) and 2.5% and 1.9%, respectively, were thin according to the WHO definitions. The prevalence of obesity varied from 1.8% of boys and 1.1% of girls in Tajikistan to 21.5% and 19.2%, respectively, in Cyprus, and tended to be higher for boys than for girls. Levels of thinness, stunting, and underweight were relatively low, except in Eastern Europe (for thinness) and in Central Asia. Despite the efforts to halt it, unhealthy weight status is still an important problem in the WHO European Region. ; The authors gratefully acknowledge support from a grant from the Russian Government in the context of the WHO European Office for the Prevention and Control of NCDs. Data collection in the countries was made possible through funding from the following: Albania: WHO through the Joint Programme on Children, Food Security and Nutrition "Reducing Malnutrition in Children," funded by the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund, and the Institute of Public Health; Austria: Federal Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, Republic of Austria; Bulgaria: Ministry of Health, National Center of Public Health and Analyses, WHO Regional Office for Europe; Croatia: Ministry of Health, Croatian Institute of Public Health and WHO Regional Office for Europe; Czechia: Ministry of Health of the Czech Republic, grants AZV MZČR 17-31670 A and MZČR – RVO EÚ 00023761; Cyprus: not available; Denmark: Danish Ministry of Health; Estonia: Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education and Research (IUT 42-2), WHO Country Office, and National Institute for Health Development; Finland: Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; France: Santé publique France, the French Agency for Public Health; Georgia: WHO; Greece: International Hellenic University and Hellenic Medical Association for Obesity; Hungary: WHO Country Office for Hungary; Ireland: Health Service Executive; Italy: Ministry of Health and Italian National Institute of Health; Kazakhstan: Ministry of Health of the Republic of Kazakhstan and WHO Country Office; Kyrgyzstan: World Health Organization; Latvia: Ministry of Health, Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; Lithuania: Science Foundation of Lithuanian University of Health Sciences and Lithuanian Science Council and WHO; Malta: Ministry of Health; Montenegro: WHO and Institute of Public Health of Montenegro; North Macedonia: funded by the Government of North Macedonia through National Annual Program of Public Health and implemented by the Institute of Public Health and Centers of Public Health in the country. WHO country office provided support for training and data management; Norway: Ministry of Health and Norwegian Institute of Public Health; Poland: National Health Programme, Ministry of Health; Portugal: Ministry of Health Institutions, the National Institute of Health, Directorate General of Health, Regional Health Directorates and the kind technical support from the Center for Studies and Research on Social Dynamics and Health (CEIDSS); Romania: Ministry of Health; Russian Federation: WHO; San Marino: Health Ministry, Educational Ministry, Social Security Institute and Health Authority; Serbia: World Health Organization (Ref. File 2015-540940); Slovakia: Biennial Collaborative Agreement between WHO Regional Office for Europe and Ministry of Health SR; Slovenia: Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia within the SLOfit surveillance system; Spain: Spanish Agency for Food Safety and Nutrition (AESAN); Sweden: Public Health Agency of Sweden; Tajikistan: WHO Country Office in Tajikistan and Ministry of Health and Social Protection; Turkmenistan: WHO Country Office in Turkmenistan and Ministry of Health; Turkey: Turkish Ministry of Health and World Bank. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion