Suchergebnisse

Different parts of state territory on land, sea, & in the airspace are explained first. The concept of territorial sovereignty is envisaged through principles of its all-inclusiveness & its exclusivity, subject to many exceptions & restrictions imposed either by rules of general international law or by specific treaty obligations that can be assumed by a state. The concept of state servitudes was not assimilated in the practice of international courts & tribunals. Besides, it can be the cause of some misconceptions & confusion in public international law. Within the explanation of territorial boundaries are discussed the so-called natural boundaries -- such as rivers, lakes, & mountain boundaries -- as well as the artificial boundaries. An explanation of the principle of uti possidetis, of procedures of fixing boundaries, & of special legal scope of boundary treaties in international law is offered in conclusion. Adapted from the source document.

Mediterranean cooperation is addressed in the context of the creation of the Euromediterranean zone. The European Union has been developing various modes of cooperation with non-member Mediterranean countries by signing association agreements or cooperation agreements. The new European states, created after the disintegration of former socialist federations, demonstrate an interest in Mediterranean cooperation, though they tend to have different attitudes toward it. Their interest is based solely on the fact that Mediterranean cooperation has not been standardized & that it has a poorly developed institutional framework. This enables these countries to join in from time to time, when it suits their purposes. Regarding the role of the new states, the author distinguishes between two types of cooperation: (1) autonomous regional cooperation, which is not beneficial for the new states (eg, the Balkan states); & (2) occasional, specialized, dispersed cooperation, which might attract the countries of Central & Eastern Europe. Adapted from the source document.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the World Trade Organisation's most important agreements. This accord is the first & only set of multilateral rules covering international trade in services. It is a framework for international trade in services & a legal basis for resolving conflicting national interests. For the past two decades, trade in services has grown faster than merchandise trade. Currently, they represent more than two thirds of the World Gross Domestic Product. As the term services covers a wide range of intangible & heterogeneous products & activities, there has been an increasing demand for detailed, relevant & internationally comparable statistical information on trade in services. In the last ten years, the share of transportation services in international trade in commercial services was steady & amounted to about one quarter. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Commenting on the article by R. Badinter (1996, this issue), the author contends that experts in international law are not broad-minded regarding the establishment of a state. Most legal experts take for granted the statements of the international judiciary on the existence of certain rules of general international law & consider them validated & indisputable. This fiction has been given support by states, since they uphold only those legal statements that suit their interests. The author analyses the Opinions of the Arbitration Committee on the process of the disintegration & the Criteria for the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia as well as the criteria for the creation of the new states. He considers this precedent as central for international judiciary law. Adapted from the source document.

The turmoils in international relations following the fall of the Berlin wall represented a serious challenge for the overall concept of European political unity. In its first international assignment outside the context of the Cold war, traditional national interests & animosities surfaced, & they demonstrated rather precisely all the complexity of the project promulgated by the Maastricht Agreement. At the time there was no common European approach to the solution of the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia & no consent regarding the key issues, such as the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics as sovereign entities i.e. defining the criteria for their recognition. The paper focuses on this very specificity of the new approach to this problem, since it has increasingly been a subject of discretionary political decisions rather than the issue of international law in the traditional sense of meeting certain criteria for state recognition. & finally, concerning the degree of encroaching upon national sovereignty, there is a marked difference between the nature of the process of shaping a common foreign & security policy & shaping policies in other areas (e.g. transport, science & education, & so on). Also, the importance of developing an awareness of this difference as the main precondition for the realization of the project of the EU political integration is pointed out. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the genesis & the scenarios of the Kosovo crisis resolution, as well as the possible political reverberations of the NATO military intervention. The premise is that the Kosovo crisis is only a continuation of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia; Kosovo has for centuries been a separate entity largely populated by Albanians; the policy of Serbian nationalism has permanently discriminated against the Albanian population; & prior to the recent air strikes against Yugoslavia, Serbia had systematically led an ethnic-cleansing campaign on Kosovo. Although the author recognizes that support for the NATO military action can hardly be found in the tenets of the UN Charter, he argues that it can nevertheless be justified by international law. He points out that NATO's military campaign enjoyed the broad support of the people of NATO member countries, but that it has made a rift in the European Left. The new Left was in the forefront of the action, while the old, dogmatic, & sectarian Left found itself in the ranks of its most vocal opponents. The author claims that Milosevic, with his overall politics, & particularly his policy on Kosovo, had propelled the West into an action from which it could not extricate itself. He concludes that the consequences of Belgrade's defeat will be (1) the collapse of Milosevic's regime (the beginning of his end); (2) the final incapacitation of Milosevic's politics to create new conflicts; (3) the protectorate over Kosovo & its autonomy, with a factual independence from Serbia; (4) the independence of Montenegro; (5) Reinforcing the Dayton policy in Bosnia & Herzegovina (eliminating centrifugal tendencies); (6) the organized participation of the West in the transitional processes in this region (the pact on the stability of southeast Europe); & (7) bolstering the democratic & weakening the undemocratic tendencies in the region. Adapted from the source document.

This paper analyses international response to the Croatian military operation Maslenica in January 1993. Based on media comments and reactions of key international mediators in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the United Nations, France and Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, it seeks to answer the question of what the reaction was, how in reality it was in accordance with the proclaimed policies and how it fit into the overall international policy towards the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The paper is based on the documents of the United Nations, the analysis of several newspapers and reports of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It situates behaviour of the main participants within the context of 'carrots and sticks' strategy. The Maslenica operation had shown that international community would not prevent military interventions against the self-declared Republic of Srpska Krajina by Croatian forces. It thus announced what subsequently happened in 1995 with the decisive Operation Storm. Adapted from the source document.