Suchergebnisse

Defence date: 18 May 2020 (Online) ; Examining Board: Professor Ramon Marimon (EUI, Supervisor); Professor Russel Cooper (EUI); Professor Kjetil Storesletten (University of Oslo); Professor Iván Werning (MIT) ; This thesis investigates consumption insurance within economic unions from both a country and household perspective. Chapter 1 deals with the question of how an economic union like the Euro Area can support enough risk sharing, through transfer payments, to prevent the breakup of the union. I model the union as a dynamic contract between two countries. The contract captures two political restrictions which are especially relevant for the Euro Area. First, risk sharing must avoid `permanent' transfers (including repayments of debt) between countries. Second, there is a requirement that countries implement policies to improve economic performance, which is subject to moral hazard. Relative to the previous literature, the specification of the reform process makes the moral hazard component of the model more powerful by allowing reform effort to have a permanent effect. I then characterize the optimal transfer system, which trades off risk sharing against reform incentives. I propose an implementation of this transfer system using trading of one-period bonds with state-contingent debt restructuring. Chapter 2, which is co-authored with Johannes Fleck, deals with household earnings risk in the United States. We observe that due to differences in economic conditions across American states, and the autonomy which state governments have in implementing means tested policies, identical households may receive very different levels of earnings insurance from the government simply because they live in different states. We quantify this variation in public insurance by simulating the response of the main state and federal tax and benefit policies to earnings shocks for a prototype household, adjusting any nominal dollar amounts for purchasing power using our own measure of state living costs. We confirm that there is significant regional variation in household earnings insurance, with a large contribution coming from the design of the federal Earned Income Tax Credit. Chapter 3, which is joint work with Ramon Marimon and Alessandro Ferrari, returns somewhat to the theme of Chapter 1. We address a gap in the theoretical literature on optimal transfers in currency unions, which fails to account properly for the participation constraints imposed by each country's option to exit the union. We model a currency union as a dynamic contract between countries facing endowment risk and a nominal rigidity in the production of non-tradeable goods. The contract is constrained by each country's outside option of reclaiming its own monetary policy, which optimally eliminates the labour market distortion caused by the nominal rigidity, and defaulting on any payment obligations accumulated within the union. We find that there is still some scope for considerable risk sharing in the union, although the presence of the nominal rigidity introduces consumption risk into the stochastic steady state of the currency union. ; -- 1. Risk sharing and policy convergence in economic unions -- 2. Public insurance in heterogeneous fiscal federations - evidence from American households -- 3. Fiscal and currency union with default and exit

Mestrado em Economia e Políticas Públicas ; Esta dissertação pretende analisar o papel do Banco Central Europeu (BCE) na União Europeia e na crise da zona euro. Especialmente, procura compreender se a arquitetura inicial sobre a qual o BCE foi construído era adequada para responder aos desafios que se vieram colocar durante a crise, procurando analisar as alterações motivadas pelo desenvolvimento da crise. O BCE é uma instituição fundamental para a união monetária. Estando no centro da questão, dadas as características financeira e bancária da crise, o BCE tem vindo a enfrentar muitos desafios. Muitos têm criticado o papel do BCE na crise da zona euro, realçando a sua limitação de poderes pelos Tratados e a sua lentidão na resolução dos problemas de liquidez dos estados membros. Outros consideram que o BCE tem sido a instituição determinante para a resolução da crise. Mas durante o período em que a crise se foi aprofundando, e em que a crise financeira inicial evoluiu para a crise da zona euro, o BCE enfrentou e continua a enfrentar muitos desafios e mudanças, assumindo um papel decisivo na crise. No Sistema Monetário Europeu, o BCE é agora uma instituição mais forte com mais instrumentos e novos poderes. A União Europeia enfrentou o seu maior desafio e conseguiu sobreviver unida pelo euro. Contudo, o BCE, que tinha a estabilidade de preços como o seu principal objetivo, enfrenta agora o perigo de deflação. Manter a estabilidade financeira é agora um objetivo fundamental e a regulação das instituições financeiras é fundamental para a estabilidade da zona euro. Uma união bancária eficaz, capaz de regular a integração financeira e de efetuar uma supervisão bancária centralizada adequada é fundamental para a continuidade da zona euro. Nesta presumível fase final da crise europeia, o BCE tornou-se num banco central muito mais interventivo devido às circunstâncias excepcionais que tem vindo a enfrentar. Esta dissertação começa por caracterizar o papel de um banco central numa união monetária e os seus constrangimentos. Seguidamente, expõe as políticas, os instrumentos e a arquitetura original do BCE. No final, é abordado concretamente o papel do BCE na crise da zona euro com a análise paramétrica dos efeitos das políticas do BCE nas taxas de juro das dívidas soberanas. ; This dissertation is an attempt to explain the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the European Union and in the Eurozone crisis. In depth, it attempts to comprehend if the initial framework on which the ECB was built was designed to respond to the problems faced by the Eurozone, and to analyze the changes motivated by the course of the Eurozone crisis. The ECB is a key institution in the monetary union. Being at the heart of the problem, the ECB faces many challenges. Many have criticized the ECB's role in the current crisis, pointing out its lack of power and slowness in solving the Eurozone's problems, while others see the ECB as the main contributor to solving the ongoing crisis. But as the crisis deepened, and the initial financial crisis became the Eurozone crisis, the ECB has experienced many challenges and changes, playing a key role in the Eurozone crisis. The ECB is now a stronger European institution with more instruments and power. The European Union has faced its biggest challenge and has, for now, survived united by the euro. However, the ECB that saw price stability as its primary objective now faces the danger of deflation. Financial stability is now of major importance and the regulation of financial and banking institutions must be undertaken by the ECB in order to prevent future crisis. A strong Banking Union, capable to regulate financial integration and to supervise banking institutions is fundamental to the Eurozone. In this presumably final stage of the Eurozone crisis, the ECB has evolved into a much more active central bank, due to the exceptional circumstances. This work characterizes the role of a central bank in a monetary union and its constraints. After, it describes the ECB's framework, instruments and policies. Lastly, this dissertation addresses the ECB's role in the Eurozone crisis supported by a parametrical analysis of the effects of the ECB's measures on sovereign debts.

The social and electoral map of Nijmegen has changed, and so has the map of the Netherlands and Europe. A similar set of observations could be made in many cities across the continent. New patterns of voting behavior have emerged, reflecting new polarities in changing societies. These polarities are set in the context of centuries-old rivalries that still persist. One of the most striking recent developments is the rise of Euroskeptic right-wing populist parties. The Jun 2014 elections for the European Parliament turned them into major parties in several countries, particularly the UK, Denmark, and France. Left-wing populists got their share as well, especially in southern Europe. Here, De Voogd looks at the new political map of Europe. Adapted from the source document.

We assess the benefits of a potential European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS) using a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model with labour market frictions. Our calibration provides a novel diagnosis of the European labour markets, revealing the key parameters - in particular, job-separation and job-finding rates - that explain their different performance in terms of unemployment (or employment) and its persistence. We show that there are only small welfare gains from insuring against country-specific cyclical fluctuations in unemployment expenditures. However, we find that there are substantial gains from reforming currently suboptimal unemployment benefit systems. In spite of country differences, it is possible to unanimously agree on an EUIS with unlimited duration of eligibility, which eliminates the risk of not finding a job before the receipt of benefits ends, and a low replacement rate of 15%, which stabilizes incentives to work and save. We argue that such reforms are more effectively designed at the European level than at the national level because national governments do not take into account general equilibrium effects of their reforms on citizens in other countries. Concerns regarding the political feasibility of such a system are addressed through country-specific contribution payments that eliminate cross-country transfers. The resulting tax differences across countries may be the best statistic of their structural labour market differences, in terms of job creation and destruction, providing clear incentives for reform. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

KEY ISSUES Context: Austria did not experience a severe boom-bust cycle and came through the crisis relatively well. The main impact was on the banking sector and public debt. With cyclical slack low and the recovery taking hold, this is the time to resolve crisis legacies and address long-standing structural issues. Outlook and risks: The recovery is taking hold, driven by a pick-up in exports. The most acute risks are mainly geopolitical and could in particular lead to financial spillovers. Financial sector policies: Bank restructuring should now be rapidly completed and bad asset disposal accelerated. Large internationally active banks should stand ready for further capital increases, and the EU banking union framework needs to be swiftly transposed at the national level. Public expenditure reforms: More decisive expenditure reforms in key areas such as pensions, health care, subsidies, and fiscal federalism would generate savings that could be used for both an accelerated debt reduction and lower labor taxation. Boosting potential output growth: Enhancing IT adaptation, improving the performance of the education system, facilitating access to financing for innovative start- ups, and reducing administrative barriers for new businesses would raise potential growth and labor productivity

Asset securitization across borders offers not only increased opportunities, but also increased risk for those structuring financing packages. Lawyers and accountants examine the basis for using asset securitization, basic elements and "players" in the asset securitization process, implementation of such new assets as intellectual property rights bonds, Bowie bonds, Rod Stewart bonds, and James Bond bonds, and the impact of European monetary union. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint

AbstractEuropean monetary union presents a paradox. On the one hand, despite three years of continuous battering and pounding, the euro still exists. On the other, the crisis has revealed serious flaws in the governance of the Euro Area and it has become clear that the old system of managing the euro macroeconomy is not sustainable. This article attempts to explain this apparent contradiction and how to resolve it.

A multicountry econometric model and stochastic simulation are used to estimate the stabilization costs of the European Monetary Union (EMU). A measure of the variability of output and other variables is computed for the current regime and for the EMU regime. The results show that Germany is hurt the most in terms of increased output variability in moving from the current regime to the EMU regime.

The 'Stability Pact' agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 and concluded at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 prescribes sanctions for countries that breach the Maastricht deficit ceiling in stage three of European Monetary Union. This paper explores the central provisions and possible motivations of the Stability Pact as an incentive device for fiscal discipline and as a partial substitute for policy coordination and a common 'stability culture'.

There are at least two reasons why sustainability of public debt is an issue of increasing importance. First, public choice considerations show the danger of excessive use of deficit finance in a democracy. Second, the conditions of a European Monetary Union imply further incentives for deficit finance. The following paper presents various approaches to assessing the sustainability of public debt and applies them to the EC countries.

As a member of the franc zone, the devaluation of the Ivory Coast currency – the C.F.A. franc – was automatic upon the French devaluation of August 1969. The purpose of this short article is to analyse the implications and consequences of the French action for the Ivory Coast, in the hope that this will throw some light on the pros and cons of such a centre–periphery monetary union.

There have been numerous attempts to reform the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) after the Great Recession, however the reform success varies greatly among sub-fields. Additionally, the political science research community has engaged a diverse set of theory- driven explanations, causal mechanisms, and variables to explain respective reform success. This article takes stock of reform policies in the EMU from two angles. First, it outlines distinct theoretical approaches that seek to explain success and failure of reform proposals and second, it surveys how they explain policy output and policy outcome in four policy subfields: financial stabilization, economic governance, financial solidarity, and cooperative dissolution. Finally, the article develops a set of explanatory factors from the existing literature that will be used for a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).