Suchergebnisse

How much is beauty worth in dollars? Some people may recoil at the very phrasing of this question. Yet placing a monetary value on natural resources is not inherently destructive. Custom places a monetary value on artwork. Capitalism even values beautiful natural vistas in the form of land prices. Placing a monetary value on beauty and other features of nature may be essential if one is to protect natural resources fully. This Article explores the proper monetary valuation under Superfund and other legislation of natural objects,' including living animals, aesthetic views, and water purity. The path to achieving valuation is rife with pitfalls, both philosophical and practical. Should the law focus on the monetary value to those people who "consume beauty for gain," as in the free market, or should government also consider beauty's existence and intrinsic value to the rest of society, which may"consume it to live." If the latter, then what dollar value possibly can be used?

TOO MUCH POWER IS IN THE HANDSOF LARGE CORPORATIONS, AND LARGE COMPANIES DOMINATE AND CONTROL TOO MUCH OF MARKETS AND SUPPLIES. THE PAPER IS A PLEA FOR CANADA TO PURSUE THE EXPLORATION FOR, AND DEVELOPMENTOF, NATURAL RESOURCES BY CROWN CORPORATIONS

State web portal to provide a single place to discover, learn about, and access available salmon and watershed data for Washington State. This represents the first phase in the development of this portal and includes a searchable catalog with simple links to datasets and their associated metadata ("data about the data"). This catalog currently includes spatial datasets, tabular datasets, reports and studies. This site has been designed for a wide range of users who may be interested in salmon and watershed data including scientists, watershed planners/managers, consultants, and the general public.

pt. 4. Our mineral resources [by] G.O. Smith. The production and waste of mineral resources and their bearing on conservation [by] J.A. Holmes. Preservation of the phosphates and the conservation of the soil [by] C.R. Van Hise. ; pt. 1. Forestry on private lands [by] G. Pinchot. Public regulation of private forests [by] H.S. Graves. Can the states regulate private forests? [by] F.C. Zacharie.--pt. 2. Water as a resource [by] W.J. McGee. Water power in the United States [by] M.O. Leighton. The scope of state and federal legislation concerning the use of waters [by] C.E. Wright. The necessity for state or federal regulation of water power development [by] C.W. Baker. Federal control of water power in Switzerland [by] T. Cleveland.--pt. 3. Classification of the public lands [by] G.W. Woodruff. A summary of our most important land laws [by] K. Nelson. Indian lands: their administration with reference to present and future use [by] F.E. Leupp. The conservation and preservation of soil fertility [by] C.G. Hopkins. Farm tenure in the United States [by] H. Gannett. What may be accomplished by reclamation [by] F.H. Newell. The legal problems of reclamation of lands by means in irrigation [by] M. Bien. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Although the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction.