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The author considers Jurgen Habermas's conceptualization of & concern about the "pressure of the street." In the realm of the street, force or violence often overwhelm reason. In Habermas's theory, both civil society & the state hover precariously above an abyss symbolized by the street. 22 References. A. Funderburg

The author considers Jurgen Habermas's conceptualization of & concern about the "pressure of the street." In the realm of the street, force or violence often overwhelm reason. In Habermas's theory, both civil society & the state hover precariously above an abyss symbolized by the street. 22 References. A. Funderburg

Traces legal scholar Ronald Dworkin's developing work in legal & political philosophy; describes both his constructive theory of law & his understanding of liberal equality; & summarizes his argument about the ethical foundations of liberalism. Dworkin views law as an interpretive concept & general theories of law as constructive interpretations. His definition of liberal equality links equality, liberty, & community into a general political ideal that emphasizes the need for compensatory strategies to reduce inequalities. Other issues discussed include Dworkin's recent defenses of the foundations of liberalism; distinctions he draws between volitional & critical interests; & dilemmas associated with critical interests. A look at differences between the impact model & the challenge model of value notes that Dworkin believes the ethical roots of political liberalism are found in the challenge model of ethics. Dworkin's most recent work is summarized to conclude that his legal theory needs further philosophical development, especially in regard to his argument about the superiority of the challenge model. J. Lindroth

Examines the philosophical arguments made in Karl Marx's dissertation, a work dedicated to moving beyond Hegelian philosophy by determining the conditions in which an abstract generality becomes a concrete objectivity. This subject is pursued in the context of a demonstration that a basic philosophical difference exists between the philosophies of Democritus & Epicurus, in that Epicurus distinguishes between the atom as principle & structural element, while Democritus remains aware only of the latter. While Marx ultimately failed to find an answer to his general question, it is suggested that the exercise produced an invaluable, basic Marxist insight: the epistemological foundations of science cannot be established on the basis of a form of individual reductionism; rather, science can be constructed only on the basis of a notion of the collective individual. 15 References. D. Ryfe

Explores the theoretical orientation of judge & author Richard Posner who describes his general philosophy as "pragmatism." Posner applies an empirically & economically oriented social science approach to issues of law & justice. A socially liberal but economically conservative libertarian, Posner claims the legal formalism & "academic moralism" of political philosophers like John Rawls & Ronald Dworkin fails to pay enough attention to facts or consequences. He argues that debates about such contentious issues as affirmative action are "unproductive when they concern the moral requirements of an abstract ideal like racial equality." Posner's views on questions of sexual morality & public policy utilize an "economic" analysis that supports a diminished role for government. It is contended that Posner is best described as a "quasi-rule pragmatist" in regard to the role of the judiciary because he rejects both "act pragmatism" & "pure judicial formalism" in favor of a narrower kind of pragmatism that limits judges' freedom to ignore traditional sources of law. Similarities are pointed out between Posner's theorizing & the theories he critiques. J. Lindroth

In den aktuellen Kulturkämpfen kritisieren Konservative Identitätspolitik und "Cancel Culture" als Einschränkungen von individueller Freiheit. Der Artikel untersucht die dabei zugrundeliegenden Freiheitsbegriffe. Die konservative Kritik stützt sich in der Regel auf einen negativen Begriff von Freiheit als Nichteinmischung im Sinne der liberalen Tradition. In der politischen Theorie wird ein solcher negativer Freiheitsbegriff als Gegensatz zur Auffassung von sozialer Freiheit gesehen, die Freiheit in hegelianischer und kommunitaristischer Tradition als ein gemeinschaftliches Unternehmen begreift. Der Artikel zeigt, dass beide Konzepte - trotz ihrer philosophischen Gegensätze - in der zeitgenössischen konservativen Kritik an Identitätspolitik übereinstimmen und daher politisch kompatibel sind. Beide Freiheitsbegriffe kranken an einem falschen Universalismus. Im Gegensatz dazu hilft die radikaldemokratische Tradition, Freiheit partikularistisch zu verstehen. Dabei wird verständlich, dass Identitätspolitik nicht in erster Linie eine Einschränkung individueller Freiheit ist, sondern als Demokratisierung der Demokratie ein Beitrag zur Freiheit aller ist.

In der Debatte um Freiheit bei Foucault wird das "Freiheitsproblem" verhandelt: Wie können Freiheit und Widerstand innerhalb von Foucaults Theorie der Macht und Subjektivierung konzipiert werden? Der Aufsatz leistet eine Rekonstruktion und interne Kritik der besten Interpretationsstrategien von Foucaults Werk, die die Lösung dieses Problems zum Ziel haben, und entwickelt dabei eine neue These: Freiheit als Fähigkeit zur reflexiven Kritik der eigenen Subjektivierung ist abhängig von freiheitlicher Subjektivierung durch politische Institutionen. Die Interpretationsstrategien werden systematisch unterschieden und anhand der Arbeiten exemplarischer Vertreter_innen diskutiert: 1. Foucault ist kohärent (Paul Patton), 2. Foucault korrigiert sich (Thomas Lemke), 3. Foucault kritisiert kohärent (Martin Saar), 4. Foucault ist nicht genug (Amy Allen). Gegen Lemke wird argumentiert, dass Freiheit nicht durch eine anarchistische, sondern nur durch eine institutionalistische Foucault-Lesart bestimmt werden kann. Mit Saar wird gezeigt, dass das Ziel einer eindeutigen Definition von Freiheit im Gegensatz zur Methode der genealogischen Kritik steht und nur im Rahmen der normativen politischen Theorie verfolgt werden kann. In Auseinandersetzung mit Allen wird argumentiert, dass Freiheit nicht in linken Bewegungen verortet werden kann, sondern nur in demokratischen Institutionen.

"The concept of resentment is inherently linked to the cultural criticism of Europe and the West. By way of this cultural criticism and affirmative reaction to it, the syndromes of resentment are widespread in non-European cultures. Thus resentment is also linked to the often diverse multiple formulations of the cultural programs of modernity. The conventional usage of the term would suggest that resentment means a sort of envy of the socially and culturally deprived or a psychological reactive attitude of the unjustly treated who are - morally or factually - deprived to act for revenge and justice. However, in Nietzsche's genealogy of morals, we are informed that Christian altruism and generalised morals of love produce a sort of self-distancing disinterestedness, a general value orientation which in itself remains non-interested in the fate of values in general and in the fate of the other in specific. For Nietzsche, it were priests and other office holders who with their own distancing attitude were - in the process of civilizational constitution of Europe - strongly involved in featuring the general laws of the 'morality of resentment' (i. e. the religious and intellectual formulations of restraint against immediate revengeful action) and in making it the most ambiguous and powerful cultural tool ('Kulturwerkzeug') in the construction of modernity. Since Max Weber the social philosophy of modernity and modernization was - in an affirmative turn - to a large extent engaged in developing science and rationality, as non-resentful components of modern self-construction, professionalism and individualism. The point is that the constitution and reconstitution of the cultural and institutional programs of modernity are as a whole fossils of the inherent struggle to come to grips with 'resentment' and the challenges of the cultural criticism of modernity. Moreover, and following this statement, the essential point is that modern dialogue - in as far as it is determined by the logic to overcome or even to suppress the 'Kulturkritik' on which it was originally built - remains at large inapt to understand the constitution and reconstitution of the non-modern, the non-European and the non-western in contemporary cross-civilizational exchange. I will develop this line of argument by looking closer to the conditions and potentials of dialogue between Muslims and Europeans in the contemporary scene which is so strongly marked by the 'resurgence' of religion and the new modes in which religious components enter or are re-entering today the cultural and political arenas of modernity." (author's abstract)