Suchergebnisse

The idea underlying the politics of the Independent People's Party (Samostalna narodna stranka), emphasized already in the program of 1863, was the principle that Croatia had rights as an independent entity and consonant with this the duty to determine the status of its rights in the Monarchy independently, and not in conjunction with Hungary. In accordance with this principle the Party took as a point of departure its political conceptions of 1848 from which arose the separation of Croatia from Hungary. Although of all parties, the Independent People's Party built least on historical rights, it was prepared to turn to them in order to strengthen the position of Croatia as a state. It differed from the other parties in that the viewpoints of the aristocrats received least expression in its publications, and it favored the democratization of politics, with the involvement of the widest range of social strata in political life. Regarding the central government, the Independent press emphasized that the Croatian Office and the Viennese government did not have the same goals; to verify this assertion they indicated that the programmatic document "Conditionally or Unconditionally?" originated with the sanction of the Office. The demands expressed in this document were certainly not in accord with the centralistic tendencies in the Viennese government. Conditions for entrance into the Emperor's Council were, namely, an independent and autonomous budget, unification with Dalmatia and with a part of Krajina. Besides this it was emphasized that the Croatian Constitution and autonomy could not come into question, nor could the government ministers interfere in the issue of Croatia's autonomy. It was further emphasized that Inasmuch as Hungary obtained a different status as a state, those same rights must also be granted to Croatia. In their writings the Independent politicians sharply differentiated between two freedoms: the political freedom of citizens and the freedom to develop national identity, and they consistently supported the latter. They were convinced that within the Hungarian community of nations, Croatians would not be able to attain conditions conductive to free national development, and hence supported an agreement with Vienna. Aside from this, they hinted that in the event an agreement with Vienna could not be reached, the Croatians still had the opportunity to negotiate with Budapest. On the other hand, inasmuch as the Croatians would first negotiate with Budapest, or rather send their representatives to the Hungarian Assembly, the significance of the Croatian Assembly would be greatly reduced and would become completely dependent on the Hungarian Assembly. In this event there would be no further possibility for Croatia to enter into any other combination of states' rights. They further stressed, quite correctly, that the Hungarians themselves were making agreements with Vienna and that in some transactions they treated the Monarchy as an equal unity. Insofar as negotiations were already under way, the Independents were convinced that it was more advantageous for Croatians to take part in them immediately rather than directly with Hungary. In spite of the fact that the program demanded a lot, the majority of the populists did not support it from distrust that the program was merely a decoy to draw the Croatians into the Emperor's Council. The Independents were convinced that the main reason for this distrust was the widespread conviction that the goals of the Viennese government and the Croatian Office were identical, so they attacked such assertions in their publications. However, despite this, the majority of the populists continued to reject Independent policies and in their resistence joined the Unionists; in this way they strengthened the dualistic trend, which even without this support, became stronger in the political life of the Monarchy.

Considering the System theory the author conceives the Yugoslav enterprise to be an open system. Moreover critically taking into consideration all the various definitions for the purpose of operationalization he defines the environment as a communicative influential domain, integrating in this way the theory of the environment and of the organization. Accepting the phenomenological hypothesis and considering the actual influence as equaling the perceptional one — the influence has been investigated, with a help of some innovations, by means of the graph of control on the top management in 55 industrial organizations. The difference between the external and internal, passive and active influences has been distinguished. Internal influence is the one within and the external is the one outside the relevant enterprise; passive is the one to which the respondent is subjected by other members of the organization and active is the one which is exercised by the respondent on other members of the organization. According to the indexes got in this way the enterprises seem to be influenced by the examined factors of the environment to a larger extant than vice versa. The grouping of the bodies of the environment has shown the dominant status of the bank and the trade organizations in their relation to the industrial enterprises. Still that environment is not very much like the system that was typical of eighteenth century liberal capitalism although it might appear so. Considering the system of the country itself we seem to be speaking of the seemingly liberal environment with the state itself appearing indirectly through the banks. The results seem to be confirmed and even more differentiated by the factor analysis. Regarding the internal influence it should be pointed out that the influence of the top management on the organizational groups in the enterprises is almost equal to the amount of the influence exercised on the top management by the organizational groups. Generally, the internal organizational relationships of influence are more intensive and more balanced. We can assume that the social relations between the organizational groups within the enterprises are more socialized and more integrated than the relations between the enterprises and their environment. Top management in an enterprise has a marginal relation towards the political representatives, a central relation towards the professionals and self-managing bodies and a firm-hierarchical-superordination-and-superordination-relation towards managerial groups. The analysis of the correlations has shown that the active and passive external influences make up a united system of power — if viewed from the standpoint of the top management. That does not mean that the top management are exposed to the system of total control because there is also a united system of influence, which is exercised by the top management on the bodies outside the enterprise. In the same way the uncontrolled power does not appear either in the influence of the top management on the organizational groups within the enterprise. So we claim the existence of only two integrated subsystems of the active and passive influences. The increasing influence of the top management on the environment and the organizational groups leads to the reverse influence, that is, the increasing influence of the environment and organizational groups on the top management, exhibiting thus clearly the logic of the reciprocal influence. The author has found out a considerably different influence of the environment within the work organizations than he expected. He expected the influence of the administrative-political environment to lessen the internal active influence of the top management, and the influence of the business professional environment to increase the internal active and passive influences of the top management, and the influence of the trade organizations to increase the active internal influence of the top management. He has found out that the redistribution of power within the work organizations is not influenced by the administrative political environment, and that the influence of the top management within the enterprise is even diminished by the trade-organizations. Moreover, though in a system of external- -internal power-relations the self-managerial bodies and political organizations are not reduced to being merely marginal factors, the backbone of the whole system of the external-internal power-relations still makes the influence of the top management on the leading organizational groups and the influence of the business organizations on the enterprises. That means that the business circle from other enterprises exercises a considerable influence on the internal status of the top management within individual enterprises, and thus on the interactions between the other managerial groups as well. This circulus vitiosus of power is uncontrolled and spontaneous product of the division of labor at the macro-level of the whole society and also at the micro-level of the work-organizations because it makes possible an intensive reciprocal influence between the external and internal managerial groups. This proves the functional autonomization of the management which will be sustained spontaneously up the time when a functionally adequate, and not only politically adequate redistribution of managerial function will be varied out.