Suchergebnisse

The Russian Federation belongs to the small group of States which have enacted special legislation on the domestic procedures with respect to international treaties. The new Federal Law on International Treaties, which was adopted by the Russian State Duma on 16 June 1995, regulates the procedure for the conclusion, fullfillment, and termination of treaties of the Russian Federation. The 1995 Law replaces the Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution, and Denunciation of International Treaties of the U.S.S.R of 6 July 1978. The present introduction to the new law draws attention in particular to the fact that, although many rules of the new law are patterned along the model of the old law, the new law has a different significance within the new Russian constitutional framework. This is at least true for those rules which determine the respective powers of the State Duma and the President. Rules, which, under a system of unity of state power, could be considered as having a mere technical character, acquire political significance under a system of separation of powers. Noteworthy are, therefore, in particular those rules which give the State Duma powers which surpass those of the legislatures in most Western countries (power of initiatives and of compulsion to conclude and to terminate a treaty). Since, however, the new law does not possess constitutional rank, it is probable that the Russian Constitutional Court will have to decide upcoming disputes as to whether the law has correctly specified the general rules which are laid down in the constitution. (ZaöRv/SWP)

By proposing the European Political Union (Fouchet Plan), General de Gaulle had wanted to get the political unification process which had been stagnating for quite some time, under way again. The Union was not only meant as a political superstructure to the existing Communities (which in his eyes had a more or less «technical«role to play), but should help overcome the East-West stalemate and give Europe the say to which it was entitled. France and Germany were to be its indispensable motor. When the Fouchet Plan failed, the General and Chancellor Adenauer drove towards a genuine union between France and Germany which, they firmly believed, the other four would join if only the two of them went straightforwardly ahead. This gave rise to the idea of the Franco-German Treaty of January 1963. But hardly signed, the Treaty met with such savage opposition from all Western political quarters and the «European integrationists» (as well as that of the Soviets) that it was on the brink of failure. The political circles and the press in Germany, frightened at that reaction, emsily adopted the idea of a preamble to the Treaty. Even Adenauer, much against his feelings, had to put up with it. Thus the Treaty, instead of paving the way to a «genuine merger» between the two nations and thus of the Europe of Six, was reduced to nothing more than an agreement on regular consultations.