AbstractField experiments, in which the researcher manipulates one or more variables in a naturally occurring setting, have sometimes been used in studies of social conflict and should probably be used more often. They are more useful than observational studies for assessing the impact of novel conditions, establishing cause and effect, and reducing confounding. And they are more useful than laboratory experiments for examining long-term effects and those that involve strong passions, and for establishing external validity. However field experiments also have their limitations. Some variables cannot be practically or ethically manipulated and require the use of observational methods, which are also more useful for looking at the relationships among a large number of variables and for estimating the strength of association between variables. Furthermore, laboratory experiments allow more control of conditions and greater flexibility in designing manipulations. What this suggests is that all three methods have their value.
This article aims to evaluate the implications of the general elections inBurma in 2015 for the ongoing armed conflicts in this country. The article isconceptually based on Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflict.This theory was chosen because ethnic armed organizations in Burma havealways emphasized needs such as securing their own identity, security, andthe possibility of political participation, which are the main tenets of Azar'stheory. For the purposes of this article, a series of field studies in selectedlocations was carried out in the years 2016–2017. This research hascomplemented some of the previous findings of a number of authors whohave dealt with the region and has shown that the main obstacle to settlingthe conflict is the current Burmese constitution, which was issued in 2008by the former military government at the end of its reign.
This article has two goals. First, using district-level panel data we identify key determinants of violent crime, nonviolent crime, and crime against women in India, 1990-2007. Second, using district-level variation in regard to Maoist-driven social conflict, we examine how social conflict affects crime and its determinants. In addition to conventional determinants of crime (e.g., law enforcement and economic variables), we examine how variation in sex ratios affects crime. We also study whether the gender of the chief political decisionmaker in each state affects crime. We find that improvements in arrest rates decreases the incidence of all types of crimes. Socioeconomic variables have relatively little explanatory power. We also find evidence that unbalanced sex ratios, particularly in rural areas, increase crime. The presence of a female Chief Minister diminishes violent crime and, especially, crimes against women. Finally, we find that in districts affected by the Maoist insurgency, all types of crime are lower and we offer explanations for why that may be the case.
Social conflict, as opposed to armed conflict, has received less attention in the field of quantitative research. This paper investigates the structural causes of political violence in 35 African states using data from the Social Conflict in Africa dataset and the Beck and Katz panel corrected standard errors time series regression model. Theoretically, a closed political opportunity structure, combined with a weak state unable to provide public goods, should together produce high levels of social conflict. The independent variables attempt to operationalize these concepts from four different angles. In this analysis Access to Education and Infrastructure (AEI), Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), Freedom in the World Political Rights (FIW), and National Material Capabilities (NMC) were all significant predictors of social conflict. This study found that as the level of ethnic fractionalization and material capabilities within states rose, the frequency of social conflict events also increased. However, as access to infrastructure and political rights declined, the number of social conflict events increased. Wald chi-square and R-square values suggest that the model is complete and has substantial explanatory power. ; 2014-08-01 ; B.A. ; Sciences, Dept. of Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
Both structural-functional theory & conflict theory provide useful models of society. However, the elements of the structural-functional model are diametrically opposed to those of conflict theory, so that in the former the following propositions hold: (1) every society is a relatively persisting configuration of elements, (2) every society is a well-integrated configuration of elements, (3) every element in a society contributes to its functioning, & (4) every society rests on the consensus of its members. In conflict theory, on the other hand, the following propositions hold: (a) every society is subjected at every moment to change: soc change is ubiquitous, (b) every society experiences at every moment soc conflict: soc conflict is ubiquitous, (c) every element in a society contributes to its change, & (d) every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others. Until a more general theory of society is developed, society must be thought of as presenting a double aspect to the sociol'al understanding. A model of conflict is constructed which locates the structural origin of soc conflict in the dominance relations which prevail within certain units of soc org. Max Weber's concept of 'imperatively co-ordinated group' is employed for these units. Thus soc conflicts are structurally explained on the basis of the division into positive & negative dominance roles, so that: (i) interest in the status quo is associated with the positive dominance roles & interest in the change of the status quo is associated with the negative dominance roles, (ii) the bearers of positive & negative dominance roles organize themselves into groups with manifest interests, (iii) interest groups which originate in this manner are in constant conflict concerned with the preservation or change in the status quo, & (iv) the conflict among interest groups leads to changes in the structure of the soc relations in question through changes in the dominance relations. Interest groups are a function of conditions of org; specific forms of conflict are a function of the conditions of conflict; & specific forms of change are a function of the conditions of change. 'Thus the task of the theory of conflict turns out to be to identify the 3 sets of conditions & to determine as sharply as possible their respective weight - ideally, by quantitative measure.' Illustrations of the theory & the sorts of variables involved are given from the realms of industrial conflict & the totalitarian state. I. Taviss.
