This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal investment path in a model that places no restrictions on the growth of collateral. Our model predicts that neither positive wealth of the entrepreneur nor the lack of discounting ensures that all profitable projects proceed. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the project to be financeable when there are no costs of delay.
Technology commercialization needs a large amount of financial resources and governments in developed and developing countries play a critical role in resource allocation to the technology commercialization, especially through "Technology Development Funds (TDFs)". But, because of resource limitations, determining high priority technologies with higher impact on the country's innovative performance and the optimal resource allocation to technology development is very important for science and technology policymakers. "Technology portfolio planning" has been developed and applied in this regard. Accordingly, a two-phase decision-making framework has been proposed. At the first phase, the priorities of technology fields are determined by using the best-worst method (BWM) and at the second phase, a two-stage stochastic technology portfolio planning model is developed by considering technological projects' risks and export market, as one of the important factor in the "Global Innovation Index" (GII) ranking. It also has been considered technology fields' priorities, staged-financing, moratorium period, reinvestment strategy, and technology readiness levels (TRL) in allocating financial resources to technological projects The main advantages of our proposed model are considering uncertainty and early signaling about under performing technological projects Due to the uncertain nature of the problem, our solution methodology is based on the Sample Average Approximation (SAA). In order to demonstrate the applicability of this model, a real case study and its computational results are presented.
AbstractThis paper uses real options analysis to study later round financing in the presence of two standard venture capital contracting provisions: anti‐dilution (ratchet) and liquidation preference. We argue that such provisions can preclude financing of a positive NPV venture in the case of a large follow‐on financing relative to firm value. Liquidation preference contracting at multiples greater than one is not feasible in the later round if the financing is small relative to firm value. We highlight an interaction effect between the two provisions: increasing the liquidation multiple can help to avoid dilution and the need for the prior venture capitalist to waive ratchet provisions.
Paper presented at the 4th Strathmore International Mathematics Conference (SIMC 2017), 19 - 23 June 2017, Strathmore University, Nairobi, Kenya. ; This study involves modelling healthcare financing in Kenya. The 2001 Abuja Declaration that requires governments to allocate at least fifteen percent (15%) of their total budgets to health and the universal $60 health per capita target are used as benchmarks in this study. The proposed model that is used for modelling healthcare financing in Kenya is the Green Path Model (GPM). GPM consists of a six-staged path that involves identification of health financing gaps at both National and County level, issuing of a Social Impact Bond, SIB, and a conceptual shift to the Circular Economy, CE framework and refocusing on repayment of the social investors. At the final stage, the surplus amount generated from the Circular Economy's green initiatives is channeled to the Green Fund – pool of funds in a Green Bank thus filling up the health financing deficits. This study found out that as at now, Kenya has neither allocated at least 15% of its total budget to health nor met the universal $60 health per capita target both at National and County Level.
New venture financing : considerations and choices -- Venture capital and angel investing -- Venture deals -- New venture strategy and real options -- Developing venture strategy using simulation -- Revenue forecasting -- Financial modeling -- Assessing cash needs -- Foundations of new venture valuation -- New venture valuation in practice -- Designing and valuing staged investment with real options -- Harvesting -- The future of entrepreneurial finance.
This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, first, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. The results suggest that governments attempting to postpone the legal retirement age should increase the degree of intra-generational redistribution of the pension system in order to make the reform aimed at more easily achievable. More importantly, the most productive individuals could support some degree of redistribution to that aim.
This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, firstly, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system, and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. Our results suggest that an increase in the re-distributive character of the system could lead to a larger social consensus to postpone the legal retirement age. Surprisingly, it could be the case that the richest people would support more redistribution if that implies to postpone the pensionable age.
