Suchergebnisse

Data from a study of internat'l conflict in the Middle East supported by the Office of Naval Res are drawn upon. The focus is on the manner in which decision-make rs in an internat'l conflict situation perceive themselves, their allies, & their enemies. A content analysis of 82 Egyptian & Israeli documents relevant to internat'l pol was done for 3 time periods: (1) Oct 27-Nov 10, 1956; (2) Nov 11-Nov 24, 1956; & (3) Nov 25-Dec 5, 1956. Data show that to a large extent the findings of small group studies are also relevant to nations: Winners & losers in intergroup competition will hold diff evaluations of themselves, their allies, & their enemies. As hyp'ed, & with few inconsistencies, Egypt was appraised positively in Period (1) by Egyptians, but less positively in Periods (2) & (3); Egypt's allies were appraised positively in Period (1), but less positively in Periods (2) & (3); & Egypt's enemies were perceived negatively in Period (1) & less negatively in (2) & (3). For Israel, the findings, as hyp'ed were: (a) Israel was appraised positively by Israelis in Period (1) & more positively in Periods (2) & (3); (b) Israel's allies were evaluated positively in Period (1) & more positively in Periods (2) & (3); (c) Israel's enemies were perceived negatively in Period (1) & more negatively in Periods (2) & (3). 6 Tables. M. Maxfield.

A new conflict analysis technique is employed to analyze the international crisis that was created when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956. The Suez Crisis involved the use of strategic surprise by the Egyptians and it is clearly demonstrated how this type of situation can be readily modelled by utilizing contemporary methods from conflict analysis. The analysis algorithm provides a procedure for systematically studying the implications of the Suez Crisis and also for predicting what possible scenarios could have taken place.