Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Since its inception, the inter-state dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation has generally been praised for effectively protecting the rule of law in international trade relations. While the relatively recent dismantling of this system does not necessarily mean the end of the WTO nor of the binding nature of its rules, the current crisis may be a good opportunity to reconsider the role of the rule of law in international trade relations and the ways in which it could further be accommodated. One suggestion, occasionally raised in the past, would be strengthening the enforcement of WTO rules by opening it to private action, either before national courts or through international adjudication. After all, the latter has been widely available to foreign investors covered by thousands of international investment agreements in force for decades. This contribution recalls the reasons behind the current lack of private enforcement of WTO law and argues that developments in international trade relations and experiences with investor-state dispute settlement are likely to work against rather than in favor of its introduction in the foreseeable future. Increased transparency and institutionalisation of non-state actors' role in trade enforcement is therefore recommended instead.

As tariffs have fallen dramatically over the past decades, behind-the-border measures—such as technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures—have become increasingly important for international trade policy. To facilitate trade, governments sign trade agreements in which they agree to base such measures on international standards. But who actually develops these standards? This book takes a close look at the International Organization for Standardization and the Codex Alimentarius – two prominent standard-setting organizations in the area of TBT and SPS – to investigate how international standardization influences the design of international trade agreements, and vice versa.

Recent critiques of decentralized approaches to fisheries management have focused on problems related to poor governance. This paper aims to extend such critiques by considering in greater depth local perceptions of governance in the Philippines. Specifically, it deals with a set of regulations addressing the live reef fish trade in the Calamianes Islands. The paper shows how the entire process of implementing a closed season, the fishers' critique, and the subsequent overturning of these regulations exposes the way personalized politics is understood and practiced within Philippine society. Firstly, a background about the live reef fish trade is provided, and how the regulations were proposed and developed is described. The majority of the paper then analyses local opposition to the regulations in terms of local understandings of politics. The paper argues that when negative sentiments towards governance and governments are widespread among local residents, this may hinder successful co-management.

Reforms of international trade and investment law and institutions are hampered by conflicting economic paradigms. For instance, utilitarian Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism (e.g. promoting self-regulatory market forces privileging the homo economicus), constitutional European ordo-liberalism (e.g. protecting multilevel, constitutional rights and judicial remedies of EU citizens), and authoritarian state-capitalism (e.g. protecting totalitarian power monopolies of the communist party in China) pursue different legal and institutional designs of trade and investment agreements. Globalization and its transformation of national into transnational public goods (PGs) require extending constitutional and institutional economics to multilevel governance of transnational PGs in order to enhance the wealth of nations. Maintaining the worldwide legal and dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - and interpreting its regional and national exception clauses broadly in order to reconcile diverse, national and regional institutions of economic integration and of 'embedded liberalism' - remains in the interest of all WTO member states.

This paper is published simultaneously by the European University Institute as a School of Transnational Governance Report. ; The EU may not be a superpower but it holds a 'power surplus' when it comes to the trade-regulatory nexus. The strategic challenges posed by the deployment of this power surplus are the subject of this paper, which argues that in order to be a responsible regulatory power and positively influence the multilateral agenda, the EU needs to develop a coherent overall approach to the external dimension of its regulatory policies. In this spirit, and in most cases, the EU would be ill advised to project itself as a model or to seek to 'weaponise' its regulatory powers in pursuit of unrelated foreign policy goals. Instead, it should wield this power to enhance the regulatory compatibility between its own and others' jurisdictions through cooperation rather than relying on the passive market-based influence of the so-called Brussels effect. This is simply a way to be faithful to its core defining philosophy of legal empathy. The CEPS Policy Insight by authors Ignacio Garcia Bercero and Kalypso Nicolaides offers a typology of different forms of external EU regulatory impact, a discussion of the risks of either underuse or overuse of the regulatory power surplus, and considers the 'good global governance' model implied by a principled geopolitical role. It moves on to discuss a unifying conceptual framework to encompass this approach, under the umbrella of 'managed mutual recognition' as the operationalisation of legal empathy. It concludes with six specific suggestions as to how the EU can best exercise its regulatory power through a closer integration of trade and regulatory policies. ; Introduction -- Cooperation as residual: the global impact of EU regulatory policies -- The EU's regulatory power surplus: how should it be used? -- An integrated approach to managed mutual recognition: legal empathy and the regulatory compatibility paradigm -- Recommendations: globalising legal empathy -- Postscript

The setting is 25 February 1603. At dawn the three ships under the supreme command of Jakob van Heemskerk spot a Portuguese carrack in anchor off the Eastern shores of Singapore Island. She was richly laden with wares from China and Japan. The battle for the carrack lasted for most hours of daylight, and as night was about to fall, the Portuguese captain, crew, soldiers and passengers surrendered. They forfeited ship and cargo for having their lives spared.

American political parties frequently advance contradictory arguments in policy debates, but scholars know relatively little about where these arguments originate. Outside research-producing institutions are likely culprits. Have the research and advocacy efforts of these groups helped structure policy discussions along party lines, thereby contributing to partisan polarization? I answer this question by tracing the diffusion of policy language related to cap-and-trade regulations across actors and over time. Utilizing quantitative network and text analysis techniques, as well as qualitative textual analysis, I find that outside groups inform policy discussions through their early research. First, prominent organizations develop ideas and talking points that then spread to other groups. Second, members of Congress adopt these talking points and use them to justify their views to their constituents. Importantly, the diffusion of arguments is most likely among actors with shared partisan commitments, resulting in two relatively cohesive and distinct partisan communities that advance partisan policy narratives. These findings have important implications for our understanding of partisan polarization, outside group influence, and the capacity for Congress to address meaningful public problems.

The initial leaps forward in international trade liberalisation were achieved under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) when trade barriers in the form of tariffs were significantly reduced or removed up until the mid-1970s. However, this advancement was counteracted by a new protectionism which surfaced in the oil crises and the subsequent world economic recession. The term new was not to indicate the novelty of protectionist tendencies regaining momentum, but instead referred to the ever more subtle instruments, deploying non-tariff barriers to trade. Among thes