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The book gives a uniquely comprehensive philosophical analysis of Nietzsche's thinking. It shows how this thinking has its unifying focus on values: both the past and prevailing values that his psychologies and genealogies explain and the new values that he himself creates and defends. It maps, in detail, the argumentative structure of his thinking as it bears on this central topic. It argues that his ultimate ambition is to show how we can incorporate the truth about values into our own valuing-and that he is therefore more deeply committed to truth than often supposed. The book's chapters examine twelve key concepts, each at the heart of a network of problems and ideas.

This Element introduces the philosophical literature on values in science by examining four questions: (1) How do values influence science? (2) Should we actively incorporate values in science? (3) How can we manage values in science responsibly? (4) What are some next steps for those who want to help promote responsible roles for values in science? It explores arguments for and against the "value-free ideal" for science (i.e., the notion that values should be excluded from scientific reasoning) and concludes that it should be rejected. Nonetheless, this does not mean that value influences are always acceptable. The Element explores a range of strategies for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate value influences. It concludes by proposing an approach for managing values in science that relies on justifying, prioritising, and implementing norms for scientific research practices and institutions.

"The book gives a uniquely comprehensive philosophical analysis of Nietzsche's thinking. It shows how this thinking has its unifying focus on values--both the past and prevailing values that his psychologies and genealogies explain, and the new values that he himself creates and defends. It maps, in detail, the argumentative structure of his thinking as it bears on this central topic. It argues that his ultimate ambition is to show how we can incorporate the truth about values into our own valuing-and that he is therefore more deeply committed to truth than often supposed. The book's chapters examine twelve key concepts, each at the heart of a network of problems and ideas. A first group of concepts (value, life, drives, affects) treat the bodily valuing he attributes to our drives and affects; a second group (human, words, nihilism, freedom) treat the valuing we carry out in our deeply-flawed conception of ourselves as moral agents; the third group (the Yes, self, creating, Dionysus) project the values he offers as the lesson of his critiques--values centered on a universal affirmation expressed in the idea of eternal return. Each chapter organizes the rich complexity of Nietzsche's thought on its topic, and works to resolve contradictions, often by showing how he treats the concepts and problems as historical. The book synthesizes these detailed analyses into a systematic picture of his thought"--

Critiques notions of Asian values & Confucianism as reasons for East Asia's economic success during the past decade. East Asia's poverty during the last century is used to argue that these values & beliefs did not aid them in the past; therefore, its present success is owing to economic reforms rather than Confucian ethics. Singapore, under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, is an example of an East Asian nation that has liberalized its economy & then democratized its politics. Other nations, including Malaysia & Chile, are cited as examples of countries that have instituted economic reforms that have brought about prosperity. It is concluded that economic success is not easily attributed to any single factor. I. Sharp

We propose a new type of values for cooperative TU-games, which we call pyramidal values. Assuming that the grand coalition is sequentially formed, and all orderings are equally likely, we define a pyramidal value to be any expected payoff in which the entrant player receives a salary and the right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition, whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. To be specific, we consider some parametric families of pyramidal values: the egalitarian pyramidal family, which coincides with the a-consensus value family introduced by Ju et al. in (2007), the proportional pyramidal family, and the weighted pyramidal family, which in turn includes the other two families as special cases. We also analyze the properties of these families, as well as their relationships with other previously defined values. ; This research has been supported by I+D+i research project MTM2011-27892 from the Government of Spain.

Metadata only record ; Values are often invoked in discussions of how to develop a more sustainable relationship with the environment. There is substantial literature on values that spans several disciplines. In philosophy, values are relatively stable principles that help us make decisions when our preferences are in conflict and thus convey some sense of what we consider good. In economics, the term values is usually used in discussions of social choice, where an assessment of the social value of various alternatives serves as a guide to the best choice under a utilitarian ethic (the greatest good for the greatest number). In sociology, social psychology, and political science, two major lines of research have addressed environmental values. One has focused on four value clusters: self-interest, altruism, traditionalism, and openness to change and found relatively consistent theoretical and empirical support for the relationship of values to environmentalism. The other line of research suggests that environmentalism emerges when basic material needs are met and that individuals and societies that are postmaterialist in their values are more likely to exhibit pro-environmental behaviors. The evidence in support of this argument is more equivocal. Overall, the idea that values, especially altruism, are related to environmentalism, seems well established, but little can be said about the causes of value change and of the overall effects of value change on changes in behavior.

Abstract
Protected values (PVs) are values protected from trade-offs with other values. They are absolute in this sense. People hold these values even when they do not necessarily abide by them in their behavior. I suggest that most of these values are a subset of deontological rules, defined by their absoluteness. Their origin may be understood by looking at the origin of deontological rules more generally, which includes religious (hence sacred) values among others. But PVs are usually maintained by lack of reflection of the sort that would see counterexamples to their absoluteness. PVs often have other characteristics that would lead to classification into other types of values: they are often moralistic (imposed on others regardless of the willingness of others to accept them); they are about morality rather than convention and thus independent of authority or social consensus; and they often concern second-order preferences (values for values). Especially in combination with these other properties, PVs can be harmful in the domain of politics. Education in the sort of reflection that would lead people to question them could improve the political situation around the world.