Обозначены принципиальные идеи и основные этапы становления одного из базовых понятий канадской внешней политики, - «принципа функциональности». В первой половине XX в. Канада находилась в процессе поиска своих внешнеполитических ориентиров в мировой политике. Необходимость поиска баланса между собственными национальными интересами и позицией ведущих мировых держав, особенно Великобритании и Соединенных Штатов Америки, предопределила формирование основ концепта «функциональности» как одного из базовых конструктов канадской внешнеполитической практики. «Принцип функциональности» представлял собой концепт учета двух базовых характеристик государства, а именно: «возможности» вносить вклад в развитие международного сообщества и «непосредственной заинтересованности» государства в решении того или иного вопроса при определении его места в системе международных отношений. «Принцип функциональности» изначально был трудно адаптируемым к реалиям мировой политики того времени, и Канада потерпела ряд неудач в процессе его воплощения на практике. Но тем не менее он позволил Канаде заявить о себе как о самостоятельном акторе международных отношений. В дальнейшем эти идеи легли в основу другого определяющего для Канады внешнеполитического концепта «Средней державы». ; The fundamental ideas and the main stages of one of the basic concepts of Canadian foreign policy, "the principle of functionality" are considered. In the first half of the 20 th century, Canada was in process of searching for its foreign policy orientation in world politics. The necessity to find the balance between its own national interests and positions of leading world powers, especially Britain and the United States, determined the creation of basics of the concept of "functionality" as one of the basic constructs of Canadian foreign policy practice. "The principle of functionality" was a concept allowing two basic characteristics of the state, namely the "opportunity" to contribute to the development of the international community and "direct interest" of the state in addressing a particular issue in determining its place in the system of international relations. "The principle of functionality" was initially difficult adaptable to the realities of world politics at the time, and Canada has suffered a series of setbacks in the process of its implementation in practice. But, nevertheless, it allowed Canada to declare itself as an independent actor in international relations. In the future, these ideas formed the basis for defining other Canadian foreign policy concept of "middle powers".
Статья предлагает новый ракурс в рассмотрении «эльзас-лотарингского вопроса» как основы франко-германского антагонизма накануне Первой мировой войны. Она акцентирует внимание на судьбе населения Эльзас-Лотарингии, воссоединение с которым в равной мере рассматривалось в Германии в 1870-1871 гг. и во Франции в 1914-1918 гг. необходимым условием восполнения национального единства. На деле немало примеров свидетельствуют о том, что эльзас-лотарингцы оказались в годы Первой мировой войны в недостаточной мере «своими» как для французов, так и для немцев. Эльзас-лотарингцы сражались в обеих армиях-противницах, но их положение на фронте отличалось существенной спецификой. Автор отмечает схожесть действий французских и германских властей на контролируемых ими частях Эльзас-Лотарингии, куда входили также практика захвата заложников и перевод тысяч гражданских лиц в разряд интернированных. Французские военные и гражданские власти не менее ревностно пытались искоренить германские черты эльзасской культуры, чем прежде немцы стирали из памяти местного населения два века французского правления. Библиогр. 30 назв. ; The article put forward a new perspective in examination of the Alsace-Lorraine question as a base of the Franco-German antagonism on the eve of the First World War. It brings to attention the fate of the population of the Alsace-Lorraine, reunification with which was considered, equally in Germany in 1870-1871 and in France in 1914-1918, a necessary condition for national unity. In fact there are a lot of examples of how Alsatians and Lorrainians appeared to be insuffi ciently "French" or "German" in the years of the First World War. Alsatians and Lorrainians fought both in the German and the French Army, but their situation at the front was signifi cantly peculiar. The author stresses a similarity of actions of the French and German authorities in the parts of Alsace-Lorraine under their control, which included the practice of hostage-taking and internment of thousands of civilians. The French civilian and military authorities were as zealous in extirpation of the German aspects of the Alsatian culture as Germans had been before in sponging the memory of two centuries of the French domination here. Refs 30.
Регулярные политические кризисы франко-германских межгосударственных отношений в 1870-1880-е годы не исключали возможности и устремления обеих сторон к разрядке. Однако отныне отправной точкой самой возможности разоружения, мирного разрешения конфликтов и наднационального объединения Европы становится вопрос возвращения к Франции отторгнутой Германией Эльзас-Лотарингии. Фактически в эти годы было выявлено два пути мирного решения франко-германского территориального спора: интернационализации и нейтрализации Эльзас-Лотарнигии. На деле же формальные декларации в пользу нормализации отношений и примирения двух народов обслуживали лишь тактические маневры французской и германской дипломатии. Реальной альтернативы войне так и не было предложено ; Frequent political crises in the Franco-German interstate relations in 1870-80s didn't exclude the possibility of reconciliation. However the starting point to initiate the process of disarmament, peaceful conflict settlement and supranational union was to reverse Alsace-Lorraine to France. Actually, there were two ways of peaceful resolution of the Franco-German territorial dispute in those years: internationalization and neutralization of Alsace-Lorraine. In practice, formal declarations in favor of normalization of the relationships and reconciliation of two states served only as tactical maneuvers of the French and German diplomacy, with no real alternative to war being offered.
В этой книге предпринимается попытка хотя бы частично воссоздать многосложную картину взаимоотношений Франции и Германии в первые годы после окончания франко-прусской войны 1870-1871 гг. В это время роль ближайшего соседа в жизни каждой из двух указанных стран, начиная с внешней и внутренней политики и заканчивая общественным сознанием и культурой, была исключительно велика. Американский историк Алан Митчелл не сильно преувеличивал, когда писал в одной из своих блестящих книг, что «национальная история Франции закончилась в конце XIX в. вместе с франко-прусской войной. Отныне исторический опыт французского народа был столь тесно и неразрывно связан с опытом своего ближайшего соседа, что двусторонний ракурс становится неизбежным». Однако итоги франко-прусской войны, запечатленные в положениях Франкфуртского мирного договора, коснулись не только победителя и побежденного, сковав оба народа незримой цепью. По общему признанию, они открыли также новую главу в истории международных отношений последней трети XIX в.: локальная война в сердце Европы неожиданно резко изменила расклад сил на дипломатической арене. Военное поражение привело к падению режима Второй империи и к краху всех претензий Франции на доминирующее положение в Европе. На смену ей в этой ипостаси поднималась спаянная войной с «вековым врагом» Германская империя. Отзыв французского корпуса из Рима на защиту Парижа позволил Итальянскому королевству присоединить город к себе и завершить, наконец, объединение страны. АвстроВенгрия предыдущая жертва прусского оружия после разгрома Франции потеряла надежды на реванш и, стремительно развернувшись на 180 градусов, начала сближение с Германией. Именно в этом значении Франкфуртского мирного договора как кардинального изменения европейского равновесия сохраняет свою актуальность рассмотрение и анализ внешнеполитической деятельности великих держав в 1870-е гг. Именно в эти годы вырабатывались приоритеты и основные направления их политики, оценка которых постоянно уточняется с учетом все новых фактор и документальных свидетельств. Неизменно актуальной, к сожалению, остается также проблема выхода государств из военных конфликтов и нормализации отношений вчерашних противников. Рассмотрение франко-германских отношений в первые годы после Франкфуртского мира приобретает в этой связи тем большую наглядность, поскольку охватывает этап более широкого отрезка с логическим завершением в 1914 г. С учетом этого финала взаимоотношения Франции и Германии после 1871 г. являют собой яркий пример во многом пример негативный того, какого развития событий следует избегать. Франко-германские отношения после 1871 г. это и отношения двух новых в политическом смысле государств Третьей республики во Франции и Германской Второй империи. Немалую роль в их формировании сыграл внешний фактор: фактор их каждодневного влияния друг на друга в рамках дипломатической практики и более глобального, но менее осязаемого влияния на уровне массового сознания. Эти годы были сопряжены для Франции с осмыслением причин поражения в войне, итоги которой во многом поставили под вопрос не только текущие позиции страны на международной арене, но и дальнейшее существование ее как великой державы. Материальные потери далеко не в полной мере дают представление об этом, равно как и не объясняют всю глубину разлома, который стал восприниматься в «поколенческом» измерении. Пережитый в 1870 г. исторический опыт стал восприниматься значительной частью французского общества как опыт национальной катастрофы. Одним из его следствий стало широкое реформаторское движение, имевшее целью не просто восстановить потери, но и заложить основы подлинной модернизации страны во всех сферах, оздоровления «политического тела» и переустройства нации, воспитание ценностей гражданственности и патриотизма в целой системе преобразований от школы до армии. Итак, в центре нашего внимания в большей степени Франция, «французский взгляд» на становление соседней Германской империи. Свежесть реакции нации на события обусловила взять отрезком первое послевоенное десятилетие: от подписания 10 мая 1871 г. Франкфуртского мирного договора до отставки 30 января 1879 г. маршала МакМагона с поста президента страны. Этот хронологический отрезок в жизни Третьей республики, названный «республикой без республиканцев», ознаменовался постепенной сменой идеологии и переходом власти от прежних элит к новым. Подробный анализ перипетий этих трансформаций дело отдельного исследования. Здесь же они задают общую канву повествования для первой части книги, призванной ввести читателя в круг ключевых проблем, наполнивших содержанием франко-германские отношения в 1870-е годы. В первых четырех главах дается характеристика послевоенного внешнеполитического курса двух стран, выявляются его приоритеты. Рассмотрен германский фактор политики и дипломатии первых двух президентов Третьей республики, Адольфа Тьера и маршала Мак-Магона, равно как и ключевые принципы дипломатии бессменного руководителя германской внешней политики канцлера Отто фон Бисмарка. Наиболее подробно внимание читателя будет остановлено на кульминационной точке развития франко-германских отношений первого мирного десятилетия, так называемой «военной тревоге» 1875 года. Вторая часть работы посвящена всестороннему анализу ряда ключевых проблем, составивших фундамент развития Третьей республики в той его части, что задавалась логикой соперничества с Германией. К таковым как для рассматриваемых лет, так и для последующих десятилетий, безусловно, можно отнести реорганизацию французских вооруженных сил (Глава 5), проблему «германского присутствия» во Франции (Глава 6), феномен французского реваншизма (Глава 7) и, наконец, стереотипы восприятия французами и немцами друг друга в новых условиях, «французский взгляд» на новую Германскую империю (Глава 8). Подобный анализ осуществляется в рамках отечественной историографии франко-германских отношений последней трети XIX в. впервые. Автор стремился также избежать традиционного для отечественной историографии сосредоточения исключительно на конфликтных ситуациях во франко-германских отношениях в рассматриваемую эпоху. Очевидно, что историю взаимоотношений двух стран нельзя сводить исключительно к «истории кризисов». Автору хотелось избежать излишних повторений того, что уже было подробно разработано в прежние годы в частности, темы русско-французского сближения. Работы советских историков отличаются большой основательностью, однако рассматривают дипломатию Франции и Германии исключительно через призму их отношений с Россией. Общей тенденцией этих исследований стало подчеркивание агрессивности внешней политики Германии и уязвимости позиций Франции. Однако трудно признать по-настоящему объективным подход, по которому все шаги французских руководителей на пути к союзу с Россией с самого начала признавались «правильными», а, скажем, меры Парижа, направленные на сглаживание франко-германских противоречий «трусливой политикой угодничества», «раболепством», «заигрыванием» с Берлином. Не умаляя значения фактора России, необходимо вернуть самостоятельную ценность собственно франко-германским отношениям. Работа осуществлена на основе анализа материалов Архива внешней политики Российской империи в Москве, Российского государственного архива военно-морского флота в Санкт-Петербурге и архива Департамента сухопутной армии Исторической службы министерства обороны Франции (Service historique de la defense / Departement de l'Armee de Terre SHD/DAT, бывший S.H.A.T.) в Париже. Привлечен также широкий круг опубликованных документов, многочисленных источников личного происхождения (дневники, мемуары, переписка), прессы, публицистики, художественных произведений и произведений искусства рассматриваемого времени. Ряд материалов изучен автором в рамках научной командировки в Париж по гранту Франко-российского центра гуманитарных и общественных наук в Москве. ; As far as possible a book makes an attempt to reconstruct the versatile picture of relations between France and Germany within the fi rst years after the end of The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. During that period the role of neighbor for both countries' foreign and internal policy, including public consciousness and culture, was incomparably high. An American historian Allan Mitchell wasn`t exaggerating, when he wrote following lines in one of his works: The national history of France ended in the late nineteenth century with the Franco-Prussian War. Thereafter the experience of the French people was o intimately and inseparably related to that of their closest neighbor that a bilateral perspective becomes unavoidable. However, the results of the Franco-Prussian War fi xed in the states of a Frankfurt peace treaty, concerned not only the winner and the defeated side, welding together both countries with an unseen chain. According to the common point of view the treaty opened also the new chapter of the history of international cooperation at the end of the 19th century: the local war in the heart of Europe changed the situation on the diplomatic arena surprisingly fast. Namely in this meaning of the Frankfurt peace treaty as a cardinally changing the European balance keeps its actuality the analysis and observation of relations between the Great Powers during 1870s. Namely these years represent the time, when the basic priorities had been chosen, which estimation is constantly clarifi ed, especially concerning the appearance of new factors and documents. Inevitably important, unfortunately, still seems the problem of existing confl icts and reaching the balance in relations between the yesterday enemies. An observation of Franco-German relations in the fi rst post-war years after the Frankfurt peace treaty becomes in this case its utter clearness, as far as it embraces the wider period with its logical end in 1914. Taking into account this fi nal, Franco-German relations after 1871 represent a vivid and mostly negative example, what kind of situations should be avoided. Franco-German relations after 1871 year are the relations of two politically new countries The Third Republic in France and The German Second Empire. A big role in their formation played the foreign policy, a factor of their everyday intercommunication within the diplomatic practice and within the more global and less tangible infl uence at a scale of the public consciousness. These years in France were associated with reconsideration ofthe main causes of its defeat in the War, which results actually produced the question not only of the future existence of France as a great Power, but also of the present state`s position on the international stage. Material losses cannot provide an adequate picture, as far as do not demonstrate the real deep of a break, which can be only seen in dimension of generations. An experience of 1870 was taken by most part of Frenchmen as a national catastrophe. Among the results of this events was a big wave of reforms with a general aim not only fi lling in the losses, but also constructing a fundament of real modernization in France in all spheres. So, France is in the central focus of attention, French point of view on the revival of its neighbor German Empire. A fresh reaction of a nation on the situation was the basic cause to take into consideration the fi rst decade after the war from the signing of the Frankfurt peace treaty on 10th of May, 1871, till the retirement of Marshall MacMahon in 1879, on 30th of January. This chronological period in the life of the Third Republic, called the Republic without the republicans, meant the gradual change of an ideology and political elite. The detailed observation of those events is an object of another book. Within this work they just introduce the main direction of a narration in the fi rst part of a book, which should provide the basic explanation to the most important problems, which characterized the Franco-German relations in 1870s. The fi rst 4 chapters give a wide characteristic of a postwar international policy direction of the both countries, point the basic priorities. This part of a book also emphasizes the German factor in the policy and diplomacy of the fi rst two presidents of the Third Republic in France Adolphe Thiers and MacMahon as well as the basic principles of the continuous chancellor of the German Empire Otto von Bismarck. Under the more scrupulous view is the culmination of the development of Franco-German relations during the fi rst decade after war the so called war scare of 1875. The second part of this work is devoted to the versatile analysis of several key problems, which constructed the basis of the Third Republic`s development, supported by the logic of the rivalry with the German Empire. Among such problems during the fi rst decade after the war, as well as for the other periods, can be pointed the reorganization of French army (Chapter 5), the aspect of German presence on the territory of France (Chapter 6), a phenomenon of the French revanchism (Chapter 7), and, at last, stereotypes of mutual perception by both French and German people of each other in the new conditions, a French view on the new German Empire (Chapter 8). Such an analysis was lead for the fi rst time within the limits of the historiography of Russia of the Franco-German relation in the last decades of the 19th century. The author aimed to avoid the traditional for Russian historiography focus on the confl icts between France and Germany in the given period. But it is absolutely clear, that the history of both countries could not be described as only the history of confl icts. The other aim was also to keep off the needles recapitulation of facts, which were examined in the previous works, especially the subject of Russian-French cooperation. Not limiting the Russia factor`s importance, there is a need in examination of the French-German relations as an independent factor. The examination of the fi rst decade since the Sedan catastrophe appears as the utterly serious question. Namely these years were the period of the formation of the political structure of the Third Republic, which will last for 70 years till the next attack from Germany the catastrophe of 1940. Namely during these years the German infl uence on the international and internal policy, cultural and public consciousness of France was especially serious. Germany was the ideal to be adored, to be competed with and to be longed for. Berlin understood the power of its position and did not hide its aspiration to show the direction of international evolution for France, which was comfortable for Germany, if the French people wanted to escape the new confrontation. The origin of the given and future confl icts between France and Germany took its source in the states of the Frankfurt peace treaty, which Bismarck surely understood. He considered, that the hostility of France after the war was inevitable, and this point of view shared many representatives of German intellectual and political elite. The constant tendency of French revanchism was immediately taken by German people as an axiom. The main principle of Bismarck`s policy after the war was very simple: the hostility of France obliges us to make her weak. He did not changed his point of view till the end of his chancellorship. So, the strong fi rm seemed the position of France, the more intensive was Bismarck`s confrontation against it. However, we could not state, that the Franco-German in 1870s were at the edge of breaking out in an opened war. In spite of all provocative demarches of Bismarck, the basic political priority of the German chancellor remained the realization of all states of the Frankfurt peace treaty. First of all, Bismarck was a great manipulator, who reached his goals with the help of diplomacy and provocative campaigns in press. Of course, when he faced the possibility of a new war with France, he was not worried. But he scarcely forgot an experience of the last war, when his power was partly grabbed by military generals and he lost control over some aspects of the internal policy. He clearly felt the balance, when the international threat could burst out in an opened confrontation. That is why he concentrated on fi xing the seized borders. In the spring of 1875 Bismarck started his favorite war of nerves. Its main goal was to slow the postwar military revival of France, to draw the attention of European elites to the French revanchism and to gain on this base some new guarantees of safety in addition to the Frankfurt peace treaty. Not occasionally Berlin rose a question concerning the updating of the French forces as a war preparations, and proposed to limit those actions. Taking into an account the fact, that Marshall Moltke noted, that German army could hardly hope to receive such a gift from European Powers, but if there followed just a moral condemnation in the form of advises to be more careful and patient it could become a big signifi cance in the international relations of the period. During all these years Bismarck constantly predicted that a new war between France and Germany seemed inevitable. Those predictions of the chancellor were a moral and public fundament to justify a discussion about the preventive intrusion. But this opinion zip directed in both ways to German people and to the European countries in order to fi nd a general decision of the salvation of Franco-German confl ict, which had all chances to become a start of a Europe's wide confl ict. One of alternatives could be proposed was the condemnation of the French strivings for returning the lost territories. But it was in spring of 1875, when Bismarck probably for the fi rst time did not cope with a situation and passed a carte-blanche to the Duc Decazes, the minister of foreign affairs of France, who made his best to turn the common Visit of Alexander II in a form of an intrusion in new Franco-German confl ict, and Bismarck faced the situation, when he was bringing humiliating apologizes. To turn the crisis in its turn, the French administration decided to undertake a deliberate exaggeration of an immediate threat of war in Europe. Fixing this fact, one can understand the justifi cation of the Quai d`Orsay`s policy. The Ministry just used the political situation, like Bismarck did, many times before. The Duc Decazes not only surpassed Bismarck in cooperation with European cabinets, but also turned against Bismarck his beloved weapon the press. At that the end of the war scare of 1875 didn't become a real bifurcation point in Franco-German relations. It did not actually produced dramatical changes, not in Bismarck political principles concerning France, nor in relations between both countries. An idea of an immediate war was widely spread in France, and in Germany as well, both governments took this threat into account while their dialogue started improve slowly. However, Bismarck was sincere enough in his search for a possible alternative to war with France. This position was fi rmly occupied by the German diplomacy after the crisis of 1875. On the other hand the same was with France, which unclear assurances to reach the compromise with Germany still were not offi cially confi rmed till the end of 1870s. Although France did not refused its thesis concerning unfairness of the states of the Frankfurt peace treaty, despite this fact had the strongest interest in rapprochement with its enemy. Right since the fi rst years after the war French government proposed some symbolic actions, which aim was to soften at a large scale the tension in relations with Germany. For example France took part in construction of monuments in honor of the war heroes, fi nancing the art devoted to the war period, and offi cially condemned attempts on lives of the German Elite. Anyway the main basis of French development was the idea of revanchism, which by the way should be considered at a wider scale, than it is represented in Russian (Soviet) historiography. French revanchism by itself is to a certain extent a powerful historical myth, which takes its sources in both World Wars of the 20th century and which draws Franco-German relations in the most dark colors. But the last decades of the 19th century including the fi rst decade after the Franco-Prussian war surely did not seem for the contemporaries as a period of the sacred hatred towards Germany. Especially clear this fact was for the French ruling elite, which mostly had mixed feelings about Germany: fear, but on the other hand a very strong wish to compete, feeling of respectfulness and even adoration, but not sympathy of course. The generation of 1870s was not ready to forget the results of the war this idea was accompanied by the interpretation of a German success as a natural phenomenon and thus the developmental lag of France in different spheres. That is why the revanchism for French people meant not only preparing before the just war, not only revival of a national prestige, but also competition with a German success, modernization, which was the fi rst and necessary precondition for a future military success. Both French political, culture and war elite, and common masses supposed the revanchism as a deal of future generations. For representatives of the French army Germany become through these years the most wanted and practically the one enemy, which was an orienteer for all war preparations after 1871. Those preparations take form of wide borrowings from the Prussian forces: from the introduction of a compulsory military service and army organizations according to 18 military districts, to regulations, which provided compensations for peasants for their territories, damaged through the military manoeuvres. But all offi cial discussions about the possibilities of bursting out a new war with Germany were a prohibited subject among the political and diplomatic elites. But on the other hand the French government constantly raise a problem of Alsace-Lorraine territories, supporting the hope to solve this problem by peace methods. Especially important fact in this situation was that all Great Powers, including Russia, were from the very beginning on the side of France in this question, emphasizing the correctness and rightness of French position. Observing the policy of the French politicians, it should be noted, that no one of them, despite the German provocations, didn`t considered the close perspective of a revanchist war seriously. More to say, relying on reports of a Russian ambassador in France, N. A. Orlov, forms an impression, that revanchism of A. Thiers was far more deeper, than that of the Marshall McMahon or of another main fi gures of the French international policy Duc de Broglie and DucDecazes. So, all these aspects tell, that during the fi rst decade after the war the French administration was not preparing any offensive war plans against Germany in order to get back Alsace-Lorraine. Even for A. Thiers the most important purpose to follow besides the execution of the states of the peace treaty and avoiding the internal revolutionary threat was a search of a new way of returning the former status of France in its internal affairs, which vividly showed the eager interest to contemporary events in Spain. A. Thiers and his successors actually understood the real French position in a possible future confrontation with Germany and also knew, that there was a strong need in allies. But before leading any negotiations with potential allies France was facing the problem of its forces revival, by the way fi xing the balance in the internal policy and recovering the confi dence, which was a very hard goal. That is why politicians of the Third Republic during the fi rst years after war absolutely excluded the method of provocations on the international arena, what was so characterizing of the previous period. An aspiration to penetrate in the plans of a neighbor, eager measures of the last to avoid any such actions in its turn, mainly constructed a fi rm fundament of Franco-German policies. After Franco-Prussian war changed the understanding of a problem of German presence on the French territory, which expressed itself in the actions of the French war and political reconnaissance and counter-intelligence. Work of the French special services in many respects remained imperfect, and a quality level of the received data was low. But without any doubts the information received from Germany by some private channels, rendered a great infl uence on decisions, undertaken by the French management. The Franco-German border and frontier areas of both states become arena of the hidden antagonism. Frequent change of offi ces, intrigues of monarchic fractions and political crisis didn't exclude steady continuity of a foreign policy and the policy of reorganization of armed forces of France. It could be mainly explained by the especial positions of the fi rst presidents of the Third Republic. Thiers and MacMahon made a considerable impact on country development, rather than it was prescribed for their successors by the Constitution of the 1875, which has fi xed a parliamentary republic in the country. A. Thiers controlled actually all thespheres of internal policy, he entirely defi ned the native foreign policy. Marshal MacMahon, having conceded at a big scale the initiative in political sphere of the nearest advisers, up to the end of 1877 supported a principle of formation of the government, which would enjoy confi dence of the president, instead of the National Аssembly. Both Thiers and MacMahon defi ned key aspects of military reorganization, leaving behind the fi gures of Ministers of War on the second plan. Splash of patriotic feelings of the Frenchmen, shown in various essences, became result of the war. Firstly prevailed what can be called a mournful patriotism, and examples of militant patriotism could be found only in scientifi c polemics, literature and on a theatrical stage. The starting point of the Revenge as a fi nal vengeance should become a reconsideration of war 1870-1871. Without any doubts heroization of France's defeats, appeals to a revenge in science, fi ction and arts already in 1870th years have put those bases, which subsequently this movement has got political expression on. The success of similar aggressive rhetoric within the French public, however, didn't mean determination of Frenchmen to be at war as soon as possible again. The fear concerning a new war prevailed in consciousness of Frenchmen, and Germans, although it didn't made them pacifi sts. Nevertheless, already in the fi rst post-war decade there were those in France, who called for Franco-German reconciliation, who searched for alternatives to war. However even this part of the French intellectual elite wasn't ready to recognize war results fair. With all its paradox, it meant that there were no alternatives to war actions indeed. It should be noted, fi rst and last, that the reaction of the French and German writers, scientists and publicists on fatal events of 1870-1871 differed with its variety and an extreme emotionality. Almost all of them had to endure serious reconsideration of the French status and the world surrounding it. War 1870-1871 did not practically left signifi cant changes in the public consciousness of Frenchmen concerning the national idea of superiority in intellectual sphere. But views on Germany changed a lot. The secret of its success, weaknesses and strengths of a new empire were fundamentally analyzed. Widely spread was a representation about incompleteness, dualities of the German empire, where Prussia was opposed to other Germany. Similar logic conceptions, taking into account all its artifi ciality, promoted softening of inevitable displays of Germanofobia in France. Both in France and in Germany has quickly rooted itself an idea, that information about the neighbor became since that time an essential guarantee of its safety and the very existence. Research was made on the basis of the analysis of materials of Archive of foreign policy of the Russian empire in Moscow, the Russian state archive of Navy in St.-Petersburg and archive of Department of the land forces of the Historical service of the Ministry of Defence of France in Paris. Among the sources was used also a wide spectrum of published documents, numerous sources of a personal origin (diaries, memoirs, correspondence), the press, publicism, fi ction and also works of art of the given period.