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Intro -- COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS -- DEDICATION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION -- 1. THE TYPES OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS -- CHAPTER II - THE NATURE OF PREFERENCE AND CHOICE -- 1. MEASURABILITY AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF UTILITY -- 2. A NOTATION FOR PREFERENCES AND CHOICE -- 3. THE ORDERING OF SOCIAL STATES -- 4. A DIGRESSION ON RATIONALITY AND CHOICE -- CHAPTER III - THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION -- 1. FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. POSITIVE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES -- 3. THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES -- 4. THE CONDITION OF CITIZENS' SOVEREIGNTY -- 5. THE CONDITION OF NON-DICTATORSHIP -- 6. THE SUMMATION OF UTILITIES -- CHAPTER IV - THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE -- 1. THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION -- CHAPTER V - THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS -- 1. THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES -- 2. TWO INDIVIDUALS AND THREE ALTERNATIVES -- 3. PROOF OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- 4. INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- CHAPTER VI - THE INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ASSUMPTIONS -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY THEOREM UNDER INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 3. QUASI-ORDERINGS AND COMPATIBLE WEAK ORDERINGS -- 4. AN EXAMPLE -- 5. A ONE-COMMODITY WORLD -- 6. GROUP CHOICE IN THE THEORY OF GAMES -- 7. DISTRIBUTIONAL ETHICS COMBINED WITH INDIVIDUALISM -- CHAPTER VII - SIMILARITY AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL WELFARE JUDGMENTS -- 1. COMPLETE UNANIMITY -- 2. THE CASE OF SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES -- 3. THE IDEALIST POSITION AND THE CONCEPT OF CONSENSUS -- 4. KNOWLEDGE AND THE MEANING OF SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES -- 5. PARTIAL UNANIMITY -- 6. THE DECISION PROCESS AS A VALUE -- REFERENCES.

"It is well-known that 50% or more of all jobs are obtained through informal channels i.e. connections to family or friends. As well, statistical studies show that observable individual factors account for only about 50% of the very wide variation in earnings. We seek to explain these two facts by assuming that the linking of workers and firms is mediated by limited network connections. The model implies that essentially similar workers can have markedly different wages and further that the inequality of wages is partly explained by variations in the sizes of workers' networks. Our results indicate that differences in the number of ties can induce substantial inequality and can explain roughly 15% of the unexplained variation in wages. We also show that reasonable differences in the average number of links between blacks and whites can explain the disparity in black and white income distributions"--Federal Reserve Board web site