Suchergebnisse

We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out preexisting federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other states. Using a computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian federation, we show that vertical fiscal externalities can be the major determinant of the welfare change following environmental policy implementation by a state government. Our numerical simulations indicate that - as a consequence of vertical fiscal externalities - state governments can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by over 20 percent without any net cost to themselves.

Unilateral carbon policies are inefficient due to the fact that they generally involve emission reductions in countries with high marginal abatement costs and because they are subject to carbon leakage. In this paper, we ask whether the use of carbon tariffs - tariffs on the carbon embodied in imported goods - might lower the cost of achieving a given reduction in world emissions. Specifically, we explore the role tariffs might play as an inducement to unregulated countries adopting emission controls of their own. We use an applied general equilibrium model to generate the payoffs of a policy game. In the game, a coalition of countries regulates its own emissions and chooses whether or not to employ carbon tariffs against unregulated countries. Unregulated countries may respond by adopting emission regulations of their own, retaliating against the carbon tariffs by engaging in a trade war, or by pursuing no policy at all. In the unique Nash equilibrium produced by this game, the use of carbon tariffs by coalition countries is credible. China and Russia respond by adopting binding abatement targets to avoid being subjected to them. Other unregulated countries retaliate. Cooperation by China and Russia lowers the global welfare cost of achieving a 10% reduction in global emissions by half relative to the case where coalition countries undertake all of this abatement on their own.

Unilateral emission reduction commitments raise concerns on international competitiveness and emission leakage that result in preferential regulatory treatment of domestic energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. Our analysis illustrates the potential pitfalls of climate policy design which narrowly focuses on competitiveness concerns about energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) branches. The sector-specific gains of preferential regulation in favour of these branches must be traded off against the additional burden imposed on other industries. Beyond burden shifting between industries, differential emission pricing bears the risk for substantial excess cost in emission reduction as policy concedes (too) low carbon prices to EITE industries and thereby foregoes relatively cheap abatement options in these sectors. From the perspective of global cost-effectiveness we find that differential emission pricing of EITE industries hardly reduces emission leakage since the latter is driven through robust international energy market responses to emission constraints. As a consequence the scope for efficiency compared to uniform pricing is very limited. Only towards stringent emission reduction targets will a moderate price differentiation achieve sufficient gains from leakage reduction to offset the losses of diverging marginal abatement cost.

Die Klimaschutzdiskussion wird von der Frage dominiert, welche gesamtwirtschaftlichen Kosten mit der Umgestaltung des Energiesystems zu klimaverträglichen Strukturen verbunden sind. Höhe und Verteilung dieser Kosten entscheiden darüber, ob sich umweltpolitische Strategien zum nachhaltigen Schutz der Erdatmosphäre durchsetzen lassen. Für Kostenschätzungen des Klimaschutzes werden typischerweise quantitative Modelle des energie- oder volkswirtschaftlichen Systems eingesetzt. Allerdings weisen modellgestützte Studien erhebliche Unterschiede in den Kostenschätzungen aus, was zu widersprüchlichen politischen Handlungsempfehlungen führen kann. Ziel des folgenden Beitrages ist es, die mit quantitativen Wirtschaftsmodellen ermittelten Kosten von Klimaschutzstrategien vor dem Hintergrund wichtiger Determinanten zu analysieren. Das Verständnis für wichtige Determinanten der Kostenschätzungen ist eine Voraussetzung für die richtige Interpretation von Kostengrößen und damit Grundlage für eine rationale Klimapolitik.