Jane Austen, Game Theorist. By Michael Suk-Young Chwe. (Princeton University Press, 2013.)
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 3, S. E12
ISSN: 1468-2508
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In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 3, S. E12
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 3, S. E11
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 22-35
ISSN: 1741-3060
While epistemic democrats have claimed that majority rule recruits the wisdom of the crowd to identify correct answers to political problems, the conjecture remains abstract. This article illustrates how majority rule leverages the epistemic capacity of the electorate to practically enhance the instrumental value of elections. To do so, we identify a set of sufficient conditions that effect such a majority rule mechanism, even when the decision in question is multidimensional. We then look to the case of sociotropic economic voting in US presidential elections to provide empirical tractability for these conditions. We find that absent such an epistemic capacity a number of presidential elections might well have been decided differently. By generating clear conditions for the plausibility of claims made by epistemic democrats, and demonstrating their correspondence to empirical data, this article strengthens the broader instrumental grounds recommending democracy.
Agent-based models have played a prominent role in recent debates about the merits of democracy. In particular, the formal model of Lu Hong and Scott Page and the associated "diversity trumps ability" result has typically been seen to support the epistemic virtues of democracy over epistocracy (i.e., governance by experts). In this paper we first identify the modeling choices embodied in the original formal model and then critique the application of the Hong-Page results to philosophical debates on the relative merits of democracy. In particular we argue that the "best-performing agents" in the Hong-Page model should not be interpreted as experts. We next explore a closely related model in which best-performing agents are more plausibly seen as experts and show that the diversity trumps ability result fails to hold. However, with changes in other parameters (such as the deliberation dynamic) the diversity trumps ability result is restored. The sensitivity of this result to parameter choices illustrates the complexity of the link between formal modeling and more general philosophical claims; we use this debate as a platform for a more general discussion of when and how agent-based models can contribute to philosophical discussions.
BASE
In: Historical social research: HSR-Retrospective (HSR-Retro) = Historische Sozialforschung, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 259-284
ISSN: 2366-6846
Agent-based models have played a prominent role in recent debates about the merits of democracy. In particular, the formal model of Lu Hong and Scott Page and the associated "diversity trumps ability" result has typically been seen to support the epistemic virtues of democracy over epistocracy (i.e., governance by experts). In this paper we first identify the modeling choices embodied in the original formal model and then critique the application of the Hong-Page results to philosophical debates on the relative merits of democracy. In particular we argue that the "best-performing agents" in the Hong-Page model should not be interpreted as experts. We next explore a closely related model in which best-performing agents are more plausibly seen as experts and show that the diversity trumps ability result fails to hold. However, with changes in other parameters (such as the deliberation dynamic) the diversity trumps ability result is restored. The sensitivity of this result to parameter choices illustrates the complexity of the link between formal modeling and more general philosophical claims; we use this debate as a platform for a more general discussion of when and how agent-based models can contribute to philosophical discussions.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft 6, S. 5373-5394
ISSN: 1573-0964