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This article discusses the role of historical closure in conflict resolution and reconciliation, departing from the example of the Polish Round Table negotiations in 1989. The concept of a "thick line" ("Gruba kreska" or "Schlussstrich") was used in several historical contexts, showing the intention to detach from history when resolving pressing current societal issues. Historical evidence suggests that it was an intentionally chosen strategy by both sides taking part in the Round Table negotiations in 1989. Historical closure is known to have good consequences for building mutual trust, improving attitudes and making contact interventions more effective in improving intergroup relations. This is mostly attributed to the fact that historical crimes can have a long-standing impact on intergroup relations: past victimhood and perpetratorship lead to current grievances, denial, and mistrust. Only when these historical roles are overcome can both parties achieve any agreement. At the same time, historical closure breeds a sense of injustice among political followers and gives birth to numerous conspiracy theories. This article analyzes these problems in the Polish context and beyond. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

AbstractThis article critically examines Krajewski's (in this issue of Contemp Jewry) argument about the assimilation and subsequent de-assimilation of the Jewish population in Poland. While Krajewski asserts that Polish Jews underwent a process of assimilation followed by a revival of their cultural and religious practices, the authors argue that the term "de-assimilation" is not applicable in this context. They propose that post-war Polish Jews consciously chose to embrace a secular identity rather than a religious one, keeping their Jewish life private. This secular identity, characterized by interests in secular Jewish culture, learning, and social justice, as well as maintaining specific distinctive habits, remained dominant even after 1989. The authors also compare this process to the experiences of Spanish and Portuguese conversos, who returned to Judaism but retained syncretic identities. They emphasize the importance of understanding the complex nature of Jewish identity and involvement, highlighting the significance of secular and cultural practices among Polish Jews.

AbstractThe moral exemplars model of reconciliation (Cehajic‐Clancy & Bilewicz, 2021) proposes that through focusing on the moral behavior during the genocide, the descendants of perpetrators, bystanders, and victims could become more willing to reconcile and engage in intergroup contact. In the present article we aim to test the boundary effects of such approach by analyzing the usage of moral exemplars argument in the Polish‐Israeli conflict over the history of the Holocaust. In two studies, we tested whether Poles' and Israeli's estimations of moral behavior and emotions (vs. immoral ones) during the Holocaust are related to their attitudes towards contemporary counterparts. The studies confirmed that higher estimations of moral behavior during the Holocaust were related to more positive attitudes of Israelis towards Poles but not of Poles towards Israelis. On the contrary, higher estimations of such moral behavior among Poles were positively related to secondary antisemitism and harsh criticism of the current role of Israel in the Middle Eastern conflict. The results of our studies suggest that the moral exemplars‐based model of reconciliation should be carefully applied to the contexts in which historical perpetrators and bystanders aim at whitewashing their histories.

Exposure to derogatory language about immigrants and minority groups leads to political radicalization and deteriorates intergroup relations. This article addresses the psychological processes responsible for these effects as well as those involved in hate‐speech proliferation in contemporary societies and discusses the factors that constrain its growth. We propose that frequent exposure to hate speech has severe effects on emotional, behavioral, and normative levels. Exposure to hate speech results in empathy being replaced by intergroup contempt as a dominant response to others—it is both a motivator and a consequence of derogatory language. The increased presence of hate speech in one's environment creates a sense of a descriptive norm that allows outgroup derogation. This leads to the erosion of existing antidiscriminatory norms. Finally, through a process of desensitization, hate speech reduces people's ability to recognize the offensive character of such language. Based on empirical evidence from the fields of social psychology and psychology of emotion and aggression, we propose a model that explains the described processes, and we trace the dynamics of this model using an agent‐based modeling approach. We show that the mechanisms potentially effective in constraining hate‐speech proliferation (empathy, norms) are eroded by hate speech itself. We argue that through basic psychological dynamics, societies become more accepting of derogatory language and less accepting of immigrants, as well as religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities.

Specific social categories differently affect the motivation to resist the disadvantage among the members of low‐status groups. While subgroup identity instigates collective action, common identity inhibits support for societal change. We propose that individuals who construe their disadvantage in terms of group relative deprivation (GRD) rather than individual relative deprivation are less prone to the demobilizing force of common identity salience. The moderating role of GRD in responding to superordinate category (i.e., "Poles") was demonstrated in two studies conducted in the Polish LGBTQ community. In Study 1 (N= 125), GRD moderated the effect that common identity (relative to subgroup identity) exerted on in‐group pride, which translated into support for social change. Study 2 (N= 165) confirmed GRD as the moderator of common identity influence. Both studies showed that LGBTQs who exhibited low but not high level of GRD were susceptible to the quieting effect of superordinate category.

Niniejszy artykuł stanowi analizę ideologicznego uwikłania światowej i polskiej psychologii społecznej w kontekście zaangażowania społecznego nauki. Autorzy używają przykładów zaczerpniętych ze światowej psychologii stosunków międzygrupowych oraz prac wiodących polskich psychologów społecznych dotyczących transformacji ustrojowej, aby pokazać społeczne uwikłania badań psychologicznych i wytwarzania wiedzy naukowej. Są to fakty niezbyt uświadomione w praktyce badawczej i twórczości naukowej psychologów. Do analizy tych praktyk zastosowane zostają koncepcje psychologiczne z obszaru umotywowanego poznania, teorii atrybucji oraz stosunków międzygrupowych. Artykuł kończy się opisem niedawnych pozytywnych zmian prowadzących do przeobrażania się dominującego paradygmatu psychologii społecznej w stronę bardziej krytyczną i wrażliwą społecznie.

AbstractMoral exemplars (Imena) play an important part in commemorative practices and reconciliation in post‐genocide Rwanda. Acknowledging the essential role of moral exemplars in reconciliation and intergroup contact in post‐conflict setting, we aimed at examining the effects of exposure to moral‐exemplars on people's attitudes toward reconciliation and identification with superordinate national category in Rwanda. A study of 168 young Rwandans showed that higher awareness of moral exemplars during genocide was related to stronger ingroup ties with other ingroup members and higher centrality of national identification. Strong ingroup ties significantly mediated the effects of moral exemplars awareness on reconciliation attitudes. This shows that ties with other members of common national ingroup, as well as the centrality of superordinate categories could be effective means for reconciliation after genocide.

AbstractStories about moral exemplars can provide crucial information about the moral heterogeneity of social groups involved in the conflict. This article addresses the role of moral exemplars narratives in changing perceptions of violent historic intergroup conflicts. We propose that two central outcomes of such interventions make them potentially an effective approach for improving intergroup relations in situations of violent intergroup conflict: (1) facilitation of intergroup contact and (2) increasing reconciliatory attitudes. Although most of the existing research on moral exemplars is focused on their positive outcomes, we suggest that moral exemplars might also have destructive consequences: they could be misused to gain an advantage in an intergroup conflict and might stress the immorality of the non‐helping majority. By integrating these two possibilities, we propose a curvilinear model of the effects of moral exemplars narratives in post‐conflict reconciliation and resolution of violent conflicts.

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory‐driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta‐analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian‐dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need‐related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.