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An introduction to the special issue on strategic behavior and market structure
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 106, S. A1-A3
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Working paper
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Working paper
Trade and Growth: A Simple Model with Not-so-Simple Implications
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Working paper
Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking
In this paper we present a model where agents can choose between productive and rent-seeking activities.We consider two governance institutions: autocracy and parliament rule. Under autocracy rent-seeking reflects the taste of the autocrat for such activities. Under parliament rule rent-seeking depends on parliament voting. We show that under parliament rule the size of rentseeking may be larger than under autocracy. This cast doubts on the idea that "rigth" institutions necessarily promote good economic performance. We also show that rent-seekers may be interested in overthrowing autocracy. ; Publicado
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Forms of Governance and the Size of Rent-Seeking
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Working paper
Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking
In this paper we present a model of an organization where agents can choose between productive and rent-seeking activities. We consider two governance institutions, single ownership and corporate governance or parliament rule. Applications include models of internal organization of a firm, of a kingdom ruled either by an absolute monarch or by the parliament, and location where agents can locate either in the court and become rent-seekers, or in an industrial city and become entrepreneurs. Our main goal is to study the size of rent-seeking activities under the two governance regimes. Under single ownership, rent-seeking reflects the taste of the owner for such activities and the possibilities of extracting rents from productive agents (who finance rent-seeking). The main conclusion of the paper is that, under corporate governance, the size of the rent-seeking sector may be larger than under single ownership despite the fact that in the former nobody has an intrinsic taste for rent-seeking activities.
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Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 151-165
Tax evasion and the underground economy
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 445-454
A Note on Tax Evasion
In this paper we present a partial equilibrium model of tax evasion. Several equilibrium concepts are used to analyze the game of the Government against a single taxpayer.
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Properties of Contests: Constructing contest success functions from best-responses"
In: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-10
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Working paper