Federalism, fiscal authority, and centralization in Latin America
In: Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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In: Cambridge studies in comparative politics
In: Studies in comparative international development, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 129-150
ISSN: 0039-3606
World Affairs Online
In: Política y gobierno, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 231-262
ISSN: 1665-2037
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of democracy, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 36-49
ISSN: 1086-3214
Abstract: Social policy in Latin America has traditionally failed to benefit the poor. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the main redistributive efforts in the region went into building welfare states. Social insurance schemes generally foster a "reverse Robin Hood effect" in which the poor are made to pay for the benefit of the rich. In addition, subsidies—another form of social policy commonly used in Latin America—have historically tended to go disproportionately to the urban middle classes. If the tremendous income disparities that characterize Latin American life are not mitigated, the stability of the region's democracies may be jeopardized.
In: Journal of democracy, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 36-49
ISSN: 1045-5736
In: El trimestre económico, Band 81, Heft 324, S. 783-806
ISSN: 2448-718X
En las últimas dos décadas, la investigación de la economía política en México ha transitado de estudios amplios y comprensivos hacia investigaciones sobre temas cada vez más específicos. Este documento presenta las principales aportaciones al tema que en años recientes han hecho economistas y politólogos, y que se destacan por haber producido un rico debate a nivel nacional e internacional. La observación de esta reseña se dirige a los patrones políticos en regímenes democráticos, la dependencia y el desarrollo, la formación del Estado y el Estado de derecho, desigualdad y política social, recaudación y gasto, y vínculos internacionales
In: Latin American research review: LARR, Band 52, Heft 4, S. 529-551
ISSN: 1542-4278
Latin America's largest federations have significantly reduced their levels of income inequality in recent years, perhaps reflecting a structural change toward egalitarianism. However, we argue that the political geography of federalism in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico strongly shapes preferences against centralized redistribution likely to promote equity in the long term. While federalism does not necessary lead to lower redistribution in theory, the geographic spread of income and malapportioned political institutions limit egalitarianism in these nations. These dynamics help explain why fiscal structures are distinct in Latin American federations as compared to federations in high-income countries. First, we show that the territorial structure of inequality and malapportionment are associated with lower redistributive effort in the global context and that the Latin American federations have extreme values for both variables. Second, using a new data set of income distributions within and across Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico over time, we demonstrate that the conditions that favor fiscal transfers from the national to subnational governments are consistently strong, but conditions are rarely favorable for centralized policies to equilibrate national income. Unequal income patterns are reinforced by legislative malapportionment, which encourages interregional transfers to regions and limits the political voice of more populated and unequal regions that would benefit from centralized redistribution.
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 100-123
ISSN: 1548-2456
AbstractTo fight criminal organizations effectively, governments require support from significant segments of society. Citizen support provides important leverage for executives, allowing them to continue their policies. Yet winning citizens' hearts and minds is not easy. Public security is a deeply complex issue. Responsibility is shared among different levels of government; information is highly mediated by mass media and individual acquaintances; and security has a strong effect on peoples' emotions, since it threatens to affect their most valuable assets—life and property. How do citizens translate their assessments of public security into presidential approval? To answer this question, this study develops explicit theoretical insights into the conditions under which different dimensions of public security affect presidential approval. The arguments are tested using Mexico as a case study.
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 100-123
ISSN: 1531-426X
In: International journal of public opinion research, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 125-137
ISSN: 1471-6909
In: Cambridge Studies of Comparative Politics
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 53, S. 80-93
In: Children and youth services review: an international multidisciplinary review of the welfare of young people, Band 142, S. 106645
ISSN: 0190-7409
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 52, Heft 12, S. 1841-1880
ISSN: 1552-3829
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 59, Heft 8, S. 1455-1485
ISSN: 1552-8766
In 2006, the Mexican government launched an aggressive campaign to weaken drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). The security policies differed significantly from those of previous administrations in the use of a leadership strategy (the targeting for arrest of the highest levels or core leadership of criminal networks). While these strategies can play an important role in disrupting the targeted criminal organization, they can also have unintended consequences, increasing inter-cartel and intra-cartel fighting and fragmenting criminal organizations. What impact do captures of senior drug cartel members have on the dynamics of drug-related violence? Does it matter if governments target drug kingpins versus lower-ranked lieutenants? We analyze whether the captures or killings of kingpins and lieutenants have increased drug-related violence and whether the violence spills over spatially. To estimate effects that are credibly causal, we use different empirical strategies that combine difference-in-differences and synthetic control group methods. We find evidence that captures or killings of drug cartel leaders have exacerbating effects not only on DTO-related violence but also on homicides that affect the general population. Captures or killings of lieutenants, for their part, only seem to exacerbate violence in "strategic places" or municipalities located in the transportation network. While most of the effects on DTO-related violence are found in the first six months after a leader's removal, effects on homicides affecting the rest of the population are more enduring, suggesting different mechanisms through which leadership neutralizations breed violence.