Rethinking positive and negative liberty
In: Routledge innovations in political theory
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In: Routledge innovations in political theory
In: History of European ideas, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 229-245
ISSN: 0191-6599
In: Contemporary political theory: CPT, Band 21, Heft S3, S. 122-125
ISSN: 1476-9336
In: The European legacy: the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), Band 26, Heft 7-8, S. 841-844
ISSN: 1470-1316
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 46-70
ISSN: 1741-2730
This paper aims to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective employed by the British idealists in the analysis of justice. In the context of Green's and Bosanquet's political theory, justice is a secondary moral ideal. Yet, it is argued here, their moral philosophy leads us, through a longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already occupy today: those of thinking about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, i.e. thinking about justice as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. There are three related yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British idealists saw clearly the stand-off between justice and virtue. Second, the personal ethics of Green and Bosanquet, with some reconstruction offered here, outlines the way in which this stand-off can be resolved without undermining its significance. Third, the personal ethics perspective is beneficial for resolving some of the difficulties surrounding the institutional approach of implementing of social justice.
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 46-71
ISSN: 1474-8851
In: Contemporary political theory: CPT, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 477-489
ISSN: 1476-9336
In: The British journal of politics & international relations: BJPIR, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 533-534
ISSN: 1467-856X
In: The British journal of politics & international relations: BJPIR, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 18-28
ISSN: 1467-856X
This article addresses the question of whether we can explain moral action in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal. It defends T. H. Green's internalist ethics against John Skorupski's externalist claim that moral ideals are optional whereas moral duties are not. A parallel is drawn between the Internalism and Externalism debate in ethics and the liberal-communitarian debate in political theory. My defence of Internalism offers new arguments in support of communitarian approaches to the nature of moral action. Green's internalist ethics provides the communitarian discourse with the universalist moral dimension it traditionally lacks.
In: The British journal of politics & international relations, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 18-28
ISSN: 1369-1481
This article addresses the question of whether we can explain moral action in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal. It defends T. H. Green's internalist ethics against John Skorupski's externalist claim that moral ideals are optional whereas moral duties are not. A parallel is drawn between the Internalism & Externalism debate in ethics & the liberal-communitarian debate in political theory. My defense of Internalism offers new arguments in support of communitarian approaches to the nature of moral action. Green's internalist ethics provides the communitarian discourse with the universalist moral dimension it traditionally lacks. 9 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 554-562
ISSN: 1552-7476
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 554-562
ISSN: 0090-5917
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 508-532
ISSN: 1552-7476
This article offers a new scheme of the relation between positive and negative freedom that is based on a retrieval of T. H. Green's theory of freedom and on further reconstructions of his theory. Some of the distinctions in the literature have proven difficult to sustain, and this has resulted in a weakening of the dichotomy in principle, and of the concepts of positive and negative freedom independently of each other. The main distinction between negative and positive freedom offered here is based on the relation of freedom to the will. We have two kinds of freedom, in both our private and social spheres, because there are two types of goods that we, as human beings, pursue: ordinary and moral. This distinction proves to be sustainable, manages to explain the antagonistic nature of the two concepts, and provides grounds for the support of the two kinds of freedom in their own right.