Suchergebnisse

'The Regimes of European Integration' shows why international regimes get built or not and whether national governments delegate to the international level. It contains case studies in economic and social regulation in Germany, the UK, and within the European Union

<p>This article analyses chips and critical ICT infrastructure policy in the US and the EU. It examines the increasing importance of Waltian geopolitical security threats on both sides of the Atlantic as a driver of industrial policy, export controls, self-sufficiency, and friendshoring as a replacement for dependence on global supply chains. It shows that threat perceptions are strong and bipartisan in the US, allowing comprehensive, strategic and well-funded industrial policy. Threat perceptions driving chip and 5G industrial policy are also present in the EU's Economic Security Strategy and related policies. However, differing national preferences dilute a Waltian turn with continued attachment to liberal (global supply chain) approaches to chips and 5G infrastructure and a Waltzian realist stance (capacity-building to build, protect, and promote regardless of security threat) that occupies the middle ground.</p>

This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at "getting to yes" for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.

This article examines selected political party positions on a Eurozone budget and fiscal transfers between 2018 and 2021. It posits that German government positions on common European debt and fiscal policy have undergone a significant but fragile shift. It must contend with continued domestic hostility before it can be said to be a lasting realignment. A great deal with depend less on the Social Democratic Party that is largely responsible for bringing it about with the support of German Greens, and more on the willingness of the Christian Democratic Union, their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union and the German voting public to adopt a more interventionist fiscal policy as well, generating shared commitments to economic policy at home and in Europe. That has not happened yet.

This article examines selected political party positions on a Eurozone budget and fiscal transfers between 2018 and 2021. It posits that German government positions on common European debt and fiscal policy have undergone a significant but fragile shift. It must contend with continued domestic hostility before it can be said to be a lasting realignment. A great deal with depend less on the Social Democratic Party that is largely responsible for bringing it about with the support of German Greens, and more on the willingness of the Christian Democratic Union, their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union and the German voting public to adopt a more interventionist fiscal policy as well, generating shared commitments to economic policy at home and in Europe. That has not happened yet.

International actors promoted the transfer of regulatory authority and financial resources from national governments to the European Union (EU) in the context of establishing the prerequisites for financial stability in Europe through banking union. It was supplied, however, by a political process that kept significant resources in resolution and deposit insurance largely in national hands. This article examines the politics behind those decisions, and how the hybrid of European and national competences affects bank regulation and financial stability in the EU. It concludes that the tension between strong EU supervisory powers and weak capacity to deal with insolvent institutions will persist.

This article analyses the politics of banking and fiscal union in the EU in the context of continued threats to financial stability in Europe. Contrasting the expectations of functional responses and power politics, it finds that the behavior of the states and the outcome of negotiations most closely resembles contemporary realist expectations. Minimal supranationalism takes place to prevent complete collapse, but the main development is that financially powerful member states coerce and impose changes on weaker member states, without committing to the financial transfers that the latter require to survive the financial crisis, with negative consequences for European financial stability. Adapted from the source document.