Suchergebnisse

The objectives of economic integration suggest countries' mutual efforts to their implementation. In fact, the post-crisis recovery demonstrated that there is virtually no alternative to Basel III standards and recommendations in protecting against external shocks and strengthening the stress resilience of banks. Besides, in the EU, the Basel III mechanism has become the basis for the standardization of regulatory policies. However, in the EAEU, integration processes are still missing any banking regulation accords, while the variety of the national regulatory regimes hinders integration and slows down the process of supranationalization of the regulatory architecture, threatening the exacerbation of systemic risks and, ultimately, the erosion of strategic focus within the framework of the EAEU's single financial market and the EAEU integration at large. This article is the first attempt to propose the perspectives of bringing together the national regulatory regimes in the EAEU based on Basel III as well as reaching the consensus in the "Mini-Basel III" concept in order to further strengthening the economic basis of integration processes, including minimization of systemic risks and ensuring financial stability. Based on the analysis of banking supervision standards in the EAEU member states and their quantitative metrics in 2015–2024 (i.e., from the moment the Basel III standards have been phasing-in in the EAEU member states), we came to the conclusion that different regulatory regimes are the main source of systemic risks, while single regulatory regime will minimize systemic stress subject to implementation of the Mini-Basel III framework. Furthermore, taking into consideration the increasing uncertainty and riskiness in the Eurasian financial market, we have developed scenarios of financial integration that are based on the Mini-Basel III concept and without it. At the same time, the dominance of implicit and often apparent advantages of the different vs. single regulatory regimes, as well as sanctions imposed on Russia and the threat of secondary sanctions against the remaining EAEU member states will impede implementation of the Mini-Basel III concept. The proposed Mini-Basel III concept could be used by financial regulators in developing an EAEU supranational banking regulation mechanism, including for regulation of the prospective regional banking union.

The article looks into the reasons underlying the outspread of the full-scale mechanism of banking regulation over U. S. investment banks. We analyze the effect of the Basel III standards on stress-resilience of investment banks and examine the role of U. S. investment banks in ensuring financial stability. Based on regression analysis we found that minimum capital adequacy standards of Basel III do not have negative effect on ROE of the U. S. investment banks that are G-SIB category-designate; however, additional capital requirements (Higher Loss Absorbency (HLA) surcharge) that depend on G-SIB's systemic significance according to their bucket as per Financial Stability Board classification do have significant and negative effect on ROE in the post crisis period. Besides, leverage requirements that also depend on G-SIB's systemic significance have a statistically significant effect on ROE.

The global financial crisis of 2007–09, followed by sweeping overhaul of international banking regulation, urged financial regulators to apply a tailored supervisory regime to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). This approach was caused by exacerbation of the G-SIBs' systemic risks and their transmission during macro level instability. The size of G-SIBs, the extent of their market power, and the heterogeneity of their operating models resulted in their dual role in systemic stress: being a source of systemic risks for the macro level, G-SIBs are at the same time transmitters of crisis developments to the micro level, hence increasing their own exposure to risks. Under these circumstances, the objectives of the post-crisis recovery required a revision of regulatory priorities by shifting them from G-SIBs' profitability to G-SIBs' stress resilience through the application to them of more stringent capital adequacy standards and liquidity requirements, which ultimately contributed to G-SIBs' insusceptibility to external shocks. At the same time, the G-SIBs' role in exacerbation of systemic stress remains uncertain due to the unresolved issues of the G-SIBs' systemic importance. Accordingly, the crisis and liquidity dilemmas remain unresolved. Given the high level of G-SIBs interconnectedness in the international financial area, their dysfunction can provoke a domino effect of insolvency and bankruptcies in the international banking sector. Based on 2011–21 statistics for all G-SIBs included in the annual lists of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), we found certain decline in G-SIBs' systemic risks, which is attributable to further strengthening of their market discipline. This proves that international regulatory policy is on the right track. We also found that the stress resilience of G-SIBs, a product of the application of Basel III capital surcharge buffers and the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) standard, significantly contributed to financial stability at a level sufficient not only for the integrity of G-SIBs' performance during the COVID-19 pandemic, but also for minimization of the risk of collapse of the banking systems that prevented the transformation of the related shocks and instability into an economy-wide crisis. Nevertheless, the post-crisis regulatory reform failed to contain the systemic importance of G-SIBs, mostly due to the lack of supervisory tools and techniques in reduction of the negative effects of the G-SIBs' international interconnectedness.