Suchergebnisse

I Einleitung: Fragestellung und Vorgehensweise -- II Theorien und Entwicklungspfad territorialer Strukturen und Prozesse in Frankreich -- III Die Dezentralisierungsreformen -- IV Regionale Innovationspolitik und Technopole -- V Genese und Entwicklung regionaler Innovationspolitik -- VI Der Staat und die Technopole: Administrative Bearbeitung -- VII Zwischen Strukturkrise, Dezentralisierung und Europäisierung: Die neue Arena staatlicher Politik -- VIII Institutionelle Anpassung und Neuformierung -- IX Schluß: Abschied vom etatistischen Unitarismus.

Political CSR has made great strides towards a better appreciation of the political involvement of corporations in global governance. However, its portrayal of the shifting balance between business and government in the globalized economy rests on a central, yet largely uncontested, assumption: that of a zero-sum constellation of substitution in which firms take on public responsibilities to fill governance gaps left by governments. This conceptual paper expands the political CSR perspective and makes three contributions to the debate on the political role of business and the role of government in global governance. First, it deconstructs the problematic assumptions underlying the zero-sum notion of governance gaps filled by corporations. Second, it offers a variable-sum mapping of how private and public authority interact in global governance where substitution is only one of four constellations. The mapping identifies 'soft steering' as a prominent mode of governments governing business conduct. Third, the paper theorizes 'orchestration', a 'soft steering' tool discussed in the global governance literature, from an organizational, corporate perspective. It identifies the mechanisms through which orchestration may address the barriers to corporate engagement with the public good and applies these mechanisms to the case of the Global Reporting Initiative.

ABSTRACTThis case study asks whether delegated, sectoral governance by private actors and arm's-length agencies enhances policy efficacy or does sectoral governance require a shadow of hierarchy cast by government actors to deliver desired policy results? EU energy market liberalisation shows that sectoral governance successfully mobilises regulatory expertise, capacity and legitimacy and delivers workable norms and rules for market transactions in a complex policy environment. However, it also finds that the efficacy of sectoral governance mechanisms is constrained by distributive conflicts between different national jurisdictions and sector interests. If deadlock occurs, the European Commission as governmental principal casts a double shadow of hierarchy over sectoral governance agents: the threat of further legislation and of EU competition law. While both instruments enhance policy efficacy, they cannot substitute for the intrinsic rule-making qualities of sectoral governance: governance and government play complementary roles in the policy process.