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There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay I will refute that claim, both normatively and positively. In addition, I will suggest that a different approach, based in behavioral economics, might be a more productive way to model the choices that legislatures make among multiple alternatives.

The traditional approach to election design focuses solely on the best method to aggregate the preferences of the voters. But elections are run by institutions, and the interests of the institution may not be reflected in the preferences of the voter. In this comment I discuss how institutional considerations come into play in election design in three areas: political representation, corporate voting, and judging in competitions. As an illustration of this institutional approach I appraise the method by which the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences selects the nominees and winners of the Oscars. Adapted from the source document.