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Reginald McKenna has never been the subject of scholarly attention. This was partly due to his own preference for appearing at the periphery of events even when ostensibly at the centre, and the absence of a significant collection of private papers. This new book redresses the neglect of this major statesmen and financier partly through the natural advance of historical research, and partly by the discoveries of missing archival material. McKenna's role is now illuminated by his own reflections, and by the correspondence of friends and colleagues, including Asquith, Churchill, Keynes, Baldwin, Bonar Law, MacDonald, and Chamberlain. McKenna's presence at the hub of political life in the first half of the century is now clear: in the radical Liberal governments of 1905–16, where he acted as a lightning conductor for the party; during the war, where he served as the Prime Minister's deputy and the principal voice for restraint in the conduct of the war; and as chairman of the world's largest bank, where until his death in office aged eighty, he prompted progressive policies to deal with the issues of war debt, trade, mass unemployment, and the return to gold.

AbstractThe victorious conclusion of the war, coupled with a great democratising reform for the peace, created a sense of expectation that the parliament elected in December 1918 could not more starkly have disappointed. There was widespread shock at the overnight transformation of party politics, and general disorientation and speculation. To the central criticism that the 1918 Reform Act had produced a deeply unrepresentative, and therefore undemocratic, house of commons, came complaints that the legislature had become merely an appendage of the executive, and parliamentary government had been supplanted by party government. Many opined that the authority of the house of commons had been undermined. This essay considers how the implications of the act were envisaged, and how they were experienced and reported. It will look at the legislature that resulted, its members, and how they adapted to, and changed, its procedures and conventions. Finally, it will reflect on the politics of the impact of the Reform Act, on the parties, on their policies, and on a new political environment that had been created. Through their writings at the time and their reflections subsequently, those who were members, and those who were observers, of parliament testified as to how they felt the house of commons had changed as a result of the impact of the 1918 Reform Act.

Reginald McKenna has never been the subject of scholarly attention. This was partly due to his own preference for appearing at the periphery of events even when ostensibly at the centre, and the absence of a significant collection of private papers. This new book redresses the neglect of this major statesmen and financier partly through the natural advance of historical research, and partly by the discoveries of missing archival material. McKenna's role is now illuminated by his own reflections, and by the correspondence of friends and colleagues, including Asquith, Churchill, Keynes, Baldwin, Bonar Law, MacDonald, and Chamberlain. McKenna's presence at the hub of political life in the first half of the century is now clear: in the radical Liberal governments of 1905–16, where he acted as a lightning conductor for the party; during the war, where he served as the Prime Minister's deputy and the principal voice for restraint in the conduct of the war; and as chairman of the world's largest bank, where until his death in office aged eighty, he prompted progressive policies to deal with the issues of war debt, trade, mass unemployment, and the return to gold.

British strategy during the Asquith coalition 1915-16 is usually described as being a battle between ideological `voluntarists' and `compulsionists', with the latter prevailing as Lloyd George came to power. In fact the view held by the leading voluntarist, the chancellor of the exchequer, McKenna, was not predicated on theory but on efficiency. Moreover, such were the consequences of his warnings being ignored, Britain found itself by 1917 in a position he had predicted, being forced into employing the policies he had advocated. The difference was that by then it was not out of choice.

1. Introduction- Michael Patrick Cullinane -- 2. Presidents and Prime Ministers- Kathleen Burk -- 3. Grover Cleveland and Lord Salisbury: A Shared History- Andrew Ehrhardt and Charlie Laderman -- 4. Theodore Roosevelt and Arthur Balfour: Friendship without Familiarity- Michael Patrick Cullinane -- 5. Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George: Uncongenial Allies- John A. Thompson -- 6. Herbert Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Ramsey MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain: The Amelioration of Anglo-American Rivalry- B. J. C. McKercher -- 7. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill: Power Relations- Warren Dockter -- 8. Harry S. Truman and Clement Attlee: "Trouble Always Brings Us Together"- Clive Webb -- 9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden: A Common Cause?- Justin Quinn Olmstead -- 10. John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan: Dependence and Interdependence- Nigel Ashton -- 11. Lyndon Johnson and Harold Wilson: Pragmatist v. Pragmatist- Sylvia Ellis -- 12. Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and James Callaghan: Personal Diplomacy and the Special Relationship- Todd Carter -- 13. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Not So "Special" Relationship?- James Cooper -- 14. John Major, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton: A Tale of Two Relationships- Victoria Honeyman -- 15. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Tony Blair: The Search for Order- James Ellison -- 16. Barack Obama and David Cameron: The Ostensible Relationship- Martin Farr -- 17. Donald Trump and Theresa May: the incredible relationship- Martin Farr -- 18. Donald Trump and Boris Johnson: The Unfulfilled Relationship- Martin Farr -- 19. Conclusion- Gill Bennett.