Suchergebnisse

Dieser Band hinterfragt aus verschiedenen Perspektiven die Beziehung zwischen Ökonomie und politischem Verhalten und Einstellungen vor dem Hintergrund der Wirtschaftskrise. Innovative Analysen einer Vielzahl von Datenquellen ergeben, dass der Satz "It's the economy, stupid!" mehrfach differenziert werden muss: DEN ökonomischen Wähler gibt es nicht.Vielmehr gilt es, verschiedene Kombinationen von Wählertypen, Aspekten der Wirtschaft sowie Kontexten zu berücksichtigen. Auch in Hinblick auf Parteien und Politikern ergeben sich für den Wählerwettbewerb relevante Unterschiede in der Bedeutung von Ökonomie und den damit verbundenen politischen Maßnahmen. Gerade vor dem Hintergrund der Wirtschaftskrise müssen zudem deren Folgen in den Blick genommen werden, sowohl für die Demokratiezufriedenheit als auch für gesellschaftliche Konfliktlinien. In der Summe liefern die Kapitel sowohl Kritik an als auch eine Weitereinwicklung der Theorie des ökonomischen Wählens.Mit Beiträgen von:Tarik Abou-Chadi, Simon Bauer, Daniela Braun, Thorsten Faas, Heiko Giebler, Sascha Huber, Jürgen Maier, Nicolas Merz, Agatha Rudnik, Carmen Schmidt, Sebastian Schneider, Harald Schoen, Thomas Schübel, Alexander Staudt, Markus Steinbrecher, Nils Steiner, Markus Tausendpfund, Markus Tepe, Aiko Wagner

Democracy measurement is an ever growing and increasingly important research area. Nevertheless, lively discussions concerning the qualities of different measurement approaches are seldom combined with an adequate perspective on the underlying methodological framework. This article argues that a substantial theoretical perspective is only a sufficient condition for improving contemporary democracy measurement. Theoretical considerations have to be accompanied by an equally well-developed measurement concept. On the basis of examples taken from prominent approaches, potential for improvement becomes obvious. Any improvement is not just an end in itself but necessary if these measures are used as variables in all areas of research. Adapted from the source document.

"Bürger in den meisten EU-Ländern sprechen sich weitaus häufiger für die Ausweitung direktdemokratisch gefällter Entscheidungen aus als die politische Elite. Dies gilt insbesondere für Referenden über EU-Verträge. Dabei befürworten sowohl euroskeptische Bürger als auch euroskeptische Kandidaten für das Europaparlament Referenden eher als die Befürworter einer weiteren EU-Vertiefung. Über kurz oder lang werden sich Politiker diesem Druck wohl beugen müssen; die Gefahr, dass Referenden sich als Stolpersteine der europäischen Einigung erweisen, wird dadurch wachsen." [Autorenreferat]

The spread and success of radical and populist parties has triggered a profound debate on the state of democracy. Not only are these parties described as the outcome of a democratic malaise in which democratic regimes had ceased to integrate, represent and engage all their citizens. At the same time, questions arose as to the consequences of these parties for existing representative democracies. Could radical and populist parties be a (partial) cure to the woes of established democracies? Or would they make the democratic malaise even worse, further poisoning an already sick patient? Could it be that these parties act like a placebo that exists because of the democratic malaise but does not actually change anything except for those who desperately want to believe in an effect? The contributions to this Special Issue address questions of the impact of radical and populist parties on representative democracy. This introduction systematise their findings along party functions and draws broader conclusions.

Political parties respond strategically to the electoral success of radical right populist parties (RRPPs). While previous research has focused on programmatic responses on cultural conflict issues, we are expanding the research on policy position adaption to the economic left-right issue of welfare-state politics. Actual and potential supporters of RRPPs do not only feel threatened by migration or liberal conceptions of society but are also often confronted with real or perceived socio-economic decline. Therefore, we argue that established parties do not only react by changing their socio-cultural policy offers but also by adjusting their welfare state policy positions. Based on parties' voter potentials and issue ownership theory, we investigate whether such changes are especially pronounced for left-of-center parties. Analysing data from 18 West European countries since 1985, we find that non-RRPPs indeed advocate more leftist positions on welfare state policies in response to increasing electoral support for RRPPs. This effect is especially pronounced for economically left-of-centre parties as these parties might consider this to be a promising strategy to win back voters from the populist radical right.