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Main description: Extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to war powers has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Stephen M. Griffin shows unexpected connections between the imperial presidency and constitutional crises, and argues for accountability by restoring Congress to a meaningful role in decisions for war.

Extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to war powers has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Stephen M. Griffin shows unexpected connections between the imperial presidency and constitutional crises, and argues for accountability by restoring Congress to a meaningful role in decisions for war.

Extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to war powers has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Stephen M. Griffin shows unexpected connections between the imperial presidency and constitutional crises, and argues for accountability by restoring Congress to a meaningful role in decisions for war.

1: American constitutionalism -- The idea of American constitutionalism -- The sovereignty of the people -- The problem of constitutional change -- 2: The constitution and political institutions -- Madison and the problem of faction -- The Constitution and the concept of the state -- The Constitution and American political development -- 3: Judicial review and American democracy -- The establishment of Judicial independence -- Judicial review and democracy in the modern state -- The contemporary debate and the role of the Supreme Court -- 4: Problems of constitutional adjudication -- The Supreme Court and American constitutionalism -- The process of Judicial decisionmaking -- 5: Theories of constitutional interpretation -- A pluralist theory of American constitutional interpretation -- The contemporary theoretical debate -- Democracy and theories of interpretation -- The problem of history in constitutional interpretation -- Interpreting the fourteenth amendment -- Republicanism and constitutional philosophy -- 6: Constitutional crisis and reform -- Constitutional crisis -- Constitutional reform -- The future of American constitutionalism

Amid much recent American work on the problem of informal constitutional change, this article stakes out a distinctive position. I argue that theories of constitutional change in the US must address the question of the relationship between the "small c" and "big C" Constitution and treat seriously the possibility of conflict between them. I stress the unavoidable role the text of the Constitution and structural doctrines of federalism and separation of powers play in this relationship and thus in constitutional change, both formal and informal. I therefore counsel against theories that rely solely on a practice-based approach or analogies between "small c" constitutional developments and British or Commonwealth traditions of the "unwritten" constitution and constitutional "conventions." The alternative I advocate is to approach constitutional change from a historicist perspective that focuses attention on state building and the creation of new institutional capacities. This approach will allow us to make progress by highlighting that there can be multiple constitutional orders in a given historical era, thus accounting for the conflictual nature of contemporary constitutional development in the US.