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"This book is about the enactment, adaption, and ultimately fragmentation of government policy regarding the use of water in the American West. It describes its origins, how it became about building big projects, and how it was fragmented by pressures from environmental activism. It explores western water crisis in the United States. The case studies used in this book will help readers understand about water development and political battles in most of the western states to show readers how and why the policy changed and broke-down. The book is divided into two parts and describes the different eras of water policy. While most books on water policy focus on its deficiencies for meeting future challenges, Water Politics: The Fragmentation off Western Water Policy attempts to explore why those deficiencies occurred in the first place. The book is intended for undergraduate and graduate students in political science and policy studies who are interested in how public policies are enacted, how they change, and how they fall apart over time and why. The book should also be of particular interest to students in other disciplines that deal with water such as environmental studies, geology, sociology, hydrology, and civil engineering"--

"Interest Groups and Lobbying shows how political organizations and their lobbyists play a crucial role in how policy is made in the United States. It cuts through the myths and misconceptions about interest groups and lobbyists with an accessible and comprehensive text supported by real world examples and the latest research. New to the Second Edition Fully updates and expands the discussion of social media and other online activity engaged in by interest groups, showing that they have become more sophisticated in their use of the internet--especially social media--for keeping current members informed and for their advocacy work. New case studies on more recent advocacy efforts. Updated data used in the book, including: Total number and types of interest groups lobbying in Washington, DC Total number and types of interest groups lobbying in the fifty states Data on campaign contributions Data on amicus briefs and case sponsorship Data on stages of the lawmaking process where interest groups appear to lobby the most New data on revolving-door lobbyists"--

Since the early days, citizens have hired professionals to press their interests with lawmakers. However, recent examples of misconduct highlight ethical challenges the industry faces. Holyoke offers a road map to reform that will transform "ethical lobbyist" from an oxymoron to an expectation--and change the industry and our government for the better.

Competitive Interests does more than simply challenge the long-held belief that a small set of interests control large domains of the public policy making landscape. It shows how the explosion in the sheer number of new groups, and the broad range of ideological demands they advocate, have created a form of group politics emphasizing compromise as much as conflict. Thomas T. Holyoke offers a model of strategic lobbying that shows why some group lobbyists feel compelled to fight stronger, wealthier groups even when they know they will lose. Holyoke interviewed 83 lobbyists who have been advocat

Abstract
Lobbying in the United States is protected by the First Amendment's petitioning clause, so the profession cannot be suppressed, merely regulated. Since efforts to enact new regulations on the lobbying profession have largely stalled, there is a growing interest in having lobbyists regulate themselves with a canon of ethics provided by their professional associations. Many professions self-regulate, and many articulate obligations to serve the public interest. But what would it mean for lobbyists to serve the public interest? What could their ethical public service obligation be? In this article, I argue that because lobbying is protected by the Constitution, lobbyists have a reciprocal duty to serve the public interest. This creates a duality in how they view their job, as an advocate and as a guide. Following the ideas of Cassinelli, which are based on those of Rousseau, I argue that lobbyists can serve the public by engaging the people they represent, their interest group members or corporate clients, in deliberations that help them articulate their own interests and help them understand and appreciate the concerns and fears of other interests against whom they are competing to shape policy. While always vigorously lobbying for their members or clients, lobbyists also strengthen democracy and thus serve the public interest by helping those they represent empathize with others and perhaps find some common ground.

AbstractPolicies are assumed to rarely change after enactment. Punctuated equilibrium theory argues this is because law makers shift attention away from policies after enactment, letting them run on autopilot. I argue that the periods between punctuations deserves study, and that what law makers do is design institutions to make policies path dependent so they can only change within limited parameters—if at all. It may also be that interest groups opposing new policies are still able to shape the way they evolve, pushing against intended paths. In this article I test the influence of path dependence versus group opposition in state charter school policies. I find some evidence of path dependence, but I also find that, to some extent, opposing interests can still change these laws after enactment. Furthermore, I find these policies became increasingly similar over time, partially because of path dependence, but also because of the influence of opposing interests.Related ArticlesErtas, Nevbahar. 2015. "Policy Narratives and Public Opinion concerning Charter Schools." Politics & Policy 43(3): 426–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12120.Kwon, Sung‐Wook, and Sylvia Gonzalez‐Gorman. 2019. "Influence of Local Political Institutions on Policy Punctuation in Three Policy Areas." Politics & Policy 47(2): 300–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12295.Patrick, Barbara. 2016. "Performance Policies and Workforce Development: Can the Market Model Be Successfully Implemented in the Public Arena?" Politics & Policy 44(6): 1116–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12185.

Do lobbyists always advocate for the interests of the members or clients employing them, or, under competing pressures, do they sometimes take positions on bills reflecting the interests of lawmakers or other lobbyists? Do they, in fact, lobby strategically by making choices that balance competing pressures in pursuit of goals like furthering their careers? Most lobbying research assumes that interest groups and lobbyists are the same, but I argue that the interests of lobbyists may be different from those they represent, which I test with a model of strategic lobbying using data on positions lobbyists took on bills in Congress from 2006 to 2017 made available by MapLight. I find that lobbyists sometimes do take positions at odds with member interests under pressure from legislators, other lobbyists, and the president, though some groups can constrain their lobbyists. I conclude by speculating on what this means for lobbying as a form of representation.