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AbstractThe ban on inter-state war in the UN Charter is widely identified as central to the modern international order–Michael Byers calls it 'one of the twentieth century's greatest achievements'. Even if it is only imperfectly observed, it is often seen as a constraint on state autonomy and an improvement on the pre-legal, unregulated world before 1945. In response to this conventional view, this article shows that the laws on war in the Charter are better seen as permissive rather than constraining. I make two points. First, by creating a legal category around 'self-defence', the laws on war authorise, and thus legitimate, wars that are motivated by the security needs of the state, while forbidding other motives for wars. Second, state practice since 1945 has expanded the scope of this authorisation, extending it in both time and space beyond the black-letter text of the Charter. The permissive effect of law on war has therefore been getting larger. These two effects suggest that international law is a resource that increases state power, at least for powerful states, and this relation between international law and power politics is missed by both realists and liberal internationalists.

AbstractScholars and activists commonly see international law in a privileged normative and political position in world politics, where international legal institutions are assumed to advance important goals such as international stability, human justice and even global order as a whole. I explore this attitude toward international law, which I call an 'enchanted' view, and contrast it to the 'disenchanted' alternative. Where the enchanted attitude presumes the normative valence and political wisdom of following international law, the disenchanted approach treats these as open questions for inquiry and discussion. The disenchanted approach is more empirically minded, and more politically open, than the enchanted, and leads to a distinct research program on legalization in international affairs – one that is attentive to the politics of law, the connections between law and power, the ambiguity that exists between legality and policy wisdom.

AbstractA surge in academic interest in the interaction of international law with international politics has recently raised the profile of the rule of law in global politics. The idea of an 'international rule of law' is central to many accounts of international order, and to both political science and legal scholarship. Despite its popularity, the concept is rarely defined or examined. This article considers the theory and practice of the international rule of law. It shows first that the international rule of law cannot be deduced from the conventional Anglo-American version of the rule of law in domestic legal theory, as sketched by Joseph Raz and others. It then considers two competing versions of a distinctly international concept of the rule of law, one based on a positivist theory of compliance and the other on a structurationist theory of practice. The former is more common in legal and political scholarship but the latter accounts better for the political power of international law in relation to states.

The international rule of law is often seen as a centerpiece of the modern international order. It is routinely reaffirmed by governments, international organizations, scholars, and activists, who credit it with reducing the recourse to war, preserving human rights, and constraining (albeit imperfectly) the pursuit of state self-interests. It is commonly seen as supplanting coercion and power politics with a framework of mutual interests that is cemented by state consent.

The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations provides an authoritative account of the law and politics of international organizations. Looking at the role, function, and history of organizations, this Handbook offers a wide ranging and thorough analysis of the area.

Virtually every important question of public policy today involves an international organization. From trade to intellectual property to health policy and beyond, governments interact with international organizations in almost everything they do. Increasingly, individual citizens are directly affected by the work of international organizations. Aimed at academics, students, practitioners, and lawyers, this book gives a comprehensive overview of the world of international organizations today. It emphasizes both the practical aspects of their organization and operation, and the conceptual issues that arise at the junctures between nation-states and international authority, and between law and politics. While the focus is on inter-governmental organizations, the book also encompasses non-governmental organizations and public policy networks. With essays by the leading scholars and practitioners, the book first considers the main international organizations and the kinds of problems they address. This includes chapters on the organizations that relate to trade, humanitarian aid, peace operations, and more, as well as chapters on the history of international organizations. The book then looks at the constituent parts and internal functioning of international organizations. This addresses the internal management of the organization, and includes chapters on the distribution of decision-making power within the organizations, the structure of their assemblies, the role of Secretaries-General and other heads, budgets and finance, and other elements of complex bureaucracies at the international level.

The legalization of world politics is often celebrated for reducing impunity for those who contribute to humanitarian crises. This may sometimes be true but the opposite is also true. In 2010, United Nations peacekeepers unwittingly brought cholera to Haiti and sparked an epidemic. Nearly a million people were made sick and 8,500 died. Legal activists have sought to hold the UN responsible for the harms it caused and win compensation for the cholera victims. However, these efforts have been stymied by the structures of public international law—particularly UN immunity—which effectively insulate the organization from accountability. In short, the UN is empowered, and the cholera victims disempowered, by legalization. The Haiti case powerfully illustrates the dangers of legalism, which have been largely overlooked in discussions of international law, and suggests that law alone is an inadequate arbiter of responsibility in international politics.