Negative Monetary Policy Rates and Systemic Banks' Risk-Taking: Evidence from the Euro Area Securities Register
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14988
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14988
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 2398
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We show that risk mitigating incentives dominate risk shifting incentives in fragile banks. Risk shifting could be particularly severe in banking since it is the most opaque industry and banks are one of the most leveraged corporations with very low skin in the game. To analyze this question, we exploit security trading by banks during financial crises, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. However, in contrast with the risk shifting hypothesis, we find that less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial market stress shocks. We show this using the supervisory ISIN-bank-month level dataset from Italy with all securities for each bank. Our results are over and above capital regulation as we show lower reach-for-yield effects by less capitalized banks within government bonds (with zero risk weights) or within securities with the same rating and maturity in the same month (which determines regulatory capital). Effects are robust to controlling for the covariance with the existence portfolio, and less capitalized banks, if anything, reduce concentration risk. Further, effects are stronger when uncertainty is higher, despite that risk shifting motives may be then higher. Moreover, three separate tests – based on different accounting portfolios (trading book versus held to maturity), the distribution of capital and franchise value – suggest that bank own incentives, instead of supervision, are the main drivers. Results are confirmed if we consider other sources of balance sheet fragility and different measures of risk-taking. Finally, evidence from the recent COVID-19 shock corroborates findings from the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Area Sovereign Crisis.
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15276
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15273
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In: Economic policy
ISSN: 1468-0327
In: Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 2105
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In: Economic policy, Band 28, Heft 75, S. 459-512
ISSN: 1468-0327
In: ECB Working Paper No. 1527
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1228
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We analyse the impact of standard and non-standard monetary policy on bank profitability. We use both proprietary and commercial data on individual euro area bank balance-sheets and market prices. Our results show that a monetary policy easing – a decrease in short-term interest rates and/or a flattening of the yield curve – is not associated with lower bank profits once we control for the endogeneity of the policy measures to expected macroeconomic and financial conditions. Accommodative monetary conditions asymmetrically affect the main components of bank profitability, with a positive impact on loan loss provisions and non-interest income offsetting the negative one on net interest income. A protracted period of low monetary rates has a negative effect on profits that, however, only materializes after a long time period and is counterbalanced by improved macroeconomic conditions. Monetary policy easing surprises during the low interest rate period improve bank stock prices and CDS. ; L.P. acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness [Grant ECO2015-68136-P] and FEDER, UE and from the European Research Council Grant [project 648398].
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We identify the relative importance for bank lending of borrower (demand-side) versus bank (supply-side) factors. We submit thousands of fictitious mortgage applications, changing one borrower-level factor at time, to the major Italian online mortgage platform. Each application goes to all banks. Borrower and bank factors are equally strong in causing and explaining loan acceptance. For pricing, borrower factors are instead stronger. Moreover, banks supplying less credit accept riskier borrowers. Exploiting the administrative credit register, there is borrower-lender assortative matching, and the bank-level strength measure estimated on the experimental data is associated to credit supply and risk-taking to real firms. ; This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the PGC2018-102133-B-I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) grant and from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S)
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We show that negative monetary policy rates induce systemic banks to reach‐for‐yield. For identification, we exploit the introduction of negative deposit rates by the European Central Bank in June 2014 and a novel securities register for the 26 largest euro area banking groups. Banks with more customer deposits are negatively affected by negative rates, as they do not pass negative rates to retail customers, in turn investing more in securities, especially in those yielding higher returns. Effects are stronger for less capitalized banks, private‐sector (financial and nonfinancial) securities and dollar‐denominated securities. Affected banks also take higher risk in loans. ; This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 648398). Peydró also acknowledges financial support from the PGC2018‐102133‐B‐I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE) grant and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV‐2015‐0563). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank, or the Eurosystem.
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