Suchergebnisse

We explored the effect of two forms of maltreatment of children (emotional and physical) on two kinds of envy in adulthood (benign and malicious), and the moderating role of psychological resilience in these associations. Participants were 676 Chinese undergraduates who completed the
Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale, and the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale. The results indicate that of the two types of childhood maltreatment, only emotional maltreatment negatively predicted benign envy and positively predicted malicious envy. Psychological
resilience played a moderating role in the childhood emotional maltreatment–benign/malicious envy link and childhood physical maltreatment–malicious envy link. These results reveal the direct relationships between different types of childhood maltreatment and benign/malicious envy
and the moderating effect of psychological resilience in these associations. Our findings have theoretical and practical implications for cultivating psychological resilience to inhibit malicious envy and promote benign envy in adults.

Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders' backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience costs. We investigate this question by implementing a series of survey experiments in China, a single-party authoritarian state. Findings based on responses from 5375 Chinese adults show that empty threats and commitments expose the Chinese government to substantial disapproval from citizens concerned about potential damage to China's international reputation. Additional qualitative evidence reveals that Chinese citizens are willing to express their discontent of leaders' foreign policy blunders through various channels. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate over whether and how domestic audiences can make commitments credible in authoritarian states.

Does the public in authoritarian regimes disapprove of their leaders' backing down from public threats and commitments? Answers to this question provide a critical micro-foundation for the emerging scholarship on authoritarian audience costs. We investigate this question by implementing a series of survey experiments in China, a single-party authoritarian state. Findings based on responses from 5375 Chinese adults show that empty threats and commitments expose the Chinese government to substantial disapproval from citizens concerned about potential damage to China's international reputation. Additional qualitative evidence reveals that Chinese citizens are willing to express their discontent of leaders' foreign policy blunders through various channels. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate over whether and how domestic audiences can make commitments credible in authoritarian states.

Abstract
The rapid increase in recent years of Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) has prompted growing scholarly interest in its economic and political implications for host countries. However, relatively little attention has been paid to how concerns over the rise of China may shape public attitudes towards such investment. This article tests the link between threat perception and preferences for FDI in the United States. We argue that, due to heightened geopolitical concerns and nationalism, perceptions of the China threat negatively affect how the American public views the impact of incoming Chinese FDI. Using a survey experiment, we show that respondents are indeed less likely to support Chinese FDI when primed with information that highlights the security and economic threats posed by China than when they receive no such priming. Furthermore, causal mediation analyses reveal that the treatment effects of security and economic threats are mediated by respondents' concerns about the challenges that Chinese FDI poses to national security as well as to American economy.

AbstractPreferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of excluded parties. But what does this exclusivity mean for firms in nonmember states if production networks are internationally organized? This paper analyzes the effect of PTA exclusion on firms embedded in the global supply chains, focusing on the case of China's exclusion from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Drawing on a survey of Chinese firm managers during the TPP negotiations, we find that productive and downstream firms anticipated the exclusion and made adjustments accordingly, which led to a general sense of optimism toward the agreement. When presented with the prospect of an expanded TPP, however, firms are divided depending on how their own positions in the global supply chain complement or compete with the new member. These findings, validated with interviews in the field, suggest that the effects of PTA exclusion depend on the ability and need for firms to adjust. As a result, exclusion does not equate to an unalloyed loss for excluded firms.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often regarded as a vehicle of China's economic statecraft in that country's endeavour to expand its geopolitical influence overseas through investments and trade. In today's globalized world, however, the vast majority of international economic interactions are conducted by firms, not states. The success of the BRI therefore depends on whether and how China can compel its firms to behave in a way that serves the strategic interests of the state. Using a unique firm-level survey, we find that Chinese firms' interests in the BRI do not necessarily align with those of the state. Despite similar perceived risks and challenges to participation in the BRI among private and state-owned firms in China, state-owned enterprises are much more likely than private ones to express a willingness to participate in the BRI. These findings highlight the importance of state control in the exercise of economic statecraft. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

AbstractForeign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries such as India and China is often met with domestic backlash by the citizens of the host country, and backlash in the form of protests and other disruptive behavior has increased the salience of public opinion in FDI policy. As one of the first survey experiments assessing Chinese citizens' attitudes toward FDI, this paper adopts a novel conjoint design to evaluate the impact, in the present project, of individual respondent characteristics and specific FDI features on respondents' preferences. Importantly, we find that low-skilled respondents are not necessarily more likely to support labor-intensive FDI, a result that challenges the conventional wisdom that individuals in developing countries abundantly endowed with labor should be more likely to support low-skilled FDI. Instead, citizens are more concerned about FDI projects' country of origin and impact on the local job market when forming their preferences.

Token forces - tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions - have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace operations despite its limited relevance for missions' operational success. It conceptualizes token forces as a path-dependent unintended consequence of the norm of multilateralism in international uses of military force. The norm extends states' participation options by giving coalition builders an incentive to accept token forces; UN-specific types of token forces emerged as states learned about this option and secretariat officials adapted to state demand for it. The Element documents the growing incidence of token forces in UN peacekeeping, identifies the factors disposing states to contribute token forces, and discusses how UN officials channel token participation. The Element contributes to the literatures on UN peacekeeping, military coalitions, and the impacts of norms in international organizations.