How to Improve Ranked-Choice Voting and Democracy
In: Capitalism & Society, Band 16, Heft 1
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In: Capitalism & Society, Band 16, Heft 1
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In: The Arrow Impossibility Theorem
In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Internet and Network Economics, S. 1-1
In: Division of Labour & Transaction Costs : A Journal for the Society of Inframarginal Economics, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 67-71
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Originally published in 1951, Social Choice and Individual Values introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers."Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem,' has changed the way we think."—Donald G. Saari, author of Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 3, S. 567-576
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: American economic review, Band 89, Heft 2, S. 421-425
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: The Arrow Impossibility Theorem
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 611-635
ISSN: 1756-2171
We argue that when innovation is "sequential" (so that each successive invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors) and "complementary" (so that each potential innovator takes a different research line), patent protection is not as useful for encouraging innovation as in a static setting. Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off without such protection. Furthermore, an inventor's prospective profit may actually be enhanced by competition and imitation. Our sequential model of innovation appears to explain evidence from a natural experiment in the software industry.
In: American economic review, Band 95, Heft 4, S. 1290-1299
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: American economic review, Band 94, Heft 4, S. 1034-1054
ISSN: 1944-7981
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called "politicians"), or to nonaccountable officials (called "judges").
In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, S. 237-288
In: Economics of transition, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 1-27
ISSN: 1468-0351
This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies –ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment‐problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.
In: The Economic Journal, Band 100, Heft 403, S. 1338
In: The Economic Journal, Band 97, Heft 387, S. 581